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The genesis of this book was a research program on alternative models for state-
formation in Palestine. It was launched by the Center for Development Studies 
at Birzeit University in 2013, under the directorship of Dr. Samia Al-Botmeh. 
The aim of this research was to explore Palestinian understandings of statehood, 
democracy, and citizenship in view of the regional upheavals ushered in by the 
Arab uprisings and the failure of the Oslo peace process to bring about a via-
ble two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A grant from the Soros 
 Foundation financed this project, enabling the Center for Development Studies 
to commission six papers and conduct a survey on Palestinians’ attitudes toward 
the one-state solution that included the views of Palestinians in Gaza and the West 
Bank as well as those living in Israel. The findings of this research were presented 
at a conference held at Birzeit University in 2015.
I was involved in this project from its inception. Upon its completion, it became 
clear to me that its findings should be accessible to everyone, as they expressed 
the voices of a new generation of scholars who are central to the definition of 
 Palestinian political liberation in the twenty-first century. Like every book, though, 
this one has undergone various transformations, especially as some contributors 
dropped out and I persevered to have others join. I deeply regret that Samia Al-
Botmeh could not remain my coeditor as we had originally planned. Her commit-
ment and work at Birzeit University left little room for anything else, especially 
after she became dean of the Faculty of Business and Economics. Linda Tabar, who 
was central to the inception of this project and to the Soros grant, also could not 
remain in it, as her important research and teaching took all her time. I remain 
deeply indebted to Samia and Linda for their intellect, their precious friendship, 
the solidarity we developed over the years, and for their incredible  generosity 
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with various versions of the introduction; Susan Jacoby for her fine-tooth edito-
rial combing of that same introduction; and Sahar Bazzaz for her reading and 
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Self-determination, statehood, and partition are dominant political concepts that 
shaped the formation of the modern global order following World War I. The 
resistance of the Palestine question to any attempt at resolution guided by the log-
ics of these concepts has generated a veritable industry of academic publications— 
buttressed by and even bigger industry of documentation, reports, initiatives, 
resolutions, and summits—on how to secure a two-state solution. Most of this 
scholarship, regardless of the political position of the authors, uncritically dwells 
within the confines of this nationalist conceptual architecture, thus reproducing 
the very epistemological climate that made possible the ongoing dispossession, 
displacement, and statelessness of the Palestinians. It is ironic, but hardly surpris-
ing, that the “peace process” launched by the 1993 Oslo Accords, based on the par-
tition logic of “land for peace,” greatly accelerated the tempo of Israeli colonization 
of Palestine.
The spectacular contrast over the past three decades between state-centric 
discourses in the public sphere and settler-colonial practices on the ground has 
pushed a new generation of scholars to consider intellectual exit strategies from 
the identity/territory/sovereignty matrix and to experiment with alternative par-
adigms. Rethinking Statehood in Palestine: Self-Determination and Decoloniza-
tion beyond Partition is an outstanding collection of essays, mostly by leading 
 Palestinian scholars of this new generation, that forensically explain the  operations 
of partition logic on the ground and point to different paths to decolonial futures.
Statehood was never the sole mission of decolonization movements globally, 
and there is a rich tradition of thinking beyond the telos of the state among anti-
colonial intellectuals. The Palestinians are no exception. Indeed, an outpouring of 
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scholarship, activist initiatives, literary writing, and cultural projects have shifted 
the focus from the state to the nation. The concept of nation is more capacious 
engine for political struggle, as it privileges people over territory and recognizes 
the critical importance of the everyday lived experience.
This outpouring was especially noticeable in the period following the 1982 Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon, which sought to destroy the institutional infrastructure of 
the Palestine Liberation Organization and to make irreversible the colonization 
of the territories occupied in the 1967 war. Nevertheless, the hold of partition logic 
remains especially strong in the Palestinian case for a variety of historical reasons, 
not the least of which are the modalities of international interventions.
Rethinking Statehood encapsulates the mission of the New Directions in 
 Palestinian Studies book series in that most of the authors draw on their intimate 
familiarity with the Palestinian condition to provide fresh perspectives, from the 
inside out, so to speak, on larger theoretical and global concerns. The editor, Leila 
Farsakh, assembled scholars from a variety of disciplines—political economy, law, 
international relations, history, and cultural studies—all of whom deliver crisp, 
concise, informative, and robustly insightful essays honed by years of research in 
their respective fields as well as by activist work. This makes the book an important 
inspiration for scholars, a go-to resource for teachers, and a stimulating read for 
anyone interested in understanding the deeper structures of the Palestine question 
and its relationship to central debates about, among other things: colonialism and 
self-determination, the political economy of state formation, legal constructions 
of nation and state, settler-colonialism and citizenship, international law, and the 
promise and limits of cultural decolonization practices informed by the politics 
of indigeneity.
Rethinking Statehood directly engages with the dominant debates on the 
 question of Palestine and pushes against their limits. Deeply informed, theoreti-
cally engaged, and accessible, this anthology is designed as a long-term resource 
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Map 1. Palestine under the 1947 UN Partition Plan, and with the 1949 armistice lines. Source: Pales-
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Map 2. Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, July 1967. Source: Palestinian Academic 
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Map 3. Division of the West Bank according to the Interim 
Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Oslo II), 
 September 1995. Source: Palestinian Academic Society for the 
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Map 4. Gaza Strip, 2000. Source: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs.
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Introduction
The Struggle for Self-Determination and the Palestinian 
Quest for Statehood
Leila Farsakh
The quest for an independent Palestinian state has been at the core of the 
 Palestinian national struggle for a very long time. It has been central both to 
the assertion of the Palestinian right to self-determination and to challenging 
Zionist attempts to erase the Palestine question.1 In 1971, the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization (PLO) declared the creation of a democratic state in Palestine 
inclusive of Christians, Jews, and Muslims to be its goal and the only just solution 
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In 1988, it went further by issuing the Declara-
tion of Independence and having its chairman, Yasser Arafat, officially recognize 
Israel. This paved the way to the Oslo peace process in 1993 and implied that the 
 Palestinian state was to be confined to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. By 2019, 
the state of Palestine was officially recognized by 137 states and admitted into the 
United Nations as a nonmember state. It remains, though, under occupation and 
is far from being independent or sovereign.
The aim of this book is to rethink the Palestinian state project and the chal-
lenges facing any alternative to it. It sheds new light on the ways in which the past 
three decades of peace process have transformed the meaning of Palestinian state-
hood and, with it, the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As many have 
argued, the Oslo peace process reformulated, rather than ended, Zionist coloniza-
tion, thereby undermining the possibility of a viable Palestinian state.2 Israel’s con-
tinuous war and siege of Gaza, the presence of over 650,000 Israeli Jewish settlers 
in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), the 708-kilometer Separation Wall 
and the institutionalization of over ninety-nine Israeli checkpoints have destroyed 
the two-state solution, long considered the only option for ending the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict. Despite the Trump administration’s 2020 peace plan, which 
put the final nail in the coffin of that solution, the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, 
and the international community remain committed to Palestinian national 
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 independence.3 The Arab Peace Initiative and the 2003 internationally sponsored 
Quartet Road Map to Peace consider the creation of such a Palestinian state not 
only a right but also the only means to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.4
Rethinking Statehood delves into the ways Palestinians are redefining the rela-
tionships among self-determination, decolonization, and political liberation today, 
given the territorial impossibility of a Palestinian state. The contributors, mostly 
young Palestinian scholars, move away from the conflict resolution approach that 
has dominated the peace discourse and the political science  literature on  Palestine. 
They provide instead a critical political perspective that situates the Palestinian 
state project within its regional context, rather than confining it to the limits 
of a narrow nationalist paradigm. At the same time, they go beyond the ongo-
ing debate over the inevitability of a one-state solution or its political danger, by 
focusing on the political challenges Palestinians need to address in articulating an 
alternative to the present impasse.5 These include analyzing the extent to which 
Palestinian political rights, both collective and individual, can be protected out-
side the international consensus on partition as the paradigm for resolving the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
In this regard, Rethinking Statehood engages with an emerging trend in 
 Palestine studies that advocates for breaking out of national frames to understand 
the  Palestine question.6 Its main contribution lies in examining the opportunities 
and costs of moving away from the pursuit of territorial sovereignty as a means to 
achieve political liberation. As this introduction argues, the quest for a Palestinian 
state was not in vain, but its historical role has come to an end. It is thus neces-
sary to reexamine this role and explore how the failure of national independence 
enables us to rearticulate the relationship between self-determination and decolo-
nization away from the telos of the nation-state. Such a rearticulation requires 
transcending the partition paradigm that has dominated all international attempts 
to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It entails defining the elements of a polit-
ical alternative that is democratic, viable, and economically feasible. It also must 
address the question of Zionism and explain how the political rights of Jewish 
Israelis can be reconciled with Palestinian rights in any attempt to decolonize the 
ongoing settler-colonial reality.
SELF-DETERMINATION AND STATEHO OD
At the heart of the Palestinian struggle is a yearning to return home and for 
 freedom—freedom from settler-colonialism, as much as from oppression and 
exile.7 Ever since they were expelled from their land during the 1948 war and the 
creation of the State of Israel, Palestinians have sought to fulfill their right of return, 
which is enshrined in UN Resolution 194, issued on December 4, 1948. The estab-
lishment of the PLO by the Arab League in 1964 reaffirmed this right, as its charter 
called for the liberation of Palestine from Zionist imperialism. The PLO charter 
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did not specify statehood as part of its mission, though, since it envisaged Palestine 
as part of a larger Arab collectivity. It was only in the aftermath of the 1967 Six Days 
War and the international consensus on UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolu-
tion 242 as a framework for peace in the Middle East that the Palestinian national 
movement made the project of an independent state the vehicle for decolonizing 
Palestine from Zionism and affirming the Palestinian right to self-determination.
In this regard, the Palestinian national movement was not much different 
from most anticolonial liberation movements of the twentieth century. Self- 
determination, a concept internationalized with Lenin’s defense of people’s right 
to national independence and reframed by Wilson’s Fourteen Points in 1918, laid 
the foundation of a twentieth-century world order composed of nation-states.8 
By 1960, it became “the juridical component of international non-domination,” as 
Adom Getachew put it.9 Yet, as she and others have shown, self-determination was 
a concept used by imperial powers to reorganize their spheres of control, as much 
as it was claimed by every national liberation movement demanding freedom from 
colonialism. Imperial powers viewed it a principle that colonized people could 
exercise once they prove fit to do so, thus tying it to imperial racial and political 
considerations. Anticolonialists, on the other hand, defined self-determination as 
an inalienable right to achieve freedom from external domination.10
UN Resolution 1514, adopted in 1960 by the UN General Assembly (UNGA), 
affirmed the status of self-determination as a human right, one that is necessary in 
order to fulfill all other rights. It also declared colonialism a crime and  specified that 
“all people have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sov-
ereignty and the integrity of their national territory.”11 It thus  inadvertently made 
self-determination synonymous with national territorial sovereignty, that is, state-
hood.12 While many were aware of the inherent contradiction of the  nation-state 
as protector as well as violator of human rights, an international consensus had 
formed around the necessity of independent statehood as a first, if not sufficient, 
step towards political liberation. This is because the nation-state was conceived as 
the internationally recognized sovereign entity that ensures citizens their political 
rights, including their right to security and protection from external domination.
For many anticolonialists, though, the creation of an independent state was 
not the only, or optimal, means to guarantee people’s freedom and their national 
sovereignty. They considered the right to self-determination as a people’s right to 
define their political future and choose their political form, or system, of govern-
ment for managing their affairs. It did not need to be territorially bound, since 
sovereignty is enshrined in the people, or the nation, not in the state per se. Instead 
it can be fulfilled through various political configurations, such as transforming 
empires into representative federations, or confederations, of equal citizens. As 
Wilder and Getachew have shown, anticolonial proponents of the right to self-
determination envisaged its implementation as part of a larger project of remak-
ing the world beyond the Westphalian order of sovereign states, one that required 
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transforming political and economic structures, both domestically and interna-
tionally, in ways that would guarantee the freedom and equality of all people.13 
They were cognizant of what revolutionaries from Toussaint Louverture to Fanon 
have warned against, namely that national independence does not guarantee lib-
eration, for it can create new forms of domination that deny citizens their political 
and economic rights.
The Palestinian struggle for self-determination carried within it this ambigu-
ity concerning the relationship between national liberation and statehood. As 
Edward Said put in 1978, the PLO never resolved “the question of whether it is 
really a national independence or a national liberation movement.”14 Since the 
arrival of Fatah at the head of the PLO in 1968, the Palestinian national discourse 
has tied return with liberation and conscripted the notion of self-determination to 
the right to establish an independent Palestinian state. In 1971, the eighth Palestin-
ian National Council (PNC) convention adopted a unanimous resolution specify-
ing that “the armed struggle of the Palestinian people is not a racial or religious 
struggle directed against the Jews. This is why the future state that will be set up in 
Palestine liberated from Zionist imperialism will be a democratic Palestinian state. 
All who wish to will be able to live in peace there with the same rights and the same 
duties.”15 What came to be known as the Palestinian version of a one-state solution 
was presented as the means to protect Palestinian political rights by affirming the 
right to an independent, decolonized nation-state. It asserted Palestinian politi-
cal existence in the face of international denial, as best exemplified with UNSC 
Resolution 242. This resolution, adopted on November 22, 1967, acknowledged the 
right of each state in the region to “live in secure and recognised boundaries.” It 
did not, though, mention the Palestinians nor any of their UN-protected rights, 
such as those detailed in UN Resolutions 181 and 194. It simply referred to them as 
refugees in need of a humanitarian solution, not a national group with a right to 
self-determination.16
From its inception, the Palestinian state project was a project of national self-
affirmation as well as of political actualization. Its aim was to assert Palestinian 
“peoplehood,” which Zionism sought to eradicate, as much as to articulate a just 
political future inclusive of all those who live on the land. While many doubted 
the sincerity of its inclusive vision, which Israel outrightly rejected, Palestinian 
nationalists were clear about opposing Zionism as a racial colonial project of dom-
ination rather than rejecting Jews for their identity. The PLO’s diplomatic and legal 
efforts in this regard came to fruition in 1974 with UNGA Resolution 3236, which 
affirmed the legitimacy of Palestinian anticolonial struggle and right to “national 
independence and sovereignty.” In UNGA Resolutions 3236 and 3237, the interna-
tional community—as represented by the UN—also recognized the PLO as the 
sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and invited it to partici-
pate in the works of the General Assembly like any nonmember state, such as the 
Vatican.17 The PLO, meanwhile, acted as a state in exile, with its various political 
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institutions, electoral structures, and economic services, representing and provid-
ing for Palestinians in the diaspora as well as for those under Israeli occupation.18
Linking self-determination with statehood, in other words, gave the Palestinian 
revolution a concrete political meaning in an international system that recognized 
the legitimacy of decolonization struggles in the post-WWII era and bestowed 
on states the primary responsibility of representing and protecting the human 
and political rights of citizens. What remained contested within the Palestinian 
national movement was the content and shape of this state, as much as the extent 
to which its creation would be the means to, or the end of, decolonization.
By 1974, the PLO gave up on the idea of remaking the regional and international 
order of nation-states and defeating imperialism. It accepted instead the confines 
of realpolitik and the international consensus on UN Resolution 242, which it 
 officially recognized in 1988. In 1974, the twelfth PNC adopted the Ten Points 
transitional program, which became known as the pragmatic, or  step-by-step, 
route to decolonization. It specified that “the PLO will employ all means . . . . for 
the liberation of Palestinian land and setting up a patriotic, independent fighting 
national authority in every part of the Palestine territory that will be liberated 
. . . . The PLO will consider any step toward liberation which is accomplished as a 
stage in the pursuit of its strategy for the establishment of a democratic  Palestinian 
state.”19 Although many contested the possibility of a Palestinian state without 
fully  dismantling Zionism, the majority accepted the view that national inde-
pendence was a first step towards national liberation. This view gained further 
strength after Israel’s war against the PLO in Lebanon in 1982 and the failure of 
the Arab states to come to the rescue of the Palestinians. The PLO’s Declaration 
of Independence in 1988, announced in the wake of the First Intifada, which 
erupted in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in December 1987, represented the 
official Palestinian acceptance that national self-determination could only be ful-
filled on part of  historic Palestine, and that it is attainable by negotiating with, 
rather than  defeating, Israel.20
The Palestinian state project thus became the price for the Palestinian historic 
compromise with Israel. Herein too lies its historical importance. It was the only 
way for the Palestinians to advocate for themselves at any peace negotiations 
bounded by the parameters of the international consensus on partition as the solu-
tion to the Arab-Israeli conflict as set out in UN Resolution 181, and more specifi-
cally by UNSC Resolution 242. A Palestinian state on only 22 percent of Palestine 
was considered better than no state, because it promised political independence. 
It offered recognition and a historical compromise with an enemy, even if it could 
not bring about full liberation. It allowed a means for the return of the refugees, 
even if it could not restore justice to the Palestinians for the Nakba. Above all, it 
promised citizenship rights to Palestinians denied of these rights, whether in the 
diaspora or under Israeli occupation. In other words, the Palestinian state project 
affirmed the Palestinian “right to have rights” to quote Arendt.21
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PALESTINIAN STATEHO OD AND THE OSLO  
PEACE PRO CESS
The Oslo peace process in 1993 provided an opportunity for the Palestinian national 
movement to reap the fruits of Palestinian resistance by territorializing the dream 
of a Palestinian state, at least from the point of view of the PLO leadership. With 
the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993 and Interim Agreement on 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1995, the PLO acquiesced to a conflict resolution 
approach intrinsically tied to the concept of territorial partition as a paradigm for 
achieving a minimum of Palestinian rights. It accepted Israel’s insistence that the 
starting point of the conflict was the 1967 war—not the 1948 war. Although fully 
aware that the Oslo peace process did not end the occupation or specify as its end 
goal the creation of a Palestinian state, the Palestinian leadership remained com-
mitted to proving that Palestinian statehood was both necessary and achievable. 
It was bolstered by international community support in this regard, especially as 
expressed by the Arab Peace Initiative in 2002 and the Quartet Road Map to Peace 
in 2003.
Starting with Arafat’s return to Gaza in 1994 and role as the head of a 
 democratically elected Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in January 1996, the 
Palestinian official narrative shifted from decolonization to state-building. 
The PNA focused on behaving as a state in order to be recognized as one, embark-
ing on a wide variety of activities that ranged from setting up a new police force 
and various ministries and ritualizing presidential salutes and national anthems 
while receiving foreign ambassadors, to devising national development strategies 
and filing petitions against Israel’s separation barrier to the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) in 2005. Such performances of statehood sought to abstract the real-
ity of occupation, not so much in order to deny it but rather to refuse to be con-
strained by it. They were not simply acts of “make believe,” even if they appeared 
at times delusional. They were rather attempts to affirm Palestinian agency and 
legitimate national existence despite Israel’s continuous obstructions, a legitimacy 
recognized by the international community, which admitted the State of Palestine 
into the UN in 2012, as well as into the UNESCO, International Criminal Court, 
and other international fora.
The PNA’s belief that national independence was attainable through state-
building in the present, rather than by revolutionary armed struggle resistance as 
in the past, was best exemplified by the Fayyad technocratic government in 2007. 
This government, which was set up in the aftermath of the international boycott 
of Hamas’s  electoral victory in 2006 and the Fatah-Hamas debacle in June 2007, 
defined its mission as providing “the final push to statehood.”22 It worked on prov-
ing Palestinian institutional readiness for independent statehood by laying the 
foundation of a modern state, as advised by PNA’s new international  sponsors, the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund. It confined the meaning of self-
determination to the establishment of a neoliberal state, as defined by  Washington’s 
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conception of good governance. State-building thus became about law and order, 
not about national unity or democratic representation. Its mission was to foster 
“institution-building” and fiscal transparency in order to ensure the development 
of a vibrant private sector. It was sustained by the creation of large bureaucracy 
who produced, as much as depended on, the institutional edifice of this neoliberal 
state.23 State-building implied that the PNA was performing “a kind of statehood 
not based on sovereignty but on management of financial resources and credible 
claims to management of an uncertain future.”24
More assiduously, this state-building effort proved to be a site of governance 
and control. It became an effort by which the PNA shaped power relations 
over space and people, rather than a strategy that could effectively halt Israeli 
 settlement construction, end the siege on Gaza, or bring liberation. This was vis-
ible at the macro level, in the creation of a repressive police force and prison sys-
tem in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and in the failure to create independent and 
 transparent judiciary. It also was clear in the way state-building efforts reshaped 
access to resources and power at the micro level, whether in developing the hous-
ing and land markets, encouraging public-private partnerships, or setting up the 
infrastructure for a modern electricity grid and road system. As a new generation 
of scholars have demonstrated, the development of modern electricity grids, new 
housing projects, or even “national environmental policies” does not only high-
light the PNA’s attempt to affirm a certain sovereign modernity.25 Such projects 
also reflect the kind of polity the PNA is seeking to create, one that promotes a 
transactional, individualized relation between the central authority and the Pales-
tinian population, rather than encourages collective representations and account-
ability. This state-building apparatus inevitably produced a political entity that was 
increasingly authoritarian, serving mostly an emerging private sector tied to the 
PNA and international capital. The PNA became unable, or unwilling, to undo the 
settler-colonial reality, given how embedded it was with safeguarding Israeli secu-
rity through the Oslo peace agreement and its state-building efforts.
With the signing of the Oslo peace accords, the historical role of the Palestinian 
state project for the Palestinian cause was thus bound to come to an end. This was 
confirmed with the failure of the final status negotiations, after the Camp David 
Summit in 2000, to bring about Palestinian territorial independence, despite all the 
compromises that the Palestinian Authority was willing to make towards Israel.26 
The pursuit of a state had been essential for achieving Israeli and international rec-
ognition of the Palestinians as a collective, or national, political entity. However, 
Israel’s recognition of the PLO had proved to be a means to fragment the Palestin-
ian people and undermine their right to self-determination. Attempts to counter 
this fragmentation remained ineffective because the Palestinian leadership, the 
international community, and the regional powers all remained committed to par-
tition as the only way to achieve Palestinian independence. The PNA’s insistence 
that the problem is not partition in itself, but in the lack of  implementation of UN 
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resolutions did not carry much sway since the international community proved 
unwilling to exert pressure on Israel to retreat fully from the West Bank and Gaza 
or even to adhere to the terms of the Oslo agreements.
Indeed, it is impossible to explain the persistence of the Palestinian state 
 project, as much as its failure, without considering the international investment in 
it.27 The Quartet on the Middle East (UN, European Union, United States,  Russia) 
has been the major advisor and funder of the Palestinian state project, dispers-
ing over twenty-seven billion dollars to the Palestinian territories since 1994, 
making the Palestinian Occupied Territories one of the world’s largest recipients of 
aid per capita.28 Although the international community has been frustrated with 
Israel’s continuous construction of settlements and its violation of  Palestinian 
human rights, its approach has been to reform, rather than reject, the principle of 
partition. It focused its energy on improving the PNA’s institutional capability to 
prove Palestinian readiness for political independence, giving special attention 
to enhancing the PNA’s monopoly over the use of violence in the West Bank and 
Gaza. The international community thus restricted the meaning of statehood to 
the power of an internationally recognized authority to impose law and order over 
a specific population. It did not tie it to fostering democratic accountability or 
ensuring Palestinian unity, let alone adhering to international law or forcing Israel 
to withdraw from Palestinian land.29 It ignored the importance of territorial conti-
guity for the physical viability of any state by prioritizing Israel’s security concerns 
in delineating the extent of Palestinian territorial and demographic jurisdiction.
In acquiescing to the prioritization of Israeli security demands, the interna-
tional community and the PNA thus contributed to transforming the Palestinian 
state project from a vehicle for national independence to a regionally and inter-
nationally sponsored endeavor to dissolve the Palestine question. Juridically, the 
 Palestinian state project under Oslo confined the Palestinian nation to the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. It thus compromised the unity of the Palestinian people and 
the political rights of those Palestinians not included in the new territorial nation-
state, that is, the Palestinian citizens of Israel and refugees, who are at the crux 
of the  Palestinian question. It also undermined the national Palestinian political 
system with the creation of new territorially confined political bodies, namely 
the PNA and the Palestinian Legislative Council. These political entities de facto 
superseded the Palestinian Liberation Organization and its Palestinian National 
Council, the bodies that had historically represented Palestinians both inside and 
outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip.30 The Palestinian national collective, or 
“we,” was thus compromised, especially as no new encompassing entity was cre-
ated to represent and reunite all Palestinians as the PLO had before 1993.
The territorialization of the Palestinian dream of national self-determination 
has thus been emptied of any emancipatory potential. Rather than undo the 
unequal power relations imposed by Israel and the international order, the  project 
of statehood introduced instead new structures of domination that  perpetuate, 
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rather than dismantle, the settler-colonial reality Palestinians are forced to endure. 
The Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza are effectively living in a one-
state condition, with Israel as the only sovereign a reality that has been increasingly 
described as apartheid.31 The entrenchment of the PNA’s authoritarian regime and 
its refusal to revive the PLO or hold elections have compromised Palestinian citi-
zenship rights.32 Meanwhile, the PNA’s obsession with statehood risks reducing the 
Palestinian struggle to a humanitarian problem once again; Palestinians leaders 
are now more focused on finding means to combat Covid-19 and prevent poverty 
levels from rising further in the Gaza Strip while keeping a captive economy afloat 
through international aid. They are not focused on ensuring an inclusive national 
debate on how to protect Palestinian rights in the face of continuous Israeli colo-
nial onslaught, as seen in the latest war on Gaza in 2021.
RETHINKING DEC OLONIZ ATION,  
TR ANSCENDING PARTITION
If the past fifty years of Palestinian struggle prove that the quest for a Palestinian 
state was necessary to affirm a people’s collective political existence, they also indi-
cate that the pursuit of statehood can compromise national rights, especially when 
such a state is confined to an international neoliberal understanding of political 
 sovereignty. The experience of the past fifty years makes it clear that national inde-
pendence cannot be achieved through partition or in a context of ongoing Zion-
ist colonization. As Dubonov and Robson have most recently argued, partition 
plans are intrinsic to imperial strategies to divide and conquer.33 They have been 
proposed to “resolve” ethnic or national conflicts by steering ethnic or national 
groups into divided spaces. However, they have not succeeded in bringing about 
enduring peace, let alone reconciliation between conflicting parties, whether it is 
between Hamas and Fatah, Israel and the Palestinians, India and Pakistan, or the 
UK and Northern Ireland, among other examples.
The crisis that the Oslo peace process created for the Palestinian national cause 
has led to a renewed call for a return to the original tenets of the Palestinian politi-
cal struggle, namely its commitment to liberation from settler-colonialism. The 
question that took hold of Palestinian activists and academics became how to 
think of “liberation beyond the not yet fully realised and yet already mutilated 
project of the nation-state.”34 This did not mean that the “national as a horizon of 
liberation” has lost its importance, as Salih and Richeter-Devroe put it, but rather 
that it has become a more contested space, since people in the Occupied Territo-
ries and in the diaspora questioned the PNA’s attempted monopoly at defining the 
contour and content of this nation. A new discourse started to emerge, focused on 
articulating the elements of a new political strategy able to unite the Palestinian 
body politic and protect Palestinians rights. Such a strategy unequivocally rejects 













Map: © Jan de Jong, 2001









security zone, to be transferred
to Palestinian sovereignty
Israeli cities and settlements
shown at projected size
Network of existing or
planned Israeli thoroughfares 
MAP 35
Map 5. Scope of Palestinian sovereignty proposed at the Camp David Summit, 2000. Source: 
Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs.
Map 6. The Separation Wall and boundaries of the Palestinian state according to the Olmert 































Israeli settlements to be 
evacuated 
Israeli settlements to be 
incorporated in State of
Israel
Palestinian territory
( West Bank and
Gaza Strip )
Areas regarded by
Israel as not being part
of the West Bank
1- Palestinian territory 
transferred to State of Israel
2- Israeli territory 






Route ( April 2006 )












5.5 % 5.4 %
Territorial  Land Exchange Percentages
( in terms of West Bank area )
according to Israeli methodology (left) and
according to Palestinian methodology (right)
To State of Israel:




























Map : © Jan de Jong
10 Km
G A Z A 
S T R I P
W E S T    B A N K
Proposed
Palestinian Corridor
between the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip
12    Introduction
for understanding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.35 It seeks to transcend an ethnic 
and territorial understanding of self-determination, that is, the framework of the 
exclusive nation-state, and to propose a political alternative that protects the indi-
vidual and collective rights of citizens.
Since the failure of the Camp David negotiation in 2000, Palestinian academ-
ics and activists have become more vocal about how Israel reformulated, rather 
than ended, its colonial rule. They have highlighted, in particular, how Oslo’s insti-
tutionalization of the demographic separation between Israelis and Palestinians 
through territorial fragmentation and annexation of Palestinian land has not only 
violated Palestinian rights but also made any solution based on partition racially 
delineated and unequal. The Oslo peace process, and the partition paradigm on 
which it was based, avoided dealing with Israel’s colonial foundation, for it was 
premised on the principle that the only way to affirm Palestine’s political existence 
is to acknowledge Israel’s. This proved to be a real trap for the Palestinian leader-
ship, given Israel’s insistence on being recognized as a Jewish state in any final sta-
tus peace agreement. Palestinians cannot acquiesce to such a demand, for it would 
deny their political existence and their right to the land.
The revival of settler-colonialism as an analytical framework has also been 
accompanied by a discursive shift away from the pursuit of statehood and towards 
Palestinians’ inalienable rights. This rights-based approach has gained promi-
nence with the ICJ ruling against Israel’s wall in 2005 and the rise of the Boy-
cott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement. It sees in international law a 
potent tool for holding Israel accountable to its international obligations and for 
 protecting the unity of Palestinian rights, including the right of return, freedom 
from occupation in the West Bank and Gaza, and the right to equal citizenship 
for the  Palestinians living inside Israel. The BDS movement has been particularly 
effective in  mobilizing support for new strategies of nonviolent resistance as an 
alternative to the violence of the Second Intifada, which became demonized in a 
post-9/11 world. It has helped to show the continuity of Israeli settler-colonial poli-
cies that violate Palestinian rights and to generate a growing international solidar-
ity with Palestinians at the grassroots level and in different policy circles (such as 
local governments, unions, and churches, et cetera).
The rights-based discourse, however, has not been sufficient for articulating 
a political alternative to the present political impasse. The BDS movement, for 
example, does not take a position on whether the Palestinians should abandon the 
pursuit of a state. It also does not take a position on the international legal con-
sensus on partition or offer an alternative to it. According to some critiques, the 
rights-based approach risks, albeit inadvertently, individualizing the Palestinian 
struggle by focusing on Palestinian individual human rights.36
Attempts to redress this problem have focused on affirming the unity or nation-
hood of Palestinian people, albeit by proposing two different approaches. The first 
rejects the very idea of a Palestinian state as a political aspiration. Led mainly by 
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anthropologists and historians, this approach calls for transcending nationalist 
frames, given that such frames prioritize the creation of a state over the  Palestinian 
people.37 It considers the state a site of inherent violence and thus bound to be 
oppressive, especially in the absence of a free and active civil society. It emphasizes 
that sovereignty lies with the people, not with the state, and highlights that global-
ization has undermined the importance of territorial sovereignty. Politically, this 
approach affirms the political agency of the Palestinians everywhere, not just in 
the Occupied Territories. It embraces the fragmented and exilic Palestinian expe-
rience rather than negates it, as the state project tried to do.
This anti-statist approach has gained traction in the diaspora promoted among 
Palestinians living in Western societies. While this discourse may sound  reminiscent 
of the PLO’s original prioritization of return over statehood, its main focus is on 
redefining the relationship between identity and place beyond the territory of 
the nation or the boundaries of the state. In this regard, the anti-statist critique 
of the Palestinian state project provides a resounding rejection of the PNA attempt 
to monopolize who the Palestinian collective, or “we,” is. It gives space to counter-
narratives created through Palestinian grassroot initiatives to reclaim the public 
sphere by challenging hegemonic power structures. Yet this anti-statist critique 
does not solve the political and humanitarian problems of those living with no 
legal protection or citizen rights in Lebanon or Syria, for example. It also overlooks 
the fact that vibrant autonomous public spheres usually exist only in democratic 
societies where residents have the legal and political tools to challenge state vio-
lence and where state power is both limited and circumscribed by law. This anti-
statist critique remains pertinent, though, insofar as it highlights the importance 
of taming state power by emphasizing the creation of representative counterpow-
ers and the protection of spaces for public engagement. It is helpful in pointing 
out the importance of  defining the kind of political community, or polity, that the 
struggle for  self-determination seeks to create in order to ensure that it does not 
compromise its people’s rights.
The second approach for reaffirming Palestinian national rights does not 
bypass the state. It rather considers the one-state solution the only means to 
decolonize Palestine.38 Most of the critical writings by political scientists, legal 
 scholars, and activists over the past twenty years have revolved around defining 
the political shape, and ethical value, of such a state. There is no consensus, how-
ever, on whether such a state should be a liberal democratic state or a binational 
one. Defenders of the former remain fundamentally attached to the importance 
of Palestinian territorial sovereignty over the whole of Palestine. They are com-
mitted to the principle of individual political equality between all the inhabit-
ants of the land while emphasizing the indigenous sovereignty of the Palestinian 
 people. According to Abunimeh (2014), Israeli Jews living in Palestine have legiti-
mate individual  political rights as equal citizens, but not a collective, or national, 
right to self-determination: this is largely because whenever they have had such 
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a right, it has come at the expense of the Palestinians. Abunimeh and others reject 
 binationalism as an option since, in their view, it entails an endorsement, how-
ever oblique, of Zionism and thus of colonialism.39 The 2018 Israeli nationality law, 
which bestowed the right to self-determination in the whole area Israel controls 
only to the Jews, is a case in point. According to Omar Barghouti, a democratic 
state in all of Palestine offers the only ethical solution to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, for it dismantles Zionism while allowing Israelis to remain in the land and 
live in the new polity as equal citizens. Its erodes the native/settler dichotomy by 
proposing the “de-dichotomisation” or “hybridisation” of individual identities.40
The binationalists, on the other hand, are concerned with the ethical problems 
involved in denying different ethnic groups their histories and collective political 
identities. Like the advocates of the democratic secular state, binationalists reject 
the ethno-exclusionary character of Zionism. They also agree on the impossibility 
of partition, given the growth of settlements and the multilayered, unequal interde-
pendence between the colonizer and colonized that Israel produced over the past 
seventy years.41 Binationalists, however, accept the enduring nature of Palestinian 
and Israeli national identities and recognize the political potency of national mark-
ers (language, religion, traditions, et cetera). They acknowledge that both Israelis 
and Palestinians have collective, not just individual, rights, including a right to self-
determination. Their central argument is that this right does not need to be terri-
torially conscripted and cannot be fulfilled through partition or in a nation-state. 
Instead, it can be protected only in a civic state, one that is not ethnically based 
but is established through a democratic, inclusive process of constitutional self-
creation. The underpinning assumption here is that the state is a juridical order 
that is accountable to its citizens and responsible for protecting their equality. Such 
an understanding of the state echoes Hannah Arendt’s argument that “our political 
life rests on the assumption that we can produce equality through organisation.” 
As she put it, “we are not born equal; we become equal members of a group on the 
strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutual equal rights.”42
Binationalists thus consider that the only way forward is for Palestinians and 
Israelis to come together to create a new organization, or polity, that guarantees 
their equal collective and individual rights. Only then will it be possible to over-
come the political inequalities that both nationalism and colonialism foster. The 
question then becomes how it could be possible to engage in such a process of 
decolonization, given the unequal power realities on the ground. Some scholars, 
including authors in this volume, call for adopting a new framework of analysis, 
one that focuses on indigeneity or indigenous people’s rights as a way to  decolonize 
Israel from within. They are supported by legal scholars using international law 
to challenge Israel from outside its borders. As discussed by Susan Akram in 
chapter 8, such a legal strategy emphasizes a civic, rather than an ethnic, definition 
of nationality, and perceives the state as a juridical order responsible for protect-
ing the equal rights of its citizens. Others emphasize that decolonization is not 
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an event but a process that involves decolonizing Israeli-Palestinian relationships, 
rather than simply the land. According to Bashir and Busbridge, it requires plac-
ing Arab-Jewish relations at the center of the decolonization process, allowing “for 
the narration of Palestinian and Jewish experience in the Middle East alongside 
each other,” rather than at the expense of each other.43 Such an approach engages, 
rather than avoids, the enemy, in order to unravel the intertwined history of the 
settler and the native. It works through history rather than negates it, both at 
the local and regional level. It is a process that also seeks to tackle questions con-
cerned with historical reconciliation, national trauma, and transitional justice.44
Engaging in such a decolonization process is not easy, especially given the 
privileges and international immunities that Israelis continue to enjoy today. For 
most Palestinians, especially for those living under Israel’s continuous assault on 
the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, as much as for those living in 
refugee camps in the diaspora, it is unrealistic, if not defeatist, to engage a con-
versation about the rights of Israelis in a future democratic state. It is, however, 
going to be necessary to identify who could lead such a conversation and how to 
create a representative platform that articulates the shape of a decolonized polity 
that would end Palestinian dispossession and provide equality for all. According 
to Edward Said, it falls on the Palestinians, as unfair as this might sound, since “no 
people, for bad or for good, is so freighted with multiple, and yet unreachable or 
indigestible significance as the Palestinians . . . . Their relationship to Zionism, and 
ultimately to political and spiritual Judaism, gives them a formidable burden as 
interlocutors of the Jews.”45
Decolonizing Palestine would require articulating the components of a new 
political framework that acknowledges the violence and injustices of the past and 
the present while prioritizing citizenship rights over territorial sovereignty. It can-
not be divorced from the larger struggle within the Arab region, where citizens 
are defying their oppressive governments, reminding them of their responsibility 
towards their citizens: to represent rather than oppress them, to honor rather than 
crush their diversity, and to acknowledge that the acceptance of differences forms 
the basis of any democratic polity that ensures equality for all.
RETHINKING STATEHO OD
Rethinking Statehood exposes how Palestinian scholars are redefining the politi-
cal meaning of decolonization given the end of the historical role the Palestinian 
state project played for the Palestinian cause. The first part of the book highlights 
the importance of resituating the Palestinian struggle for liberation within both its 
regional and its settler-colonial contexts to understand the costs to the Palestinians 
of remaining confined to the partition paradigm as a means to achieve political 
independence. The second part exposes the legal and political possibilities in imag-
ining an alternative to partition that protects Palestinian rights. It analyzes how 
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the relationship between the nation and the state is being rearticulated to protect 
both the individual and collective rights of all those living in Israel/Palestine. It also 
discusses how international law continues to be a powerful instrument to defend 
Palestinian nationhood. Together, the chapters included here advance a new episte-
mology of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one that sees the Palestinian struggle not 
solely through the prism of the nation-state or as confined only to  Palestinians, but 
rather enables us to construct a new critical way of thinking about political libera-
tion that allows people to live in equality and dignity,  irrespective of their ethnicity.
In chapter 1, Adam Hanieh provides a political economy critique of the Pales-
tinian state project. Hanieh argues that the Palestinian obsession with statehood 
cannot be understood by remaining confined within a nationalist framework of 
analysis and without unpacking the political economy of state, and class, forma-
tion. He sheds lights on the PNA’s institutional role as a facilitator of capital accu-
mulation and highlights the role of regional capital originating in the Arab Gulf 
states in the development of a Palestinian capitalist class that sustains the Palestin-
ian state project and depends on it. This class, or elite, is supported by a regional 
and international capitalist system that is key to understanding the obduracy of 
the status quo, despite it failing the Palestinian people.
Chapter 2 looks more closely at the Gaza Strip as a microcosm of the limitations 
of the Palestinian state project and the crisis it created, rather than resolved, for 
the Palestinian national struggle. Tareq Baconi argues that one of the unexpected 
effects of the Oslo Accords was the split of the Palestinian national movement 
into two projects: one that adopted the diplomatic route to achieve Palestinian 
independence, as represented by Fatah and the PNA; the other committed to 
armed struggle for liberation, albeit in an Islamist guise, as represented by Hamas. 
Although divisions within the Palestinian movement are not new, the persis-
tence of this political infighting for over fifteen years despite many reconciliation 
attempts leads to the conclusion that the Palestinian state project is sustained by 
an elite more interested in power than in national liberation.46 Baconi argues that 
the Gaza Strip has become the lynchpin for determining the future of the Palestin-
ian national movement; its present humanitarian crisis demonstrates the costs of 
remaining committed to the tenets of Palestinian national liberation and seeking 
to assert political independence in a context of ongoing colonization.
Chapter 3 provides a micro-picture of how the Palestinian state project dis-
empowered different Palestinian constituencies, denying their political rights and 
dream of liberation. Hania Assali focuses on East Jerusalem to show how Jerusa-
lem’s position as the capital of a future Palestinian state has been undermined by 
the failure of the PNA to counter Israel’s decision to sever the Holy City from the 
rest of the West Bank. She provides a review of Israel’s legal, demographic, and ter-
ritorial assaults on  Palestinians living in East Jerusalem and the ways in which they 
resist it, as exemplified by the “prayer intifada” in the summer of 2017 and again 
during Ramadan in April and May 2021.
Introduction    17
Hanan Toukan in chapter 4 touches on the symbolic and aesthetic dimen-
sion of the Palestinian state project as represented by the construction of the 
Palestinian Museum. National museums have typically been markers of national 
 independence. They can thus provide a discursive means to affirm the existence 
of a people whose history has been denied by the colonizer. The construction of 
the Palestinian Museum in Birzeit in 2016, however, elicited criticism for being 
a selective and an elitist endeavor that siphoned money away from more urgent 
needs. Toukan unpacks the political economy of the Palestinian Museum, arguing 
that its construction cannot be understood without situating it in a larger regional 
attempt to shape the discourse around art, identity, and modernity outside the 
confines of the Western world. Her analysis complements Hanieh’s argument in 
chapter 1 by emphasizing the role of the museum’s investors, mostly based in the 
Gulf and closely tied to the PNA, in seeking to shape the meaning of independence 
and resistance against Israel’s physical, cultural, and economic domination. She 
shows that the Palestine Museum’s political value lies in its temporal orientation, 
namely its focus on the present. Unlike the Darwish or Arafat museums, which 
are dedicated to the past and display the contours of the national narrative of 
dispossession and historical struggle, the Palestinian Museum leaves an open 
space for engaging the present and rethinking the future. Its architecture reveals 
an engagement with the continuing reality of dispossession and an attempt to 
disrupt  hegemonic understandings of statehood, peoplehood, space, and time. 
Whether the Palestinian Museum will succeed in this mission is still to be seen, 
but so far it shows both the scope and limits of Palestinian agency in a context of 
ongoing colonization.
Chapter 5 provides a glimpse of the political opportunities that can emerge 
from resituating the Palestinian cause away from the paradigm of statehood and 
within a rights discourse instead. Yousef Munayyer in this chapter argues that a 
political strategy focused on defending Palestinian rights, rather than statehood, 
is more successful in generating international support today, particularly in the 
United States. He shows that US support for Palestinians’ rights has grown since 
2000, highlighting the paradoxical opportunities offered by the Trump era for 
activists emphasizing Palestinian demands for equality and dignity. Their activism 
draws on the intersectionality of political struggles, making connection between 
Trump’s and Netanyahu’s racist policies to build new international networks of 
solidarity for the Palestinian people.
Munayyar’s analysis provides a segue to the second part of the book, which 
explores the legal and political dimensions that must be revisited in order to 
construct a viable political alternative to the current colonial reality. Nadim 
Khoury in  chapter 6 examines the question of transitional justice and the way 
the  Palestinian state project avoided it. He argues that the term has been raised 
by Palestinian critiques of Oslo to stress the impossibility of peace without provid-
ing justice for the full range of Palestinian rights, including the right of return, 
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recognition of the Nakba, and an end to the ongoing Israeli violence. The Oslo 
peace agreements sought to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by sidetracking 
the question of historical reconciliation. As Khoury demonstrates, the concept of 
transitional justice could spark new conversations about moving forward but it 
is also a deeply contested concept since there remain fierce disagreements over 
whose historical injustices need to be addressed, with what mechanisms, and 
toward what ends.
Chapter 7 examines how the first Zionist and Palestinian alternatives to parti-
tion sought to protect the individual and collective rights of Palestinians and Jews 
in a single polity. In this chapter, Leila Farsakh examines how early protagonists 
of a one-state solution conceptualized the notion of the nation and how sepa-
rate it could be from the state. She also assesses Palestinian and Zionist attempts 
to incorporate the “other” in their conception of a one-state solution and points to 
the economic and political challenges that continue to haunt any binational or 
democratic alternative to partition today.
Chapter 8 focuses on how international law protects Palestinian rights, not only 
the right of return but also the right to a Palestinian nationality. Susan Akram 
in this chapter argues that Palestinian nationality is a legally protected concept, 
despite the Balfour Declaration, the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, and the 
establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1995. She unpacks the international 
legal definition of nationality, which emphasizes the direct relation between a 
people and a land, rather than the ethnic criteria or a sense of an “imagined com-
munity” that sociological use of the term implies. She thereby challenges Israel’s 
denial and elimination of Palestinian nationality in 1948, as well as its creation of 
a Jewish nationality that is open to all Jews in the world. Akram maintains that 
Israel’s notion of Jewish nationality is not legitimate from an international legal 
perspective because Israel based it on a religious and extra-territorial definition 
of the nation. Her analysis suggests that while the concept of Israeli nationality, 
which presently does not exist and which would bestow equal citizenship rights 
on both Jews and non-Jews born and living in Israel, would be a legally binding 
category, Israel’s latest nationality law is not.47
The legal persistence of the concept of the Palestinian nation has significant 
ramifications for any post-Oslo political configuration. Mazen Masri in chapter 9 
looks more closely at various constitutional frameworks for a single state in 
 historic Palestine. He provides a comparative lens to assess which of the various 
models of federalism, binationalism, and/or liberal democracy can best protect 
Palestinian and Israeli individual citizenship rights without compromising their 
collective or national rights. These rights include not only the freedom to speak 
one’s own language, levy taxes, and elect representatives, but also to acknowledge 
historical grievances, establish mechanisms for reparation and reconciliation, and 
decolonize economic and social relations.
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Chapters 10 and 11 meanwhile zoom in on Palestinian citizens in Israel, core 
constituents of the Palestinian people, to consider how they are rethinking the 
relationship between the nation and the state in envisaging a political future. 
Maha Nassar in chapter 10 examines the historical origins and ongoing chal-
lenges that Palestinian citizens of Israel confront in trying to both defend their 
individual and collective rights within Israel and remain part of the Palestinian 
national movement. She focuses on the evolving positions of Palestinian citizens 
of Israel in the one-state or two-states debate, exposing the tension they expe-
rience between asserting their intrinsic link to the Palestinian national struggle 
and finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that is politically feasible. 
Ilan Pappe complements this discussion in chapter 11, where he makes a case for 
the notion of indigenous sovereignty. He argues that Palestinians citizens of Israel 
are at the forefront of reclaiming indigeneity as a way to assert the sovereignty 
of the  Palestinian people. Indigenous sovereignty helps resituate the Palestinian 
struggle within a decolonization paradigm and offers new forms of resistance that 
challenge the nation-state as a solution.
The conclusion wraps up the book by highlighting some of the line of inquiries 
that emerge from its chapters and the areas of new research needed to expand our 
understanding of the meaning and locus of political liberation moving forward.
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Part One




The Political Economy of State 
Formation in Palestine
Adam Hanieh
The question of state formation in Palestine has attracted a great deal of atten-
tion from scholars and activists alike since the establishment of the Palestinian 
National Authority (PNA) in 1994. Much of this debate has focused upon ques-
tions about three matters: (1) the relationship between peace and “state-formation”, 
(2) the  priorities and nature of Palestinian Authority institution-building, and 
(3) the linkages between donor funding and the emerging features of Palestinian 
government. Given the nature of the Oslo Accords and subsequent negotiations 
between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the discourse 
surrounding these debates has tended to be based almost exclusively on some ver-
sion of a “two-state” solution—typically with greater attention given to the West 
Bank as the spatial center of PNA institution-building.
The aim of this chapter is to present a critique of this state-formation litera-
ture, focusing in particular on the analytical silence it shows concerning the wider 
political economy of the Middle East region as a whole. I argue that much of the 
debate around Palestinian state formation tends to a methodological perspective 
that views Palestinian society in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)—and 
in the West Bank specifically—as a self-contained social formation in which state-
civil society relations are implicitly assumed to exist as separate and distinct from 
the wider region. In this sense, state-formation literature is typically characterized 
by a form of methodological nationalism, in which the territorial borders of the 
national state—or the Palestinian state-in-formation—are considered as the exclu-
sive vantage point from which to understand the various modalities of state-build-
ing.1 This is not to deny that much of the literature considers the impact of various 
trade and financial relationships between a future Palestinian state and neighbor-
ing countries. The point, however, is that these relationships are considered as 
external to Palestinian social formation as such. It is the contention of this chapter 
that it is necessary to consider the ways in which the developmental  tendencies of 
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the regional scale already exist internal to Palestinian social  formation. Without 
considering the ways that these regional processes have been internalized into the 
nature of Palestinian state and class formation under the PNA, it is not possible to 
accurately assess the likelihood of any state-building trajectories over the coming 
period (including both one- and two-state options).
The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first begins with a survey 
of the general state-building literature as expressed in the policies of international 
agencies and government donors. This literature has identified three supposed 
 characteristics of “successful” states—authority, legitimacy, and capacity—and 
aims to develop these features through technical support and financial aid. The 
section then concretizes these formulations in the Palestinian context, looking at 
both the dominant approach towards state-building in Palestine and the criticisms 
that have been raised against this within the literature. The final part of this sec-
tion presents a reexamination of the state-formation debate (both generally and in 
Palestine) based upon a critique of the way that much of this literature conceives of 
the state itself at a theoretical level. In counterposition to the neo-Weberian under-
standing of the state that dominates most state-formation discussions, this section 
puts forward an alternative conception of the state based upon an understanding 
of the prevailing social and power relations that exist under capitalism.
The second part of the chapter aims to build upon this alternative conception 
of the state to assess how the regional context has determined the character of 
state formation in Palestine. In this vein, I present an overview of Palestine in the 
regional context, and the ways in which global relations of power have shaped 
the nature of the state-building project in Palestine. I also look at the implications 
of these regional trajectories for the nature of Palestinian class and state formation, 
arguing that the particular social base of the PNA has come to rest upon a business 
class that is largely drawn from a layer of Palestinian diaspora capital—one that 
has been fully integrated into the modalities of state formation under the PNA. 
The concluding section examines what this particular class-state structure means 
for the possible future trajectories of Palestinian self-determination.
THE STATE FORMATION DEBATE
Authority, Legitimacy, Capacity
The explosion of the state-building literature through the 1990s and 2000s was 
closely related to two important developments in the global political economy at 
the time. The first of these was the emergence of the neoliberal economic  paradigm 
as the virtually unchallenged policy model. This framework promoted market lib-
eralization and deregulation, and the opening up of economies to cross-border 
trade and finance. Closely connected to the breakup of the Soviet Union and the 
emergence of newly independent states across Europe and Central Asia—the so-
called “transition economies”—this new era of neoliberal globalization raised a 
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series of questions about how best to move from centrally planned, bureaucratic 
economies to market-based systems of accumulation. At the same time in the 
South, a range of conflicts and wars across numerous countries—notably Soma-
lia, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan—placed the 
issue of rebuilding apparently dysfunctional state systems firmly on the map of 
international institutions and development practitioners.
These trajectories of neoliberalism and conflict were to shape the content 
of the emerging state-building debate, which crystallized around two key theoreti-
cal propositions. The first of these was the linkage between “democratization” (or 
“democracy-promotion”) and neoliberal models of development. The creation of 
liberal democracies and market-based economies were said to be mutually rein-
forcing processes that offered the best guarantors for stability. In Europe, newly 
established institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (EBRD) consciously twinned the rebuilding of former Eastern bloc states 
with free-market principles, providing loans and grants to promote the privatiza-
tion of infrastructure and industry. Elsewhere, notably in the Middle East, the US 
government was to launch a policy framework based on what George W. Bush 
described in 2004 as “free elections and free markets.”2 The initial testing-ground 
for this policy was post-2003 Iraq, where the US government stated they sought 
to see a narrow form of liberal democracy that could provide legitimacy for free-
market economic measures. Accompanying this policy turn, a host of quasi-
governmental institutions such as the US National Endowment for Democracy 
(NED), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican 
Institute (IRI), the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), and the 
Solidarity Center were to employ the same basic argument linking “free markets” 
and “a vibrant civil society” with the new state-building emphasis.
The second key theoretical proposition of the state-building literature was the 
explicit argument that effective state building was causally related to more peace-
ful states. This “liberal peace” perspective claimed that “conflicts could be defused 
by encouraging the liberalization of the political and economic structures of post-
conflict societies.”3 If a state were governed along liberal democratic lines, it would 
be less likely to go to war because of the inherent reluctance of the population to 
engage in military conflict. “Democracies,” as one perceptive critic of the liberal 
peace paradigm noted, “do not go to war with one another.”4 Through the 1990s 
and 2000s, this perspective was supplemented with further arguments—both the-
oretical and empirical—that intra-state violence was also less likely to occur within 
liberal democracies.5 Francis Fukuyama, for example, was to link state weakness to 
a long list of internal crises, claiming that “weak or failing states commit human 
rights abuses, provoke humanitarian disasters, drive massive waves of immigra-
tion, and attack their neighbors.”6 Likewise, the World Bank would explain the 
rationale behind its State and Peace Building Fund as one in which building states 
and building peace are considered as complementary processes.7
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Nonetheless, beyond the emphasis on neoliberal economic models and the 
claims around peace, the question of state-building raises a range of related theo-
retical and practical issues. What is meant by state building in practice? How is the 
state conceived of theoretically, and what particular institutional features charac-
terize a successful state? What is the most appropriate temporal sequencing for 
the process of building state institutions? What actors should drive this process? 
Although there exists a wide variety of specific approaches to these questions, the 
starting point for the vast majority of relevant literature is an ideal-type definition 
of the state drawn from neo-Weberian sociology.8 According to this perspective, a 
state is defined through its “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within 
a given territory.”9 Flowing from this definition, there are three supposed features 
of all states that are typically highlighted across the literature:
1.  Authority, defined as “the ability of the state to project its political power 
over all its territory, to reach all citizens regardless of their location, to main-
tain law and order and protect citizens from predation and violence. It is the 
ability of the laws and rules of the state to trump all other laws and rules.”
2.  Capacity, or “the ability of the state to deliver or procure goods and  
services, design and implement policies, build infrastructure, collect 
revenue, dispense justice, and maintain a conducive environment for the 
private sector.”
3.  Legitimacy, or “whether citizens feel the government has the right to  
govern—and whether they trust the government.”10
Each of these three features is postulated to be interrelated to the others and 
 self-reinforcing. Successful states are able to enforce authority over their popu-
lations within a defined territory, and this helps to sustain their legitimacy. But 
authority stems not only from the use (or threat) of violence, but also from the 
generalized belief of the subject population in the legitimacy of the state’s right 
to act as the supreme monopoly of force. In turn, this legitimacy arises from the 
state’s capacity to ensure that needs such as security, stability, and provision of 
basic services are met.
Successful states are therefore characterized by the right balance of this inter-
connected triumvirate—authority, legitimacy, and capacity. When this balance 
does not exist, a state is said to be in crisis. As the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development (USAID) was to put it in the mid-2000s, such states are 
defined by a “central government [that] does not exert significant control over 
its own territory or is unable or unwilling to assure the provision of vital services 
to significant parts of its territory where legitimacy of the government is weak or 
non-existent, and where violent conflict is a reality or a great risk.”11 By assessing 
states’ relative degrees of authority, legitimacy, and capacity, academic and devel-
opment research attempted to correlate gaps in one or more of these attributes 
with what were described as weak, fragile, fragmented, or stressed states.
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Throughout these debates, the case of Palestine and the Palestinian National 
Authority has provided a prominent laboratory for these theoretical claims. Large 
levels of donor funding have gone towards building the institutions of the Pales-
tinian National Authority since its establishment in 1994. In many ways, as numer-
ous government and donor reports have noted, the PNA’s institutional capacity 
has consistently been viewed as an international exemplar in relation to state-
building.12 Moreover, given the ongoing reality of Israel’s occupation, Palestine 
also remains a key focus of the debates around “peace-building” and state forma-
tion. In this respect, it is instructive to turn to how these state-formation debates 
have unfolded in the Palestinian context.
State-Building in Palestine
The debates around state formation in Palestine are closely linked to an  assessment 
of the negotiations process between Israel and the PLO that began in the early 
1990s with the Oslo Accords. Drawing upon the “liberal peace” theory, the  creation 
of a functioning Palestinian state was portrayed as means of fostering a success-
ful peace process—typically understood through the lens of guaranteeing Israel’s 
security. A particularly significant role in this was played by the World Bank, 
which issued its influential six-volume study, Developing the Occupied  Territories: 
An Investment in Peace, in early 1993, laying out “a path to reforming, reorganizing 
and stabilizing the OPT’s economic and social balance . . . and preparing its eco-
nomic integration into the broader set of regional neoliberal interests.”13 Accord-
ing to one critic, the logic essentially came down to the argument that “building 
a democratic Palestinian state would buttress the peace process.”14 The European 
Union was a prime advocate of this approach, arguing in its 1999 Berlin Declara-
tion that it was “convinced that the creation of a democratic, viable and peaceful 
sovereign Palestinian state . . . would be the best guarantee of Israel’s security.”15
Based on this perspective, and drawing heavily from the wider theoretical 
 literature outlined above, donor support to the PNA since the mid-1990s has 
focused on building the institutional elements of the PNA’s capacity and author-
ity. Following the end of the Second Intifada in the early 2000s, the death of 
Yasser Arafat in 2004, and the split between the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 
2006— leading the PNA to become largely territorialized in the West Bank—this 
orientation was codified in the November 2007 Palestinian Reform and Develop-
ment Plan for 2008–2010 (PRDP). Written with the assistance of the World Bank 
and other IMF advisors, the PRDP became the guiding framework for Palestinian 
development policy, particularly in the West Bank areas where the PNA was well 
established. In many ways, the PRDP explicitly confirmed the neoliberal orienta-
tion of state-building highlighted above. It committed the PNA to undertaking 
a series of fiscal reforms aimed at reducing public expenditure on public sector 
wages and employment, as well as supporting private sector-led development of 
key sectors such as housing, infrastructure, and industry. The overall goal was to 
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reach a “diversified and thriving free market economy led by a pioneering private 
sector that is in harmony with the Arab world, [and] is open to regional and global 
markets.”16 External donor funding to the PNA was linked to its implementation, 
and these flows were to be controlled through a dedicated bank account managed 
by the World Bank.
The other aspect of PNA state formation that was heavily promoted as part 
of the PRDP and other donor assistance was security. Connected explicitly to the 
notions of state “authority” and “peace through state-building,” security expen-
diture was to become a major focus of foreign support. Essential to this was the 
reconstitution and unification of PNA security forces through the open financial 
and logistical support of Western military and intelligence agencies. The PNA 
security budget was allocated the largest portion of all funding in the PRDP (257 
million dollars), with money going to the training of new police and intelligence 
forces as well as the construction of new prisons. A US Army officer, Lieutenant 
General Keith Dayton—fresh from his position as head of the search for alleged 
“weapons of mass destruction” in Iraq, following the 2003 US-led invasion—
served as the key point person for the training of Palestinian police from 2005 to 
2010. Headquartered in Tel Aviv and supported by British, Canadian, and Turkish 
personnel, Dayton’s mission involved running two training compounds in Jordan 
and the West Bank for Palestinian security forces.17
In this manner, PNA state formation was largely conceived through a tech-
nocratic lens, with a focus on building the (neoliberal-oriented) capacity of 
state institutions, and developing the “monopoly of violence” within the territo-
ries administered by the PNA (understood, as noted, through the perspective of 
 ensuring Israeli security). These themes—encapsulating the authority and capac-
ity features of the state-building theory—were strongly supported by US and EU 
policymakers, institutions such as the Quartet, the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as nongovernmental donor organizations.
Despite the uniformity in international support for this model of state- building, 
a number of important studies have raised significant critiques regarding donor 
approaches to state-building in Palestine.18 One early influential critique of the 
dominant approach to state formation in Palestine has been offered by Mushtaq 
Khan. Echoing a shift in the focus of state-building discourse towards the ques-
tion of legitimacy, Khan has highlighted the problematic nature of donor sup-
port for the PNA’s technocratic capacities—in which emphasis is placed on the 
effectiveness and viability of state functions rather than popular endorsement 
of PNA rule.19 Identifying a two-way relationship between what he describes as 
state functions and state legitimacy, Khan notes three possible feedback routes 
through which these two variables could potentially impact one another. First, 
state legitimacy is partially dependent upon the provision of functions by the state. 
In the case of the PNA, this has been the traditional focus of donor assistance, 
which has consequently emphasized the building of the technical and bureaucratic 
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 capacities of the state-in-formation. Secondly, however, Khan notes that the choice 
of what functions are provided is inherently a political one—if certain functions 
are  prioritized over others, and these do not correspond with the “distribution of 
political values, organizations and aspirations in a country,” then the legitimacy 
of the state is likely to be undermined.20 In the case of Palestine, Khan argues that 
this process of prioritization has largely been determined by external powers and 
has traditionally focused upon the provision of security guarantees to the occupy-
ing power and a developmental model that reflects the concerns of foreign inter-
ests. Finally, a third possible feedback route is the impact that declining legitimacy 
has on the viability of the state itself. If a state lacks legitimacy, according to Khan, 
then it becomes more and more difficult for it to provide the requisite services. 
What may ensue is a vicious cycle, in which declining legitimacy fuels declining 
ability to provide functions, leading to further declines in legitimacy.21
Similarly, other scholars have focused on the contradiction between attempting 
to build “normal” state institutions in the context of an ongoing—and deepen-
ing—Israeli occupation.22 As the International Crisis Group noted in 2002, for 
many Palestinians, “the idea of modernising the PNA and instruments of gover-
nance—while under military occupation is either impossible or meaningless.”23 
Precisely because the PNA was established with the prioritization of Israeli secu-
rity in mind, and with its sovereignty and extent of authority contingent on ful-
filling this task, it “might be more accurately characterised as an extension of the 
Israeli security apparatus.”24 As Mandy Turner put it in her analysis of Hamas’ 
electoral victory in 2006, “we are, at present, witnessing the problems inherent 
in a peace process which created an institution, the PA, whose primary task was 
to deliver security to a powerful neighbour who retained control over PA borders 
and economy. This task . . . is in contradiction to promoting the development of 
a sovereign and democratic Palestinian state—a process that is dependent upon a 
resolution of the conflict and the end of Israeli occupation.”25
In this context, flows of aid to the PNA take on a particularly pernicious role, 
as they are “mostly geared toward enhancing, if not engineering, the legitimacy 
of the PNA in the West Bank within the straightjacket imposed by the Oslo 
peace process and in accordance with the exigencies of the Israeli occupation.”26 
Because “the real obstacles to the economic development of the territories were 
not weak institutions but instead the intensifying occupation-related elements 
which donors were refusing to deal with,” donor activity served to depoliticize the 
occupation itself.27 In this sense, Israeli settler-colonialism comes to be seen as a 
question of administrative regulations that may potentially constrain Palestinian 
development (or indeed, assist it), rather than as a form of power that necessarily 
penetrates all aspects of Palestinian society.28 The technocratic approach towards 
state-building thus involves an elision of power relations, which leads to the incor-
poration of Israeli colonialism into the process of development itself.29 In short, 
the pacification of the Palestinian population, rather than any genuine concern 
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with  Palestinian self-determination or conditions of life in the OPT, becomes the 
primary goal and result of Western (and Israeli) policy.30
All of these critiques make important contributions to unpacking the supposed 
neutrality of the dominant approach to Palestinian state-building and revealing 
the relations of power that continue to structure development options in the area. 
Yet while this literature stresses the ongoing reality of Israeli occupation and its 
relationship to the politics of the PNA, it is a contention of this chapter that the 
problem with the dominant literature is a broader one, which lies in its theoretical 
conception of the state. Specifically, the neo-Weberian understanding of the state 
is itself flawed, in that it constructs an ideal-type of the state that is premised on an 
artificial separation between “state” and “society” (or “politics” and “economics”) 
and thus abstract the power relations—particularly those of class—that necessarily 
typify all capitalist societies, from its analysis of the state and state-building.
Rethinking State Theory: Alternatives to Neo-Weberianism  
and Neoliberal Approaches
Hugo Radice has noted the relationship between much of the general state- 
formation literature and the “developmental state” approach that was popularized 
in the 1980s and 1990s during the so-called East Asian miracle.31 The latter explains 
the impressive growth rates of countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan 
on the basis of the supposed autonomy of their states, which was said to enable a 
balance of contending social interests and well-coordinated government-led poli-
cies prioritizing growth and domestic industrial development. In this sense, both 
sets of literature share a neo-Weberian conception of the state, rooted in liberal 
ideology that thinks of the state as “as a public realm separate from the private 
realm of civil society.”32 The core assumption is a conception of the state as an 
autonomous body that stands above social relations, with its primary function the 
facilitation of markets and the rule of law.
Against these neo-Weberian perspectives, Radice and numerous other crit-
ics have argued that the state, as an institution, is never and cannot be neutral—
rather, it should be understood as a “form of appearance” of the social relations 
that constitute society. The state is an institutional form of these social relations, 
one which acts to maintain the existing class structure, mediate the conflicts that 
inevitably appear between and within classes, and allow these relations to repro-
duce themselves.33 The apparent neutrality of the state and its separation from 
society is thus ideological—acting to conceal the relations of power that underlie 
all capitalist social formations.34 Although the state may really appear to us in this 
neutral form, we need to penetrate below this appearance to grasp the state as a 
social relation, which, in the words of the philosopher Bertell Ollman, constitutes 
a “set of institutional forms through which a ruling class relates to the rest of soci-
ety.”35 The state is not an independent, distinct sphere, severed from the social 
structure that  generates its character, rather “state and society are interdependent 
and interpenetrate in a multitude of different ways.”36
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Seen in this manner, the separation between politics (embodied in the state) and 
a supposedly independent civil society (encompassing the market) is  illusory—
even as a normative goal. Academic approaches that present the ideal of liberal 
democracy as the desired policy end—supposedly guaranteeing the same rights 
and responsibilities for all “civil society actors” regardless of wealth, social status, 
or accident of birth—act to obscure the reality of social power that is  foundational 
to the ways that markets work. These approaches abstract the real, substantive dif-
ferences of power among individuals due to their socioeconomic role, that is, their 
class position, instead positing individuals as equal citizens with the same rights 
and responsibilities vis-à-vis the state. Within these neo- Weberian conceptions, 
markets are also neutralized, seen as instruments of “resource  allocation rather 
than exploitation.”37 As a result, much of both the developmental and state-forma-
tion literature wields concepts such as “governance,” “civil society,” and “partici-
pation” in a principally obfuscatory manner—“deflect[ing] the citizen from class 
identification in favour of a contractual relationship with the state,” while simul-
taneously, “the representative-politics component of the relationship has been 
largely reduced to a circulation of political elites through a banal and etiolated 
electoral form of democracy.”38 By treating the state as a disconnected and neu-
tral “thing” rather than as a relation formed alongside the development of social 
structures, the dominant state-building literature treats the institutional forms of 
society as determinant rather than determined.39
The implications of this perspective for understanding state-formation in Pal-
estine are two-fold. First, it allows us to penetrate the ideological form contained 
within the standard themes of authority, capacity, and legitimacy that dominate 
Palestinian (and the wider) state-building literature. While these features may 
indeed be necessary functions that all states perform, they are nonetheless func-
tions of capitalist states (about this, the normative, market-oriented prescriptions 
of state-building literature are unequivocal). To pose these categories as if they 
can be understood in the abstract—or through undifferentiated aggregates such 
as “the people” or “the national interest”—only serves to conceal the ever-present 
relations of power. Instead, we should ask questions like: Authority—in whose 
hands? Capacity—to do what, and in whose interest? Legitimacy—in whose eyes? 
If the state is not, in fact, a neutral, distinct sphere then these questions are neces-
sarily presupposed; to posit them in their abstract, general form only serves to 
disappear power itself.
Secondly, approaching the state through the social relations that produce its 
particular forms means that it is necessary to map these relations of power in their 
entirety. In the case of Palestine, this is clearly inseparable from the settler-colonial 
character of the Israeli state, as the critical literature surveyed above affirms. To 
treat Palestinian state-building as a technical exercise of authority, capacity, and 
legitimacy that can be achieved in partnership—or at least within and alongside—
an ongoing colonial occupation acts again to disappear power relations. But the 
critical literature, in this respect, does not go far enough. It is the contention of this 
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chapter that it is necessary to view Palestinian social relations in their regional con-
text—to understand the way that class formation under the Palestinian National 
Authority is deeply interpenetrated with the regional political economy. This can 
tell us a great deal about the state-building project as it currently is framed, as well 
as the obstacles to alternative models of state formation.
SITUATING PALESTINE IN THE REGIONAL C ONTEXT
Central to any understanding of the Middle East is an appreciation of the region’s 
insertion within the global economy and its role in shaping the architecture of 
international power relations. In this respect, there are two interlinked dynamics 
that have shaped the region’s development since the early twentieth century. The 
first of these is the fundamental place of hydrocarbons—oil and gas—in power-
ing global capitalism. Oil and gas came to underpin the shifts in global produc-
tion chains in the post-World War II era, constituting a strategic commodity that 
fueled industrial, transportation, and military networks, and formed the feedstock 
of petrochemical products such as synthetic rubbers, plastics, and fertilizers.40 
Through the postwar period, the Middle East—notably the oil-rich region of the 
Gulf Arab states—became the core global supply source for the extraction and 
export of relatively cheap and accessible hydrocarbons. Simultaneously, the sale of 
these hydrocarbons facilitated the flow of large amounts of capital, which came to 
be known as petrodollars, into the Gulf. The redirection of these petrodollar sur-
pluses into US and European financial markets was a vital feature of the way that 
the architecture of global finance developed through the 1960s and 1970s, helping 
to underpin the reserve status of the US dollar as well as the emergence of debt and 
other financial markets through these decades.41 In the context of these two inter-
related dynamics of oil and finance, foreign domination of the region constituted 
a key strategic element to the balance of rivalries between different global powers; 
this was particularly significant with the shift from a largely European-centered 
colonial system to an international state system structured around US hegemony 
in the postwar period.
These global issues intersected with local, regional dynamics—most 
notably the various anticolonial and nationalist movements that emerged through 
the 1950s and 1960s in countries such as Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, Syria, and Iraq. As 
new governments came to power in these states, they attempted to pursue statist 
forms of development that prioritized domestic control of industry, the provision 
of social services backed by food and fuel subsidies, the expansion of higher edu-
cation, and the guarantee of employment to university graduates within  growing 
public sectors. These policies led to an improvement in living conditions for much 
of the region’s population, but they were also characterized by repressive forms of 
rule aimed at curtailing any independent political action.42 In response to these 
developments, Western governments—led by the United States—sought to roll 
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back the growing independence movements in the region. At the political level, 
this was pursued through the consolidation of alliances with three main regional 
allies: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel. Financial and military aid to these three 
countries helped to strengthen their positions within regional hierarchies, and, in 
return, these states moved to confront and undermine the nationalist or left-wing 
movements that were growing in influence across the Middle East.
Israel played a particularly significant role in this process. Because it had 
emerged as a settler-colonial state founded upon the expulsion of around three-
quarters of the original Palestinian population, Israel depended upon foreign sup-
port for its ongoing viability and the maintenance of its ethno-religious character 
as a self-defined Jewish state.43 In this sense, it was a much more reliable partner 
of foreign powers than Arab regimes that faced ever-present pressure from their 
own citizen populations. Following the 1967 war, in which the Israeli military dealt 
a devastating blow to Arab nationalist regimes in Syria and Egypt—and expanded 
its occupation of Arab land to the West Bank, Gaza Strip, (Egyptian) Sinai Pen-
insula, and (Syrian) Golan Heights—the United States became the country’s key 
patron, supplying it annually with billions of dollars’ worth of military hardware 
and financial support. Indeed, one former US intelligence officer has been quoted 
as claiming that the US-Israel military relationship was worth “five CIAs” and that 
upkeep of an armed force equivalent to Israel’s in the Middle East would cost US 
taxpayers 125 billion dollars.44
In the wake of these military defeats—soon followed by the global economic 
recession of the early 1970s, and the subsequent erosion of Arab nationalist 
regimes—the door was opened for the reconfiguration of the regional politi-
cal economy. Through the latter part of the 1970s and 1980s, virtually all Arab 
 governments began laying the ground for a range of structural adjustment pack-
ages that embodied the basic precepts of neoliberal reform. Most notably, this 
involved the dismantling of collective and state property rights in land, the begin-
nings of privatization and cut-backs to the state sector, and opening up to foreign 
trade and financial flows. Although the pace of these changes varied considerably 
across the region, by the early 1990s most Arab states had made significant steps 
along this new path.45
The changes during this period coincided with—and were closely connected 
to—the rise to prominence of the state- and peace-building literature surveyed 
above. The cases of Iraq and Palestine were the two central foci of this policy shift 
in the Middle East. In Iraq, the themes of democracy promotion, regime change, 
and state-building adumbrated the devastating decade-long sanctions regime 
imposed on the country in the 1990s and the US/British-led invasion of 2003, 
which led to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the establishment of a new 
US-led Coalition Provisional Authority. Simultaneously, the Palestinian Authority 
was formed in 1994 as part of the Oslo peace process discussed above. These politi-
cal developments were accompanied by a rearticulation of both US and EU policy 
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towards the region itself. In the case of US policy, hegemony over the Middle East 
continued to center upon alliances with Israel, the Gulf states, and client regimes 
such as Egypt and Jordan (the strategic link with Iran was broken with the 1979 
revolution). There was a change, however, in how these alliances were conceived. 
Most importantly, through the 1990s and 2000s, US policy shifted towards the 
explicit aim of developing closer political and economic ties between these three 
pillars of support within the region. Articulated under the concept of “the New 
Middle East,” the policy sought to tie these different zones together within a single 
economic zone. To do so required the dropping of Arab boycotts towards Israel 
and the development of joint investments and other economic projects. “Normal-
ization” of Israel’s ties with Arab states thus became a central focus of US policy 
in the region.46
In this respect, the Oslo negotiations were an important feature of integrat-
ing Israel into the region. Most significantly, Oslo would provide a Palestinian 
“green light” for Arab normalization with Israel. For Israel, this process would 
also enable a shift in its own economic orientation. Following an economic crisis 
in 1985 the Israeli economy had moved towards high-value added exports con-
nected to development of information technology, pharmaceuticals, and military 
industries. Growth in these sectors was enabled by US financial support—indeed, 
for many decades Israel had been the recipient of US aid without the conditions 
that were tied to loans made to Arab states. Moreover, since the signing of a US 
free trade agreement with Israel in 1985, the United States had run a significant 
trade deficit with Israel. In this context, the attempt to normalize Israel’s relations 
with other Arab states would further facilitate the internationalization of Israeli 
capital itself—allowing foreign investors to invest in the country without fear of 
Arab boycotts and marking the expansion of Israeli companies through core stock 
markets in the United States and European Union.47
Between 1994 and 1998, a series of intergovernmental summits known as the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Economic Summits codified this trend 
towards normalization. The first of these, held in Morocco in 1994, saw concrete 
steps towards the lifting of regional economic boycotts and the establishment of 
a Middle East-wide chamber of commerce. Then-US Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher was to note that “the Middle East is open for business .  .  . the con-
ference could be the beginning of a beautiful friendship.”48 Subsequent MENA 
summits in Cairo and Amman explicitly tied normalization with the deepening 
of neoliberal reform processes, including—as the Cairo conference final resolu-
tion noted—“privatisation, structural reform, and removing trade barriers” which 
were said to provide “for a more business-friendly economic climate throughout 
the region.”49
One important indication of these regional shifts was the establishment of 
qualified industrial zones (QIZ) in Jordan and Egypt. QIZ provided duty-free 
access to US markets for Jordanian and Egyptian exporters, provided that a  certain 
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 percentage of inputs were from Israel (8 percent in the case of Jordan, 11.7 percent 
in the case of Egypt). Launched in 1997, these QIZ perhaps best symbolized the 
new era of normalization between Arab capital and Israel. In 2004, Egypt also 
launched its first QIZ in an agreement with Israel and the United States. Six more 
QIZs were approved in subsequent years, and from 2005 to 2008 exports from 
these zones grew at an annual average rate of 58 percent, ten times that of total 
exports from Egypt to the United States.50 Since their establishment, they have 
come to dominate bilateral trade between the United States and Jordan and Egypt 
respectively. In 2007, the US government was reporting that exports from the thir-
teen QIZs established in Jordan accounted for a massive 70 percent of total Jor-
danian exports to the United States.51 In 2008, close to one-third of Egypt’s total 
exports to the United States came from QIZs.52 By 2013, this figure had risen to 
nearly 50 percent.53
Despite the eruption of the Second Intifada in 2000, the orientation towards 
normalization, neoliberal reform, and the strengthening of US influence in 
the region continued to deepen. In mid-2003, George W. Bush announced the 
US aim to establish a Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) by 2013, which 
was envisioned as encompassing the region from North Africa to the Gulf. The 
means to achieving this free trade area were a range of bilateral economic agree-
ments between the United States and individual Arab states, eventually joined 
together within a single zone. Importantly, these free trade agreements contained 
clauses that committed these states to lift any boycotts on Israel. Pointedly, they 
were also connected within US government discourse with the “democratization” 
discourse described earlier. Robert Zoellick, for example, who acted as US trade 
representative in the early 2000s, was to note that the goal of this regional trading 
bloc was “to assist nations that are ready to embrace economic liberty and the rule 
of law, integrate into the global trading system, and bring their economies into 
the modern era.”54 Although MEFTA ultimately proved unable to reach its goal of 
establishing a regional free trade area, it did lead to four new free trade agreements 
with countries in the Middle East: Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman. Prior 
to MEFTA, the only bilateral free trade agreement the United States held in the 
region was with Israel, completed in 1985.55
In parallel to these US trade agreements through the 1990s and 2000s, the 
European Union also sought to deepen its influence in the region. In this case, 
the focus was on countries surrounding the Mediterranean, reflecting the 
 longstanding economic ties between Europe and North Africa in particular. 
The European Union’s moves in this direction, like those of the United States, have 
promoted liberalization of economies and normalization with Israel. These goals 
were initially expressed in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also called 
the Barcelona Process, which was established in 1995 with representatives from 
Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the PNA, Syria, 
Tunisia, and Turkey. The Barcelona Process aimed at creating “open economies 
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by the opening-up of markets . . . [and] the elimination of trade barriers.”56 This 
would include a focus on “fiscal, administrative and legal reforms as well as dereg-
ulation of public services . . . in order to raise the level of foreign direct investment 
in the southern Mediterranean economies.”57 Following the establishment of the 
EMP, the European Union moved to sign a range of individual treaties, known as 
association agreements, with Mediterranean countries.58 These association agree-
ments required EMP countries to liberalize trade and domestic markets in order 
to receive access to financial aid and European export markets.
In the wake of these internationally driven restructuring processes— 
accompanied by the increased engagement of international financial institutions 
in the development of Arab government economic policy—was a pronounced 
 deepening of neoliberal reform processes throughout the 2000s. By 2009, the 
Middle East as a whole was acclaimed by the World Bank as the region with 
the second greatest jump in liberalization measures of any in the world—seven-
teen out of nineteen countries recorded advances in this regard. This was most 
clearly marked in Egypt where the so-called “government of businessmen” of the 
mid-2000s won plaudits from the World Bank and other international institu-
tions; but, more  generally, Arab governments moved decisively in this period 
towards adopting policies such as privatization, labor market deregulation, and 
opening up to trade and financial flows. Importantly, however, this extension of 
neoliberalism did not only involve shifts in national economic policy. Accompa-
nying these trends, large Arab conglomerates—most notably those based in the 
Gulf region—utilized  market liberalization to expand their own regional activi-
ties. This  internationalization of largely Gulf-based capital—facilitated by the 
rapid rise in oil prices (and hence surplus capital) from 2000 to 2008—meant 
that class  structures within individual Arab states became increasingly imbricated 
with ownership structures involving Gulf investors.59 This is partially indicated by 
figures on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows originating in the Gulf, notably 
to the Mashreq subregion: indeed, from 2003 to 2010, Gulf investments made up 
75 percent of total FDI inflows for Lebanon, 69 percent for Jordan, 61 percent for 
Syria, 59 percent for Egypt, and 46 percent for Iraq.60 These capital flows were 
especially marked in the real estate, financial, telecommunications, and retail 
 sectors—but also involved the extension of Gulf-based ownership of logistics, 
manufacturing, and industrial assets.
This particular feature of the regional political economy has critical implica-
tions for understanding Palestinian state formation as it is currently conceived. 
From 2003 to 2008, more than two-thirds of total global FDI projects announced 
in PNA-controlled areas originated in the Gulf region.61 These figures are a tiny 
proportion of total Gulf-origin FDI in the wider region (less than 1 percent), but 
for the Palestinian economy they are substantial. Moreover, they do not capture 
other important Gulf capital flows to the PNA—including budgetary support, 
development loans, and portfolio investment in the Palestinian stock market.
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It is necessary, however, to conceptualize the internationalization of Gulf capi-
tal in a wider sense than simply FDI flows. Most significantly, internationalization 
has occurred through the “return” to Palestine of diaspora Palestinian groups who 
are headquartered or largely based in neighboring countries (particularly Jordan 
and the Gulf). Two prominent examples are the Al Masri and Khoury family 
groups, both of whom locate their origins in pre-1948 Palestine. The initial capital 
accumulation of these groups was closely connected to state formation in the Gulf 
states, through the establishment of companies involved in the laying of pipelines, 
engineering and construction, and the provision of services to the Gulf ’s oil and 
gas industries. Since that time, the original companies founded by these family 
groups have expanded across the Middle East, but a key zone of their  accumulation 
remains located in the Gulf. Following the signing of the Oslo Accords and the 
establishment of the PNA in the 1990s, this diaspora capital became integral to 
the development of the new Palestinian economy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
This took place through direct investments and the establishment of subsidiaries 
in the OPT, as well as through the formation of an important network of hold-
ing companies that linked this diaspora class to state capital (ultimately funded 
through foreign aid to the PNA) and local elites.
The outcome of these cross-border ownership ties linking the diaspora and the 
local Palestinian market has been an economy largely dominated by Palestinian 
capital groups based in the Gulf, as well as Gulf investors. In banking and finance, 
for example, such groups directly control fifteen out of the seventeen banks in 
operation in PNA-controlled areas.62 These include the three most  important 
banks (the Bank of Palestine, the Arab Bank, and Cairo Amman Bank), which 
between them operate nearly half of all bank branches in the Palestinian terri-
tories. In telecommunications, two companies—Paltel and Wataniya Mobile— 
completely monopolize Palestinian cellular, fixed landlines, and Internet service 
provision in the West Bank. The first is controlled through a holding company that 
is dominated by the Masri family and a range of other diaspora investors (mostly 
from the Gulf), while the second is a subsidiary of a Qatari telecom company. 
Similar patterns of ownership and control over key Palestinian economic sectors 
can be seen in real estate, manufacturing and transport, retail, and energy.63
These characteristics of Palestinian class structure help to illuminate the 
 neoliberal form of state-building under the PNA. As noted earlier, in line with 
the wider regional trends, the PNA has pursued a clear neoliberal project over the 
past decade that has been codified in the PRDP and subsequent national 
 development plans. This trajectory is not simply a reflection of policies driven by 
international financial institutions, but has actually helped constitute the PNA as a 
principal conduit of wealth transfer to the large, internationalized conglomerates 
that  dominate the Palestinian economy. Affirming the perspective on state the-
ory outlined above, the PNA appears as an institutional form (or social relation) 
expressing the dominance and interests of these (largely diasporic) capital groups.
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Moreover, this configuration of class and state helps to clarify the social forces 
that underlie the PNA’s incorporation into the structures of the Israeli occupa-
tion. Closely tied to the major regional powers in the Arab world, the social class 
embodied by these large conglomerates remains reliant upon power structures 
in the Gulf and the regional order constructed over recent decades. Moreover, in 
Palestine itself, its reproduction as a class is contingent upon the particular form 
of state-building materialized through the PNA—including the neoliberal policy 
trajectory and the economic policies that have unfolded through the Oslo process. 
Palestinian state and class structures are thus intimately linked, with each side of 
the equation shaping the characteristics of the other.
C ONCLUSION:  IMPLICATIONS FOR ALTERNATIVE 
MODELS OF STATE FORMATION
Before returning to the question of Palestinian state-building in light of these 
dynamics, it is necessary to briefly discuss how the regional framework has 
changed following the 2011 Arab uprisings. In their initial phases, the uprisings 
represented an important moment of popular hope across the region, embodying 
a rejection of neoliberal authoritarianism and aspirations for a long sought-after 
transformation in socioeconomic and political rights. In many ways, these upris-
ings represented the most significant upsurge of popular mobilization since the 
postwar Arab nationalist struggles; the striking manner in which their political 
and social forms generalized rapidly across all states in the Middle East indicated 
a profound challenge to the regional order of the past five decades.
Since this initial phase, Western powers and their regional allies have moved 
decisively in an attempt to reconstitute state structures and the local bases of sup-
port on which their hegemony depends. Despite ongoing struggles, established 
elites have largely been able to win back political power. Military- and state-sup-
ported repression was a critical element in this return to the status quo—seen, for 
example, in the assassinations of Tunisian opposition leaders Chokri Belaid and 
Mohammed Brahmi in 2013, and the May 2013 military coup in Egypt. Simulta-
neously, the devastating repression of the Assad regime in Syria and the ongoing 
disintegration of the Iraqi state helped to spur the growth of sectarian and Islamic 
fundamentalist movements across the region, further disrupting the social and 
political goals initially embodied in the uprisings.
Given the social justice aspirations of the uprisings, it is particularly significant 
that there has been little change in the near-universal hegemony of the neoliberal 
development model post-2011. The Deauville Partnership, an initiative launched 
at the May 2011 G8 Summit in France and led by the major international  financial 
institutions, which promised up to forty billion US dollars in loans and other 
 assistance towards Arab countries “in transition,” was premised upon a neoliberal 
orientation in all its essential elements.64 Since that time, both the World Bank 
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and IMF have deepened their engagement in the region, rolling out new loan 
 agreements and assistance that are in essential continuity with past programs—
emphasizing private-sector driven growth, fiscal austerity (particularly subsidy 
and pension reform), and the liberalization of financial and labor markets.65 Inter-
national actors, notably the EBRD, have also entered the region for the first time—
making explicit the argument that state-building necessarily involves the twinning 
of liberal democracy and neoliberal economic policy. Indeed, the current socio-
economic and political crises are frequently portrayed by IFIs as an opportunity to 
extend the policy trajectories of past regimes. As the European Investment Bank 
noted not long after the overthrow of Ben Ali and Mubarak, “moments of political 
change can also represent an opportunity to reinforce or improve already existing 
institutional frameworks.”66
The Gulf states have played a central role in shaping the new political arrange-
ments that emerged in the post-2011 period. This has involved financial and politi-
cal support to new governments, political movements, and armed groups. The 
battle to assert regional hegemony has been marked by the surfacing of severe 
rivalries within the Gulf itself (e.g., between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on one 
side, and Qatar on the other), which has frequently led to different Gulf states 
sponsoring opposing forces in neighboring Arab states. Economically the Gulf 
also remained dominant in the years after the uprisings, with an ever-widening 
gap emerging between it and the rest of the region from 2011 to 2014. This differ-
entiation of power and wealth can be attributed to both the ways in which  different 
zones of the Middle East have been inserted into the world market as well as the 
enduring crises of the region. With the relatively stable emergence of the Gulf 
states from the global crisis of 2008 and the high oil prices that continued from 
2010 to mid-2014, Gulf states were able to accumulate vast quantities of surplus 
capital. Even following the collapse in oil prices in 2014, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council states have continued to play a dominant political and economic role in 
the Arab world.67 At the same time, the rest of the region has been faced with the 
ongoing weakness of major trading partners—particularly the European Union—
and the political and social crises of states such as Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, and 
Syria. The ensuing regional differentiation is a critical characteristic of the contem-
porary moment.
Throughout these developments, Israel’s integration into the Arab world con-
tinues to be an important focus of long-term Western policy—despite the popular 
Arab antipathy towards this goal. In particular, from 2015 onwards, the increas-
ingly close relationship between Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE has become 
apparent in joint military exercises, commercial and economic ties—most con-
spicuously in the security, surveillance, and high tech sectors—as well as open 
visits of high-ranking political figures. Israel also emerged as one of the earliest 
endorsers of the Saudi-UAE actions against Qatar in mid-2017, echoing its grow-
ing convergence with Saudi Arabia and the UAE on many of the key political 
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questions in the region. These developments also set the stage for the Abraham 
Accords, signed in August 2020, which officially recognized the normalization of 
economic relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain.
All of these features of the contemporary moment affirm that the characteris-
tics of class and state formation in Palestine will continue to be shaped by develop-
ments at the regional scale. Given this fact, what does the analysis of this chapter 
say about the possibilities for models of state formation that could encompass the 
aspirations of Palestinian self-determination? Most significantly, what conditions 
are necessary for an alternative path that breaks from the current situation under 
the PNA, and moves towards including the totality of the Palestinian people—not 
least those that live outside the borders of the West Bank and Gaza Strip?
The first aspect to emphasize in this regard is one of the core premises of this 
chapter: the importance of not approaching the question of state formation in 
the abstract—that is, as simply a technocratic question of arranging institutional 
forms to best meet a checklist of preconceived functions such as authority, legiti-
macy, and capacity. The character of the state needs to be seen as reflective of social 
and other power structures that are delineated across various spatial scales. The 
state is not a neutral apparatus that sits above these structures, but rather a social 
relation that enables ruling groups to maintain their dominant position  vis-à-vis 
those who are dominated. In this sense, it is imperative to consider, on the one 
hand, the social forces that underlie existing state arrangements, and, on the other 
hand, those that may enable alternative models of state-building to emerge. With-
out assessing these social forces, analyses of state formation that focus simply on 
a normative “recipe” of institution-building or establish moral criteria for how 
those states should function tend to abstract the concrete relations of power and 
thus—inadvertently or not—reinforce those very relations.
In the Palestinian case, this paper has surveyed the critical literature of state-
building, which correctly highlights the ongoing reality of Israeli occupation and 
the importance of incorporating the impact of this settler-colonial context into an 
understanding of the PNA state-building project. It has also, however, argued for 
the need to situate this project within the wider context of the regional political 
economy. This includes an appreciation of the ways in which the state system arose 
in the Middle East, fully located within the global economy, and the more recent 
changes in regional accumulation patterns that have occurred under the aegis of 
US power. The significant realignment of the regional political economy through 
the 1990s and early 2000s was driven by a variety of intersecting factors: mili-
tary conflict and state-building (with Iraq as the principle illustration of this); the 
widespread adoption of neoliberal policies by all states in the region; the impetus 
towards deepening regional trade and financial linkages embodied in the  various 
projects promoted by the United States, European Union, and international finan-
cial institutions; and the increasing intermeshing of capital ownership across the 
regional space, typified most sharply in the internationalization of  Gulf-based 
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capital. All of these emerging features of the regional political economy were pro-
foundly connected with the normalization of Arab relations with the Israeli state. 
And in this respect, the formation of the PNA and the extension of its state-build-
ing project across the West Bank was a central feature of the period.
The internationalization of regional capital—particularly that originating in the 
Gulf Arab states—is essential to understanding the nature of class formation under 
the Palestinian National Authority. The class that has emerged as a result of these 
processes is interiorized within the structures of the PNA state-in-formation, and 
simultaneously constituted at the regional scale through its ongoing accumulation 
activities in the Gulf and other neighboring countries. In this sense, Palestinian 
capital reproduces itself across different spatial scales that cannot be confined to 
the national “borders”—however ill-defined—that exist within the OPT. Breaking 
with nationalist methodological perspectives that treat social relations as neatly 
circumscribed within these borders is thus imperative to a full appreciation of 
state/class relations in the Palestinian context.
This internationalizing class is a particularly important frame through which 
to view the Palestinian state-building project as it is currently conceived. It con-
stitutes the primary social base of the PNA within Palestinian society, shaping the 
character of its policy-making and institution-building at the domestic level. It 
does so in full interaction with international state-building actors and the struc-
tures of the Israeli occupation and thus—in terms of assessing the various social 
forces at play within the state-building project—needs to be viewed as both a key 
element of the obduracy of the status quo, as well as a fundamental obstacle to any 
alternative paths of state formation.
Given this arrangement of social forces, any alternative model of state forma-
tion—notably that embodied in a single-state solution—is necessarily premised 
on a fundamental challenge to the position of current Palestinian elites, particu-
larly those whose accumulation is predicated upon the state/class relations ana-
lyzed in this chapter. Any just and progressive alternative model of state formation 
is thus unlikely to be an elite-driven project, but will take place in opposition to 
these elites and involve the dismantling and rejection of existing political econ-
omy structures in Palestine. It necessitates, in other words, not simply a political 
change, but must also involve tackling economic inequity and the dominance of 
the neoliberal paradigm. Moreover, because an alternative path in Palestine needs 
to occur in tandem with regional change, any full assessment of the prospects 
of Palestinian state formation is not solely a question of internal Palestinian (or 
indeed, Israeli) dynamics.
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Humanitarian Crisis and Lost Statehood
Tareq Baconi
The Oslo Accords defined a moment of transition in which the Palestinian 
 liberation project moved from a focus on armed struggle and revolution towards 
negotiation and state-building under occupation. While many were initially 
 hopeful about the Oslo Accords, one of the unexpected effects of these agreements 
was the split of the Palestinian movement into two projects: one that broadly 
remained committed to the principles of liberation as first articulated by the Pal-
estine Liberation Organization (PLO), and one that adopted a diplomatic path 
towards the  partition of Mandatory Palestine. These two projects have manifested 
themselves in  divisions between and within factions, the most explicit of which is 
the divide between Hamas, the Islamic resistance movement currently governing 
the Gaza Strip, and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in Ramallah. The 
Gaza Strip, as home to the Palestinian school of thought that remains committed 
to the PLO’s purist vision of armed struggle for liberation, albeit in an Islamist 
guise, is in many ways today a microcosm of the Palestinian national movement. 
It demonstrates in contemporary fashion the costs and limitations of remaining 
committed to central tenets of the Palestinian struggle. In that sense, the Gaza 
Strip is also the lynchpin of the debate for determining the future of the Palestinian 
national movement.
The Palestinian people are currently undergoing a period of transition into 
a post-Oslo reality, the nature of which is yet to be determined. Many possible 
trajectories present themselves: a reorientation and strengthening of efforts to 
achieve self-determination within the context of a two-state model through inter-
nationalization efforts or multilateral diplomacy; a shift towards a rights-based 
movement and the launching of an anti-apartheid grassroots struggle; an armed 
uprising; or, most likely, a future that combines elements of all of the above. It 
is also probable that debates and introspection regarding the optimal path for-
ward will be preempted by a tipping point that is at this moment unforeseen. The 
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policies of an increasingly right-wing and messianic Israeli political establishment, 
backed by American support, are actively creating facts on the ground that could 
force Palestinians to react in one way or another, heightening their sense of uncer-
tainty and instability.
Regardless of the future trajectory of the Palestinian national movement, 
 policies that have now been imposed and institutionalized within the Gaza Strip 
must be contended with. The political reality that informs and justifies present 
attempts to separate and isolate the Gaza Strip is itself a symptom of a broader 
unwillingness to contend with the ongoing suffering of the Palestinian people, and 
their quest for a justice rooted in the catastrophic events of 1948. Past and con-
temporary political discourse, led primarily by Israel and the United States, seeks 
to avoid such a reckoning by adopting humanitarian, military, and/or economic 
means to assuage the need for a political resolution. Such efforts are clearest today 
in Gaza, where members of the international community deal with the strip vari-
ously as a humanitarian challenge or a terroristic security threat. Within such a 
framing, the political drivers that have given rise to the current situation in Gaza 
are effectively marginalized.
This has resulted in the emergence of a de facto reality where dealings with the 
question of Palestine are necessarily restricted to the West Bank, particularly 
the effort to address Israel’s colonization of the territories there. Yet such a focus 
will not in any way settle the principle drivers of Palestinian nationalism. Rather, 
it is imperative to know the underlying factors that animate the status quo in the 
Gaza Strip, and Israel’s disposition towards it, as these are representative of 
the core issues. To do so, one must also contend with the reality of Hamas. The fates 
of Hamas and the Gaza Strip over the past three decades have inadvertently come 
to be intertwined, and it is impossible to deal with one without understanding the 
other. During the present period of transition, as Palestinians rethink their visions 
of statehood and contemplate the future of their struggle, an understanding of this 
interplay between Hamas and Gaza, and the historical backdrop that has led us to 
the present moment in time, where two million Palestinians are sealed off by an 
unforgiving blockade, is essential.
HAMAS AND THE OSLO PRO CESS
In late 1988, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat convened the exiled leadership of 
the PLO in Algiers. The eruption of the First Intifada in the Occupied Territories 
had finally compelled Arafat to officially adopt policies the PLO had been con-
templating for years. Since Arafat had taken over the chairmanship of the PLO, 
and his movement, Fatah, had come to dominate its leadership, the PLO’s policies 
had been clear. PLO factions were conducting a revolutionary “global offensive” 
against Israel.1 According to a 1967 statement by Fatah, armed struggle was cen-
tral to this revolution. “Our correct understanding of the reality of the Zionist 
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occupation confirms to us that regaining the occupied homeland cannot happen 
except through armed violence as the sole, inevitable, unavoidable, and indispens-
able means in the battle of liberation.”2 Fatah’s statement goes on to describe the 
necessity of dismantling the “colonial base . . . of the Zionist occupation state” and 
asserts that its intellectual, social, political, military, and financial elements have to 
be destroyed before the Palestinian homeland can be liberated.3
Addressing the convened attendees in 1988, Arafat gave a speech that  conclusively 
broke with this trajectory. Rejecting the use of armed struggle for liberation, Ara-
fat declared the independence of the State of Palestine and invoked international 
resolutions that demonstrated the PLO’s willingness to accept a state on the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as the capital. Arafat’s declaration 
signaled the PLO’s readiness to concede the 78 percent of Palestinian land that had 
been lost in 1948 and to officially renounce terrorism.4 With this long-anticipated 
about-face, the PLO transitioned to a diplomatic track that was focused on achiev-
ing statehood on the remaining 22 percent of “historic  Palestine.”5
The PLO’s concessions were anathema for Hamas, the Islamic resistance move-
ment that had been created in December 1987, only a few months prior to  Arafat’s 
speech. In its charter, Hamas stressed the indivisibility of the land of historic 
Palestine, referring to the land that had constituted the British Mandate, located 
between the Eastern Mediterranean and the River Jordan, over which Israel had 
been established. Hamas defined this territory as “an Islamic land entrusted to 
the Muslim generations until Judgement Day.”6 The charter proclaimed that “jihad 
for the liberation of Palestine is obligatory.” No other path for liberation was viable. 
The movement dismissed diplomatic efforts as contrary to its ideology, primar-
ily because they were premised on conceding parts of Palestine, but also because 
Hamas believed they were unlikely to serve Palestinian interests. Instead, jihad 
was defined not as a tactic but rather a holistic and effective strategy around which 
the Palestinian community could rally.7
With Hamas’s charter and the PLO’s strategic shift, 1988 became a turning 
point that heralded a new phase of Palestinian nationalism.8 In that year, the PLO’s 
resolve to sustain the use of armed force to liberate historic Palestine appeared to 
wane. Almost seamlessly, Islamic nationalism rose to carry the mantle forward. 
While the PLO had risen at a time of global revolutionary anticolonialism, Hamas 
emerged against a regional backdrop of resurgent Islamism. The lessons that Fatah 
and the PLO had learned regarding the limitations of armed struggle and their 
path towards pacification were not seen as relevant to Hamas, which believed 
that its success was predestined.9 The movement’s leaders contended that Hamas’s 
Islamic character would offer a robust ideological framework through which to 
offset the worldly pressures that had hamstrung the PLO.
With Arafat’s concession, the Palestinian national movement conclusively 
moved away from the notion of liberation through arms towards state-building 
in the pursuit of independence. This transition culminated with the signing of 
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the Oslo Accords in 1993, which Hamas came out in full opposition against.10 The 
Oslo Accords enshrined the mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO, without 
officially making any commitments to Palestinian statehood. A central product 
of the Oslo Accords was the creation of the PNA. It was established in 1994 as a 
temporary administrative body that could govern portions of the Palestinian ter-
ritories for a transitional period of five years, when the conclusive settlement was 
to be reached.11 Among other governing tasks, the PNA was held accountable for 
security issues, as coordination mechanisms were put in place between the nascent 
entity and the Israeli army. Security was framed as a litmus test for Palestinian 
readiness to self-govern and a prerequisite for further Israeli withdrawal.12 While 
the PNA was restricted to administering the affairs of daily governance under 
occupation, responsibility for negotiations in the pursuit of liberation ostensibly 
continued to rest with the PLO.
The Oslo Accords precipitated what has become a chronic disagreement 
between the PLO and Hamas on the nature of the Palestinian national move-
ment, one that continues to this day. Palestinians under occupation hoped the 
Oslo Accords would bring statehood.13 Yet Hamas opposed the recognition of 
Israel on which the Oslo Accords were premised. It joined forces with Marxist 
and other nationalist groups to form a rejectionist front that called for the con-
tinuation of resistance.14 As peace talks were launched, Hamas played the role 
of a typical spoiler movement, embracing armed operations to derail the talks, 
even though this put it at odds with public sentiment.15 In response, thousands 
of Hamas members were arrested by the PNA and Israel, as security coordination 
mechanisms were initiated throughout the West Bank and Gaza.16 Alongside its 
military operations, Hamas also contemplated participating in the PNA’s presi-
dential and legislative elections, which were set for 1996.17 After extensive debate, 
however, the movement’s consultative council decided to boycott the ballot box to 
avoid conferring legitimacy to the Oslo Accords.18 Expectedly, Yasser Arafat and 
his party, Fatah, emerged victorious and consolidated their grip on the presidency 
and the legislature.19
The PLO and successive Israeli governments sustained peace talks even as it 
became evident that the five-year deadline for reaching a final settlement in 1999 
would be missed. During this period, Israeli settlements continued to expand 
against a backdrop of growing Palestinian frustration, aggravated by Israeli clo-
sures and checkpoint policies that severely undermined the Palestinian econ-
omy, weakened its labor markets and physically separated the Gaza Strip from 
the West Bank.20 During this time, the number of settlers reached more than 
350,000, controlling almost 7 percent of the land on which three million Palestin-
ians were living. Israeli settlers competed with Palestinians for access to land and 
resources, fragmented the Palestinian territories into increasingly isolated silos, 
and restricted freedom of movement, with severe implications on the overall econ-
omy. During the period of negotiations, unemployment rose from under 7 percent 
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before the Oslo Accords to 25 percent in the West Bank and 38 percent in the Gaza 
Strip by 1996. In the five-year period of negotiations, Israel imposed 443 days of 
closure, preventing the movement of persons, goods, or capital between Israel and 
the  Palestinian territories.21 As the Palestinian economy sagged under the weight 
of the occupation, Palestinian quality of life suffered and discontent grew.22
AL-AQSA INTIFADA:  PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE, 
ISR AELI  UNIL ATER ALISM,  AND “WAR ON TERROR”
In September 2000, in the absence of prospects for a Palestinian state, the Occu-
pied Territories erupted in the Second Intifada, what Hamas hailed as “the divine 
 intervention” that had derailed the diplomatic process.23 Unlike the first upris-
ing, the Second Intifada rapidly militarized, as Palestinian mobilization was met 
with the full power of Israel’s army. The military wings of both Hamas and Fatah 
reverted to armed resistance in order to pressure Israel to end its occupation. 
Arafat’s role was widely interpreted as focused on leveraging arms to change the 
balance of power in the negotiations, and thereby as complementing, rather than 
supplanting, the diplomatic track that the PLO had committed to with Oslo. For 
Hamas, the reading was different. Hamas’s leaders celebrated the Intifada, and 
early on articulated their vision for it. As Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi, a prominent 
Hamas leader, explained succinctly, “I am not saying that the Intifada will lead 
to the complete liberation of Palestinian land from the river to the sea. Still, this 
Intifada [can] . . . achieve the complete withdrawal from the West Bank, the [Gaza] 
Strip and Jerusalem without giving up on 80 percent of Palestine.”24 Hamas’s state-
ments indicated that its goal for the Intifada was focused on ending Israel’s occu-
pation, a disposition that carried with it an implicit recognition of the 1967 lines.25
While both Hamas and the PLO limited their immediate goals to the liberation 
of the Occupied Territories, Hamas was clear that this must come through force 
as the only way liberation could be unconditional. The movement’s publications 
explained that diplomacy meant the “return of these lands with truncated sover-
eignty, subservience to the occupier, deformation of Jerusalem and without the 
rights of refugees.”26 Hamas rapidly became the central instigator of armed opera-
tions against Israel. Al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s military wing, adopted what 
they referred to as a “Balance of Terror” approach: in return for their brutal and 
indiscriminate killing of the elderly, women, and children, “now, the Zionists also 
suffer from being killed . .  .  . Now Israeli buses have no one riding in them and 
Israeli shopping centers are not what they used to be.”27 Balancing terror was a tool 
for Hamas to deter Israeli attacks on the Palestinians by forcing Israel to anticipate 
inevitable retaliation.28
Yet Hamas’s military strategy reflected a fundamental misunderstanding on its 
part regarding how Israel would react, particularly under Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon, who was elected into power six months after the Intifada began, on 
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 February 6, 2001. Sharon won with a landslide vote, a resounding mandate from 
the Israeli electorate to deal with the Palestinian question militarily. A deeply con-
troversial figure within Israel itself, Sharon was also despised by Palestinians, as he 
had built a military and political career rooted in destroying Palestinian national-
ism.29 His ideal outcome for Israel entailed the pacification of the Palestinian ter-
ritories and their inhabitants, subjugating them to Israeli rule without conferring 
any collective political rights. Sharon’s election had far-reaching consequences. 
Hamas, as well as Palestinians more broadly, interpreted his victory to mean that 
the Israeli public was not looking for peace.30
Early on, Sharon sought American approval for Israel’s heavy-handedness. 
Reaching out to the United States, Sharon noted that Israel was facing its own 
Al-Qaeda in the form of Palestinian armed resistance. Initially, Sharon’s rhetoric 
failed to gather sympathy from the administration of George W. Bush.31 How-
ever, after September 11, the war of attrition between Israel and the Palestinians 
that had marked the first year of the Second Intifada almost immediately shifted 
in Israel’s favor. Overnight, the Second Intifada was presented as Israel’s War on 
 Terror.  Arafat condemned Al-Qaeda’s actions, as did Hamas, which deescalated 
its military front.32 Nonetheless, in a post-9/11 Bush administration, Sharon’s anal-
ogy carried a great deal of weight. Conflating what constituted “Islamic extrem-
ism,” Hamas’s bombs in Jerusalem were described as being another symptom of 
global “Islamic terrorism.” Within the regional and international climate, any 
argument that Hamas was using armed struggle strategically to end Israel’s illegal 
 occupation of Palestinian land was circumvented, as Israel positioned its response 
to the Second Intifada as an existential battle. Even though Sharon held Arafat, 
and the PNA, directly responsible for the violence, Israel also dealt Hamas a pow-
erful blow. Israel sustained a policy of targeted assassinations that removed all 
of Hamas’s senior leadership, including those seen as pragmatic leaders who had 
been instrumental in negotiating ceasefires.
The War on Terror rhetoric justified, to the American administration, not only 
Israel’s iron grip, but also its unilateral initiatives to reconfigure the structure of 
occupation. This was carried out through the construction of a wall, which Israelis 
refer to as the security fence and Palestinians as the apartheid wall, that physically 
separates the West Bank from Israel.33 Simultaneously, Sharon announced Israel’s 
unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip. This entailed withdrawing nine 
thousand Jewish settlers as a precursor to strengthening Israel’s grip over areas that 
“constitute an inseparable part of the State of Israel,” namely the West Bank. Such a 
disengagement promised to reduce Israel’s exposure to Palestinian resistance from 
the coastal enclave, and save significant security expenditure, given that these 
few thousand settlers controlled up to 30 percent of the Strip.34 The remaining 70 
 percent of the Gaza Strip housed 1.8 million Palestinians. More important than 
security was Sharon’s plan to remove these Palestinian inhabitants from Israel’s 
direct jurisdiction. This allowed the state to maintain its control over the territories 
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of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, with their 2.7 million non-Jewish inhabit-
ants, without the threat of altering Israel’s character as a Jewish-majority nation.35
Sharon’s initiative reflected a continuation of his use of the pretext of security 
to unilaterally consolidate Israel’s grip on the territories while avoiding any form 
of political engagement with the Palestinians.36 This goal was explicitly articu-
lated by Sharon’s top aide, Dov Weisglass, in an interview several months after the 
announcement of the disengagement plan. “The disengagement is actually form-
aldehyde,” Weisglass told the Israeli newspaper Haaretz. “It supplies the amount of 
formaldehyde that is necessary so that there will not be a political process with the 
Palestinians.”37 Hamas understood these calculations and voiced early reservations 
regarding Israel’s disengagement even while celebrating what it viewed as the abil-
ity of the resistance front to prompt an Israeli retreat.38
As Israel decimated the Palestinian uprising and political establishment, the 
Bush administration pushed for “democratization” in the Palestinian territories, 
another element of its War on Terror doctrine. After Arafat’s death in 2004, the 
United States and Israel sought a new Palestinian leadership that might revert to 
the project of state-building and diplomacy that had been initiated under the Oslo 
Accords. The failure of Hamas’s military strategy meant that the movement needed 
to consider other means to safeguard its ideology. The elections that the United 
States pushed for in 2006 inadvertently provided an entry point for Hamas into 
the Palestinian political establishment, which had to be rebuilt. This major reform 
and resuscitation of the Palestinian political system offered Hamas the impetus to 
seek an alternative to its military strategy, one that could safeguard the fixed prin-
ciples that it viewed as central to the Palestinian struggle.39 Like the PLO before 
it, Hamas defined these principles as the refusal to concede the land of historic 
Palestine, a commitment to the right of return of refugees, and the safeguarding of 
the right to resist in the face of an unyielding and lethal occupation.40
MARRYING RESISTANCE WITH POLITICS
The opportunity for Hamas to transition its ideology into the political sphere came 
in the form of planned presidential and legislative elections in 2006. Hamas’s pro-
spective engagement with the elections had to contend with a central tension: 
it disapproved of the premise of the PNA and the underlying Oslo Accords that 
had created it. As the movement considered engagement in the political process, 
it sustained its armed operations, in keeping with its perception that it could 
“marry” resistance with politics.41 Musa Abu Marzouq, a Hamas leader, explained 
that Hamas’s political aspirations entailed “preserving the program of resistance. 
Despite [armed struggle] being in an ebb and flow, the political framework should 
be the continuation of resistance, the refusal to undermine it, to remove its arms, 
or to shackle it with unfair security arrangements.”42 While the PLO’s past entry 
into politics had been premised on concessions, Hamas tethered its possible 
The Gaza Strip    61
engagement in politics to the failure of negotiations and underscored the need to 
reject any further concessions from the Palestinian side.43
After extensive deliberations throughout 2005, Hamas’s consultative coun-
cil gave the go-ahead for the movement to take part in the elections.44 Hamas’s 
leadership declared that the perceived demise of the peace process meant that its 
political participation could not be seen as conferring legitimacy onto the Oslo 
Accords, which it believed had been annulled by the developments of the Second 
Intifada.45 Rather, Hamas held the goal of circumventing the PNA and what it felt 
was the focus on governance that had institutionalized Palestinian capitulation 
to the Israeli occupation. Hamas’s leaders advocated instead for the resuscitation 
of the overarching institutions overseeing Palestinian liberation, namely the PLO.46 
It was on this basis that Hamas ran on a platform of “Change and Reform,” a far-
reaching agenda that presented its strategic trajectory for the liberation struggle 
alongside promises to tackle daily administrative challenges within the territories.
In a historic watershed that marked the culmination of its politicization, Hamas 
won 76 of the 132 seats of the legislative council, relative to Fatah’s 43. As a senior 
leader in Beirut stated, “This is a peaceful coup on the present decrepit politi-
cal reality, which was born out of defeat, corruption and acquiescence to rotten 
political solutions .  .  .  . These results are an excellent political renewal, as if the 
Palestinian people are reborn, and it’s a new birth for the project of resistance, 
for the development of a society of resistance, for a shaking-off of all the institu-
tions.”47 Hamas’s political emergence heightened Israeli worries by rupturing the 
prolonged subservience of Palestinian institutions to the occupation. This compli-
ance had become concretized in the body of the PNA following the Oslo Accords. 
By resuscitating key demands that the PLO had conceded, including the goal of 
liberating historic Palestine, Hamas was attempting to take Palestinian national-
ism back to a pre-Oslo period. The Oslo Accords had failed to achieve the goals 
that Palestinians aspired to, and had instead facilitated the continuation of Israel’s 
occupation at significant cost to Palestinians. Hamas’s efforts to undo the political 
structures created by Oslo challenged a status quo that had been made sustainable, 
if not beneficial, for Israel and its colonization of Palestinian territories.
Hamas’s victory caused utter confusion within the Bush administration, given 
its focus on democracy promotion in Palestine and in Iraq, as test cases for the 
region. The most immediate reaction was trepidation regarding the place of a des-
ignated terrorist organization in public office. As Elliot Abrams, a senior member 
of the Bush administration, noted, “legally, we had to treat Hamas as we treated al 
Qaeda.”48 In high-level meetings within the White House shortly after Hamas’s vic-
tory, it was quickly decided that the optimal response was to adopt a strategy that 
could both isolate Hamas and reassert Fatah’s dominance.49 The dual-pronged plan 
was to be implemented on several levels: military, financial, and diplomatic.50 Con-
currently, the Quartet, the international body composed of the United States, the 
United Nations, the European Union, and Russia, issued a statement noting “that 
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it was inevitable that future assistance to any new government would be reviewed 
by donors against that government’s commitment to the principles of nonviolence, 
recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations.”51
The Quartet’s conditions mirrored the prerequisites the PLO had been required 
to fulfill for diplomatic engagement almost two decades prior. Even though the 
PLO’s acceptance of these conditions and the subsequent extensive peace talks 
had still not compelled Israel to relinquish its hold over the territories, the same 
demands were now put to Hamas. Until these demands were met, the United 
States and Israel launched what Hamas’s publications referred to as an “iron-wall” 
strategy aimed at suffocating its government.52 Such intervention precluded any 
engagement with Hamas despite the movement’s efforts to show pragmatism, 
including offering a political agenda that called for “the formation of an inde-
pendent and fully sovereign Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital,” on 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and limiting resistance to the removal of the 
occupation beyond the 1967 borders.53 In a pragmatic nod, Hamas’s agenda stated 
that “the government will deal with [past] signed agreements with a high level 
of responsibility, in a manner that protects the interests of our people, preserves 
their rights and does not harm their fixed principles.”54 Addressing calls for more 
flexibility in dealing with the Quartet’s conditions, Hamas’s leader Khaled Meshal 
stated, “we have shown enough flexibility. We cannot say more than the official 
Arab and Palestinian position, which is to call for a Palestinian state on the land 
occupied in 1967. The problem is not with us. It is not with Hamas, as in the past 
it was also not with the official Palestinian and Arab positions. The problem has 
always been with Israel.”55
Alongside such offerings, Hamas stressed the need to sustain resistance. Abu 
Marzouq explained, “We are in government, yes, but the government is not whole. 
We are a government under occupation. We cannot assume that we have a govern-
ment similar to others in the world. Or as the Americans demand, that we act only 
as a government. Hamas’s program in government is one which is aligned, which 
is compatible, with its program of resistance.”56 Through its political intervention, 
Hamas sought to reassess how Palestinians dealt with their occupation, namely by 
breaking from the trappings of self-governance, repoliticizing the PNA away from 
its administrative focus and dedication to endless peace talks, and rupturing the 
continuity that the incumbent leadership hoped to secure.57 In essence, Hamas 
sought to reverse the institutional inertia that had pacified the Palestinian leader-
ship, and to resuscitate the calls for liberation that had marked the PLO’s early 
history—and to do so within the framework of its Islamist ideology.58
Hamas’s politics of resistance created much discomfort to those invested in 
the peace process launched through the Oslo Accords, which called for gover-
nance and gradual state-building under occupation. Opposition to Hamas’s vision 
of the Palestinian national movement, now endowed with a popular mandate by 
the democratic election, was seen as an existential threat to Fatah and the PNA, 
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which remained wedded to the Oslo principles. Supported by the United States 
and Israel, and by the cover of the Quartet principles, domestic measures were 
taken within the Palestinian political establishment to stymie power-sharing 
and  prevent Hamas’s actual entry into a leadership position. Signaling an initial 
impetus to act pluralistically within the PNA, Hamas extended a formal request 
to Fatah to form a coalition government.59 Yet, reflecting wider sentiment, Fatah 
leaders suggested it would be “shameful” for Fatah to even consider entering a 
coalition government with Hamas.60
Fatah’s monopolization of the political establishment meant that Hamas 
faced enormous institutional inertia. This was exacerbated by the international 
 community’s overt and clandestine support of the incumbent. As discussions 
among factions progressed to forming a unity government, the PNA’s leadership 
initiated measures to mitigate Hamas’s entry into politics. In an extraordinary ses-
sion, the outgoing legislature proposed and passed bills to expand the remit of 
the president’s office, held by Mahmoud Abbas, who won the presidential elec-
tions in 2006, at the expense of the incoming cabinet in areas such as security 
and the judiciary. These measures reversed past American-led reforms and recen-
tralized political power within the hands of the president.61 Hamas’s publications 
viewed these activities as part of an “international conspiracy” and called the 
 extraordinary session “unconstitutional.”62 Articles condemned Abbas’s authori-
tarian hold on power.63 Leaders remarked that “when [the United States and 
Israel] pushed reforms on President Arafat, the goal was to pass the authority 
to the prime minister, particularly over the security forces. Now the time is to return 
the authority to the president once Hamas has come into government. That is 
illogical and unacceptable.”64
For close to eighteen months, the parties pursued a plethora of initiatives aimed 
at sharing power. Yet Fatah insisted that, prior to sharing power, it was incum-
bent on Hamas to transition, as the PLO had done in the past, from “liberation 
through armed struggle” to “state-building towards independence.” As a senior 
Fatah leader said, “If new parties come into power in Spain or Italy, they would still 
recognize their membership in NATO. Recognition does not have to come from 
the party—but the government would have to respect past agreements.”65 Fatah’s 
leadership was working from the premise of continuity, on the basis that the PLO 
was an authoritative body, akin to a sovereign state, recognized through its adher-
ence to past agreements. The PLO remained committed to the 1988 concessions 
and the Oslo Accords, despite their failure to lead to a Palestinian state, and they 
believed Hamas’s politicking in the PNA was premised on an implicit embrace 
of the Oslo Accords. Hamas dismissed these “delusions.” Citing the absence of 
sovereignty, repeated American and Israeli intervention, and the vacuous nature 
of past agreements given Israeli reservations, Hamas questioned the basis of inter-
national recognition.66 Before past agreements could be upheld, Hamas insisted 
that the PLO must be reformed so that all political parties could have a say in 





















































































































Closed since  June  2007
(conveyor belt closed since March 2011)





Closed since September 2008







Closed since January 2010


























I S R A E L















































































































































































































































Al Mawasi (Rafah) 'Abasan al Kabira
Deir al Balah Camp
'Izbat Beit Hanoun




'Abasan al Jadida 
(as Saghira)

















































































































































































Closed but Open for Exceptional Cases
Closed
CLOSED AND RESTRICTED AREAS
No-Go Zone (100 metres)











Bridge Wastewater Treatment Plant




Built-up Area Main City
Refugee Camps over 50000
Gaza Neighbourhood 2001 to 50000







announced an easing of the access restrictions along Gaza's perimeter fence. While following it some farmers resumed the 
cultivation of land located up to 100 meters from the fence, shooting incidents continued affecting civilians in areas as far as 
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Map 7. Gaza Strip, 2014. Source: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International 
Affairs.
 reconstituting its manifesto. Widely understood but unspoken was Hamas’s desire 
to reverse the trajectory that the PLO had taken under Fatah’s tenure, including its 
recognition of Israel.67
Hamas’s attempts to offer pragmatic concessions were consistently ignored in 
favor of military, financial, and diplomatic intervention. During the brief window 
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between 2006 and 2007 when Hamas sought to claim its position as democrati-
cally elected government, more than six hundred Palestinians were killed. A brief 
episode in Palestinian democracy had ended in fratricide.68 Foreign intervention 
and domestic authoritarianism ultimately facilitated military clashes between 
Hamas and Fatah, and paved the way for Hamas’s violent capture of the Gaza Strip. 
Underlying such turmoil was an absence of any effort to deal with the political 
motivations underpinning Hamas’s agenda. Like the PLO before it, Hamas’s politi-
cal vision, and with it the internationally sanctioned right of self-determination, 
right of return, and right to resist—demands that form the core of Palestinian 
nationalism—had effectively been neutralized.
THE FIG LEAF:  GAZ A AS TERRORIST HAVEN
On the eve of Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in June 2007, a leaked report noted that 
a senior member of Israel’s security establishment was quoted as being “happy” 
at the prospect of Hamas taking over the Gaza Strip, as that would then allow 
Israel to declare the coastal enclave a “hostile territory.”69 Although not an official 
position, this well encapsulates Israel’s disposition towards the Gaza Strip after 
Hamas’s takeover, a development which ruptured the Palestinian territories insti-
tutionally and politically. With that division, the international blockade that had 
been imposed on the Palestinian Authority (PA) following Hamas’s entry into 
the political establishment morphed to focus primarily on the Gaza Strip, where 
Hamas’s jurisdiction could be geographically delineated. All five crossings leading 
into the territory from Israel were shut, as was the Rafah border with Egypt, her-
metically sealing the strip and preventing the movement of goods or people into 
or out of it.70
Israel cut fuel shipments by half and reduced imports into Gaza to the minimum 
amounts of food and medical supplies required for survival without sinking Gaza 
into a humanitarian catastrophe.71 Food shortage and healthcare crises were felt 
almost instantly as poverty rates and unemployment soared. Palestinians in Gaza 
began experiencing electricity cuts of up to sixteen hours per day; half of Gaza’s 
1.8 million Palestinians were receiving water for only a few hours a week; unem-
ployment rose to more than 50 percent; only 23 out of more than 3,900 industrial 
operations continued to function; and 70 percent of Gaza’s agricultural land was 
no longer being irrigated.72 Rapid economic deterioration was compounded by the 
fact that Gaza had suffered decades of de-development, whereby its economy had 
contracted and its infrastructure regressed as a result of Israel’s isolationist policies 
towards the strip, which officially began following the Oslo Accords.73
Under international law, the blockade amounted to collective punishment and 
came at a horrific cost to Gaza’s population.74 Initially, as articulated by Israeli, US, 
and PNA politicians, the blockade was aimed at forcing the collapse of Hamas’s 
government, and reunifying the Palestinian territories under a single leadership 
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committed to negotiations with Israel. Yet rather than collapsing Hamas, the 
blockade allowed it to consolidate its grip and institutionalize a government that 
today oversees the affairs of the Gaza Strip in much the same way as the PNA 
does in the West Bank. In response to Hamas’s entrenchment in the Gaza Strip, 
Israel gradually adopted a military doctrine referred to by its security establish-
ment as “mowing the lawn.”75 This entails the intermittent use of military power 
to undercut any growth by the resistance factions in Gaza. Through three major 
military assaults and countless incursions since 2007, Israel has used overwhelm-
ing military might to break the spirit of resistance in Gaza, pacify Hamas, and 
work towards deterrence.76
Over the course of more than a decade, this dynamic has given rise to an equi-
librium of belligerence between Hamas and Israel. Hamas relies on rocket fire as 
a negotiating tactic, to unsettle the status quo and pressure Israel to ease access of 
goods and people into the Gaza Strip by loosening the blockade. Israel employs 
military might to deter Hamas and prevent it from developing its military arsenal. 
This modus operandi has enabled both Israel and Hamas to pursue short-term 
victories at the expense of a longer-term resolution while they both bide their 
time. From Israel’s perspective, resistance has been sufficiently managed so that 
Hamas’s rule over the Gaza Strip can be tolerated, even abetted. Israeli politicians 
and the security establishment today speak of the need to “stabilize” Gaza under 
Hamas’s rule and as a separate territory from the West Bank.77 As a key member 
of Israel’s security establishment noted, “Israel needs Hamas to be weak enough 
not to attack, but stable enough to deal with the radical terrorist groups in Gaza. 
This line may be blurry but the logic is clear. The challenge lies with walking this 
blurry line.”78
Such policies have produced a situation whereby Israel is able to exercise 
 effective control over the entirety of the Occupied Palestinian Territories without 
taking responsibility as an occupying force. Within the West Bank, the occupation 
has been outsourced to a compliant PA. Even as Israel maintains its settlement 
expansion throughout the territories, the PA is still held accountable for admin-
istering and governing the lives of Palestinians under Israel’s occupation and for 
safeguarding Israel’s security through extensive coordination mechanisms with 
the Israeli army. Even in the absence of an effective peace process, the Palestinian 
leadership in the West Bank remains rooted in the international legitimacy that 
was gained following the PLO’s concessions in 1988 and the signing of the Oslo 
Agreement. The ongoing belief is that international law mechanisms and diplo-
macy will ultimately compel Israel to allow for the creation of a Palestinian state on 
the 1967 armistice line. As such, commitment to security coordination with Israel 
persists alongside state-building endeavors by the PNA, despite the absence of the 
effective sovereignty such tactics entail.
Within the Gaza Strip, Hamas remains ideologically committed to the notion 
of armed struggle for full liberation, despite the failure of this strategy as well to 
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achieve any tangible gains for the Palestinian people. Hamas’s ideology and its 
Islamist nature are often described by Israel, cynically or inadvertently, as the local 
manifestation of global terror networks.79 Such demonization has  succeeded in 
marginalizing the Gaza Strip and justifying the collective punishment  inherent 
in besieging two million Palestinians. Operations carried out by the Israeli army 
against Gaza are then understood as a legitimate form of—most often  preemptive—
self-defense. By containing Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Israel has effectively cultivated 
a fig leaf that legitimates its policies of separation towards the strip. Those policies 
predate Hamas. As home to a high proportion of Palestinian  refugees, Gaza had 
long been a foundation of resistance to Zionism and to Israel’s ongoing military 
rule over Palestinians.80 In the 1950s, decades before Hamas’s creation, Israel des-
ignated Gaza a “fedayeen’s nest,” in reference to the PLO fighters, and thus a terri-
tory that merited constant isolation and military bombardment in order to break 
the resistance.81 Under Hamas’s rule, Gaza moved from being a “fedayeen’s nest” 
to becoming a “hostile entity” and an “enclave of terrorism.” Israel has leveraged 
Hamas’s entrenchment in Gaza in a manner that allows it to act as an “effective and 
disengaged occupier,” ensuring the containment and  isolation of the Palestinians 
in Gaza without having to incur any additional cost for administration.82
The outcome is two administrative Palestinian authorities operating under an 
unyielding occupation. Whether there is a systematic Israeli separation policy for 
the West Bank and Gaza remains unclear, but Israel has nonetheless benefited 
from and reinforced this division.83 More importantly, by reducing both strands 
of the Palestinian national movement from liberation to governance and stabiliza-
tion, Israel has successfully avoided any engagement with the political drivers that 
continue to animate the Palestinian struggle. Despite their failed strategies, both 
Hamas and the PLO are driven by key Palestinian political demands that remain 
unmet and unanswered and that form the basis of the Palestinian struggle: achiev-
ing self-determination, dealing with the festering injustice of the refugee problem 
created by Israel’s establishment in 1948, and exercising the right to use armed 
struggle to resist an illegal occupation.84
Hamas’s takeover of Gaza marked the failure of Israel’s efforts to centralize 
 Palestinian decision-making within compliant structures such as the PA, which 
in effect allows Israel to maintain its occupation cost-free. Hamas’s fate, and with 
it Gaza’s, is emblematic of Israel’s “decision not to decide” on the future of the 
Palestinian territories and its reliance on military superiority to dismiss the politi-
cal demands animating the Palestinian national movement, choosing instead to 
continually manage rather than address the question of Palestine.85 In this light, 
Hamas is the contemporary manifestation of demands that began a century ago. 
Israeli efforts to continue sidelining these demands, addressing them solely from a 
military lens, have persisted. Having moved from the terminology of “anti-guerilla 
warfare” to that of its own “war on terror,” Israel merely employs contemporary 
language to wage a century-old war.
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Argued in another way, the political reality that makes Gaza “a hostile entity” 
extends beyond that strip of land and animates the Palestinian struggle in its 
entirety. Gaza is one microcosm, one parcel, of the Palestinian experience.86 Instead 
of addressing this reality or engaging with Hamas’s political drivers, Israel has 
adopted a military approach that defines Hamas solely as a  terrorist  organization. 
This depoliticizes and decontextualizes the movement, giving  credence to the 
 persistent “politicide” of Palestinian nationalism, Israel’s process of erasing 
the political ideology that animates Palestinian nationalism.87 This approach has 
allowed successive Israeli governments to avoid taking a position on the demands 
that have been upheld by Palestinians since before the creation of the State of Israel.
GAZ A AS HUMANITARIANISM AND THE GREAT 
MARCH OF RETURN
Under the administration of President Donald J. Trump, American foreign policy 
towards Israel and the Palestinian territories was clarified. Rather than commit 
to the two-state model, as historically understood by the international commu-
nity, President Trump pursued drastic measures to formalize the one-state reality 
on the ground, and effectively terminated the prospect of a viable and sovereign 
Palestinian state. Over the course of little more than a year after Trump’s inaugu-
ration in 2017, the United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital; severely 
defunded the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the main 
international body charged with providing social and economic services to Pales-
tinian refugees; reduced financial support to the PA and to development organiza-
tions active throughout the territories; recognized Israel’s annexation of the Syrian 
Golan Heights; and legitimized Israel’s settlement enterprise, paving the way for its 
de jure annexation of up to 30 percent of the West Bank.
Alongside these measures, the Trump administration also pursued policies that 
focused specifically on the Gaza Strip, and that demonstrated the continued efforts 
to depoliticize and isolate the coastal enclave. One year into his administration, as 
reports gathered pace regarding the presence of a “deal of the century” that would 
presumably resolve the question of Israel/Palestine, the Trump administration 
hosted a closed, invitation-only conference in the White House. This was attended 
by politicians and businesspeople from the United States, Israel, and a host of Arab 
countries. The conference was aimed at promoting foreign investment within the 
Gaza Strip, ostensibly with the goal of alleviating the dire humanitarian suffering 
on the ground. Projects ranged from power generation plants that would miti-
gate the chronic electricity crisis in Gaza to sewage treatment and water desalina-
tion plants. These interventions expanded and built on a history of developmental 
 projects, including those that continue to be promoted by economic bodies such 
as the Office of the Quartet and other development organizations that are active 
in the Gaza Strip. Alongside planning for these projects, a media campaign was 
The Gaza Strip    69
 carried out by the US mediators against Hamas, blaming the movement exclu-
sively for the situation in the Gaza Strip, and failing to mention issues related to 
the blockade or Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories.
Efforts to deal with Gaza in a humanitarian framing are not new, and with the 
current reality, they serve Israel’s continued occupation of Palestinian territories 
in two ways. The first is by reducing the humanitarian suffering in the Gaza Strip 
without challenging the overall political context that is, in reality, the prime driver 
for that suffering: that of the blockade. Addressing Gaza’s humanitarian misery is 
an urgent priority. Yet doing so in a manner that does not engage with the block-
ade makes this reality sustainable for much longer than it otherwise might be. 
With the international community and the private sector underwriting and prof-
iting from the need for humanitarian intervention in Gaza, the structure of the 
blockade can firmly remain in place without Israel risking a catastrophic humani-
tarian crisis that would turn the world’s opinion against its flagrant violation of 
international law. The second benefit follows directly from the first, and involves 
the formalization of policies of positioning Gaza as a challenge to be addressed 
independently of the rest of the Palestinian territories. With Gaza stabilized under 
Hamas’s governance and with international intervention, Israel’s ongoing annexa-
tion of the West Bank is free to continue apace with no accountability.
The combination of these two issues has given rise to the reemergence of a 
“state minus” discourse. This alludes to a “resolution” whereby Palestinians would 
be placated with measures that are symbolically akin to statehood but that lack 
 constituent elements of true sovereignty. Past and present measures include 
demanding that the future Palestinian state remain demilitarized, or limiting 
Palestinian sovereignty to autonomous governance in specific jurisdictions. The 
Trump plan, released in January 2020, redefined Palestinian statehood to entail 
self-governance within around 168 urban silos in the Occupied Territories, almost 
entirely surrounded by Israeli territory and lacking any form of sovereignty. With 
Jerusalem having been recognized by the United States as the capital of Israel, 
with major territorial divisions throughout the West Bank as a result of illegal 
 settlements, and with the severance of the Gaza Strip from the rest of the territo-
ries, the “state” on offer to the Palestinians through formal diplomatic channels 
entails a fraction of the 22 percent of historic Palestine that Palestinians had hoped 
to build their state on when the PLO first accepted the notion of partitioning the 
land in 1988. Such formulations, although touted as “resolutions,” are little more 
than a continuation of Israeli efforts to manage, rather than resolve, the question 
of Palestine. With the current failed strategies of both Hamas and Fatah and the 
institutionalization of the division within the territories, Israel has been able to 
sustain a cost-free occupation while enjoying Jewish supremacy over the entirety 
of the land of historic Palestine.
Yet it would be a mistake to overemphasize the sustainability of this situation. 
The failure of the Palestinian political elite and the slow demise of the Oslo project 
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have initiated a gradual reorientation on the level of the Palestinian grassroots that 
is possibly indicative of where the future of the Palestinian national conscious-
ness resides. From the “prayer intifada” of the summer of 2017 in Jerusalem to the 
“return marches” carried out from Syria outside Israel’s northern front, a signifi-
cant, if sporadic, mobilization on the grassroots level has been slowly flourishing 
over the past few years. Such mobilization is taking place outside the context of 
the PLO or that of the Palestinian political establishment. Previous ruptures in the 
long history of the Palestinian struggle for self-determination suggest that such 
sporadic instances of popular resistance to Israel’s occupation are likely to erupt in 
one form or another. They are a reminder of the political nature of the Palestinian 
question, which remains unaddressed.
One of the most significant of these mobilizations was, of course, the Great 
March of Return (GRM), in which Palestinian civil society in Gaza launched a 
mass movement that cut across political affiliations. The GRM was a popular 
 initiative that mobilized under the single banner of “return”: the demand for the 
return of the Palestinian refugees to homes from which they had been expelled 
or had fled in 1948. Although the immediate goal of the GRM was to pressure 
Israel to lift the blockade, the overarching vision under which it unfolded was 
one of return. As such, the GRM openly broke from the central tenants of peace-
making that marked the Oslo period, which entailed the minutia of diplomatic 
 negotiations around land swaps and the 1967 lines, and instead returned to the 
roots animating Palestinian nationalism, which remain anchored in the tragedy 
of al-Nakba. The effect of such discourse was to begin the process of reclaiming 
a Palestinian narrative that might move beyond the factional fragmentation that 
was the outcome of the Oslo Accords, the most prominent result of which is Gaza’s 
geographic isolation. Furthermore, the fact that the GRM was initiated at a grass-
roots level demonstrates an inherent rejection, or impatience, with factional poli-
tics, and a recognition that the Palestinian political elite have become embroiled in 
a system of power dynamics that has failed to achieve freedom, equality, or justice 
for the Palestinians.
The initial hope that the GRM could be the harbinger of broader change 
within the Palestinian struggle dissolved as the movement was challenged by 
 Israel’s disproportionate, and tremendously lethal, use of force, as well as, even-
tually, by greater involvement from Hamas. Hamas’s efforts to coopt the GRM 
threatened to subsume it into the very political reality it was hoping to break away 
from. Yet even with such risks, the protests can nonetheless be understood as a 
rejuvenated form of Palestinian political mobilization—and possibly, as the cata-
lyst for the launching of the next, post-Oslo, phase of the Palestinian struggle. The 
inclusive discourse that marked the GRM’s ideology and its rootedness in 1948 
have the power to unite Palestinians across geographies in a single narrative based 
on the Palestinian historical experience of dispossession and exile. It is this kind of 
narrative that ultimately has the power to lead the Palestinians out of the current 
political stalemate that first the PLO, then Hamas, have led them into.
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In rethinking the notion of Palestinian statehood, one must heed the demands 
being generated from the grassroots, given that the political elite no longer have 
the required legitimacy to lead the narrative. Once again, Gaza is leading the path 
by illuminating the power of defining a Palestinian vision that is rooted in Pales-
tinian rights, like the right of return. These rights and the political demands that 
emerge around them are the ones that Israel continues to marginalize in the hope 
of managing rather than resolving the question of Palestine, often through the 
use of overwhelming military might. The Gaza Strip, while contained and safely 
isolated under Hamas’s government, demonstrates through its marches that even 
in the face of the greatest adversity, the Palestinian people remain committed in 
their quest to achieve the justice they have been seeking for the past century. It 
is imperative to heed this call, and to root the future trajectory of the Palestinian 
struggle in this call for rights, embracing the power of this narrative to reunify the 
Palestinian people and dismantle the political structures that have been created to 
fragment them.
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East Jerusalem and the Oslo Peace Process
Hania Walid Assali
According to the Palestine Liberation Organization’s 1988 Declaration of 
 Independence, East Jerusalem (the Arab side of the city) is the capital of the 
 envisioned Palestinian state. The Oslo Accords, signed between the PLO and 
the government of Israel in the early 1990s, defined Jerusalem as one of seven 
“permanent status” issues, to be negotiated at a future point as part of negotiations 
on a permanent status agreement. Such negotiations subsequently started and 
broke down at several points, including in 1996 and 1999–2001. This effort peaked 
with the Camp David Summit of 2000 and the Taba Talks of 2001, both of which 
used the framework of the Oslo process and ultimately ended in failure. In 2012, 
the PLO again announced its state, with its capital as East Jerusalem, this time 
at the United Nations, to which it was admitted as a nonmember state. Despite 
having been recognized by 138 countries, the Palestinian state, let alone its capital, 
has failed to materialize.
Rather, twenty-eight years after the Oslo Accords—and more than twenty years 
beyond the timeline stipulated in the original accords—the negotiations over the 
permanent-status issues have completely broken down, and the Oslo process has 
been declared dead.1 This failure has taken a particularly high toll on East Jerusa-
lem and its approximately 330,000 Palestinian residents.2
This chapter explores how the Oslo Accords failed to lay the groundwork for 
East Jerusalem to become the future capital of the State of Palestine. It exposes 
how Israel consolidated its control over the eastern side of Jerusalem, in support of 
its goal of keeping the entire city as its unified capital and Judaizing it, in violation 
of international law.
Since 1991 Israel has effectively severed East Jerusalem from the West Bank, 
for which it was formerly a central hub. Throughout the Oslo years, Israel took 
myriad unilateral measures against both land and people aimed at making any 
future  division of the city impossible. Israel’s actions and sweeping statements 
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clearly demonstrate not only that it does not intend to relinquish control over 
East  Jerusalem, but also that it intends to transform it from an Arab urban space 
to a Jewish one. On the flip side, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), 
 established as part of the Oslo Accords, failed to counter Israel’s unilateral mea-
sures.  Palestinians in Jerusalem ended up feeling abandoned and left to fend for 
themselves with the scant political and social resources available to them.
Today, the demise of the peace process and the vanishing possibility for the 
two-state solution it envisioned requires us to examine anew how drastically 
the situation for Palestinians living in Jerusalem has changed in the decades since 
Oslo, and what can potentially be done about it. This need is all the more urgent 
in view of the United States’s formal recognition in December 2017 of Jerusalem as 
the capital of Israel, US efforts to impose a regional “deal” to terminate the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, and the ongoing rapprochement between Israel, Saudi Arabia, 
and certain Gulf countries, notably the United Arab Emirates, which culminated 
with the signing of the Abraham Accords in August 2020. These accords normal-
ize economic and diplomatic relationships between Israel and the United Arab 
Emirates and Bahrain.
To this end, this chapter is divided into four parts: first, it provides an overview 
of the status of the city and its Palestinian residents since 1967. Next, it focuses 
on the toll that the Oslo years have had on East Jerusalem as a territory. Third, it 
delves into the impact of these developments on the city’s Palestinian residents. 
Finally, the chapter explores what may lie ahead for East Jerusalem and its Pales-
tinian residents.
EAST JERUSALEM SINCE 1967 :  AN OVERVIEW
During the 1967 war, Israel occupied East Jerusalem, along with the rest of the 
West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula. After 
the war, Israel illegally annexed East Jerusalem, redrew its boundaries, and 
expanded them to include the maximum amount of territory, with the fewest 
number of Jerusalemite Palestinians, in order to ensure a Jewish majority in the 
city.3 This expansion was formally approved by Israel’s cabinet on July 26, 1967, and 
by the Knesset two days later. It brought the combined East and West Jerusalem 
area to a total of 108 square kilometers with a population ratio of 74.2 percent 
Jewish to 25.8 percent Palestinian Arab.4 The newly expanded total area was com-
prised of 38 square kilometers of West Jerusalem, 6 square kilometers that had 
been the Jordanian-administered area of East Jerusalem, and 64 square kilome-
ters of additional annexed land that belonged to twenty-eight adjacent Palestinian 
 villages in the West Bank.5
Israel immediately proceeded to apply Israeli law to the total expanded munici-
pal area. It issued Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11) 5727 
of 1967, which included language from Section 11B of Law and Administration 
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Ordinance No. 5708 of 1948. Section 11B reads as follows: “The law, jurisdiction 
and administration of the State shall extend to any area of Eretz Israel designated 
by the Government by order.” By virtue of this provision, the Minister of the Inte-
rior ordered on June 28, 1967 the expansion of the municipal boundaries of the 
Jerusalem municipality and ensured the application of Israeli law within it.
Israel did not, however, explicitly state in any of the above amendments that it 
was annexing East Jerusalem, nor did it affirm that it was applying its sovereignty 
over East Jerusalem. Israel simply started applying Israeli law to East Jerusalem. 
It went for a de facto rather than a declared annexation, hoping to stay under 
the radar and avoid international condemnation—and hoping that the de facto 
annexation would become a fait accompli somewhere down the line.6 In 1980, 
Israel passed Law no. 5740, Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, which states that Jerusalem 
is the complete and united capital of Israel. UN Security Council Resolution 478 
in 1980 affirmed that this law constitutes a violation of international law, declared 
its enactment null and void, and decided not to recognize it.7 The annexation of 
East Jerusalem is illegal under international law in light of the inadmissibility 
of  territory acquired through the use or threat of use of force, as codified into 
article 2(4) of the UN Charter and reiterated in UN General Assembly Resolu-
tion 2253 and UN Security Council Resolution 242. Accordingly, the international 
community has never recognized the annexation and has continuously declared 
it null and void. The only exception came from the Trump US administration, 
which broke with the international consensus and all diplomatic precedents and 
recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in December 2017.
Israel, however, had little concern for the international illegality of its ter-
ritorial annexation of East Jerusalem. Its major interest was rather in devising 
legal, urban, and demographic strategies that would enable it to incorporate the 
city without its Palestinian population. Israel considered the Palestinians of East 
Jerusalem a liability that needed to be contained if not dissolved. In June 1967, 
just after occupying East Jerusalem and annexing it, Israel conducted a census 
in the annexed area. It declared that Palestinians who happened to be absent 
at that time had lost the right to return to their homes. Only Palestinians who 
were present in their homes in East Jerusalem during the census were given the 
status of “permanent residents.” This status was given to them on the basis of the 
Entry into Israel Law enacted in 1952, even though East Jerusalemites had not 
“entered” “Israel”; rather, Israel “entered” the area where they lived by means of 
belligerent occupation.
It is important to try to understand why East Jerusalemites were granted per-
manent residency, in contrast to the Palestinians who remained in 1948 and on 
whom Israeli citizenship was imposed in 1952, and those present in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip (WBGS) after the 1967 war, who were given identifica-
tion cards by the Israeli authorities. Elements of an answer are cited in a 2012 
book by Ir Amim’s publication: “In June 1967, during discussions to determine 
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Map 8. Municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, 1947–2000. Source: Palestinian Academic Society 
for the Study of International Affairs.
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Map 9. Greater and metropolitan Jerusalem, 2000. Source: Palestinian Academic Society for the 
Study of International Affairs.
the idea of imposing Israeli citizenship upon the residents of the annexed terri-
tory. The ministerial committee charged with drafting the unification procedures 
rejected the idea. Its members were convinced that the rules of international law 
forbade forcing the citizenship of one  country on the citizens of another. An 
opposing proposal—to let the residents keep their Jordanian identity cards—was 
also ruled out. In the end, the Arabs of East Jerusalem became Israeli residents 
with Jordanian citizenship.”8 Meanwhile, Israel worked on maintaining a Jewish 
 demographic majority in the city. In 1973, the Gafni Committee  recommendation 
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on “development rates” for Jerusalem was adopted by the Israeli government, 
calling for the percentages of Jews and Arabs to be preserved at their levels of 
1972, that is, at 73.5 percent Jews and 25.5 percent Palestinians.9 Granting East 
Jerusalemites residency rather than citizenship was a means of controlling the 
Palestinian population growth in the city since residency, by definition, requires 
constant verification and is subject to revocation.
The 1952 Entry into Israel Law, though, does not explicitly provide for a permit 
for permanent residency to expire if the permit holder leaves Israel and settles 
abroad. Provisions to that effect exist in Amendment 2 of the Entry into Israel 
Law Regulations no. 5734 of 1974.10 In 1985, that amendment was introduced 
into Section 11(c) and Section 11A. Section 11(c) states that the validity of a 
permanent residency expires if the permit holder leaves Israel and settles in 
another country. Section 11A states that a person shall be considered as having 
settled in another country if any one of the following applies: (1) s/he stayed 
outside Israel for a period of at least seven years; (2) s/he received temporary 
residency in that country; or (3) s/he received citizenship of that country by way 
of naturalization.
Jerusalem in the Oslo Accords
As noted, the first Oslo Accord (officially called the Declaration of Principles on 
Interim Self-Government Arrangements, or the Declaration of Principles [DOP], 
and known simply Oslo I) relegated negotiation over Jerusalem—as a permanent-
status issue—to a later stage. Article V2 of Oslo I stipulates that “Permanent status 
negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning 
of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the 
Palestinian people representatives.”11 Article V3 continues, “It is understood that 
these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, 
settlements, security arrangements, border, relations and cooperation with their 
neighbors, and other issues of common interest.” While Article IV specifies that 
“the two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, 
whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period,” it was not specified if 
that territorial unit includes East Jerusalem.
The 1995 second Oslo Accord excluded Jerusalem from the jurisdiction of the 
new Palestinian Authority. Chapter 3, Article XVII stipulated that “the jurisdiction 
of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that 
will be negotiated in the permanent-status negotiations.”12
The Oslo Accords also did not provide any protection to the territorial integ-
rity of East Jerusalem or its Palestinian residents. As far as the latter, the Oslo 
Accords afforded them only the right to participate in the election process of the 
 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC).13 However, this “right to representation” is 
in fact superfluous, because, as noted, the PNA and the PLO were given no juris-
diction over East Jerusalem. The lack of protection for either East Jerusalem as an 
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urban space or its Palestinian residents meant that Israel had a free hand to tighten 
its grip over East Jerusalem, especially as negotiations continued to drag on.
ISR AEL’S  C ONSOLIDATION OF TERRITORIAL 
C ONTROL IN THE WAKE OF OSLO
Since the Oslo Accords were signed, Israel has taken several unilateral actions to 
sever East Jerusalem from its hinterland. These included severing Jerusalem from 
its natural hinterland, the West Bank, via restricting entry and constructing the 
Separation Wall as well as expanding Jewish settlements and targeting the heart of 
East Jerusalem—the Old City and its surrounding basin.14
Settlement Activity and Urban Planning
As early as 1968 Israel started building settlements to create facts on the ground, 
focusing first on the Arab areas of what it had declared to be “municipal Jerusa-
lem” in 1967, on land confiscated from the West Bank. Between 1968 and 1977, 
Israel built eight settlements hosting 33,300 settlers, compared with only 4,300 in 
the rest of the West Bank.15 In 1982, a document prepared for Mayor Teddy Kollek’s 
international advisory council, the Jerusalem Committee, stated that the ring of 
settlements surrounding Jerusalem would provide a necessary buffer against any 
political or military pressure to make a compromise on Jerusalem. This document 
added that “the overriding, undisputed principle underlying Jerusalem’s planning 
is the realization of her unity.  .  .  . [by] building up the city in such a way as to 
preclude the bi-polar emergence of two national communities and forestall any 
possibility of re-dividing it along such lines.”16 By 1986, a total of 103,9000 settlers 
lived in eleven settlements in East Jerusalem, equaling the number of Palestinians 
living in what was defined as “municipal Jerusalem.”17
Israel’s settlement ideology sought the “Judaization” and “de-Arabization” of 
the city, as well as the isolation of Jerusalem from the West Bank and the fragmen-
tation of the Palestinian neighborhoods within the city.18 By 1993, just as the Oslo 
Accords were negotiated, a total of 137,400 settlers lived in settlements around 
Jerusalem and Israel had no intention to stop their development.
During the Oslo years, Israel built two new settlements (one of them Har 
Homa) around Jerusalem on confiscated West Bank land, and there was a surge 
of new hardcore religious settlements in the heart of Palestinian neighborhoods, 
in concentrated outposts in the so-called “visual basin of the Old City.”  Moreover, 
in 1995, just as Israel was negotiating the Oslo II agreement and supposedly 
deferring any action on Jerusalem to permanent-status negotiations, the Rabin 
government officially adopted the Greater Jerusalem Master Plan.19 This plan 
incorporated Jewish settlements in the West Bank that are not part of munici-
pal Jerusalem. The plan’s strategic aim was to secure Israeli domination over the 
entire central portion of the West Bank and prevent the establishment of a viable 
Palestinian state. It was revived in 2000, at the Camp David Summit. According 
The Forgotten Palestinians    87










ICBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various years and Btselem,
Number of Israeli settlers in West Bank and East Jerusalem Settlements, 1972–2017









1972 1983 1990 1995 2000 2005 2011 2017
West Bank East Jerusalem
Figure 1. Number of Israeli settlers in West Bank and East Jerusalem settlements, 1972–2017. 
Source: Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel, and B’Tselem, “Statistics 
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to Jeff Halper, during Camp David, the then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak 
believed that “expanding Jerusalem outward to include the outer settlement ring 
would make the  division of the city not only impossible but also advantageous to 
Israel: expanding Israel’s territorial control and boosting its demographic majority 
in order to neutralize the demographic and political costs of ‘conceding’ parts of 
East Jerusalem.”20
The Greater Jerusalem plan, which expanded the boundaries of Jerusalem to a 
diameter of one hundred miles was in essence an annexationist plan and remains 
so today. This plan was submitted in two bills to the Knesset in 2017.21 The Rabin 
government also adopted the Metropolitan Jerusalem Plan, which extended the 
total area to 950 square kilometers, in the same year. Both plans’ strategic aim was 
to secure Israeli domination over the entire core of the West Bank and prevent the 
establishment of a viable Palestinian state.22
By 2018, East Jerusalem had fifteen Israeli settlements with 213,000 Israeli set-
tlers living in an estimated sixty thousand housing units. About three thousand 
Israeli settlers live in the heart of Palestinian neighborhoods in outposts concen-
trated in the so “visual basin of the old city” area, which includes the Muslim 
and Christian quarters of the Old City, Silwan, Sheikh Jarrah, At-Tur (Mount of 
Olives), Wadi Al-Joz, Ras Al-’Amud, and Jabal Al-Mukabber. Settlement blocks 
surrounding municipal Jerusalem house over 100,000 Israeli settlers who are thus 
incorporated within “Greater Jerusalem.”23
Another important tool that Israel used to advance its goals in East Jerusalem 
is urban planning. Israel’s plans are aimed at creating “urban facts which would 
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make any future division of the city practically impossible.”24 Israel discriminates 
against Palestinians through the master plans and town planning schemes that it 
formulates for the city of Jerusalem, and “East Jerusalemites are unable to receive 
permits to build or renovate their homes; and if they build without permits, Israeli 
authorities demolish their homes.”25 Moreover, Israeli laws “limit the election of 
certain positions in Jerusalem solely to Israeli citizens; for example, ‘a person who 
is not an Israeli citizen’ cannot serve as a board member or executive member of 
the Jerusalem Development Authority. The Jerusalem Development Authority has 
broad powers concerning the planning and development of Jerusalem.”26
Indeed, Israel’s intentions regarding East Jerusalem, irrespective of which Israeli 
government is in power, have not changed since 1967. Less than three years after 
the signing of Oslo I, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu began to use the 
words “undivided” and “eternal” in relation to Jerusalem. In his speech to a joint 
session of the US Congress in Washington, DC on July 10, 1996, the newly elected 
Netanyahu said, “There have been efforts to redivide this city by those who claim 
that peace can come through division—that it can be secured through multiple 
sovereignties, multiple laws and multiple police forces. This is a groundless and 
dangerous assumption, which impels me to declare today: There will never be such 
a re-division of Jerusalem. Never. We shall not allow a Berlin Wall to be erected 
inside Jerusalem. We will not drive out anyone, but neither shall we be driven out 
of any quarter, any neighborhood, any street of our eternal capital.”27
Closure, Checkpoints, and the Separation Wall
In January 1991, in the wake of the First Intifada and during the Gulf War, Israel 
revoked the general exit permit for residents of the Occupied Territories wish-
ing to enter Jerusalem, marking the beginning of the permanent closure policy.28 
On March 30 1993, during Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s term and fol-
lowing a series of stabbings, Israel imposed an overall closure on the Occupied 
 Territories “until further notice.” To enforce the closure, Israel set up military 
checkpoints along the Green Line separating the West Bank from Jerusalem. Per-
mits for  Palestinians from the West Bank to enter Jerusalem for any reason were 
issued only sparingly.29
Israel also began curtailing the activities of Palestinian institutions in East 
 Jerusalem. From 1967 to 1995, Jerusalem had been “the home for Palestinian 
newspaper publishers, the main printing presses and publishing houses, the best 
hospitals, the most important schools, the largest and most important commer-
cial market, the center for trade union associations, and so on. It was the undis-
puted economic center and the center of the national movement and its official 
and unofficial leadership and institutions.”30 In October 2000, as the Second Inti-
fada erupted in the wake of Ariel Sharon’s deliberate provocation in the form of 
visiting the Al-Aqsa mosque surrounded by a phalanx of Israeli soldiers, then-
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak approved plans to establish more permanent 
 checkpoints and barriers across the entire West Bank to stop Palestinians from 
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entering Israel.31 In March 2001, Sharon’s government ordered the closure of the 
Orient House, the historic building and institution that had served as the unof-
ficial PLO headquarters in Jerusalem in the late 1980s and early 1990s and was a 
center for Palestinian national work, diplomatic relations, community support, 
and cultural and economic development projects in East Jerusalem.32 The closure 
of the Orient House happened less than four months after the sudden death of the 
Palestinian East Jerusalemite leader Faisal Hussayni in a hotel in Kuwait. Under 
his leadership, the Orient House had become the Palestinian political center of 
East Jerusalem. Its closure marked the end of the leadership role that Jerusalem 
had enjoyed in Palestinian life up until 1995, when the late Yasser Arafat set up the 
PNA headquarters in Ramallah. Israel also closed other Palestinian organizations 
in the city, notably the chamber of commerce. Several of those Palestinian institu-
tions that had not been closed by Israel were left with no choice but to relocate to 
Ramallah, especially after Israel closed the city to the West Bank and then started 
the construction of the Separation Wall in 2002.
In 2002, Israel started construction of the Separation Wall, designed to include 
as many Israeli settlements while excluding as many Palestinian neighborhoods as 
possible. The total length of the Separation Wall total is 712 kilometers, of which 
only 15 percent run along the Green Line. The length of the wall in Jerusalem 
reaches approximately 140 kilometers, of which only four kilometers runs along 
the Green Line. Its route severs entire Palestinian neighborhoods from the city, 
not only minimizing their development potential but also keeping large areas 
of open space areas as reserves for the future expansion of Jewish settlements. 
Today 140,000 Palestinian East Jerusalemites live in neighborhoods that lie 
beyond the wall and as a result do not receive any municipal services from the 
Jerusalem municipality. The Jerusalem municipality does not provide services to 
these neighborhoods because they are located on the other side of the Separation 
Wall, although legally their residents live in the municipality of Jerusalem. On the 
other hand, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) does not provide services 
to these residents because it has no jurisdiction to do so. “These neighborhoods 
have remained a sort of ‘no man’s land’ in which the warning of an impending 
humanitarian disaster is screaming from the walls.  .  .  . Police responsibility for 
these neighborhoods resides with Israel, according to its own decision and made 
ironclad by the legal constraints [previously described]; as a result, on the day of 
reckoning, it is Israel that will be called upon to give a moral accounting both to 
itself and to the international community.”33
On July 9, 2004, the International Court of Justice in the Hague published its 
advisory opinion on the Separation Wall. It held that both construction of the 
wall and the regime that Israel instituted to accompany it violate international law, 
and that Israel must tear it down and compensate the Palestinians who suffered 
losses as a result of its construction.34 The checkpoints and illegal Separation Wall 
continue to infringe upon the fundamental rights of Palestinians to freedom of 
movement and to family unity.35
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Legal Entrenchments Aimed at Impeding Future Territorial  
Concessions in Jerusalem
Over the last ten years, Israel has enacted legislation aiming at creating legal 
 barriers to conceding any East Jerusalem territory, in case the government of 
Israel was to reach an agreement with other parties or decide to do so unilater-
ally.36 Thus, in 2000, Israeli Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 5740–1980 was 
amended by the insertion of Sections 5, 6, and 7.37 Section 5 states for the first time 
that “the jurisdiction of Jerusalem includes, as pertaining to this Basic Law, among 
other things, all of the area that is described in the appendix of the proclamation 
expanding the borders of municipal Jerusalem beginning 20 Sivan, 5727 (June 28, 
1967), as was given according to the Municipalities Ordinance.”
Section 6 specifies that “no authority that is stipulated in the law of the State of 
Israel or of the Jerusalem municipality may be transferred either permanently, or 
for an allotted period of time, to a foreign body, whether political, governmental, 
or any other similar type of foreign body.” As for Section 7, it was inserted to 
entrench the above two sections. It states that Sections 5 and 6 cannot be  modified 
except by a basic law passed by a majority of Knesset [Parliament] members (MKs). 
In 2014, further entrenchment took place with Basic Law: Referendum, no. 
5774–2014.38 This law stipulates that Israel’s sovereignty over part of its territory 
may not be waived unless the government has so decided, and its decision is 
 ratified by a two-thirds majority of MKs as well as by a referendum. All these 
enactments are intended to render difficult, if not impossible, any future division 
of Jerusalem between Israel and the Palestinians.
In 2018, yet another entrenchment was undertaken by further amending Basic 
Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, with the aim of impeding any future division 
of the city. The amendment stipulates that the government must obtain a super-
majority of 80 of the 120 MKs in order to transfer to a foreign entity any “authority 
pertaining to the area of the Jerusalem Municipality.” However, it is possible to 
change this statutory requirement for a super-majority through a simple majority 
vote by only sixty-one MKs. This same stipulations would also make it possible to 
change the city’s municipal boundaries by a simple majority, rather than a super 
majority of MKs, as it did before. The Knesset thus paved the way for the realiza-
tion of its goal to advance the Greater Jerusalem plan.39 In 2017, two bill propos-
als were submitted in the Knesset with the aim of putting five settlement blocks 
under Jerusalem’s municipal jurisdiction and of disconnecting from the Jerusa-
lem municipality the Palestinian neighborhoods of Kufr Aqab and Shua’fat, which 
lie beyond the Separation Wall, placing them under a different municipal Israeli 
authority.40 As of this writing, these proposals have not yet been passed, but their 
success is likely given the immunity that Israel continues to have.
Thus with the advent of the Oslo peace process, Israel finalized the process 
by which East Jerusalem became a forbidden city for all Palestinians from the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. For them, going to East Jerusalem—surrounded by 
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 Jewish settlements and the Separation Wall—has become an unreachable dream. 
That said, in the eyes of international law and the international community, East 
Jerusalem is still an occupied territory. 
DEMO GR APHIC ENGINEERING:  AC CELER ATING 
PALESTINIAN EXPULSION FROM EAST  
JERUSALEM POST-OSLO
Alongside these sweeping changes in land, planning, and access, Israel imple-
mented a variety of harsh policies and administrative measures to discourage 
demographic growth among Jerusalem’s Arab population. Since 1967, Israeli lead-
ers have adopted two basic principles in their rule of the Palestinian residents in 
East Jerusalem.41 The first was to hinder by any means the growth of the Arab 
population and to force Arab residents to make their homes elsewhere. The second 
was to rapidly increase the Jewish population in East Jerusalem. The building of 
settlements was a key element for increasing the number of Israelis in East Jeru-
salem, as noted. Israel also introduced and enhanced administrative measures to 
deprive Palestinians of their residence rights.
The “Center of Life” Policy: The 1988 Mubarak Awad Case
In regulating the permanent residency of Palestinians in East Jerusalem, one 
case in particular became notorious for the ways in which Israel devised legalistic 
measures to curtail the rights of Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem to live in 
their city: the Mubarak Awad case of 1988.42 Mubarak Awad, an East Jerusalemite, 
was born and raised in Jerusalem. In the 1970s, he left for the United States to study 
and work. In the 1980s, he returned to live in Jerusalem but was ultimately deported 
by the Israeli authorities. In his case, the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that eligibility 
for the right of residence and loss thereof are decided in  accordance with the Entry 
into Israel Law of 1952 and with the Entry into Israel Regulations of 1974, issued 
in accordance with the 1952 law. The Court rejected the  argument that Palestinian 
Jerusalemites have a special status that provides them with  “quasi-citizenship” or 
“constitutional residency” that cannot be revoked by the Minister of the Interior.43 
Justice Aharon Barak held that “permanent residency” might also “automatically 
expire,” either because it had surpassed its period of validity or because the premise 
on which it rests—actual permanent residency in Israel—had expired.”44 He went 
beyond the provisions of the 1974 regulations and held that “a permit for perma-
nent residency, when granted, is based on a reality of permanent residency. Once 
this reality no longer exists, the permit expires of itself.”45 He thus went beyond the 
written law as it existed in the 1974 regulations and formulated a new principle, 
the “center of life” principle. Barak further stated, “Awad’s acquisition of American 
citizenship signified that his ‘center of life’ is no longer [Israel],” regardless of the 
fact that “in his heart of hearts he aspired to return to [Israel].”46
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After the Oslo Accords, the “center of life” principle came to be one of the most 
harmful policies for Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem. In the Shiqaqi case 
of June 1995, Fathiya Shiqaqi lost her permanent residency rights despite the fact 
that none of the situations specified in Section 11A of the Entry into Israel Law of 
1952 applied to her. She had remained outside Israel for less than seven years and 
had not received citizenship or permanent residency in any foreign country. At the 
time of her case, she had been living with her husband and her children in Syria for 
six years after her husband was deported from Israel. In her case, Justice Goldberg 
stated, “The appearance of a new reality, changing the reality of permanent resi-
dency in Israel, is clearly indicated by circumstances other than those mentioned 
in regulation 11A of the [Entry into Israel Law].”47
After the Shiqaqi case, Israel started to apply the “center of life” principle intro-
duced in the 1988 Awad case aggressively and across the board. By end of 1996, 739 
Palestinian East Jerusalemites had their residencies revoked. By end of 1997, the 
total annual number jumped to 1,067. In 2006, the number reached 1,363, and in 
2008, it skyrocketed to 4,577.48
The “center of life” principle was not utilized by the Israeli Ministry of the Inte-
rior until after the Oslo Accords, when Jerusalem had been defined as a perma-
nent-status issue. Up until 1995, a Palestinian resident of East Jerusalem could lose 
his or her residency status only by settling outside Israel for a period of seven years 
without renewing the exit permit or by receiving the status of resident or citizen 
in another country. The Israeli Ministry of Interior regularly renewed exit permits 
and registered changes to family status. Also, before 1995, Palestinian East Jerusa-
lemites who moved elsewhere in the WBGS were not required to have permits to 
exit and enter Jerusalem, and some even continued to receive the allotments from 
the National Insurance Institute that they had received prior to leaving the city.49
After 1995, the interpretation of the term “outside Israel” was expanded to 
include residency in the WBGS, effectuated through a directive issued by the legal 
advisor of the Ministry of the Interior to the East Jerusalem office. This meant that 
all Palestinian East Jerusalemites who had lived for a period of time in a foreign 
country or in the WBGS were liable to lose their rights as Jerusalem residents. 
This policy remained unclear on how much time spent outside Israel in a foreign 
country could cost a person his or her residency, and it has been applied arbi-
trarily.50 Even worse, the Israeli Interior Ministry did not publicize it at the time 
and then applied it retroactively.51 Between 1995 and 2017, Israel revoked the status 
of 11,555 Palestinians from East Jerusalem as opposed to 3,078 revocations during 
the period from 1967 till 1994.52
This “center of life” policy came to be known as “silent transfer” or “quiet depor-
tation,” intended to further reduce the Palestinian population in Jerusalem after 
the Oslo Accords. As a result of numerous legal challenges against this policy by 
various Arab and Israeli civil society organizations, though, the Sharansky Dec-
laration was issued in 2000. Named after then-Minister of the Interior Natan 
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Sharansky, it provided for the reinstatement of residency status on a case-by-case 
basis under a rigorous set of criteria, including the period of absence of the resi-
dents, retention of connection with East Jerusalem during their absence, reasons 
for obtaining citizenship or residency in another country, and years of residency 
in East Jerusalem after return. However, this measure led to the reinstatement of 
the residency of only a few hundred East Jerusalem residents.
On March 14, 2017, the High Court of Justice issued the Al-Haq ruling, in which 
it recognized East Jerusalemites as “native-born residents.” Al-Haq was nine years 
old when his family moved from Jerusalem to the United States. Years later, as 
a married adult, he wanted to move back to his native city and was told that he 
didn’t have the right to do so. The Court ruled that Israel must consider the unique 
status of Palestinian East Jerusalemites as native-born when deciding whether to 
restore their residency status.53 In this particular case, the High Court shifted away 
from the discriminatory legal precedents of the Awad and Shiqaqi cases. However, 
this ruling does not eliminate the possibility of revocation of residency of East 
Jerusalem residents according to the Awad precedent, as it adds weight in favor of 
restoring status only in cases of purportedly “expired” residency following a long 
stay abroad—excluding the WBGS—or the acquisition of foreign status. The most 
striking aspect of Israel’s residency regulations is how deeply discriminatory they 
are: Israeli citizens, including Jewish settlers in East Jerusalem, can live anywhere 
in the world for as long as they wish without losing their citizenship or any of the 
rights it entails.
Special Complications Facing “Mixed” Families
In families where a Palestinian East Jerusalemite marries a Palestinian from the 
West Bank or Gaza, issues of family unification and child registration further 
complicate the picture. Until early 1990, Palestinian residents of the WBGS could 
live with their Palestinian East Jerusalemite spouses and children without needing 
special permits. As noted, in 1991, Israel started to require personal entry per-
mits issued by the military commander for residents of the WBGS who wished 
to enter Jerusalem (or Israel generally). Initially such permits were issued with 
almost no restriction and for relatively long periods. Gradually, however, the issu-
ance of permits tightened. Today, only a few permits are issued and according 
to unknown criteria. Palestinians from the WBGS without permits who choose to 
live long-term in Jerusalem with their spouses and families are under the con-
stant threat of deportation. As of March 1993, when Israel started imposing a 
 sweeping closure on the WBGS, it became extremely difficult for couples in which 
one spouse has a Jerusalem ID and the other has a West Bank or Gaza Strip ID 
to live together. Many resorted to filing for family unification, although they 
had been married for years. In 1996, Israel instituted a graduated procedure that 
stipulated that permanent residency status was to be given five years and three 
months from the day the family unification application was approved (rather than 
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 immediately upon approval, as was the case before 1996). In practice, the entire 
process lasts for much longer than stipulated, due to foot-dragging by the Ministry 
of the Interior.
In 2003, to the further detriment of Palestinian family life, the Israeli  government 
issued the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Order), 5763–2003, 
which has been renewed year after year since its enactment. Its main purpose is to 
prohibit Palestinians from the WBGS who are married to  Palestinian East Jerusa-
lem residents from applying for family unification and permanent residency (or 
naturalization in the case of those married to Palestinians holding Israeli citizen-
ship). Palestinian East Jerusalem residents with mixed families were thus left with 
the following options: live separately in the unrealistic hope that their application 
would eventually be accepted; live “illegally” with their spouses in East Jerusalem 
and risk being penalized; or leave Jerusalem to live together and risk revocation of 
one spouse’s Jerusalem ID. An additional option would be to maintain two house-
holds, one within the city’s municipal boundaries and another in the West Bank or 
Gaza—an option that is open to only a few, given the cost of housing and the high 
levels of poverty in East Jerusalem.54
East Jerusalem residents with mixed families are also expected to navigate 
Israel’s draconian residency regulations, which have been deliberately designed 
to be a legal labyrinth that few can comprehend. According to the Israeli human 
rights organization, HaMoked: “The fate of each man, woman and child is decided 
according to an endless web of legal sections, subsections, procedures and prec-
edents; examinations of the family unification application submission date and the 
applicant’s age at that time in relation to the enactment dates of the amendments 
to the Law, and so on. Within this tangle of legal complexities, the natural right of 
every person to family life is often trampled—a right which Israel is charged with 
upholding, under its own constitutional law and international law alike.”55
Quality of Life Overall
By all measures, since the Oslo Accords, Palestinian East Jerusalemites have seen 
their daily lives become an increasingly constant struggle. They carry the heavy 
burden of having to continuously prove their connection to their city. They are 
required to submit endless documentation proving their residency every time they 
enter any government office.56 And any visit to the Ministry of the Interior poses 
a significant risk, because the visit could easily trigger the Ministry’s heavy inves-
tigation procedure into whether Jerusalem is indeed their “center of life.” They do 
all that they can to avoid any such visits, but avoiding all arms of the government 
is nearly impossible in East Jerusalem, where all systems are interlinked and cross-
checked against one another. As Jefferis elaborates:
For instance, claiming national health benefits requires that an individual present 
residency documentation at the National Insurance Institute, where they are then 
often referred to the Ministry of Interior to obtain proof of residence. And where 
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permanent military checkpoints might be avoided by traveling different routes, the 
Israeli army often installs temporary or ‘flying’ checkpoints in East Jerusalem neigh-
borhoods, requiring all those who pass to present their identity documentation. Sol-
diers often tell [Palestinian] East Jerusalemites that they must go to the Ministry of 
Interior to replace a worn out identity card, even where the card is still valid. When 
permanent residency is revoked, the individual is forced to attempt to continue to live 
without permission in Jerusalem, which carries enormous penalties if apprehended, 
or, if he has no other connection to another state, to flee to Gaza or the West Bank.57
Israel also infringes upon the freedom of Palestinian East Jerusalemites through a 
stringent and stifling taxation enforcement system that is linked and continuously 
cross-checked with their residency status. While they are entitled to receive social 
welfare benefits, including medical coverage, as are all Israeli citizens, these ben-
efits are not proportionate to what they pay in taxes and fees.58
Political Representation
Palestinian East Jerusalemites have been effectively deprived of their political 
rights with the advent of the Oslo years, and especially the closure of the  Orient 
House in 2001. Their freedom of expression and right to equality, including eco-
nomic equality, depend on the goodwill of Israel, their occupier. The legislative 
body they are eligible to vote for (the Palestinian Legislative Council), is not 
allowed to promulgate laws or to act in East Jerusalem; the Knesset, Israel’s legisla-
tive body, which legislates all aspects of their lives, is totally out of their reach as 
they are not allowed to participate in this body’s elections.
Generally, most Palestinian East Jerusalemites remain in a political and legal 
limbo. They have Jordanian passports, which serve as travel documents, but they 
are not Jordanian citizens.59 Likewise, they have Israeli identity cards, but they are 
not Israeli citizens; they are subject to Israeli law and are obliged to pay taxes to 
the Israeli authorities lest they lose their residency. They can obtain Israeli travel 
 documents, but not Israeli passports. They self-identify as Palestinians, but they are 
not allowed to carry any formal papers officially identifying them as such. They 
are allowed to vote in PLC elections, but the PLC is not allowed to act in the place 
of their residence, that is, East Jerusalem. In sum, Palestinian East Jerusalemites 
have no real representation or effective mechanism for defending their political 
rights today. They effectively are stateless residents of an occupying state.
On the flip side, the PNA and the PLO have failed to sustain Palestinian Jeru-
salemites’ presence and resilience in their city. This contention stands regardless of 
the limitations placed by the Oslo Accords on the PNA’s presence and actions in 
East Jerusalem. The PNA’s failure has meant that the Palestinian residents of East 
Jerusalem feel abandoned. They have been forced to fend for themselves through 
whatever institutions have survived, including a vast number of civil society 
NGOs that have emerged to try and fill the vacuum left by the PLO and PNA in 
East Jerusalem.60
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WHAT LIES AHEAD:  REDEEMING JERUSALEM?
The Palestinian people, and those in East Jerusalem in particular, find themselves 
at a standstill, with the most viable option being to exercise resilience and focus on 
self-preservation until the balance of power shifts and the time is ripe for all par-
ties to reach a comprehensive, fair, and just solution. The formal recognition by the 
United States in December 2017 of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the American 
so-called “deal of the century,” and the ongoing rapprochement between Israel, 
Saudi Arabia, and certain Gulf countries do not bode well for the Palestinian peo-
ple, making the need for resilience and self-preservation all the more urgent. As 
bad as the past twenty-eight years have been, Palestinians in East Jerusalem have 
to prepare for worse to come. Recent developments—namely the Israeli munici-
pal elections in Jerusalem in 2018 and the passage of the Israel nationality law 
in 2018—raise difficult questions that East Jerusalemites need to address; chiefly, 
how to protect their individual rights while still remaining part of a larger national 
Palestinian project, one that needs to be refined to ensure their effective, not rhe-
torical, participation.
The Israeli Municipal Elections in Jerusalem
In 2018, a few Palestinians in East Jerusalem began calling for participation in 
Jerusalem’s municipal elections, held at the end of October 2018. For the first time 
since 1967, two Palestinian Jerusalemites stepped forward as candidates, Aziz Abu 
Sarah and Ramadan Dabash. Aziz Abu Sarah was the first to present his candidacy 
for mayor but withdrew it in September. He was caught between two fires—Israel 
trying to take away his residency rights and his people’s anger at him for breaking 
ranks.61 Palestinians have historically refused to participate in such elections in 
order not to bestow any legitimacy on Israel’s annexation of the city. The Palestin-
ian leadership has always rejected participation in Israeli municipal elections and 
the council of Palestinian muftis issued a religious ruling barring Muslim residents 
of Jerusalem from either running for office or voting in municipal elections.62 Pal-
estinian Christian leaders also issued similar pronouncements in 2018.63 As for 
Ramadan Dabash, an engineer and one of the few Palestinian East Jerusalemites 
to receive Israeli citizenship, he continued in his candidacy only to receive 3,001 
votes, several hundred of them from Jews.64 According to neighborhood-level 
election results provided by the Jerusalem municipality, under 1 percent of eligible 
East Jerusalemite voters cast ballots.65
Using Israeli political channels to protect Palestinian individual rights is in fact 
futile. According to Ir Amim, an Israeli nonprofit that advocates for a shared Jeru-
salem, Palestinians do not believe that their political participation in municipal 
elections will “significantly reduce their systematic deprivation in every area of life. 
Their position is understandable because policy for Jerusalem is not made at City 
Hall but by the Israeli government, through the Ministerial Committee on Jerusa-
lem Affairs, development authorities that answer directly to the Prime  Minister’s 
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office and the Interior Ministry. Without the ability to vote on the national level 
and without political representation, the ability of Jerusalem Palestinians to affect 
their daily lives is minimal.”66 One Eastern Jerusalemite woman said: “I don’t want 
to legitimize the Israeli occupation, and I am afraid of the Palestinian Authority. 
Our situation is terrible, but voting wouldn’t make it any better. We Jerusalemite 
Palestinians are no one and we are nowhere.”67
Applying for Israeli Citizenship
In the past few years, some Palestinian East Jerusalemites have applied for Israeli 
citizenship: “they consider themselves to be Palestinians, but request citizenship 
to guard their residency status.”68 Since 1967, applying for Israeli citizenship has 
been viewed by Palestinians as recognition of Israel’s illegal “annexation” of East 
 Jerusalem. Even if this view is changing slightly, the numbers who actually become 
citizens are minimal. Between 2014 and September 2016, of 4,152 East Jerusale-
mites who applied for citizenship, only 84 were approved and 161 were rejected. 
The rest of the applications are “pending”—formally, still being processed.69 
Most importantly, and regardless of the number of applications, there should be 
no doubt as to the fact that Israel will always ensure that these applications are 
approved at the lowest possible rate, in order to ensure its demographic majority 
and Jewish character of the city.70 The outcome of all applications is ultimately at 
the discretion of the Minister of the Interior, who can deny citizenship even where 
all requirements are met.
In all cases, and notwithstanding any change in the Israeli position, applying 
for Israeli citizenship remains an individual undertaking that will not advance 
the cause of East Jerusalem and its Palestinian residents as a community and 
will only end up diluting their Palestinian identity—unless this comes as part 
of an  agreed-upon comprehensive and just solution that maintains the identity of 
both East Jerusalem and its Palestinian residents and does not isolate them from 
the rest of their fellow Palestinians. This could potentially be part of a one-state 
 solution scenario.
Palestinian Resistance
Palestinians in East Jerusalem have resisted Israel’s oppressive rule in various ways. 
Before Oslo, they maintained, against all odds, their own schools and  curricula, 
their own newspapers, their own NGOs, and a local leadership. The Orient House 
(also known as the Arab Studies Society) established by Faisal Husseini in the 
early 1970s was the main forum for catalyzing Palestinian resistance and vocal-
izing  Palestinian political demands in Jerusalem and the whole of the Occupied 
 Territories. It was the national address for local notables and grassroots organi-
zations working to challenge Israel’s encroachment upon their land. Husseini 
and other East Jerusalem notables were often the main spokespersons represent-
ing Palestinian demands as well as affirming the centrality of East Jerusalem as 
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 capital of a future Palestinian state. They garnered funds from the European Union 
and the Gulf, as well as from local Palestinians. Husseini played a key role in the 
Madrid peace negotiations between 1991 and 1993. During and after the First Inti-
fada, Husseini and other East Jerusalemites also worked with the Israeli peace 
camp to find a viable formula for sharing Jerusalem as a capital of two states.71
After the signing of the Oslo Accords and the relegation of the question of 
 Jerusalem to the permanent-status negotiations, Faisal Husseini and the Orient 
House continued to act as the unofficial representatives of the PLO/PNA in the city. 
They led major campaigns opposing Israel’s construction of the Har Homa settle-
ment on Abu Ghuneim and generated funds to prevent both Israeli eviction of East 
Jerusalemites from their homes and Israeli encroachment on the Al-Aqsa mosque. 
The death of Husseini in 2001 and the closing of the Orient House signaled Israel’s 
determination to destroy any Palestinian political and national claim to the city.
Indeed, since 2000, East Jerusalemites have had to fend for themselves, as the 
PNA had limited physical and financial access to them because of the conditions 
Israel imposed during negotiations. Although the PNA created a Ministry for Jeru-
salem Affairs and continued to have a representative for the city, its main energy 
was channeled into state-building in the West Bank and preserving its own exis-
tence in Ramallah. Palestinians and their NGOs in East Jerusalem found them-
selves devoid of any political forum in which to their individual struggles with 
the Palestinian national struggle. Often they found themselves reliant on their 
own NGOs, such as Al-Haq, the Jerusalem Legal Aid and Human Rights Cen-
ter (JLAC), and the Civic Coalition for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem (CCPRJ), 
and on Israeli peace activist organizations, such as HaMoked and the Israeli Com-
mittee against House Demolitions (ICAHD), to protest Israeli government home 
demolitions and confiscation orders.72 The Palestinian NGOs and associations in 
East Jerusalem have found themselves increasingly pushed to address the grow-
ing humanitarian needs in the city. Their success remains a function of the aid 
they receive from international donors and their compliance with the donors’ 
agendas.73 Above all, their work continues to be challenged by Israel. Perhaps the 
clearest example of the limits of Palestinian steadfastness, and extent of Palestin-
ian despair, in East Jerusalem was the wave of knife stabbings between 2016 and 
2017, which led to the death of the assailants while petrifying Israeli soldiers and 
civilians. These attacks were neither nationally planned nor coordinated, reflect-
ing a certain atomization of Palestinian resistance. They also remind everyone 
that Israel cannot ignore the Palestinians and their rights indefinitely as revealed 
by their demonstration against Israeli attempted evictions from their homes in 
Sheikh Jarrah in April-May 2021. 
The Way Forward
Palestinian East Jerusalem needs immediate, creative, proactive, and efficient 
action from the Palestinian leadership, the PNA, and the PLO. Major funding 
is required to sustain Palestinian presence in the city. The PNA has formulated 
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 several plans defining its strategy in East Jerusalem, but these have not been prop-
erly implemented, especially as the insufficient funding allocated to them is often 
inefficiently channeled.74 Meanwhile, on January 15, 2018 the PLO Central Council 
adopted a resolution, subsequently confirmed by the Palestinian National Coun-
cil meeting held from April 30 to May 3, 2018 in Ramallah, calling for “the re- 
composition of the Palestinian Jerusalem Municipality in accordance with the best 
democratic and representative ways possible.”75 On the PNA’s Council of Ministers 
website, for example, the Ministry of Jerusalem Affairs offers its services to help 
those affected “by the policies of the occupation, construction violations, total and 
partial demolition of the buildings, providing support for the engineering clinic, 
legal clinic, humanitarian assistance, and strengthening the steadfastness of the 
merchants in the Old City.”76 These are all good “reactive” assistance measures, but 
what is actually needed are proactive measures solidifying the Palestinian presence 
on the ground and countering Israel’s policies targeting the land and the people of 
East Jerusalem.
Proactive Protection of East Jerusalem Land and Property
A task force aimed at preemptively protecting Arab property in East Jerusalem 
from being dispossessed through ambiguous transactions is urgently needed to 
protect against such aggressions within and outside of the Old City walls by both 
the Israeli government and right-wing Israeli-Jewish settler organizations such 
as Ateret Cohanim. A very recent publication of the NGO Peace Now, entitled 
“Annex and Dispossess: Use of the Absentees’ Property Law to Dispossess Pales-
tinians of their Property in East Jerusalem,” reveals the collaborative efforts, dating 
from the early 1980s, between the Israeli government and settlers in dispossessing 
Arab property in East Jerusalem and the unbearable ease with which properties 
were deemed “absentees’ property.”77
Attacks and aggressions on Arab property in East Jerusalem have been made 
worse by right-wing organizations such as Ateret Cohanim, which was founded 
in 1978 with the primary goal of “seizing-acquiring” as much land and as many 
buildings as possible in order to settle as many Jews as possible in the Muslim 
and Christian Quarters of the Old City and beyond.78 Such organizations are 
extremely well organized and funded. They are able to infiltrate Palestinian soci-
ety searching for potential “deals.” For example, recently, the PNA arrested Issam 
Akel, a resident of East Jerusalem who holds US citizenship, on the suspicion that 
he sold his home in the Old City to a right-wing Jewish association. The PNA’s 
appointed Jerusalem District Governor, Adnan Ghaith, was apparently involved 
in Akel’s arrest and was subsequently himself arrested by the Israeli police.79 The 
actions of such aggressive organizations need to be exposed, defended against, 
and, if possible, halted. A task force to work to this end will require major fund-
ing. The task force should be very active and highly involved in defending Arab 
property in addition to to preemptively protecting Arab property in East Jerusa-
lem by all possible legal means.
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Proactive Protection of Palestinian East Jerusalemites
All possible efforts must be exerted to defend against the Israeli government’s 
 revocation of Palestinians’ residency status, on both the individual and on  collective 
levels. Palestinian East Jerusalemites need a support system for  defending their 
individual cases in Israeli courts. On the collective level, several organizations 
(both Arab and Israeli) offer legal assistance and advocacy in  general, among them 
the Jerusalem Legal Aid and Human Rights Center, the Alternative Information 
 Center, the Civic Coalition for Palestinians Rights in Jerusalem, and the Israeli 
Coalition against House Demolition. Their work is excellent, but their capacities are 
limited. More resources and advocacy are needed so that individual cases become 
a collective cause. This collective cause could then be put in front of all possible 
international forums to influence international public opinion and raise awareness 
about the unjust treatment of Palestinian East Jerusalemites. Israel’s treatment of 
Palestinians in East Jerusalem violates multiple internationally  recognized human 
rights, including several rights codified in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights.80 And although the systematic reporting of any such violations to the rel-
evant international bodies will not result in any enforcement, it will nonetheless 
greatly contribute to rallying support among these bodies and in the international 
public sphere in general.
East Jerusalem and its Palestinian residents are an integral part of the Palestin-
ian cause in its just call for liberation and self-determination. They remain key 
to any peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Jerusalem has been 
declared the capital of a Palestinian state, a declaration supported by international 
law. The failure of all peace negotiations conducted between Israel and the Pales-
tinians since 2000 has been attributed largely to the Israeli unwillingness to share 
Jerusalem. The US decision to move its embassy to Jerusalem might have boosted 
Israeli claims in the court of public opinion, but it did not make them legal or 
internationally acceptable.
The current conglomeration of events does not bode well for Palestinians in 
general and for Palestinians in Jerusalem in particular. Israel’s annexationist plans 
loom on the horizon, with the Greater Jerusalem bill still on hold in the Knesset. 
Israel has also been increasingly targeting Al-Aqsa mosque in particular and the 
Old City in general. All this needs to be countered effectively. The PNA and PLO 
as leaders of the Palestinian people have to stand firmly by East Jerusalem and its 
Palestinian residents, in concrete, proactive actions taken on the ground, not in 
rhetoric. They are in dire need of support from their leadership, the Arab world, 
and all freedom-loving peoples.
Israel’s policies of closure, silent transfer, impoverishment, and deinstitu-
tionalization continue to suffocate Palestinians in East Jerusalem and to render 
them increasingly dependent on the Israeli authorities. Nonetheless, they remain 
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 resilient and steadfast as they have been since 1967. Their resilience continues to be 
repeatedly tested, for example recently in the summer of 2017 when Israel planted 
metal detectors at the entrances of the Al-Aqsa mosque and ended up remov-
ing them several days later.81 In April 2021, Palestinian youth demonstrated again 
against Israeli right-wing groups, who were shouting “Death to the Arabs” in the 
Old City. Palestinians in East Jerusalem, especially the younger generation, have 
become more resilient and street smart and know how to navigate the Israeli sys-
tem with the least harm possible while maintaining their identity. Clinging to their 
city against all odds, Palestinian East Jerusalemites are morabitoun (here to stay) 
and therein lies their strength.
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The State, the Land, 
and the Hill Museum
Hanan Toukan
How are we to think about a museum that represents a people who not only do not 
exist on conventional maps but who are also in the process of resisting oblitera-
tion by one of the most brutal military complexes in the world? What is, and what 
can be, the role of a museum in a violent colonial context compounded by the twin 
effects of imperialism and capitalism? Whom does the museum speak for in such a 
context? And what can or should it say to a transterritorial nation while physically 
located in a supposed state-to-be that has no real prospect of gaining control over 
its land, water, or skies through current international diplomatic channels?
Four interrelated phenomena are central to thinking through these questions 
in relation to the Palestinian Museum, which opened in 2016 in the university 
town of Birzeit in the West Bank, on a hill that offers a breathtaking view of farms, 
terraced hillsides, and the Mediterranean Sea. First, one must acknowledge the 
convoluted, bureaucratic, and deceptive nature of the Oslo peace process and 
the new phase of colonization that it inaugurated in 1993. This predicament, 
which has been described as one of living in a “postcolonial colony,” is largely 
defined by the paradox of living in a state without sovereignty in the West Bank 
and Gaza under the guise of a diplomatic process leading toward a two-state solu-
tion.1 Under this regime, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), established in 
1994 as an outcome of the now unpopular Oslo Peace Accords, did not gain full 
sovereignty for itself or the Palestinian people it purportedly represents. Rather, it 
became the middleman of the Israeli occupation, managing security and repress-
ing  Palestinian dissent on behalf of Israel through its own internal military and 
intelligence apparatus, helping to intensify the Israeli colonial strategies of spa-
tial segregation and economic control. At the same time, despite its increasing 
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 unpopularity, the PNA has continued to act as the recognized representative of 
a state-to-be in  international diplomacy. This role has necessitated its cultural 
diplomacy and top-down identity formation in an attempt to rebrand Palestin-
ians as nonviolent and modern global citizens residing within the 1967 borders—
processes that are key to understanding how and why the Palestinian Museum 
has, from its  inception, had to think about representing the story of the Palestin-
ian people outside the limits of the diplomatically sanctioned, yet now probably 
defunct, two-state solution.
Second, one must take account of ongoing Israeli colonial practices of cultural 
exclusion and military domination. Supported by an architecture of bureaucratic 
hurdles and procedures, the Israeli occupation uses a carefully designed system of 
legalized, institutionalized, and normalized racial discrimination to debilitate the 
freedom of movement of objects, people, and ideas that a museum or any institu-
tion of knowledge production requires in order to function. As I demonstrate, 
the Palestinian Museum has had to maneuver around this in order to materialize.
Third, the Palestinian Museum has indirectly interrogated the European muse-
um’s Western-centric yet universalizing mission of acquiring, conserving, and 
displaying aesthetic objects as part of the project of constructing nation-states 
and indeed modernity itself. It is precisely because of the Palestinian Museum’s 
restricted spatial reality that it is able to intervene in a global discussion concerned 
with the role of the museum in our world. This conversation centers on the ques-
tion of how to make the museum—an institution historically bound up with the 
emergence of the nation-state and the notion of the public in eighteenth-century 
Europe—relevant to the global realities that shape its direction today.2 The Pales-
tinian Museum can be read as proposing answers to this question, first through its 
mission of being “a museum without borders,” and second through its very process 
of construction, which drew on the land’s historically terraced landscapes to create 
a structure embedded in the communities and histories it seeks to speak to and 
for.3 Through this process, it arguably rethinks the “postcolonial museum” as an 
unstable yet dynamic memory-making institution, as much a living archive of vio-
lence as an affective encounter with the weight of the land and history.4 In doing 
so, it intervenes in a global conversation about the sensorial dimensions of exhibi-
tion and collection practices in violent settings on the margins of the global South. 
The final aspect that informs my reading of the Palestinian Museum is the wave 
of state-supported building and renovation of museums and other art institu-
tions underway largely in the Arab Gulf states but also in Lebanon, Egypt, Kuwait, 
and to a lesser extent Jordan, from which the Palestinian Museum is arguably set 
apart by virtue of its status as an institution representing a transterritorial and 
stateless nation. Unlike the regional museum projects surrounding it, which offer 
clear instances of top-down globally attuned national identity formation, state-
led societal development, and soft power and public diplomacy, the Palestinian 
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Museum prompts a rethinking and reworking of the vexed relationship between 
local  Palestinian noncitizens and transterritorial Palestinian publics and their sup-
porters, on the one hand, and the aesthetic form of an exhibition and the tastes of 
its varied global audiences, on the other.5
On the surface, it is easy to dismiss the beautifully landscaped, bunker-like, 
low and uneven twenty-four million dollar building that has become known as 
the Palestinian Museum as the vanity project of one organization and possibly 
even one person. The Welfare Association, better known by its Arabic name, Taa-
won, meaning cooperation, is Palestine’s largest humanitarian and development 
nongovernmental organization, founded in 1983 by a group of Palestinian busi-
ness and intellectual figures. It has spearheaded the project in its various itera-
tions since its inception in 1997. Headed by Omar Al-Qattan, former chairman 
and acting director of the Palestinian Museum project, board member of Taawon, 
chairman of the Al-Qattan Foundation, and son of one of Palestine and the Arab 
world’s most beloved businessmen and philanthropists, the late Abdel Mohsen Al 
Qattan, Taawon played a highly visible role in the making of the museum.6 Taa-
won, which is highly respected regionally and locally in Palestine for its financial 
independence, especially from Western funders, and for its humanitarian work, 
is well known for how seriously it takes its self-proclaimed mission to “preserve 
the heritage of the Palestinians, supporting their living culture and building civil 
society.”7 The museum, one of Taawon’s flagship projects, became a crucial site 
Figure 2. The Palestine Museum. Source: Iwan Baan, © the Palestinian Museum.
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for the implementation of its heritage mandate. As with most of its humanitarian 
projects, Taawon relied heavily on private money donated by Palestinian business 
entities on the association’s board, such as Arab Tech Jardaneh (a private practice 
of consulting engineers), Consolidated Contractors Company (one of the earli-
est Arab construction companies), Al-Hani Construction and Trading (based in 
Kuwait), Projacs International (the largest Pan-Arab project management firm), as 
well as the Bank of Palestine.
Yet as is always the case with the building of art institutions with private sec-
tor funds, questions concerning transnational financial ties, corporate ethics, and 
relationships with local cultural elites arise. The role of Taawon prompted those 
working closely with the project and others observing from afar to ponder how 
much the project was about global capitalist elite collusion with the local NGO 
sector rather than response to the needs of the Palestinian people. In this regard, 
people I interviewed or conversed with as part of my research raised a number of 
provocative questions: first, about the manner in which Taawon disbursed funds 
earmarked for the cultural sector to one museum as opposed to a wider range of 
cultural projects, arts organizations, and other activist initiatives already under-
way in Palestine; second, about how Taawon was seen to run the museum as if it 
were one of its mainstream NGO socioeconomic development projects, without 
the curatorial insight needed to get a museum of this kind off the ground; third, 
about how, in the eyes of some, especially those not working directly within the 
museum or in the art world, the opening of an empty museum in May 2016 made 
clear just how much it had been compromised by mismanagement; and finally, 
and perhaps most ominously, about what to make of the allegation that Taawon 
board members were getting returns on their in-kind donations to the museum 
in a context that has allowed big businesses to set the terms of cooperation for 
smaller and more local businesses.
Sentiments like these gathered from discussions about the Palestinian Museum 
are a reminder that even the most brilliantly conceived projects encounter friction 
when they leave the space of conception to become transformed into concrete 
projects. Specifically, how museums located at the nexus of the colonial/postco-
lonial divide reinvent their spaces and visual narrations, in contexts in which the 
divisions between public and private are opaque, and access to landscapes and 
architectures necessary for the movement of objects restricted, is fundamentally 
a question of the political economy of cultural production. Though the Palestin-
ian Museum has been able to propose innovative museum practices, its ability to 
survive its near-impossible predicament of belonging to a “state” that is not in a 
position to defend itself will ultimately depend on the extent to which the trans-
national networks, including the financial ones, that it draws upon will allow it 
to experiment freely with different forms of knowledge production, narrations of 
memory, and cultural heritage preservation.
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AN EMPT Y MUSEUM? 
If there is a blotch on the Palestinian Museum’s image that metaphorically and 
visually represented some of the misgivings expressed about it, it was at its official 
opening on May 18, 2016, when there were no art objects in the building on dis-
play. The opening took place soon after the firing of Jack Persekian, the museum’s 
chief curator and director since 2008, and one of the Arab region’s most recog-
nized contemporary arts curators, over “planning and management issues.”8
The museum was supposed to have opened with Persekian’s curated project 
“Never Part,” which was to have featured illustrative material objects from the lives 
of Palestinian refugees all over the world. The “Never Part” team envisioned and 
worked towards an empty museum for the opening, but they wanted interventions 
from artists contemplating the emptiness of the building vis-à-vis Palestine’s expe-
rience of having had its material culture confiscated, destroyed, or disappeared, to 
accompany this emptiness. The point was to reflect on Palestine’s predicament—
its lack of control over borders, waters, and skies—and to question the meaning 
of a museum, and the artifacts and collecting practices that supposedly define it, 
in the case of a people violently dispersed all over the globe and prevented from 
accessing their past and material present. In Art Is Not What You Think It Is, Claire 
Farago and Donald Preziosi demonstrate how the architecture of contemporary 
museums inspires active relationships between exhibitions and visitors, thereby 
provoking the potential that germinates in the built structure of the museum.9 
Accordingly, when artists and curators are invited to converse with the spaces of 
museums rather than contexts of art-in-architecture, unexpected capacities may 
be set in motion which go beyond the ordinary encounters of exhibitions and 
spectatorship, works and visitors. Persekian and his team, conversant in global art 
theory and practice, were working within a genealogy of modern and contempo-
rary art that conceptualized and theorized the museum space as an artwork and a 
statement in and of itself.10
But having the museum empty for the official opening, which was scheduled 
to coincide with Nakba Day, did not go down well with the task force set up by 
 Taawon to take charge of the museum project.11 Less interested in the language 
of conceptual art and the contemporary global artscape’s often experimental 
approach to engaging with the political, and more concerned with the  Palestinian 
Museum’s role as a local cultural institution that speaks to the transterritorial 
Palestinian reality of displacement, solidarity networks, and grassroots initia-
tives, Taawon might have seen in the proposed opening a shift in the role of the 
 Palestinian Museum from borderless center for Palestinian culture and heritage to 
what they perceived as an overly abstract and theorized project conversing more 
with the global art sphere than the local cultural scene.12 Being a grassroots organi-
zation, Taawon may also have been attuned to the fact that Palestinians, who lack 
sufficient access to their own artifacts but who value whatever material culture 
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they are still in possession of as a means of historical narration, needed to see a 
museum that carried their name with objects in it, if only as a symbolic affirma-
tion of their existence. Hence, even if the tradition of the empty museum (whether 
empty of audiences or artifacts) may have been an apt framework for highlighting 
the Palestinian condition in conceptual terms, in the Palestinian context, it takes 
on a different meaning.
When the Jewish Museum first opened without objects in Berlin in 1999 it was 
to highlight the eerily claustrophobic and uneven architecture of the zinc-clad 
building, which was meant to evoke feelings of fear, disorientation, and paranoia, 
even though the point of the museum was to celebrate Jewish contributions to the 
history of the city.13 Its initial emptiness corresponded to the message being con-
veyed. In the case of the Palestinians, history has put them in the absurd position 
of perpetually having to convince the rest of the world of their very existence. In 
response, scholars, artists, and filmmakers working in and on Palestine, interested 
in countering orientalist tropes representing the Palestinian as terrorist, victim, or 
romantic revolutionary, are slowly building a formidable archive of the historical 
fact and experience of ongoing dispossession and displacement, but also contin-
ued survival on the land. By recording and proactively reorganizing existing oral 
and visual testaments of surviving witnesses they are reassembling the story of the 
Palestinian struggle into a coherent and introspective counternarrative that rejects 
the central tenets of the media and public discourse on Islam, Arabs, and the Pal-
estinians. Even if it is difficult to access, cultural heritage and specifically material 
culture is the site where this reclamation of narrative is fought for most fiercely.
Ironically, notwithstanding Taawon’s misgivings about the curatorial conceptu-
alization of emptiness, the museum ended up being empty on the day of its open-
ing, thanks to a series of internal developments that culminated in the dismissal of 
Persekian, officially attributed to differences over “planning and management.”14 
Despite viewing the museum as incomplete, Taawon decided to move ahead with 
its opening to honor the promise they had made to open it on Nakba Day.15
It was difficult to ignore the ironies implicit in the opening of the empty 
museum in 2016 by the ever-unpopular Mahmoud Abbas, president of the PNA. 
This was especially true of mainstream Western media coverage. Headlines such 
as “Palestinian Museum Opens without Exhibits,” “The Palestinian Museum Set 
to Open, Empty of Art,” or, more provocatively, “Palestinian Museum Opening 
without Exhibits, but Creators Say That’s No Big Deal” were predictably unkind.16 
Cynically hinting at a people with neither the capacity nor the cultural history 
required to fill such an expensive and well-designed building, the media latched 
on to the fact that the Palestinian Museum was empty. Conveniently, these same 
media outlets almost entirely ignored the reality of Palestinian existence as a dis-
possessed people with histories, memories, and material cultures scattered all 
over the world or stolen by their colonizers through the cultural appropriation 
of music, books, art, and food, or the seizure of objects and especially archives.17 
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This reality, in addition to the lack of control over the movement necessary for the 
travel of art objects—normally central to a museum’s practice—makes compiling, 
acquiring, and exhibiting works an almost impossible feat.
In artist Khaled Hourani’s 2009 art project “Picasso in Palestine,” Pablo 
 Picasso’s 1943 portrait of his lover Françoise Gilot, Buste de femme, was exhibited 
on the grounds of the International Art Academy of Palestine (IAAP) in Ramallah. 
The bringing of Picasso’s Buste to Ramallah, a collaborative effort between the 
IAAP and the Van Abbe museum in the Netherlands that began at the Middle 
East Summit held at the museum in 2008, was nearly three years in the making. 
In Hourani’s project, the process of bringing one of Picasso’s most famous works 
to Palestine included wrestling with the thorny politics of Oslo, international pro-
tocols defining museum loan traditions that normally deal only with sovereign 
states, the bureaucratic measures implementing so-called peace agreements, and 
Israel’s control over checkpoints, airports, and international insurance require-
ments. The point of the intriguing, if overly elaborate and expensive, project was 
to highlight just how difficult it would be to bring artworks to Palestine.
ON THE POLITICAL EC ONOMY OF MUSEUMS 
Only a few months after the tumultuous official opening of the Palestinian Museum 
without art objects in it, in a much-discussed public speech as part of the Young 
Artists of the Year Award (YAYA), hosted annually by the Abdel Mohsen Qattan 
Foundation, Omar Al-Qattan reproached the failure of the Palestinian cultural 
and artistic milieu in the era of Oslo to produce any meaningful dialogue or ques-
tions about the demise of the Palestinian national project.18 Having just returned 
from a trip to Gaza, Al-Qattan—also the director of the Al-Qattan Foundation, 
one of Ramallah’s most prominent cultural institutions—seemed to be lashing out 
at the entire cultural scene. In fact, Al-Qattan expressed the discomfort that many, 
if not most members of the public, including writers, intellectuals, and artists, feel 
in the West Bank and Gaza about the extent to which cultural work and especially 
the visual arts have been able to engage with the collective Palestinian experi-
ence of oppression. In his words, he wanted to use the opportunity of the YAYA 
ceremony to address what he described as a “quickness, superficiality and general 
disengagement with historical and political subjects.”19
Much has already been written about the debilitating and depoliticizing effects 
of the NGO-ization process created by international aid to the region—a process 
that has led to what is described by Palestinians as the collapse of the national 
liberation project. With globalization and transnational cultural markets becom-
ing the norm in Palestine as elsewhere, artists and their institutions have not only 
been forced to readdress their role in the politics of the region and the transna-
tional networks they need in order to survive, but also to present Palestine’s plight 
and contributions to critical global conversations in the arts and activism more 
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broadly. In Palestinian artist Khaled Hourani’s words, “Artists started to reconsider 
the perception of arts, portraits, borders, artistic values, relations of artworks and 
exhibits, audience and arts dealers.”20 Whether, as a generation of artists, they were 
in fact able to do so without compromising on the core values of cultural resistance 
and the role of contemporary art in it is, today, a central and uncomfortable dis-
cussion in Palestinian cultural circles.
Interestingly, on the day of the official inauguration of the museum in 2016, 
the building was empty of artifacts but not of objects such as the materials needed 
for the construction of the museum like shovels, barrels, and piles of cement. As 
some critics of the museum quipped, the fact that the museum was not emptied 
of its construction materials was a visual reminder of precisely how tied up it was 
in global capital circulation and real-estate development, a marker of post-Oslo 
Palestine par excellence, rather than a representation of the dispossessed and 
oppressed people it supposedly represented.21 This observation, which directly ref-
erences the landscape dotted with cranes used to build the five-star hotels, restau-
rants, and upmarket housing that have come to define the “elite-driven production 
of space” in Ramallah in particular, prods us to think about the tensions between 
the provenance of the museum’s capital and what it symbolizes.22
It is a fact that most of the investors in the Palestinian Museum were busi-
nessmen who made their money in the Arab Gulf. It is also believed that dona-
tions included in-kind contributions, revenue from which was channeled back 
into the construction, management, and development firms of some of the board’s 
members. Adam Hanieh has shown how the internationalization of Gulf capital 
throughout the economies of the Middle East has been a central feature of regional 
capitalist development over the last two decades.23 Palestinian class formation 
since Oslo has gone hand in hand with the internationalization of capital, a pro-
cess that sits at the heart of the economic doctrine of neoliberalism. Hanieh posits 
that Palestinian class formation cannot be understood solely through the prism 
of Palestine’s subordination to Israel. Important businesses based in the Gulf have 
played a critical role in restructuring society in ways that make it highly reliant and 
dependent on transnational capital in order to survive. Along these lines, Sherene 
Seikaly provides a fascinating account of a dynamic class of Palestinian capitalist 
entrepreneurs involved in both local and regional trade, enabling us to historicize 
today’s class of museum investors.24 Contemporary businesses are part of a longer 
genealogy of capital accumulation and investment in Palestine and the region at 
large. At the same time, they are only one component in a contingently linked 
cluster of people, technology, objects, and knowledge that circulate through the 
social and economic fields that museums inhabit.25 This raises a question: Even if 
the presence of construction material and workers visually symbolized Ramallah’s 
role in the normalization of the occupation, and provoked the ambivalent feelings 
that some felt toward the opening of an empty museum, might it still be possible 
to separate the function of the Palestinian Museum as resistant praxis from the 
context of its provenance?
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L ANDSCAPE AND ARCHITECTURE
Taking up a mere three thousand square meters of the forty thousand square 
meter plot on which it stands, the landscape in which the museum is set is as 
aesthetically and politically significant as the building and its artifacts. The visual 
and sensorial experience of standing in the foyer of the building is one of an affec-
tive encounter with the weight of history, the land, and continued presence on 
it. Indeed the topography of the land on which the museum is built and its ter-
raced garden design was as significant to the conceptualization of the museum as 
the building itself. According to Lara Zureikat, the landscape architect, based in 
neighboring Amman, both understanding traditional practices of horticulture and 
working with the site’s slopes and its existing plants were central to the Palestinian 
Museum’s mission to respect the cultural and natural heritage of the landscape and 
its determination not to disrupt it yet again.26 This is in reference, and contrast, to 
the Israeli occupation’s practice of intercepting and intervening in the harmony 
of the landscape for settlement construction, surveillance, and wall-building pur-
poses, intrusions which sever Palestinians’ access to cultivable land.27 Predictably, 
Zureikat, who is a Jordanian national, was prevented by Israel from visiting the 
site of the project. She and her team resorted to the use of satellite imagery and 
internet communication to finalize the project. This reveals how, from the begin-
ning, the process of turning the museum into a material reality from an idea was 
imbricated with the museum’s objective of building on the transterritorial reality 
of Palestinians by thinking imaginatively about modes of delivery.
The building is therefore physically and conceptually responsive to its land-
scape and built environment. In the words of Conor Sreenan, chief architect of 
the project, from the Dublin-based architecture firm Heneghan Peng, “It was the 
physical that introduced us to the geopolitical. We literally traced the existing 
topography and looked at the way that the landscape had been inhabited for 2000 
plus years.”28 The idea, he explained, was not to be defined by the occupation but 
rather to take back control of the landscape.
The hills of the West Bank, on which illegal Jewish settlements sit, visually 
embody what settler-colonialism entails and the consequences it has had. Some 
of these include moving communities into territories acquired in war—a Zion-
ist practice that predates the establishment of the Israeli state—in addition to 
 settler violence against local Palestinian communities and the imposition of new 
demographic realities on the ground that will not only threaten the form but 
the very possibility of a future Palestinian state. The planting on the grounds of the 
museum of groves of apricot, pomegranate, mulberry, cypress, olive, walnut and 
fig trees, lemons and oranges, herbs like zaatar, mint, and other plants that Israel 
has appropriated as part of a policy of erasing the memory and identity of Palestin-
ian people, are a step towards reclaiming what has been taken away.
But standing inside the small museum and looking out of the floor-to-ceiling 
windows that adorn an entire wall that overlooks the hills and the  Mediterranean 
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Sea in the distance—which Palestinians are barred from reaching, thanks to 
Israeli-imposed restrictions on movement—the foundation on which Zionism 
stands is usurped, even mocked, if only momentarily. In other words, instead of 
directly confronting politics as such, the Palestinian Museum may in fact be aim-
ing to create a platform from which to expand the meaning of the political to 
include not only critical thought and the collection and exhibition of dispersed 
art, but also to link the lived and built environments and peoples’ relationships to 
each of these. With this in mind, even the sight of the unpopular Mahmoud Abbas 
cutting the ribbon on the opening day becomes more palatable.
THE ART INSTITUTION,  THE STATE,  
AND DEC OLONIZ ATION
The PNA complained about the museum’s apparent appropriation of what it saw 
as the state’s role of cultural patronage, most visibly in the name the museum chose 
for itself: the Palestinian Museum. Despite this point of contention, Taawon felt 
the need to be courteous and to invite the president because in the end, as Al-
Qattan explained, “we need to work with the existing bureaucratic structure and 
engage it, regardless of who is in power. We cannot function in isolation.”29 Al Qat-
tan’s reasoning might sit uncomfortably with activists who see resisting colonial 
violence as a fundamentally confrontational act that requires tackling head-on the 
PNA’s role as middleman of the occupation. Yet it is perhaps the only way in which 
to get a grand project of this kind off the ground in colonized Palestine today. The 
question that this reality begs is whether a museum of this kind was needed and 
whether Taawon would have done better to distribute its millions to the multitude 
of artists, writers, filmmakers, collectives, activists, and smaller-scale arts organi-
zations that are working laboriously to collect and document Palestine’s history 
and cultural heritage—a question I heard on numerous occasions in the field.
Rasha Salti and Kristine Khouri’s Past Disquiet: Narratives and Ghosts from the 
International Art Exhibition for Palestine, 1978 revisits the making of the Interna-
tional Art Exhibition for Palestine, which opened in Beirut in the spring of 1978 
and which comprised some two hundred works donated by artists in solidarity 
with Palestine from nearly thirty countries. Following the exhibit’s inauguration 
in Beirut, and after parts of it had traveled to Japan, Norway, and then Iran some 
years later, the Israeli Army invaded Beirut in the summer of 1982 with the aim of 
flushing out the PLO. The building where the collection was stored was bombed, 
along with the offices of the PLO’s Office of Unified Information where most of 
the archive of the exhibition would have been stored. Salti and Khouri’s painstak-
ingly curated exhibition traces the sheer challenge of locating the works, archives, 
stories, and memories today scattered all over the globe, but which were intended 
as a seed collection for a museum-in-exile until the moment it could “return” to a 
free Palestine.30
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Palestinian artist Nasser Soumi has been working since the mid-1990s to recover 
some of this lost cultural history by navigating the labyrinth of facts, urban leg-
ends, hints, clues, and social tensions that cluster around some of the disappeared 
paintings that featured in the show. When I recently asked him about his evident 
personal need to do so in the face of challenges he has faced from colleagues as 
well as the PNA that point to the impossibility of such collecting practices, he 
replied that Palestinians need some semblance of an art institution especially as 
their so-called state refuses to look for the story of resistance in places where it is 
not in control.31 For him, finding these works and knowing their story is a way for 
Palestinians to reclaim part of their lost archive.
These histories and artistic initiatives point to the importance of a site around 
which an oppressed people fighting for liberation may gather to (re)present their 
narratives, (re)negotiate their strategies of protest in the face of oppression, and 
reflect on their colonial pasts and presents by referencing objects and ideas that 
are accessible to them in physical or virtual form. From its plans to set up a vir-
tual museum and online archival platforms to its construction of satellite muse-
ums (in Chile, the United States, United Kingdom, Jordan, and Lebanon) and its 
novel incorporation of landscape and topography into its programmatic definition 
and practices, the Palestinian Museum has committed itself in both concept and 
practice to ongoing anticolonial and decolonization processes.32 Its space is, then, 
equally a potential launch pad for interventions into, discourses on, and practices 
of decolonization, and specifically the “de-Westernizing” of knowledge production 
in a changing postcolonial world, by calling into question the principles that sus-
tain the current dominant knowledge-production system, particularly in respect 
to art and museums.33
To appreciate what a significant institution the Palestinian Museum is, despite 
its precariousness, we need to revisit Palestinian historian Beshara Doumani’s 
original conception of the project and the strategic plan he envisioned for it. Dou-
mani was invited by Taawon in 2010 to submit a proposal for a museum to the 
organization’s Palestinian Museum Task Force. To this day, the museum continues 
to use his original proposal as the blueprint for ongoing development of the proj-
ect, even if it has been modified somewhat along the way. Doumani envisioned the 
museum as “postterritorial” in its need to encompass Palestinians who are scat-
tered transterritorially and unable to access their homeland, and as “a mobilizing 
and interactive cultural project that can stitch together the fragmented Palestinian 
body politic by presenting a wide variety of narratives about the relationships of 
Palestinians to the land, to each other and to the wider world.”34 His starting point 
wasn’t the geographical locale of the West Bank and Gaza—even if the museum 
building would be situated near Ramallah, the purported capital of a future Pales-
tinian state—but rather the dispersed and divided Palestinian population brought 
together through online technology.35 This population is composed of Gazans 
under siege, Jerusalemite Palestinians walled off from the rest of their people, 
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 Palestinians living in the West Bank who are intercepted, harassed, enclosed, and 
surrounded by a complex of Israeli checkpoints, as well the Palestinian citizens of 
Israel and all those living as refugees in neighboring Arab countries and as exiles 
in the rest of the world.
Doumani, like Soumi and others who witnessed or remember Israel’s 
 destruction of the Palestine Office of Unified Information, sees the importance of 
 investing in the materiality of cultural practices, even if they will always be under 
existential threat and part and parcel of global capital circuits. In reality, the mul-
timillion dollar investment project that is the museum can neither be defended 
nor easily rebuilt, should Israel decide to destroy it at any point. The museum, like 
other initiatives in Palestine, whether “state”- or civil society-led, is vulnerable to 
the closures, looting, and destruction to which all Palestinian cultural heritage 
has always been subject. This destruction is a possibility that financial investors 
have had to contend with. Sreenan describes the stoic perseverance of financial 
and other investors in the project during the dark days of the Gaza slaughter by 
Israel in 2014 as “possibly one of the most graceful acts of resistance one could 
ever  witness.”36
Hence the question of the museum’s role vis-à-vis the power structures it has 
to counter in the case of Israel and contend with in the case of the PNA was never 
about whether its construction would in and of itself be a compromise with the 
post-Oslo configuration of power. Rather, it was always about how it would nego-
tiate with these power structures in order to position itself as a space of critique, 
resistance, and decoloniality in the convoluted colonial context of post-Oslo Pal-
estine. As Doumani puts it, complicating the issue, “How this is done, of course, is 
of utmost importance.”37
IN THE C OMPANY OF OTHER MUSEUMS 
The Palestinian Museum was first envisioned as a commemorative structure built 
around a single chronological narrative that begins in 1948. As it developed, it 
became clear to all those involved that in distancing itself from 1948 as the starting 
point of a chronological historical narrative, the museum would reject the stan-
dard Zionist line that the notion of a Palestinian people was constructed only after 
the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. By beginning in the eighteenth 
century, it was agreed, the museum would better reflect the reality of the Palestin-
ians as a dispersed people with urban, rural, and intellectual histories who were in 
existence well before Zionists began to arrive in Palestine and violently established 
their state. In this, the Palestinian Museum positions itself as a counternarrative 
not only to Israeli self-deception about the persecuted Jews of Europe having 
arrived to a land without a people, but also to the PNA’s framing of the Palestin-
ians as a people whose existence is articulated solely in opposition to Israel, as is 
evident in the museum projects in which it is involved.38
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In both the Al-Birweh Park / Mahmoud Darwish Museum and the Yasser Ara-
fat Museum in Ramallah (opened in 2014 and 2016 respectively), the PNA wrests 
control over narration from the people it governs in the name of figures who were 
dominant players (and narrators) in the Palestinian resistance movement and, in 
the case of Arafat, the Palestinian state formation project in the aftermath of the 
Oslo Accords. In other words, unlike the Palestinian Museum, the emphasis in 
the PNA’s new multimillion-dollar museum projects is more on state power and 
state-building than on agency, peoplehood, and transterritoriality. More crucially, 
by focusing on Arafat and Darwish as the main characters in a story about the Pal-
estinian struggle, the resistance is reified and commodified in ways that are both 
fathomable on the international stage and productive of nostalgia for the local 
public. What is insinuated through the aesthetics and narratives of the museums 
is that these figures are part of the struggle for independence from Israel that has 
supposedly been achieved with the signing of Oslo. They are stories from a glori-
ous past, relics from a bygone era, what Svetlana Boym has termed a “dictatorship 
of nostalgia” that reigns at the supposed end of a conflict.39 Or alternatively, they 
are a chance to critique the past in order to imagine the future, as the director of 
the Yasser Arafat Museum suggested when I proposed my cynical reading to him.40 
Ultimately, the differing temporal orientations of the Darwish and Arafat muse-
ums, dedicated to the past as a way of thinking about the future, on the one hand, 
and the Palestinian Museum, focused on the continuing reality of  colonization, on 
the other, are reflected in the way one affectively experiences each of the museums.
Both the PNA’s museum projects are exercises in formal and institutional 
design that evoke the state’s legitimacy. By commissioning the late Ja’afar Tuqan, 
one of the Arab world’s most renowned modernist architects—known for his func-
tionalism, simplicity, and minimalism, expressed in major institutional buildings 
such as mosques, government offices, banks, and schools throughout the Levant 
and the Arab Gulf over the past forty years—the PNA was asserting its role as the 
neutral state apparatus representing the public interest. In the case of the Mah-
moud Darwish Museum, which is also the “temporary” mausoleum of Palestine’s 
most loved poet, the small and darkened space that sits atop a mountain of stairs, 
and which holds most of Darwish’s personal writings and belongings, could be an 
exhibition space visualizing state grandeur anywhere in the world.41 Unlike the 
Palestinian Museum, there is nothing inside save for the writings and book covers 
of Darwish’s publications encased on the walls that tells visitors where they are. 
Formally, this could be a minimalist exhibition anywhere. Yet, like the Palestinian 
Museum, the Darwish Museum also deploys indigenous plants and the terraced 
gardening typical of the landscape to emphasize Palestinian claims over the land.
The role of museums in contributing to visualizing national identity is clearly 
identified in postcolonial literature.42 How political actors make use of these insti-
tutions as tools for the conduct of diplomacy or to claim a symbolic significance 
for the nation-state through the collections that are held within them are matters 
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that relate to the political function of museums and the emotions they conjure 
up for the communities they represent.43 Yet the building of Palestine’s museums, 
whether by civil society and private capital or by the state, cannot be fully under-
stood outside of the tide of museum-building in the region. Focusing on national 
identity, societal development, and international understanding, museums in the 
Arab Gulf states of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have taken it upon them-
selves in recent years to redraw Arab and Muslim identity on the global map as 
part of a larger process of diversifying their oil-based economies by investing in 
other areas.44 Though these efforts replicate the tools, modes, and ideas of West-
ern museum construction and maintenance, Gulf states have been credited with 
 taking the initiative to de-Westernize and decolonize Arab representations by 
delinking them from their original source: the Western museum and its historic 
relationship to the nation-state in the time of empire.
In the words of the decolonial theorist Walter Mignolo, writing about the Qatari 
Museum of Islamic Art in Doha, “What is happening is not merely an imitation 
of westernization, but an enactment of de-westernization in that western cultural 
standards are being appropriated and adapted to local or regional sensibilities, 
needs and visions. In the sphere of civilizations and museums, this is a significant 
departure.”45 The suggestion that he and others have made is that prosperous and 
stable Arab capitals like Doha, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Muscat have the capability 
to redraw the global cultural map by redefining the Arab capital in a manner that 
is neither “Eurocentric nor Europhobic; neither retrograde nativist nor rootless 
cosmopolitan.”46
While there is something to these celebratory and hopeful takes on art infra-
structure in the Gulf, what seems to be missing is an examination of how tied up 
these spaces are in regional geopolitics, economic diversification strategies, and 
military alliances with Western powers (evidenced not least by the location of mili-
tary bases such as those of France in the United Arab Emirates or the United States 
in Qatar), even if they are seemingly de-Westernizing art discourses and collecting 
practices by rerouting the direction of travel and sales of each. Decolonial claims 
do not seem to factor in the corporate power that often shapes the conversations 
that take place in and about museums, even if these museums—especially as in the 
case of the Gulf museums—are able to reverse art market trends by paying more 
for artworks than traditional Western art patrons, such as the British Museum, are 
able to today. I would argue that this process by itself is not proof that a decolonial 
epistemic shift is occurring, in the absence of evidence of the production of one’s 
own knowledge on one’s own terms, outside of market constraints.
My reference to other museums in Palestine and the Arab region more gener-
ally is not intended to suggest that the Palestinian Museum is somehow more resis-
tant or more worthy as a museum “for the people by the people.” Instead, my point 
concerns the need to start a conversation about the content and form of muse-
ums in the region that do not fit the emerging Gulf museum format of  massive, 
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 powerful symbols of capital defined by aesthetically minimalist,  white-cube styles 
that are a means to assert global relevance and centrality. I want to ask how smaller 
“postcolonial” museums, like the Palestinian Museum, that are not commissioned 
as part of a larger national strategic plan, intervene in the space of “decoloniality” 
that the Gulf is ironically now celebrated as spearheading.
It is no coincidence that the financial patrons of the Palestinian Museum have 
made their money in the Gulf. It is also possible that future links between the Pal-
estinian Museum and Gulf museums will be solidified through staff training and 
other professional and infrastructural development that will be needed as the Pal-
estinian Museum grows. What these links will signify, and how they will shape the 
direction that the museum will take, warrant continuing scrutiny and discussion.
The Palestinian Museum’s mission of wresting back the narratives, material cul-
ture, and memories that have been so crudely taken from the Palestinian people is 
a reminder of an integral element of decolonization. If we think of decolonization 
in the realm of museum curation as entailing not simply a decentering of the art 
market and the flows of art sales, as suggested in the decolonial claims of Mignolo 
and others, but also a forestalling of the violence of amnesia and narrative erasure 
that accompanies colonialism in Palestine, a new emancipatory definition of the 
term may be enunciated.47 For all its faults and the criticism it might incur in 
the future, the Palestinian Museum is ultimately striving to seize control over its 
destiny not only from its oppressor Israel but also from hegemonic understand-
ings and practices of statehood, peoplehood, space, time, and architecture. For 
that, it should be celebrated not only as a triumphant moment in the cultural his-
tory of the Palestinian people, but also as a genuinely emancipatory moment in the 
grand project of epistemic decolonization, for Palestinians and for other colonized 
peoples everywhere.
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the process of “delinking” as he expounds it in “Delinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of 
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Defending Palestinian Rights 
in the Trump Era and Beyond
Yousef Munayyer
This chapter explores the challenges and opportunities presented for Palestinian 
rights work in the United States in the era of Donald Trump and beyond. It argues 
that Trump’s election paradoxically enhanced the momentum for American sup-
port for Palestinian rights and for the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) 
movement that seeks to hold Israel accountable for its treatment of Palestinians. 
Generating greater support for Palestinian rights in the United States remains a 
function of the nature of US-Israel special relations as much as the ability of Pal-
estinian activists to expose the intersections between the Palestinian struggle and 
the struggle against racism in the United States more generally. Palestinian rights 
advocacy also remains tied to the ability of the Palestinian national movement 
to reframe the Palestinian struggle from one that is confined to implementing a 
defunct two-state solution to one that affirms and protects their rights, irrespective 
of whatever solution is proposed. By reviewing the history of activism for Palestine 
in the United States over the past two decades, and the opportunity that Obama’s 
election in particular opened for talking about race and equal rights, this chapter 
explains why a rights-based approach for defending Palestinian rights has greater 
prospects for success today than ever before.
POLITICAL ACTIVISM FOR PALESTINIANS IN  
THE UNITED STATES SINCE 2001
Advocacy for the Palestinian cause in the United States has a long history. Before 
the 1967 war, organizations such as the Arab National League and the Institute 
for Arab American Affairs focused on representing the Palestinian cause as part 
of the Arab struggle for independence from Western domination.1 After the 1967 
war, new organizations emerged, such as the Organization of Arab Students, 
the Arab American University Graduates, and eventually the American Arab 
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 Anti-Discrimination Committee and the Arab American Institute.2 These orga-
nizations focused their work on explaining the Palestinian plight to an American 
public and media that portrayed Palestinians through a stereotypical, simplistic 
lens—as terrorists. Some of these organizations also tried to lobby and generate 
support in the US Congress for a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza 
in light of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s declaration of independence, 
its recognition of Israel, and UN Security Council Resolution 242 in 1988. The 
advocacy work of these organizations, though, often came up against a special 
glass ceiling: despite an organized effort at the grassroots level, impact on policy 
was limited by influential pro-Israel interest groups who had developed strong 
relationships with policymakers.
With the collapse of the Camp David negotiations in 2000 and the eruption of 
the Second Intifada, a number of activist organizations came together to create the 
US Campaign for Palestinian Rights (USCPR).3 Founded in 2001, this campaign 
became a coalition of over three hundred member groups across the United States 
working for Palestinian rights. It includes organizations large and small of various 
identities and in various locations across the country. At first, USCPR focused 
its efforts on ending American military aid to Israel by trying to impact policy 
 makers in Washington, DC. With the advent of the Boycott, Divestment, and 
Sanction movement in 2005, USCPR took a new approach—one that sought new 
alliances and aimed at generating a grassroots approach that was seen as having 
more potential to succeed in impacting American policy on Palestine.
THE BDS CALL AND THE MOVEMENT FOR 
PALESTINIAN RIGHT S IN THE UNITED STATES
The movement for Palestinian rights is a global one, and it is not new. Its growth 
in the United States has been shaped both by the political objectives set by the 
Palestinian national movement as well as by the nature of US-Israel relations. 
The US-Israel relationship is the single most important relationship with a  country 
or group of countries that Israel has. Often referred to as a “special” relationship, the 
US-Israel relationship has paradoxically become the backbone of Israel’s human 
rights abuses against the Palestinians. Without American support, it is hard to 
imagine how Israel could continue its extensive violations of Palestinian human 
rights with impunity. The traditional channels of advocacy, particularly as they 
relate to lobbying Congress and/or the White House, were thus extremely difficult 
for Palestinians to access and navigate. For this reason, the work of the USCPR has 
been very challenging. Whereas pro-Israel advocacy groups like American Israel 
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), the 
American Jewish Committee, and many others, have invested heavily in develop-
ing and maintaining relations between Washington and Tel-Aviv for decades, such 
access to US government circles was very difficult for pro-Palestinian  advocates. 
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No matter how many letters were written to Congress, how many members of 
Congress or their staff privately told Palestine rights advocates, “I agree with you, 
but if I do anything on this, it will cost me dearly,” how many phone calls were 
made by constituents to members’ offices—the efforts all came to naught. This had 
a very discouraging and demoralizing effect on activists engaged in Palestinian 
rights advocacy.
The Palestinian call for BDS, adopted by over 170 organizations in the West 
Bank and Gaza in 2005, provided a unique opportunity for Palestinian advocacy 
work in the United States.4 While the idea of divestment had existed before 2005 
and indeed, divestment campaigns were being organized and even won in cam-
puses prior to the 2005 call, the call was the first time that the use of these tactics in 
a Palestinian-led framework was formalized, thanks to its endorsement by over 170 
civil society organizations in the West Bank and Gaza. It is no exaggeration to say 
that the embrace of these tactics by Palestinian rights activists in the United States 
had a revolutionary impact on the movement. The call gave activists new ways to 
organize, new spaces in which to organize, new targets, and, most importantly, an 
opportunity to win. Within USCPR and outside it, activists started thinking that 
it was perhaps too difficult at the moment to get the US government to address 
its complicity in Israeli abuses—but what about the complicity of various levels of 
society below the government level? There was a push for highlighting how indi-
vidual, community, organizational, institutional, and local government complicity 
in Israel’s violation of Palestinian rights could be articulated in specific campaigns 
aimed at specific targets. These campaigns could operate in an arena with far less 
competition than in the halls of Congress, making success far more achievable. 
This quickly translated to optimism, engagement, buy-in, commitment, and the 
desire to do more campaign-related work. An effort that had become debilitating 
and discouraging visibly became dynamic, energizing, and empowering instead.
This grassroots approach also disarmed Israel and its advocates of the ability to 
discredit their opponents as “terrorists,” which had become a particularly potent 
weapon in post-9/11 America. Those organizing and advocating boycott campaigns 
were engaged in explicitly nonviolent action. Further, boycott campaigns helped 
shift the focus away from a nationalist framing of the conflict that pitted Israelis 
against Palestinians—a framing that posed a number of challenges, including that 
uncommitted Americans might be reluctant to take sides. Now, the conflict began 
to be framed as about the average American’s own complicity in Israel’s human 
rights abuses against Palestinians.
For all these reasons, BDS campaigns have seen numerous successes in the 
past twelve years, as can be seen from the list of “BDS Wins” on the USCPR 
 website.5 The sheer diversity of victories is impressive: corporate divestment vic-
tories, church divestment victories, cultural boycott victories, university boycott 
victories, professional association victories, and the list goes on. As well, the pace 
of victories has accelerated over time. In the early years after the BDS call,  victories 
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were less prevalent, but in recent years, they have been increasingly frequent. 
The USCPR used to spend more time helping groups start campaigns; now, self-
starting campaigns take off around the country, sometimes thanks to preexisting 
resources but often also out of the initiative of local organizers, without any sup-
port from the USCPR. Now much more of the USCPR’s time is spent coordinating 
and providing support for campaigns that are up and running on their own.
The rights-based activist approach for defending the Palestinian cause in the 
United States has proved to be more productive than the pre-2000 efforts, which 
focused on the Palestinian demand for a state. Instead of confining itself to 
explaining and defending the Palestinian quest for a separate independent state in 
the West Bank and Gaza, a cause which is hard for outsiders to identify with, the 
USCPR opted to advocate for restoring denied human rights. This approach proved 
far easier for people, particularly Americans, to identify with and support. Fur-
thermore, the rights-based approach exposed the pernicious nature of  nationalism 
and specifically what Zionism, an ethnic nationalism, meant for Palestinians. At 
a moment when a growing political divide is emerging around the world between 
ethnic nationalism and multiculturalism, this rights-driven approach highlights 
the dangers of ethnic nationalism and the importance of defending the Palestin-
ians’ struggle for equal rights.
THE ZIONIST WHITE SUPREMACIST:  
FROM BALFOUR TO TRUMP
Revisiting the Balfour Declaration through the lens of the current moment allows 
us to understand how the tension between ethnic nationalism and multicultural-
ism has lain at the foundation of the question of Israel/Palestine from the outset 
until the present day.
Though he may be most known for aiding the Zionist cause in 1917, it is often 
overlooked that Arthur Balfour, prime minister of the United Kingdom from 1902 
to 1905, was a white supremacist. He made that clear in his own words. In 1906, 
the British House of Commons was engaged in a debate about the native Black 
population in South Africa. Nearly all the members of Parliament agreed that the 
disenfranchisement of Blacks in South Africa was evil. But not Balfour, who was 
virtually the sole parliamentarian to argue for it, using these words: “We have to 
face the facts. Men are not born equal, the white and black races are not born with 
equal capacities: They are born with different capacities which education cannot 
and will not change.”6
But Balfour’s troubling views were not limited to Africa. In fact, despite his 
now-iconic support for Zionism, he was not exactly a friend to the Jews. In the 
late nineteenth century, pogroms targeting Jews in the Pale of Settlement in impe-
rial Russia had led to waves of Jewish flight westward, to England and the United 
States. This influx of refugees led to an increase in British anti-immigrant racism 
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and outright anti-Semitism—themes not unfamiliar to us today. Support for polit-
ical action against immigrants grew as the English public demanded immigration 
control to keep certain immigrants, particularly Jews, out of the country.
In 1905, while serving as prime minister, Balfour presided over the passage of 
the Aliens Act. This legislation imposed the first restrictions on immigration into 
Great Britain, and it was primarily aimed at restricting Jewish immigration.
It may seem astonishing that Balfour, whose support of the Zionist cause has 
made him a hero among Jews, would have implemented anti-Jewish laws. But 
the truth is that his support of Zionism stemmed from the exact same source as 
his desire to limit Jewish immigration to Britain. Both can be traced back to his 
white supremacist beliefs. Balfour lived in an era of stirring nationalism, highly 
defined by ethnoreligious identity. Because of these sentiments, the early twenti-
eth century was a time when ostensibly liberal Western nations struggled with the 
challenge of incorporating Jewish citizens into their fold. The Zionists provided 
Balfour with a solution to the challenges that Jewish citizens posed to his ethnon-
ationalist vision, a solution that didn’t force him to reckon with them. Instead of 
insisting that societies accept all citizens as equals, regardless of racial or religious 
background, the Zionist movement offered a different answer: separation. Balfour 
saw in Zionism not just a blessing for Jews, but for the West as well. As he wrote 
in 1919 in his introduction to Nahum Sokolow’s History of Zionism, the Zionist 
movement would “mitigate the age-long miseries created for Western civilization 
by the presence in its midst of a Body which it too long regarded as alien and 
even hostile, but which it was equally unable to expel or to absorb.”7 By giving 
Jews a place to go to, Zionism seemingly solved two problems at once, in Balfour’s 
mind. Balfour’s support of Zionism was motivated to an extent by his desire to 
protect Britain from the negative effects, the “miseries,” of having Jews in its midst. 
Rather than protecting the rights of one of its minorities, Britain could simply 
export them, or at least, not import any more. Needless to say, this view of Zionism 
is steeped in the same kind of white supremacy as Balfour’s view of South Africa’s 
Blacks. Yet, rather than solving the problem of how to handle a minority living in 
a white-majority country, the Balfour Declaration just shifted the same problem 
to a different geography.
For the tension between ethnonationalism and equality is equally present in 
Israel/Palestine. The Israeli state rules over the fate of millions of Palestinians who 
either have no right to vote, are treated as second-class citizens, or are refugees 
denied repatriation. Today, it is Israel that views Palestinians as a “demographic 
threat” and sees “the presence in its midst of a body which it too long regarded 
as alien and even hostile, but which it was equally unable to expel or to absorb,” as 
Balfour put it.8
That Balfour’s legacy of supremacy persists today is no accident. It has lent 
itself to an imperial project that allowed the Jewish national movement to assert its 
right to national self-determination while denying the same to the native  non-Jews. 
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Remarkably, Balfour was unabashedly aware of the hypocrisy of his stance. “The 
weak point of our position of course is that in the case of Palestine we deliberately 
and rightly decline to accept the principle of self-determination,” he wrote in a let-
ter to the British prime minister in 1919.9 “We do not propose even to go through 
the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country . . . the 
700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.”10
Those Arabs, of course, made up approximately 90 percent of the population 
in 1919. Therein lies the fundamental problem that continues through this day, 
just over one hundred years later. Palestinians are denied the right to have rights 
because from the outset, their views, their human rights, and indeed their very 
humanity, were consistently seen as inferior to those of others. That was clear in 
Balfour’s perspective and the British Mandate’s policy. And it persists in one form 
or another in many of the policies of the state of Israel through this day.
Today as much as in 1917, the battle between ethnonationalism and equality, 
between particularism and universalism, has risen to the foreground, from Don-
ald Trump’s rise in the United States to Boris Johnson’s Brexited Britain. The ideol-
ogy that Trump rode into power favored a similar herrenvolk nationalism. It holds 
that a country is for a people, not for many peoples. Zionism fits this worldview 
very well. There is a crystalizing alignment taking place and it is happening glob-
ally. Israel, which has sold itself in the west as a liberal democracy, is fully and 
wholeheartedly aligning with reactionary right-wingers across the globe. Expos-
ing this to those in liberal and progressive circles in the United States who have 
not yet taken a stand on Palestinian rights was one of the key tasks of activists for 
Palestine in the Trump era.
THE POLITICAL C ONTEXT FOR PALESTINIAN RIGHT S 
BEFORE THE 2016 US ELECTION
To fully appreciate the meaning and gravity of the reactionary Trump political 
moment, it is crucial to understand the political moment it was reacting to and the 
growing partisan divide that developed in the United States. During the Obama 
era, despite his stalwart support for Israel, on par with or beyond that of his prede-
cessors, an unprecedented shift in public opinion on Israel occurred in the United 
States. This shift followed largely partisan lines, itself a significant development 
given the prior American consensus regarding Israel; even when Republicans 
and Democrats couldn’t agree on whether it was night or day, they always agreed 
on Israel. Now, suddenly, this was starting to change. Although the Democratic 
party, including under the Obama administration, remained a staunch supporter 
of Israel (indeed securing it the largest military financing agreement in history), 
the Republican party, together with right-wing Israelis, tried to portray itself 
as the only reliable ally of Israel. At the same time, Democrats began to be torn 
apart between a values-driven base, alienated by the horrors of apartheid on the 
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ground in Palestine, and a traditional political and donor class who favored main-
taining the bipartisan status quo.
This change took root for several reasons. The first was Obama the person. 
Barack Hussein Obama had been the first Black person elected as president of the 
United States. Many Israelis simply could not get past his middle name or the fact 
that his father was Muslim or that he had spent some time in Indonesia growing up 
or that he once had a dinner conversation with Edward Said and was acquainted 
with Rashid Khalidi. Obama was always viewed with suspicion in the highest 
levels of Israeli government. Michael Oren, the Israeli ambassador to the United 
States, wrote that “From the moment he entered office, Mr. Obama promoted an 
agenda of championing the Palestinian cause.”11 Oren, the representative of the 
Netanyahu government, would chalk this up to Obama’s “ties to Indonesia and 
the Muslim villages of Kenya.”12 The right-wing Israeli government believed that 
Obama sympathized with the Palestinian narrative more than the Israeli  narrative.
The second factor was Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu’s premiership in Israel 
essentially overlapped with Obama’s presidency for all but a few months. Each 
government Netanyahu formed was a right-wing government, strongly supportive 
of settlement expansion, which caused friction with Obama’s Washington as they 
spoke of advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. This tension was evi-
dent from the outset of the relationship between the two leaders, and Netanyahu’s 
way of dealing with it was to change the subject away from peace, settlements, and 
Palestinian rights to Iran.
The third factor is the Iran nuclear deal. Obama viewed the problems of the Mid-
dle East in a way that the Israelis did not like. He sought to stabilize it not through 
massive deployment, but through the pursuit of political agreements, and he saw 
an opening with Iran that allowed him to pursue the Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of Action or JCPOA, which would bring Iran in line with its commitments under 
the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. While this would result in an unprecedented 
inspections regime for Tehran’s nuclear program, it would also mean that the Ira-
nian government would be given a path out of the isolation that the international 
community had imposed on it. Netanyahu, and many in Israel, who see no option 
other than eventual regime change in Iran, viewed this as a mistake and worked 
as hard as possible to torpedo the Iran deal. On Obama’s national security agenda, 
the Iran deal was seen as a significant policy achievement that advanced American 
national security interests while also keeping a promise Obama had made on the 
campaign trail about his willingness to talk to the Iranians and advance relations 
out of mutual respect. For Obama’s opponents, some of whom accused the presi-
dent of being too kind to adversaries of the United States and others who claimed 
he was not an American and was seeking to subvert the nation from the inside, 
the Iran deal was fuel for their fire. Many of Obama’s supporters, though, not only 
agreed with the Iran deal for its national security objectives but also grew angry at 
the subtle, and not so subtle, allegations of treason against their president, which 
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they often saw as racially coded or motivated by racism. Obama’s election reflected 
a growing shift in approaching questions of race and white  entitlement, the initial 
manifestations of a minority-majority America. Though when it came to policy, 
the Obama administration was not very different than others toward Israel, the 
idea of America that an Obama victory portended clashed with the very ethos of 
Israel, which is rooted in ethnonationalism and is maintained through discrimina-
tion. The partisan divide between Democrats and Republicans grew just as these 
ideas were coming into sharper contrast.
NARR ATIVES OF R ACE,  BELONGING,  AND 
MULTICULTUR ALISM IN THE UNITED STATES
Pro-Israel advocacy in America has always relied not just on Jewish Zionist 
voices or institutions but also on Evangelical Zionists, a demographic that has for 
 generations been the base of the Republican Party. But it was more recently, during 
the two Bush administrations between 1988 and 2008, that this constituency really 
started to flex its muscles.13 The confluence of multiple American wars in Muslim 
countries, 9/11, the “War on Terror,” and the Second Intifada all helped consoli-
date a “clash of civilizations” narrative that dominated the political discourse on 
the right and beyond. The discourse was clear about the axes of good and evil: 
 predominantly white, Judeo-Christian civilization was on former side; Islam, on 
the latter.
The election of Barack Obama, the first African American US president, 
brought to the fore the first physical manifestation of the minority-majority divide 
in American politics and future. Among the immediate reactions to Obama’s 
triumph were birtherism, the Tea Party, and a narrative that undergirded both: 
“Obama isn’t one of us.” These reactionary movements shared this core analysis 
with a more intellectual-seeming group. In right-wing neoconservative circles, the 
same narrative was congealing around Obama and one core issue: Israel. Obama, 
they would argue, was out of step with tradition, an outsider to the realm of the 
special relationship between the United States and Israel, and one whose inten-
tions could not be trusted. Take, for example, a book published in 2009 by National 
Review writer Michael Ledeen, called Obama’s Betrayal of Israel. For others, one 
question loomed large: Does Obama feel it in the kishkes for Israel?14
Obama, of course, was as pro-Israel as any of his predecessors; he also received 
the support of the majority of Jewish American voters, who rank Israel as their fifth 
most important issue.15 But that didn’t stop certain pro-Israel voices on the right, 
like Charles Krauthammer, who trumpeted, “It’s Obama vs. Israel.”16 Searching for 
the source of Obama’s hatred of Israel, Krauthammer wondered if it stemmed from 
Obama’s penchant for “appeasing enemies while beating up on allies” or from his 
desire to “heal the breach between Christianity and Islam . . . and has little patience 
for this pesky Jewish state.”
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Over in The Weekly Standard, Bill Kristol argued that Obama was angry, “accel-
erating both his appeasement of Iran and his attacks on Israel.” But there was good 
news: “The Republican Party and the conservative movement—and most of the 
American people—stand with Israel and against President Obama.”17  Kristol also 
set up the Emergency Committee for Israel, a right-wing attack operation intended 
to counterbalance J Street, the moderate-in-comparison American  Jewish Zionist 
advocacy group, which was seen as giving Obama Jewish cover. The emergency? 
It was Hussein Obama, as robocalls supporting Netanyahu’s reelection in Israel 
called him.18 After the 2016 election, the Emergency Committee for Israel changed 
its name to the Committee for Israel. It literally declared the emergency over once 
the first Black president was replaced by the white-supremacist-in-chief,  Donald 
Trump. According to Bret Stephens, Obama not only “betrayed” Israel, but also sys-
tematically failed to oppose everyone from the Iranian regime to Bashar al-Assad 
to Russia to the Muslim Brotherhood. Stephens wrote that the “most betrayed” by 
Barack Hussein Obama, the first African American president, was “Americans.”19
The narrative flowed back and forth between these voices and others on the 
right, like Robert Spence, Dick Cheney, Sean Hannity and Alan West, who wrote 
for example, “The barbarians are indeed at the gate, but there are also traitors 
within our ranks. If Barack Obama goes to the UN Security Council and drops the 
veto support for the two-state solution—I believe we will see the latter enable 
the former.”20
Likewise, Mike Huckabee and Newt Gingrich, two of President Trump’s early 
supporters, helped carry the tune of dog whistles. Gingrich argued that Obama 
“is so outside our comprehension” that understanding him required knowing 
“Kenyan, anticolonial behavior.”21 Mike Huckabee told Fox News viewers that 
everything Obama “does is against what Christians stand for, and he’s against the 
Jews in Israel. Furthermore, argued Huckabee, “The one group of people that can 
know they have his undying, unfailing support would be the Muslim commu-
nity. And it doesn’t matter whether it’s the radical Muslim community or the more 
moderate Muslim community.”22
Casting Obama as a traitor to the orthodox “Judeo-Christian” position on 
Israel had a deeper impact than these pundits reckoned with. This framing is well 
illustrated in an article written by Jennifer Rubin in The Washington Post with 
the headline, “Why It’s Correct to Label the Obama Administration ‘Anti-Israel.’” 
Rubin concluded that the Obama administration was “the most anti-Israel in 
history,” a “disloyal, unhelpful ally.” Her article, which was typical of her output 
regarding Obama throughout the eight years of his presidency, had a ripple effect. 
The piece was amplified on the online magazine Breitbart News, which Steve Ban-
non, its cofounder and later a chief strategic advisor to Donald Trump, called the 
“platform of the alt-right.”23
In other words, the white supremacist base saw no contradiction between 
Rubin’s analysis of Obama and Israel and their own weltanschauung. And this 
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is exactly the point—not only did these pundits not contradict the ideological 
undercurrent of the alt-right, they provided a piece of the paradigm, with their 
insistence over and over on an “us-versus-them mentality.”
The fight over the Iran deal, during which much of this narrative swirled, put 
Israel, Republicans, Islamophobes, and racists of various stripes on one side and the 
president, Democrats, and multiculturalists on another. It came to a climax when 
the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu secured an invitation to speak 
before a joint session of the American Congress through the Republican speaker 
of the house, circumventing the White House, purely for the purpose of lobbying 
against the US president’s agenda. This meant that the Republican speaker of the 
house was cooperating with a foreign leader in an effort to derail the signature for-
eign policy objective of the American president. As a result, a stunning sixty mem-
bers of Congress, senators and representatives alike, almost all Democrats, chose 
to skip the speech of Benjamin Netanyahu and held press  conferences instead 
explaining why they had done so. Many of them were  members of the Congressio-
nal Black Caucus. Speeches of Israeli prime ministers before the  American Con-
gress had become known for featuring more standing ovations than the annual 
State of the Union Address delivered by the president. So for sixty members of 
Congress to skip out of this high-profile address was stunning rebuke for Netan-
yahu and a sign of the changing times.
This brings us to the fourth factor that can help explain the unprecedented 
shift in public opinion on Israel occurring in the United States: what Obama 
represented, and the challenge this was to many Americans, as the 2016 election 
of Trump showed. Barack Obama represented a changing America, a majority-
minority country that was headed in the direction of more people of color assum-
ing decision-making roles. Obama represented an ethos that would be at the center 
of the political battle boiling in the next election. That ethos is one of civic belong-
ing; one that prioritizes democracy over identity. American is an idea, not a color, 
ethnicity, or religion. America does not cease to exist if it no longer has a white 
Christian majority. The same cannot be said for the Israeli ethos, however. This is 
an ethos that prioritizes identity over democracy. Obama represented an America 
that was becoming more demographically diverse and was embracing this diver-
sity. Israel, on the other hand, considers demographic changes existential threats, 
a view Trump and his allies propagate with regards to the United States as well.
THE ELECTION OF TRUMP IN 2016
The 2016 US Presidential election was probably the most covered and most fol-
lowed political contest in modern history. It was a campaign unlike any other, 
pitting the most insider of insiders, Hillary Clinton, against the most unorthodox 
of outsiders, Donald J. Trump. Neither of them was particularly good on Palestine 
or a friend to the BDS movement. Hillary Clinton made a commitment on the 
Defending Palestinian Rights    137
campaign trail to combat the BDS movement, in large part as a response to her 
major donor, Haim Saban, who has made fighting BDS a priority. Donald Trump’s 
pro-Israel bona fides were laid out at the annual AIPAC conference and in many 
statements before or after.24
While activists for Palestine in the United States were not expecting much 
from Trump, most began thinking about how advocacy work for Palestine would 
change under his presidency. Trump rode to power on a wave of nativist, xeno-
phobic white nationalism that would continue to be empowered after his victory. 
Trump won despite making attacking the press a cornerstone of his campaigning 
and despite his pernicious policies towards immigrants and refugees. Some of his 
key advisors had a “clash of civilizations” mindset that advocated for eternal war 
with Islam. Some think tanks friendly to Trump had made combating BDS a pri-
ority, including through attacking Muslim American organizations that practiced 
BDS, like American Muslims for Palestine, which is part of the USPCR, and was 
subjected to hostile legal targeting.
THE NETANYAHU/TRUMP BROMANCE
Despite uttering words about neutrality between Israel and Palestine early on in 
his campaign, candidate Trump soon made very clear he would veer further right 
than any previous major-party presidential candidate before him on this issue. Not 
only did he state he would recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, but he brought 
onto his team as advisers on the matter two right-wing pro-Israel advocates, David 
Friedman and Jason Greenblatt.25 Both would later play key roles in the Trump 
administration’s relations with Israel, the former as US ambassador to Israel and 
the latter as Middle East peace envoy.
While Trump continued to attack minorities, he also continued to embrace 
Israel and in particular Benjamin Netanyahu even before officially taking office. 
This was clearly seen in December 2016, when he was president-elect and the 
UN Security Council was voting on a resolution to condemn settlements, which 
Obama had ultimately permitted to pass by withholding the US veto. Netanyahu 
worked to stop the resolution, and when the White House refused to commit to 
veto it, Netanyahu called Trump. Trump then called Egypt’s Sisi, whose ambas-
sador had introduced the resolution, and Egypt withdrew it. However, four other 
countries were prepared to move ahead with it, and the vote ultimately happened 
with a US abstention. Trump, as always, let his thoughts be known to the world 
on Twitter, slamming the Obama administration for throwing Israel under the bus 
and promising that things would be different after January 20, inauguration day. 
During this time, he also promised to move the US embassy to Jerusalem. Netan-
yahu promptly thanked him for his support and tweeted that he looked forward to 
the new relationship.26 When President Trump made clear he wanted to pursue an 
even bigger wall to prevent immigrants from coming into the United States from 
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Mexico, Netanyahu tweeted that Israel had built a wall and walls work. Trump 
would soon cite him in a TV interview.27 Shortly after Trump’s inauguration on 
January 20, it was announced that Netanyahu would be the first foreign leader to 
officially visit the White House after Prime Minister Theresa May of the United 
Kingdom. Netanyahu’s trip was planned for February 15.
THE LOVEFEST DROVE THE WED GE FURTHER
Early in his presidency, Trump was a remarkably unpopular figure in the United 
States and only becoming more despised, particularly among Democrats, includ-
ing those who did not support Palestinian rights or BDS. Being in opposition to 
Trump was where all the energy, power, and dynamism was. Being able to brand 
Israel and Benjamin Netanyahu as Trump allies was a way to continue to open eyes 
to their pernicious alliance in progressive and liberal circles in the United States. 
The two leaders were largely doing this work on their own. But activists made 
highlighting their partnership a central part of their advocacy during this time.
Further, the Trump/Netanyahu love affair sent a shock through much of the 
American Jewish community, which votes overwhelmingly liberal. Trump’s cam-
paign brought all sorts of white nationalists out of the woodwork, leading to a 
spike in both Islamophobic and anti-Semitic incidents. Yet at the press conference 
between both leaders, the leader of the “state of the Jewish people” provided backing 
when Trump faced a question about his campaign’s role in fueling  anti-Semitism. 
This rubber-stamping attitude was once again on display when Netanyahu’s gov-
ernment retracted a statement condemning an anti-Semitic ad targeting George 
Soros, an Israel critic and philanthropist, in Hungary. Or when Netanyahu’s son 
Yair and the head of the Israeli American Coalition, Adam Milstein, shared social 
media memes attacking Israeli critics using anti-Semitic tropes.
Netanyahu’s coddling of global right-wingers has been a constant theme in his 
foreign policy, and it only intensified during the Trump era. Netanyahu provided 
cover for the Polish government after it passed a law criminalizing suggestions 
that Poland had any complicity in Holocaust deaths and drew rebuke from the 
Holocaust museum in Israel.28 He similarly was criticized for providing cover for 
Lithuania, despite the fact that it continues to honor Nazi collaborators.29 In recent 
years, Netanyahu also gave a speech in which he blamed a Palestinian, not Hit-
ler, for inspiring the Holocaust.30 He welcomed a visit to Israel by the right-wing 
Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, who compared himself favorably to Hitler.31
When the US embassy was opened in Jerusalem on May 14, 2018, evangelical 
Christian pastors who have anti-Semitic track records spoke at the ceremony and 
were warmly welcomed by Israeli officials. More recently, Netanyahu has embraced 
newly elected Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, an outspoken supporter of mili-
tary rule and torture, who also pledged to move Brazil’s embassy to Jerusalem and 
close the Palestinian diplomatic office in Brazil. Netanyahu is shrewdly  calculating 
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that he can advance Israel’s diplomatic agenda—thwarting accountability for Isra-
el’s historic denial of Palestinian rights—around the world, using the far right as a 
conduit. This alignment between Zionists and right-wing bigots, anti-Semites, and 
white supremacists has a long history.
TRUMP’S  ANTI-DEMO CR AT AND ANTIDEMO CR ACY 
MIDDLE EAST POLICY
The Trump administration’s embrace of Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli right 
has catalyzed the process of making the issue of Israel a partisan one in the United 
States and helped turn away many Democrats, but Trump has also pursued what 
can be called an antidemocracy policy when it comes to Israel/Palestine. This 
approach sought to normalize Israeli apartheid, wherein millions of Palestinians 
are denied the right to vote, by having unelected Gulf Arab leaders recognize Israel 
despite the overwhelming opposition of Arab publics.32
In the beginning of 2020 and after several years of waiting, the Trump admin-
istration finally released its peace plan. Before doing so, however, it began laying 
the groundwork with regional allies, most notably Israel, the United Arab Emir-
ates, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. This coordination was rooted in what seemed to 
be the pursuit of a new strategy of using the common interest of an adversarial 
Iran to bring Israel and Gulf states together. Doing so, despite the fact that Arab 
 publics opposed the idea, would foster normalized relations between Israel and 
the Gulf states. This would in turn break the Arab consensus around the Arab 
Peace  Initiative and upend the established sequence of land for peace, weakening 
what little leverage the Palestinians had and pressing them to accept an apartheid-
like outcome instead of an independent state.
When it was revealed, the Trump peace plan followed the antidemocracy theme 
by looking favorably on Israeli annexation of 30 percent of the West Bank while 
still referring to a nonsovereign, disconnected land archipelago as a Palestinian 
state.33 The first stage of the plans’ release was programmed to coincide with an 
economic conference hosted in Manama, Bahrain, in which no Palestinians were 
officially involved. The political parameters were then released by the administra-
tion in January 2020.
The Manama conference in June 2019, which followed the Trump administra-
tion’s support for the unprecedented Saudi- and Emirati-led marginalization of 
Qatar two years earlier, made it clear to many that the Trump administration was 
hoping to work with select Gulf monarchies to press the Palestinians into accept-
ing an apartheid-like solution. While the Trump plan was roundly rejected in the 
Arab world officially and was met with an Arab League affirmation of the Arab 
Peace Initiative, that consensus began to shake when the United Arab Emirates 
announced it would pursue normalized relations with Israel in August 2020. The 
signing of the Abraham Accords in August 2020 between Israel and the United 
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Arab Emirates and Bahrain made official this normalization, to the detriment 
of Palestinian rights. The Trump administration’s overall approach toward the 
region, as well as its specific initiatives to push Gulf autocracies to help legitimize 
Israel’s ongoing violations of international law and human rights, offer observers a 
clear contrast between Trump and Israel on the one hand, and the values of rights, 
pluralism, and equality on the other.
AN AGENDA FOR CHANGE:  CHALLENGES  
AND OPPORTUNITIES IN BUILDING TOWARD  
THE “S”  IN BDS
While the movement for Palestinian rights has had success over the past twelve 
years, in many BDS campaigns much work remains as far as getting to the “S”—
the sanctions. Getting the US government to level sanctions on Israel would be a 
game-changer, and the US campaign among others has not shied away from this 
objective. Rather, it has sought to assess what it would take to achieve this goal, to 
be realistic about the time it will take, and to build the popular or grassroot sup-
port necessary to march down this path and do so unapologetically. The question 
for activists on Palestine during the Trump era was how to work most effectively 
toward this ultimate goal. Below I outline what I see as current and future chal-
lenges and opportunities for this effort.
Intersectionally Organize
During the summer of 2014, Israel bombarded Gaza for fifty-five days, killing well 
over two thousand Palestinians, most of whom were civilians.34 The war on Gaza 
received massive coverage in the United States, albeit primarily filtered through a 
pro-Israel lens, and was the lead story on almost every day of the summer and in 
every newscast. But what may be less known outside the United States is that on 
August 9, just as the war in Gaza was beginning to wind down, Michael Brown, 
an unarmed eighteen-year-old African American from Ferguson, Missouri was 
shot to death by a white police officer allegedly while he had his hands up and 
was turning around to face the officer. He was shot six times in the front. The 
case ignited long-simmering tensions between the city’s majority-black popula-
tion and the majority-white city government and police. The US media recentered 
its focus from Gaza to police brutality in the United States and the legacy of racism 
in American institutions, especially in law enforcement. But the fact that Brown’s 
murder came during the war on Gaza meant that activists in the United States fol-
lowing the news on both traditional and social media were confronted by a strik-
ing juxtaposition between state violence aimed at upholding a system of injustice 
across the world, on the one hand, and right here at home, on the other. As protest-
ers gathered in the streets of Missouri only to be met with harsh police response, 
activists from Palestine sent messages with tips on how to mitigate the influence of 
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tear gas. Others circulated images of the identical tear gas canisters being used six 
thousand miles apart, made by the same corporation in Pennsylvania. Palestinian 
keffiyahs could be seen in the streets of Ferguson during protests. The connections 
were just too striking to ignore.
This episode highlights one of many intersectional organizing opportuni-
ties that offer a path to building coalitions with groups and movements who are 
unaware of activism on Palestine and can, in turn, benefit from support from Pal-
estine activists. There are intersections with Palestinian rights issues and various 
other prominent issues in the United States, including some that came to the fore 
after Trump’s election. For example:
∙ The same company that helped build Israel’s Separation Wall in the West Bank 
and helped cage Gaza behind a wall was considered to be the frontrunner for 
the contract to expand Trump’s wall to keep immigrants out along the south-
ern border with Mexico.35
∙ The security systems company G4S, which has long been a BDS target, is 
deeply enmeshed in the American prison-industrial complex.36
∙ Since the 1990s, police exchange programs—many of them organized, facili-
tated, and funded by the pro-Israel Anti-Defamation League (ADL)—have 
been organized to take American law enforcement officers to Israel to “build 
bonds between two peoples fighting terror.” But American police already have 
a tremendous and deadly problem with profiling and brutality and need not 
learn from Israeli police, who openly and unabashedly embrace racial profil-
ing as a policing tactic.37
The opportunities to create alliances and to build support for the issue of Pal-
estinian rights as belonging within the fold of progressive and liberal priorities 
continued to grow, as can be seen in Michelle Alexander’s column in The New York 
Times ahead of Martin Luther King Jr. Day in 2019. An esteemed author on racial 
justice, she used her column to issue a clarion call for solidarity with the Palestin-
ian people. She wrote:
Reading King’s speech at Riverside more than 50 years later, I am left with little doubt 
that his teachings and message require us to speak out passionately against the hu-
man rights crisis in Israel-Palestine, despite the risks and despite the complexity of 
the issues. King argued, when speaking of Vietnam, that even “when the issues at 
hand seem as perplexing as they often do in the case of this dreadful conflict,” we 
must not be mesmerized by uncertainty. “We must speak with all the humility that 
is appropriate to our limited vision, but we must speak.” And so, if we are to honor 
King’s message and not merely the man, we must condemn Israel’s actions: unre-
lenting violations of international law, continued occupation of the West Bank, East 
Jerusalem, and Gaza, home demolitions and land confiscations. We must cry out at 
the treatment of Palestinians at checkpoints, the routine searches of their homes and 
restrictions on their movements, and the severely limited access to decent housing, 
schools, food, hospitals and water that many of them face.38
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While these changes offer important opportunities for the continued and success-
ful growth of Palestinian rights advocacy in the United States, a number of impor-
tant challenges must also be addressed.
Reform Anti-lobbying Culture
An unfortunate byproduct of the success of BDS tactics is that they have directed 
grassroots energy away from focused engagement with policy-makers in the 
 federal government. As activists get used to working on divestment campaigns 
targeting a corporation or aiming for a resolution in this church or that univer-
sity, they are honing organizing skills for those campaigns but not developing the 
lobbying skills needed for effective government engagement. As I noted earlier, 
BDS tactics provided something of a refuge for activists who were tired of getting 
nowhere with Congress, but here is the hard truth: there is no way to sanctions 
without going through Congress. This means that at some point, that engagement 
needs to happen, and the sooner it starts the better. This is not to say there is 
currently no engagement with lawmakers—there is, but there can be much more 
and there will have to be much more for us to achieve the goals we have set. The 
anti-lobbying culture that has arisen as a byproduct of focused “B” and “D” work 
makes this more difficult, but the political ground for engagement is also ripe at 
this moment. A 2017 poll found that some 56 percent of Democrats, along with 41 
percent of Americans overall, would support sanctions putting greater pressure 
on Israel over continued settlement expansion.39 Addressing this anti-lobbying 
culture and correcting it will be a big task for political activism on Palestine in the 
United States in the years ahead.
It is also important to be clear that while Democrats might have more sup-
port among their base for moving in the direction of sanctions over time, elected 
officials will still have to be pulled in this direction and will not be eager to go 
there willingly. Democrats, particularly establishment Democrats who have been 
in office for years, adjusted to a politics of bipartisan consensus of unquestioning 
support for Israel. That is starting to change and a younger generation of progres-
sive Democrats seems less beholden to this older way of thinking and more in tune 
with their base.40 Further, these newcomers, like Jamaal Bowman and Cori Bush, 
are winning in primary elections, while others like Rashida Tlaib, Ilhan Omar, and 
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez are beating back primary challengers and were elected 
to congress in 2020. Importantly, this younger generation of progressives is suc-
ceeding electorally against candidates supported by significant pro-Israel campaign 
funds.41 For these reasons, it is more important than ever for activists and organiz-
ers who turned out of frustration to boycott and divestment and away from engag-
ing elected officials to refocus their energies in that direction and in this moment.
Lawfare
An additional challenge we have been confronting in the United States in recent 
years and increasingly today is “lawfare” efforts aimed at repressing the Palestinian 
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rights movement by attempting to criminalize BDS tactics. We have seen multiple 
such pieces of legislation in state legislatures across the United States over the last 
several years. As of this writing, twenty-seven states have enacted such legislation 
since 2014.42 The US Campaign has organized local coalitions to fight these bills, 
but not all have been successful. As a group of organizations with a relatively small 
capacity in comparison to the capacity of those opposing them, local BDS orga-
nizers must be careful not to get bogged down in fighting anti-BDS legislation to 
the point where it becomes all-consuming. Activists are triaging the situation and 
strategically addressing state legislation, while also working with other civil rights 
and liberties groups to educate activists about their rights, which is a key compo-
nent to defeating the chilling effect these proposed laws are designed to have.
Former President Trump notwithstanding, the US Constitution is still the law of 
the land. By contrast with France, for example, where the state can take draconian 
steps against BDS activity, in the United States political boycotts are considered 
free expression that is protected under the first amendment to the Constitution. 
For this reason, anti-BDS laws in the United States can only go so far before cross-
ing a constitutional line that would open them to a legal challenge. Anti-BDS law 
drafters have attempted to tiptoe right up to this line in some places, but elsewhere 
have crossed it. Some state laws require state contractors to sign an oath swearing 
they will not boycott Israel. In Texas, for example, this led to a schoolteacher and 
several others being forced to choose between their constitutional rights and their 
jobs.43 Legal challenges have already begun in several states.
In the summer of 2017, an important battle began against a piece of proposed 
federal legislation called the Israel Anti-Boycott Act. As originally written, it could 
lead to civil and even criminal penalties for BDS-type activity, with up to a one 
million dollar fine and a twenty-year jail sentence. The act was cosponsored by 
Republican and Democratic senators in an attempt to provide a bipartisan veneer, 
but in reality it was overwhelmingly supported by Republicans. It was clear it 
would not have the support needed to pass, and so early on, one of its leading 
sponsors, Ben Cardin (D-MD) attempted to add it as an amendment to other leg-
islation so it could be snuck through without debate. This attempt failed, and a 
public debate began.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) joined several organizations, 
including the USCPR, to defeat this legislation. This is very important for sev-
eral reason. First, the ACLU is highlighting the unconstitutional nature of these 
bills, a view that had been expressed loudly by many but was taken seriously only 
once the ACLU weighed in. Second, the ACLU is a very well-respected organiza-
tion, particularly in liberal circles, and the fact that they adopted this cause sent 
an important political message. Third, the ACLU was the key institutional leader 
opposing Trump policies that violate human rights, such as the Muslim ban, for 
example. Once the ACLU weighed in, senators came under increased pressure 
to end their sponsorship of the legislation, and many expressed a willingness to 
amend it. Ultimately, enough pressure from a progressive coalition was generated 
144    Partition and the Cost of Statehood
to prevent the passage of such legislation in the 115th Congress and the Israel Anti-
Boycott Act expired in December 2018. Further efforts in the 116th Congress to 
pass legislation that criminalized boycotts for Palestinian rights have also come 
under opposition from progressive actors and are unlikely to pass if they continue 
to include components violating First Amendment freedoms. This consensus has 
become so significant within the party that the latest party platform, adopted in 
2020, included language specifically committing to uphold first amendment free-
doms around boycott efforts. 
Legislation is just one part of a repressive effort supported by a network of 
actors aiming to silence criticism of Israel. These authoritarian tactics belie Isra-
el’s image with American audiences as a “democratic ally.” Continuing to expose 
these repressive efforts in partnership with institutions that have been leaders in 
 protecting free expression will be an important feature of the work moving for-
ward. As of this writing, repressive laws aimed at intimidating Palestinian rights 
activism have been successfully challenged in Kansas and Arizona, where federal 
courts have sided with the plaintiffs against the states whose legislatures passed 
anti-BDS bills.
Political progress was also made at the federal level after the shift in power in 
the House of Representatives in 2018. At the end of 2018, as power was changing 
hands, there was an effort to rush federal anti-BDS legislation through Congress 
by attaching it to a spending bill urgently needed to avoid a government shut-
down.44 But thanks to pressure created by advocacy groups, including the ACLU 
and others the New York Times editorial board came out against the legislation as 
did leading Democratic senators Bernie Sanders and Diane Feinstein.45
The legislation, the Israel Anti-Boycott Act, did not make it into the emergency 
spending measure but the high public drama around it encouraged Republican 
senators to try to force Democrats into choosing between siding with Israel or 
their base soon thereafter. With a new Congress sworn in at the start of the year, 
 including members Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar, who openly supported BDS, 
the opportunity for Republicans to use Israel as a political cudgel was height-
ened. The first piece of legislation considered by the Senate, Bill S.1., included 
four  elements, among them anti-BDS legislation, seen as unconstitutional. Just 
weeks after the Israeli Anti-Boycott Act controversy, the stage was set again for 
another political fight over the constitutional right to boycott Israel. While S.1 ulti-
mately passed the Senate, half the Democratic caucus in the Senate voted against 
it, including almost all the senators who sought the Democratic nomination for 
president in 2020. In the House, where Democrats had now come into control, 
the anti-BDS components of S.1. were dead on arrival after the progressive cau-
cus extracted private concessions from House Speaker Nancy Pelosi not to bring 
forward legislation that would divide Democrats. While the party would not sup-
port BDS, and indeed opposed it on record, it also would not support efforts to 
unconstitutionally confront BDS activism. By the summer of 2020, that position 
had made it into the Democratic party platform.
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Building Congressional Support
There is a need to continue to build support in Congress for standing up for 
 Palestinian rights. In recent years, important gains have been made in this area, 
even though the energy of the movement has been more campaign-focused and 
not as focused on engaging government. In 2016, for example, nineteen members 
of Congress, led by Representative Betty McCollum, signed on to a letter to the Sec-
retary of State demanding that steps be taken to protect Palestinian children whose 
rights are abused by Israeli policies. The letter even called for holding Israeli military 
units accountable under the Leahy Law, a provision that would deny aid or training 
to those units. Other letters have focused on supporting human rights defenders 
facing falsified charges or calling for investigations into extrajudicial killings.
This may seem unremarkable, but consider that even just ten years ago, it 
was difficult to get five members of Congress to sign a “Dear Colleague” letter 
urging continued support for humanitarian aid to Gaza through UN Relief and 
Works Agency. Much has changed in these ten years. Over time, multiple “Dear 
 Colleague” letters have rallied progressive and liberal members of Congress con-
cerned about Palestinian rights. After the letter-writing of the past decade, it was 
possible to introduce legislation supportive of Palestinian rights. That happened 
in late 2017, when Representative McCollum introduced HR 4391, which would 
condition aid to Israel on its treatment of Palestinian children. Some thirty-one 
members of Congress have since joined this legislation as cosponsors. While these 
letters and bills are important on their own, they are also vehicles for building and 
broadening congressional support.
By way of historical comparison, the first comprehensive bill for sanctions 
against South Africa was introduced in 1972, but it took a full fourteen years 
before it could pass. Today with unprecedented numbers of representatives and 
senators taking steps to defy the intimidation of pro-Israel lobby groups, there is 
newfound energy to redouble efforts and continue to build. As the number of peo-
ple supporting Palestinian rights grows, more members feel safe joining. Activists 
are working to build a core, first among progressive Democrats and then into the 
mainstream of American politics, of Americans who support Palestinian rights—
because  Palestinian rights are as important as the rights of any other people 
or group.
THE LONG WALK
American policy is central when it comes to Israel-Palestine because American sup-
port for Israel enables it to act oppressively and with impunity. For many reasons, 
America’s policy toward Israel is a function of a unique set of foreign and domestic 
interests that have established a long-standing orthodoxy. Today, that orthodoxy is 
starting to shake as a rights-based advocacy for Palestinians meets an America at 
a crossroads. Rights-based advocacy approach is uniquely positioned to gain the 
greatest traction in this American political moment and perhaps beyond.
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While the conditions that can create change in US policy are increasingly begin-
ning to assemble, there should be no doubt that the road ahead remains a lengthy 
one. Activists and advocates for Palestinian freedom can take comfort in the fact 
that the rights-based approach, as opposed to nationalist advocacy for partition or 
statehood, is the shortest path toward the goal because it is most likely to permit 
the formation of coalitions and alliances in a changing America. As the contrast 
between the values of freedom, justice, and equality and what Israel is doing to 
the Palestinian people continues to grow increasingly stark, Americans across the 
political spectrum will begin to reevaluate US support for Israel. Energy dedicated 
to sharpening that contrast for American audiences will likely help make the long 
walk to freedom shorter.
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Transitional Justice in Palestine/Israel
Whose Justice? Which Transition?
Nadim Khoury
This chapter examines the significance of transitional justice in Palestine/Israel.1 
Transitional justice is the process of dealing with past wrongs in order to shift 
towards a new democratic regime. While the concept has gained little attention 
in mainstream debates on Palestine/Israel, it touches upon crucial aspects to end-
ing the conflict, such as dealing with historical injustices, decolonization, and the 
proposed one-state and two-state solutions. The chapter makes two claims. First, 
it argues that transitional justice has gained appeal within the Palestinian camp as 
a way to devise political alternatives to the Oslo peace process. In this case, it is a 
tool used to counter the fragmentation of the Palestinian people, reckon with past 
wrongs, and provide venues for political reconciliation with Israeli Jews. Transi-
tional justice, however, can further a variety of political ends or solutions. After 
examining the various ways in which transitional justice is discussed in Palestine/
Israel, the chapter identifies deep disagreements over key issues, including what 
counts as a historical injustice; what mechanisms we should employ to deal with 
historical injustices; what are the goals we are transitioning to; and what is the 
nature of the transition that is supposed to take place. Disagreement over these 
issues means that transitional justice can serve a range of ends: to devise alterna-
tives to the Oslo agreements, to justify measures that are in line with them, or 
even to negate Palestinian demands for justice. The chapter concludes with a pre-
cautionary note. In the context of Palestine/Israel, transitional justice is a deeply 
contested concept and its potential as a tool to devise real alternatives to the failed 
peace process depends on whether or not it is incorporated into a larger political 
project that seeks to establish equality and justice for all Palestinians.
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WHAT IS  TR ANSITIONAL JUSTICE? 
According to the United Nations, transitional justice is “the full range of processes 
and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a leg-
acy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and 
achieve reconciliation.”2 The definition is wordy, but it is comprehensive. Tran-
sitional justice occurs when societies transition away from regimes responsible 
for large-scale abuses (e.g., dictatorship, apartheid) and move towards establish-
ing accountable democratic regimes. These transitions rely on a variety of mecha-
nisms, such as truth commissions, criminal trials, and apologies, whose purpose 
is to enable political reconciliation among competing parties in order to create a 
peaceful present and future.
Transitions rely on two kinds of justice: retributive and restorative.3 Retribu-
tive transitional justice grants legitimacy to new democratic regimes by punishing 
the perpetrators of the old regime. Germany after WWII is good example in this 
regard, as the criminal trials at Nuremburg punished the leaders of the old regime, 
established a new jurisprudence, and created an official record of Nazi horrors. 
Nationally, these trials enabled a transition towards a new and democratic (West) 
Germany, and internationally they laid the basis of our contemporary interna-
tional criminal justice system on which retributive transitional justice relies (with 
legal frameworks such as crimes against humanity, genocide convention, interna-
tional tribunals, etc.).4
Retribution, however, is not a one-size-fits-all recipe. In the case of South 
Africa, for example, retribution would have hindered a peaceful transition towards 
 democracy, as Thabo Mbeki acknowledges: “Within the ANC [African National 
Congress], the cry was to ‘catch the bastards and hang them.’ But we realized that 
you could not simultaneously prepare for a peaceful transition while saying we 
want to catch and hang people. So we paid a price for the peaceful transition. If 
we had not taken this route, I do not know where the country would have been 
today. Had there been a threat of Nuremberg-style trials over members of the apart-
heid security establishment we would never have undergone the peaceful change.”5
The price that South Africa paid was indeed costly. The perpetrators were not 
punished but offered amnesty in exchange for the public acknowledgment of 
their crimes. Not all South Africans were happy with this decision, but the ANC 
deemed it necessary to guarantee a peaceful transition out of the apartheid regime. 
Therefore, it privileged truth commissions rather than criminal trials to pave the 
way towards a democratic South Africa. Truth commissions are government-
appointed bodies mandated to unearth large-scale human rights abuses. Unlike 
criminal courts, they are extrajudicial and cannot pass sentences.6 More funda-
mentally, they rely on a restorative conception of justice that is premised on public 
mediation between victims and perpetrators. In truth commissions, victims are 
given ample space to voice their narratives, receive validation for their stories, and 
demand reparations. This is unlike in criminal courts where victims are heard only 
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to testify and provide evidence. Truth commissions, moreover, do not punish the 
perpetrators, but give them the opportunity to acknowledge their crimes, so that 
they can be restored as “active, full and creative members of the new order.”7 In 
South Africa, the work of restorative justice was colossal. Over a period of seven 
years, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission gathered the testimony of 21,000 
victims and received 7,112 amnesty applications—849 of these were granted while 
5,392 were denied.
The aim of both modes of transitional justice (retributive and restorative) 
and the variety of mechanisms they employ (criminal trials, truth commissions, 
apologies, commemoration, reparations, etc.) is political reconciliation.8 In the 
context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and international politics more generally, 
the term reconciliation has remained vague and confusing, especially given the 
reluctance of some peace negotiators to deal with the historical roots of conflict. In 
this regard, Nadim Rouhana calls for making a clear distinction between conflict 
settlement, conflict resolution, and reconciliation.9 Conflict settlement, he argues, 
is a negative peace that is geared towards stopping conflict rather than seeking 
justice between the warring parties. It is used interchangeably with a victor’s peace 
because it results from a military victory and serves to consolidate the interests of 
the victor. This limits peace negotiations to technical and military issues that are 
addressed by high officials and excludes the rest of society. Unlike conflict settle-
ment, conflict resolution seeks to resolve conflict rather than contain it. The goal 
is a sustainable peace grounded in a principled solution that promotes reciproc-
ity and formal equality between the fighting entities.10 The cooperation it fosters, 
moreover, is not limited to foreign policy and military officials, but includes other 
strata of society such as business elites and civil society actors—what is usually 
referred to as track-two diplomacy.
Political reconciliation departs both from conflict settlement and conflict reso-
lution, because it is a more transformative enterprise: “Reconciliation is defined 
as a process that brings about a genuine end to the existential conflict between 
the parties and transforms the nature of the relationship between the societies 
through a course of action that is intertwined with psychological, social, and 
 political change.”11 Reconciliation does not mean that everybody will be rec-
onciled. No political program can achieve such a goal, not in stable societies or 
in divided ones. Rather, the goal is to live in reconciliation—that is, to create struc-
tural and  objective conditions that have the capacity to transform people’s subjective 
and psychological predispositions towards one another while ensuring their polit-
ical equality. Dealing with historical injustices is central to creating such condi-
tions, and it is one important factor that distinguishes reconciliation from conflict 
settlement and conflict resolution. Moreover, reconciliation seeks the involvement 
of more than officials and social elites. It encourages the participation of victims, 
perpetrators, and the affected members of both communities.12 The focus on vic-
tims is particularly noteworthy.13 The guiding principles of the United Nation’s 
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approach to transitional justice, for example, stress “the centrality of victims in the 
design and implementation of transitional justice processes and mechanisms.”14 
In theory, this means that political reconciliation is more of a victims’ rather than 
victor’s peace. In practice, however, things are far from being so clear-cut, as is 
evidenced by the mixed record of transitional justice over the last thirty years.
TR ANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE OSLO  
PEACE PRO CESS
The Israeli-Palestinian peace process contains elements of both conflict resolution 
and conflict settlement. Aspects of conflict resolution are evidenced in nominal 
references to international law, as well as attempts to set up democratic institutions 
and foster economic cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian authority. The 
terms and conditions of the peace process, however, were set by the stronger party, 
which is why the process is much closer to the realpolitik of conflict settlement.15 
What is clear is that the Oslo peace process did not qualify as a process of  political 
reconciliation, especially since there was no serious engagement with the past. 
“Both leaderships eschewed discussions of the past,” argues Ron Dudai, “and tran-
sitional justice mechanisms were never proposed.”16
Avoiding the past was a deliberate policy on both sides, especially in the early 
stages of the negotiations. “We decided not to deal with past accounts,” Yitzhak 
Rabin told the Israeli Knesset on April 18th, 1994, but “to try and create a new and 
better future for both peoples.”17 Israeli negotiator Uri Savir put it more bluntly: 
“never again would we argue about the past . . . . Discussing the future would mean 
reconciling two rights, not readdressing ancient wrongs.”18 “We focused our atten-
tion on the present and the future,” writes Palestinian negotiator Ahmed Qurei, 
“trying to gauge the extent to which we had a common ground.”19 The focus was 
therefore given to “immediate” issues such as mutual recognition, the creation of 
a Palestinian authority, and a progressive withdrawal of Israeli occupying forces. It 
left the final-status issues, namely the status of Jerusalem, borders, and Palestinian 
refugees, to a later stage.
The negotiations at Camp David in 2000 were supposed to address these final-
status issues, but they failed to bring about any resolution. One year later in Taba, 
the refugee issue made some progress and a consensus emerged around monetary 
compensation as the primary response to the problem of Palestinian refugees.20 
Disagreements remained, however, regarding what losses would be compensated, 
the amount for which they would be compensated, the party who would bear the 
costs of such compensation, as well as how the refugee issue would be narrated. 
Compensation, of course, was not a new solution. United Nations General Assem-
bly Resolution 194, issued in December 1948, already offered refugees the option 
of monetary compensation if they decided not to return to their homes in what 
became Israel. The novelty at the Taba negotiations was to delink compensation 
from return, leaving Palestinian refugees with compensation as their only option. 
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And this option itself quickly disappeared with the collapse of the peace process 
that followed the Second Intifada and the election of Sharon as head of the Israeli 
government in Spring 2001. The short-lived revivals of the peace process in 2007 
and 2008 could not bring the refugee question back to the negotiation table, let 
alone other forms of reparations.
This failure to grapple with the historical and ongoing injustice of the Nakba, 
from which the issue of refugees emerged, did not occur by accident but by 
design. The peace process was not meant to solve the refugee problem, but to dis-
solve it—that is, to undermine the framework that had made it a problem in the 
first place.21 This occurred primarily by framing the refugees issue as a humanitar-
ian one, a trend that goes back to 1948 when the entire question of Palestine was 
treated as a humanitarian question, rather than a question of justice and national 
self-determination. With the peace process, only parts of the West Bank and Gaza 
became subject to potential self-determination, further constraining the 1948 refu-
gee issue to a humanitarian framework. For example, if one looks at the proceed-
ings of the Refugee Working Group at the 1991 Madrid Multilateral conference, 
one notices a strong emphasis on humanitarian solutions. There, the multilateral 
negotiations were focused on discussing databases, family reunification, human 
resources development, public health, child welfare, job creation, and social infra-
structure.22 No doubt, these are important issues. However, when these become 
the only issues, they reduce the refugee question to a humanitarian problem. 
Israeli negotiators have systematically insisted on this humanitarian approach, 
which purposely sets aside issues of justice. Even when they accepted the return 
of a limited number of refugees at the Camp David Summit in 2000, they did so 
solely on humanitarian grounds (family reunification), not reparatory ones (his-
torical injustice).23
The peace process also dissolved the refugee issue by imposing a new tempo-
rality to the conflict that blocked the Palestinian memory of 1948. By erecting the 
Green Line as a potential future border, the peace process delineated the field of 
territorial and historical negotiations. Only the land conquered in 1967 and the 
history that followed it were open to negotiations. What occurred before 1967 
was placed off-limits and, therefore, off-memory.24 “The Palestinian leadership 
knows that they have to forget Ramle and Lod and Jaffa,” wrote the Israeli journal-
ist Danny Rubinstein, referring to cities ethnically cleansed in 1948 and currently 
located in Israel. “If I was a Palestinian politician,” he continued, “I would say 
that you don’t have to remember. You have to forget.”25 Rubinstein’s demand to 
forget is not coincidental but integral to the compromise signed in Oslo. Within 
the mindset of territorial partition, there is no place for a narrative of Palestinian 
ethnic cleansing, but only a narrative of Jewish rebirth; no Nakba (catastrophe), 
only geula (redemption).
Not only does partition erase the memory of the Nakba, it also displaces the issue 
of historical responsibility, deferring it to a future Palestinian state. “The basis for 
the creation of the state of Israel is that it was created for the Jewish people,” Tzipi 
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Livni told Palestinian negotiators, and “your state will be the answer to all Pales-
tinians including refugees.”26 According to Livni therefore, only a future Palestin-
ian state, not Israel, will be responsible for the issue of Palestinian refugees. Such 
a state would offer them a country to “return” to, and in the process, wash Israel’s 
hands clean of its past crimes. Surely, Livni was not alone in endorsing this posi-
tion. At the negotiating table, she was representing a liberal Zionist consensus and 
negotiating with a Palestinian leadership that had accepted the principle of parti-
tion in 1988. Many within the Palestinian leadership hoped that partition would 
not entirely sacrifice justice for the refugees. This was naively optimistic, especially 
since Israel systematically denied its responsibility for the refugee problem. Even 
at the height of the process in the Taba negotiations in 2001, Israel rejected legal, 
historical, and moral responsibility. This is why Israeli negotiators insisted that 
monetary compensation payments for Palestinian refugees be indirect—that is, 
paid by an international fund and administered by an international commission.27 
The insistence is important, since direct compensations imply responsibility 
for the past (we are responsible, therefore we pay), while indirect ones do not (oth-
ers pay, because we are not responsible).
THE PROMISE OF TR ANSITIONAL JUSTICE
In light of these in-built problems and the inability of the Oslo peace process 
to deal with the past, many in the Palestinian camp have turned their attention to 
the issue of transitional justice. “As long as historical truth is denied or excluded,” 
writes Nur Masalha, “there can be no peace, no reconciliation in the Middle East.”28 
Palestinians and Israelis should therefore learn from countries such as Guate-
mala and South Africa that have relied on transitional justice mechanisms. As 
Masalha and a host of intellectuals, as well as NGOs such as the Israeli Zochrot 
and the Palestinian BADIL, have concluded, transitional justice is appealing for 
the following reasons.29 First, it prescribes a wide range of legal and symbolic 
mechanisms to deal with the Nakba. Second, it supports integrative solutions to 
the conflict (variants of the one-state solution) that maintain the unity of all Pal-
estinians. Finally, it allows for a swift transition away from the status quo. As I 
argue in the section that follows, however, transitional justice does not necessarily 
support these goals, for it depends on how its proponents are using it and for what 
political agenda or project.
Reparations for the Nakba
The primary appeal of applying transitional justice mechanisms to Palestine/Israel 
lies in their capacity to deal with historical and enduring injustices. To appreciate 
how this differs from the approach of the Oslo peace process, one could contrast 
the monetary compensation offered to the refugees at the Taba negotiations in 
2001 to the reparations that transitional justice could potentially offer in the future. 
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Compensations are sometimes confused with reparations, but they are different 
since reparations cover a wider spectrum of remedies to past wrongs. Accord-
ing to the UN, reparations also include restituting original property to refugees, 
aiding their return, ending ongoing violations, holding perpetrators accountable, 
commemorating the victims, acknowledging wrongs, issuing a public apology, 
and implementing a variety of measures to prevent the reoccurrence of injustice.30
Israel and its allies have systematically rejected this wider understanding of 
reparations. When Palestinian negotiators brought up the issue of reparations they 
were met with disapproval and censure. The US Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice deemed Israeli reparations for Palestinian refugees “backward- looking” 
rather than “forward-looking,”—an attempt to halt the peace process rather than 
move it in the right direction.31 Proponents of transitional justice disagree. The 
only way forward, they insist, is for Israel to reckon with its past through a host of 
transitional justice mechanisms. These include material remedies such as return, 
restitution, and compensation, as well as symbolic reparations like apologies. Had 
Israel issued an apology when it recognized the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion (PLO), notes Meron Benvenisti, the peace process would have been placed on 
an entirely different footing.32 “A sincere Israeli apology,” writes George Bisharat, 
“would be a milestone toward reconciliation that no Palestinian could ignore.”33 
Both recommend that Israel follow the example of other governments that have 
issued apologies for crimes of mass violence, such as ethnic cleansing, intern-
ment, slavery, and apartheid. Of course, apologies can be cheap. However, if they 
acknowledge responsibility, expresses remorse, and are supported by a host of 
legal and material remedies, they can be meaningful and consequential.34
Besides apologies, truth commissions are another way of acknowledging past 
crimes. For proponents of transitional justice in Palestine/Israel—especially NGOs 
such as Zochrot and BADIL—they figure high on the list of mechanisms to deal 
with the Nakba. Truth commissions can expose perpetrators of ethnic cleansing 
and provide a platform for its victims. This puts them at odds with a peace process 
that has protected the former and silenced the latter. Surely, Palestinian refugees 
were the objects of heated negotiations since 1991. They were debated, studied, 
quantified, and measured. However, they were never heard and were purposely 
cast aside from the peace process.35 Truth commissions can potentially bring them 
back to the center, providing them and their descendants a space to voice their 
stories and demand acknowledgment. Putting theory into practice, the Israeli 
NGO Zochrot already set up its own truth commissions to expose Israeli crimes 
committed in the Negev between 1948 and 1960. It has also engaged in other tran-
sitional justice work such as commemorating the Nakba, obtaining testimonies 
from 1948 Jewish fighters, and educating the Israeli public on what happened in 
1948. Israeli public officials have responded aggressively to the work of Zochrot 
and other Palestinian NGOs commemorating the Nakba, issuing a series of mem-
ory laws (“Nakba laws”) that criminalizes their activism.36
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It is worth noting that, in most case, proponents of transitional justice in Pal-
estine/Israel emphasize restorative mechanisms such as reparations and truth 
commissions over retributive ones.37 There could be many reasons for this, but 
the primary one is power. Criminal trials punishing Israeli perpetrators will most 
likely never see the day, because Israel is the stronger party. This is why restorative 
mechanisms are privileged, with the understanding that they can offer a relative 
kind of justice. “No one gets absolute justice,” writes Edward Said, “but there are 
steps that must be taken, like the ones taken at the end of apartheid.”38
These limits notwithstanding, transitional justice offers a discourse that 
allows many in the Palestinian camp to demand justice for the Nakba, and this 
is its primary appeal. This discourse is novel, and it differs from the Palestinian 
 revolutionary discourse through which the Nakba was originally (and in some 
cases still is) narrated. The early revolutionary discourse promised a solution to 
the plight of refugees in a Palestine that was fully liberated from Zionist coloni-
zation. It sought absolute justice. Transitional justice, on the other hand, prom-
ises reconciliation between Jews and Arabs in living in historic Palestine. It seeks 
relative justice. The revolutionary discourse was pan-Arabist and excluded Israel. 
Transitional justice challenges the Arab-Jewish binary and calls for new forms of 
Jewish and Arab engagement; for example, by linking the memories of the Holo-
caust and the Nakba.39 Finally, historical responsibility in the revolutionary dis-
course was framed in internal terms: How did we, Arabs, allow this tragedy to 
happen?40 In the transitional justice discourse, historical responsibility is framed 
in external terms: How can Israelis take responsibility for the Nakba?
Integrative Solutions and Decolonization
Transitional justice is also appealing for critics of the Oslo peace process because, 
by returning to the Nakba, it reframes the entire land of historic Palestine as one 
political unit and Palestinians as one people.41 This counters the fragmentation 
codified by the Oslo Accords, which divided Palestinians into separate entities: 
Palestinian citizens of Israel, refugees, members of the diaspora, East Jerusalem-
ites, West Bankers, and Gazans. Transitional justice also supports integrative solu-
tions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as a one-state democracy, because 
the paradigmatic cases of transitional justice, like South Africa, have all occurred 
within a single state. This does not mean, however, that transitional justice pre-
scribes specific institutional arrangements, whether one or two states. In fact, the 
mechanisms of transitional justice can go either way. Restitution, for example, is 
premised on reversing the consequences of conflict and returning to the status quo 
ante. As such, it pushes against a two-state solution that formalizes the results of 
war and displacement.42 Mechanisms such as apologies and compensation, on the 
other hand, could satisfy either a one-state or a two-state solution.43
Besides supporting integrative solutions to the conflict, transitional justice is 
appealing because it promises a uni-directional journey that is drastic, uniform, 
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and absolute. As Fionnuala Ní Aoláin and Colm Campbell note, “there was a spe-
cific point at which the Berlin Wall came down, and at which the apartheid gov-
ernment and the Argentinean military relinquished power.”44 This is unlike the 
slow and incremental transition of the Oslo Accords where addressing the most 
contentious issues (sovereignty, refugees, borders, settlements, and Jerusalem) was 
constantly delayed, and interim arrangements halted and reversed.45
As a result of this promise of radical and absolute transitions—dealing with past 
injustices, supporting integrative solutions, and promising radical transitions—
transitional justice in Palestine/Israel is sometimes associated with  decolonization. 
Reconciliation, argues Nadim Rouhana, could be framed as  decolonization, 
 especially when it acknowledges the power asymmetry between colonized and 
colonizer and offers to overturn this asymmetry in a new, democratic political 
order.46 The link between the two might come as a surprise, especially since decol-
onization is usually associated with armed resistance and the ousting of colonial 
power. This was the case with early Palestinian calls for decolonization, but not 
with recent ones. Increasingly, decolonization is discussed in nonviolent rather 
than violent terms, as a vehicle for civil equality rather than mutually exclusive self-
determination and as grounded in universal human rights rather than  particular 
national rights.47 These new understandings bring decolonization and transitional 
justice closer, rather than further apart.
These new understandings of decolonization draw on the South African expe-
rience, which Palestinian academics and activists often point to when discussing 
alternatives to the Oslo peace process. “The ideological collapse of the two-state 
solution,” writes Ali Abunimah, “leaves no alternative but to shift our discourse and 
practice toward democratic and decolonizing alternatives [such as] South Africa.”48 
As in South Africa, transitional justice in Palestine/Israel would lead to one state and 
hinges on dealing with the crimes of the past. And as in South Africa, the transition 
would be a drastic shift towards a new democratic regime. This does not mean that 
South Africa was a success story in which transitional justice completely dismantled 
the apartheid system. It did not, especially not in the socioeconomic sphere. Ref-
erences to South Africa are meant to rethink the terms and conditions of a just 
peace in Palestine/Israel, rather than to idealize the South African experiment.
THE LIMIT S OF TR ANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Transitional justice has its promises, but it also its limits. While it can offer a viable 
way to decolonization, as Nadim Rouhana suggests, it can also pave roads similar 
to the Oslo peace process, or even paths that run against Palestinian demands for 
justice. Transitional justice can serve these divergent ends because it leaves open 
crucial questions, namely: What counts as a historical injustice? When does a his-
torical justice begin and end? What are we transitioning to and from? And how 
do we transition?
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What Historical Injustice? Whose Historical Injustice?
In current discussions on transitional justice in Palestine/Israel, the Nakba  figures 
high on the list of past wrongs to be remedied. However, it is not the only one 
to be addressed. Ron Dudai, for example, argues that dealing with past injus-
tices also means dealing with Palestinian acts of violence against Israeli citizens, 
some of which qualify as war crimes according to international law. It also means 
 addressing intra-Palestinian violence such as the assassination of real or alleged 
collaborators, the violence committed between Palestinian factions in Gaza, and 
the human rights violations committed by the Palestinian Authority against its 
own people. This would be similar to the way the South African truth commissions 
addressed the issue of “black-on-black” violence between the Inkatha Freedom 
Party and the ANC. Applying transitional justice in Palestine/Israel would require 
a similar reckoning with intra-Palestinian violence, namely the split between Fatah 
and Hamas. Israelis, Dudai argues, would have to deal with “intra-Israeli violence, 
by which he means violence committed by the state of Israel against Palestinians 
with Israeli citizenship.49 Details aside, the point is that transitional justice will 
be demanding on Israelis, but also on Palestinians. This, in itself, should not be 
surprising. Reconciliation is costly for both victim and perpetrator. The question, 
however, is how demanding and what demands can be made on Palestinians in the 
name of transitional justice? And for what purpose?
Because transitional justice can open the Pandora’s box of historical injustices, 
it could potentially heighten competition over victimhood between Israelis and 
Palestinians, rather than pave the way to political reconciliation. This is already 
happening with the issue of Arab Jewish refugees and Palestinian refugees. For 
a long time, Israel has equated the exile of Arab Jews with the exile of Palestin-
ians refugees, claiming that what happened in 1948 was not ethnic cleansing but 
population exchange, a practice that was legal in the beginning of the twentieth 
century. In this view, Palestinian Arabs were “moved” to neighboring Arab coun-
tries and Jews from these same countries were “moved” to Israel, much as Greeks 
and Turks were in 1923.50 Today, Israel has upgraded this argument and turned it 
into public diplomacy campaign by using the discourse of transitional justice. The 
Israeli foreign ministry’s website, for example, notes that “a true solution to 
the issues of refugees will only be possible when the Arab League will take historic 
responsibility for its role in creating the Jewish and Palestinian refugee problem.”51 
Similarly, advocacy organizations such as Justice for Jews from Arab Countries 
demand that Arabs and Palestinians take historical responsibility, issue apologies, 
and offer reparations, in the name of a future reconciliation. Even the term Nakba, 
whose use is a long-standing taboo in Israeli society, is employed to highlight the 
exile of Arab Jews. “The Palestinian Nakba narrative must be seen in direct paral-
lel to the Jewish Nakba,” reads an editorial published by The Jerusalem Post. “The 
basic facts of the history of this conflict must become known so that the world 
recognizes that two peoples suffered and were uprooted.”52 The article also decries 
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the Palestinian “refugee industry” in the Arab world, contrasting it with the suc-
cessful assimilation of Jewish Arab refugees in Israel. Like the foreign ministry and 
advocacy organizations, it also holds Palestinians and Arabs directly responsible 
for causing the Palestinian and Jewish refugee problems.
Discursively, these public diplomacy campaigns are weaponizing the lan-
guage of transitional justice against Palestinians. In the process, they are erasing 
the racism Sephardi Jews suffered at the hands of their Ashkenazi counterparts. 
In The Human Right to Dominate, Nicola Perugini and Neve Gordon show how 
Israeli  settler groups mimic, invert, and co-opt the discourse of human rights to 
 legitimize their colonization of Palestinian land.53 A similar dynamic is happening 
with the discourse of transitional justice, which draws heavily on human rights. 
Pitting a “Jewish Nakba” against a Palestinian one is one example of such inver-
sions. Rather than bridge the experience of Arab Jews and Palestinians, it creates 
competing claims with the sole purpose of adding more chips to the negotiat-
ing table.54 If these strategies were to succeed, the Palestinian Authority and Arab 
states would be the ones apologizing for past wrongs, not Israel.
The Mechanisms and Temporal Scope of Historical Injustice 
Even if the historical injustice of the Nakba eventually becomes the focus of tran-
sitional justice work in Palestine/Israel, there will still be contestation over its tem-
poral scope—that is, when the Nakba began and when it ended. Disagreements 
over the temporal scope of historical injustices are common and can be found in 
other settler-colonial states. For example, in 2008, Canada employed transitional 
justice mechanisms to address the forced removal of First Nations, Métis, and Inuit 
children and their relocation to residential schools. Indigenous leaders and activ-
ists welcomed the government’s decision to deal with a crime that affected more 
than 150,000 children in the nineteenth century. However, they disagreed with the 
government’s understanding of when these injustices began and when they ended.
For the Canadian government, the injustice of the residential schools referred 
to a specific event in time, and employing mechanisms of transitional justice 
meant moving “to an even playing field in which the government can no longer 
be held accountable for past wrongs.”55 For indigenous peoples, however, tran-
sitional justice meant another thing. As Courtney Jung argues, the “interest in 
using apologies, compensation and truth commissions is to draw history into the 
present, and to draw connections between past policy, present policy and present 
injustices . . . . The ‘transition’ is to a relationship in which connections between 
pasts and present are firmly acknowledged, and in which the past guides present 
conceptions of obligation.”56 Indigenous leaders, writes Jung, wanted to use transi-
tional justice as a bridge to connect past with present injustices, linking what was 
happening today to a larger history of settler-colonialism. The Canadian govern-
ment, however, wanted to use it as a wall, separating historical injustices inflicted 
on indigenous people from current ones.
164    Decolonizing beyond Partition
Similar disagreements will most likely arise should Israel employ transitional 
justice mechanisms. Israel, for example, can acknowledge the Nakba as a historical 
injustice that occurred between 1948 and 1949. This, however, would clash with the 
way Palestinians see the Nakba as a historical and ongoing injustice (al Nakba al 
mustimirriah).57 To paraphrase Patrick Wolfe, the Nakba is a structure, not a single 
event.58 The expulsions of Tantura in 1948 and the assaults on Gaza in 2021 form 
a long chain of injustices that cannot be severed. A transitional justice approach, 
however, does not have to treat them as such. It can accommodate both interpreta-
tions, thus creating opportunities for contestation. 
Disagreements on the temporal scope of historical injustices will influence 
another important issue, that of the mechanisms used to deal with the Nakba. Do 
we deploy the full breadth of legal and symbolic mechanisms, or do we take a more 
limited approach? Since Palestinians see the Nakba as a historical and ongoing 
injustice, they could demand compensation and restitution to provide refugees 
with material justice; apologies and truth commissions to provide them with sym-
bolic justice; constitutional and institutional reforms to overturn a system designed 
to exclude them. Israel, on the other hand, could opt for much less. Delimiting 
the Nakba to a specific event in time, Israeli negotiators could acknowledge it, 
offer some compensations, and stop there. This acknowledgment would “act as a 
no-further-claims clause, vaccinating Israel against further Palestinian demands, 
foremost among them the right of return.”59 This targeted approach would do 
more to absolve the consciousness of Israelis than provide justice for Palestinians, 
but it would still be consistent with a transitional justice approach.
Transition to What? Which Transition?
Earlier, I argued that most advocates of transitional justice are also supporters 
of integrative solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.60 Paradigmatic cases of 
transitional justices have all occurred within one state, not between states, thus 
lending support to their position. Transitional justice, however, can justify alter-
native positions. “In Israel/Palestine,” writes Ron Dudai, “reconciliation would be 
between two states, not in a single society. It would thus entail not ‘learning to 
live together’ but ‘learning to live side by side.’ Perhaps a less ambitious task.”61 
Dudai suggests a three-strand approach to transitional justice. The process would 
be Israeli-Palestinian, intra-Israeli, and intra-Palestinian. Reconciliation would 
take place primarily among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, Israeli Jews, 
and Israeli Arabs, and later between the state of Israel and a future state of Pales-
tine. And rather than a drastic transition away from the status quo, there would 
be an incremental transition that would not fully break with current institutional 
arrangements: “The potential for transitional justice programs lies in an incre-
mental process of narrow mechanisms and small steps through a long process of 
transition, rather than in one high-profile and all-encompassing mechanism in the 
post-conflict state, as in the case of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
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Commission.”62 Transitional justice, in this view, would work as a corrective to 
the Oslo peace process, not as an alternative. It would not change the incremental 
nature of the process, but only add extra steps to the process. Such a proposal 
maintains continuity with the status quo, rather than a break with the current 
regime. Edward Kaufman and Ibrahim Bisharat defend a similar position. While 
dealing with the past is typically undertaken by a new regime, they argue, in Israel/
Palestine “there will be two sovereign governments, each representing more con-
tinuity than change and both with a history of involvement in individual, group 
and state terror.”63
This is surely not what advocates of the one-state solution have in mind when 
advocating for transitional justice. And while the above-mentioned proposals 
are not paradigmatic, they are in line with the current broadening of transitional 
 justice and its application to a wide array of contexts. In the case of Canada, men-
tioned above, for example, there was simply no transition. Mechanisms of tran-
sitional justice were employed in an ad hoc manner to address specific historical 
injustices. They did not move Canada towards a new regime but reinstated the 
moral legitimacy of the state and its basic structures. The larger point is this: tran-
sitional justice per se does not offer guidance on what we are transitioning to (one 
state or two states) nor how we transition (incrementally or drastically). Rather, it 
can support all these solutions.
C ONCLUSION
This chapter defended two arguments. The first highlighted the promise of transi-
tional justice in Palestine/Israel, the second, its limits. The promise of transitional 
justice, I argued, hinges on dealing with past injustices, offering reconciliation, 
and guaranteeing equality from the river to the sea. Its pitfalls, however, are the 
multiple meanings of “past injustices,” “reconciliation,” and “equality.” While both 
arguments push against one another, they essentially boil down to one. In Pales-
tine/Israel, transitional justice is an essentially contested concept, for while there 
is some broad agreement on what transitional justice means, there remain deep 
disagreements on whose historical injustice we should address, with what mecha-
nisms, and towards what ends. As such, transitional justice can be used for diver-
gent political projects and goals.
Should one draw a conclusion from this analysis, it is a cautionary one. Avoid-
ing the pitfalls and harnessing the promises of transitional justice depends on a 
larger political project that sets clear goals and strategies. Absent such a politi-
cal project, transitional justice is but a means, one that can be mobilized to serve 
a variety of ends. If the future after apartheid is reconciliation, we should learn 
from three decades of transitional justice and formulate a Palestinian approach to 
it. The task is demanding, but important. If we do not do it, someone else is bound 
to do it for us.
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Alternatives to Partition in Palestine
Rearticulating the State-Nation Nexus
Leila Farsakh
It might sound absurd to discuss alternatives to partition in Palestine when a Pal-
estinian state in the West Bank and Gaza has been recognized by over 138 countries 
and was admitted as a nonmember state into the United Nations in 2012. Partition, 
defined as separating Palestinians from Israelis, has long been considered the only 
solution to the intractable Arab-Israeli conflict. It is enshrined in UN Resolution 
181 of 1947, which called for the creation of two states in historic Palestine. Parti-
tion is also ingrained in the first peace agreement signed between the Palestinians 
and the Israelis, in 1993, which initiated what came to be known as the Oslo peace 
process. Even if it was never spelled out clearly, the aim of this process has been 
assumed to be the establishment of a Palestinian state living side by side with Israel 
in peace and security. In 2009 the Israeli government declared its acceptance of 
such a state in principle, so long as it met Israel’s conditions.1
Despite all these recognitions, however, a Palestinian state is unable to mate-
rialize on the ground. Partition—in the form of over ninety-nine checkpoints 
separating Palestinians from Israelis, the 708-kilometer Separation Wall that Israel 
built to encompass its settler population in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, 
which doubled to over 643,000 in 2018, and the siege on the Gaza Strip—makes a 
contiguous Palestinian state impossible, and has led many academics and activists 
to call for a revival of the one-state solution as a political alternative.2
This chapter explores some of the key political questions that need to be 
answered in any rejection of partition as a political solution to the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict. It focuses on two key historical documents that promoted 
one-state solutions in Palestine. These include Palestine: A Bi-National State, writ-
ten by Martin Buber, Judas Magnus, and Moses Smilansky, published by Ihud in 
1946 and “Towards a Democratic State in Palestine for Muslims, Christians and 
Jews,” published by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1970, the latter 
of which formed the basis of the Palestinian National Council’s call in 1971 for the 
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 establishment of a democratic state in all of Palestine. These two documents pro-
vide insights into how to rearticulate the relation between the nation and the state 
in a way that allows for competing national claims to the land to be accommo-
dated without compromising individual political rights to equal citizenship and 
justice. The chapter also examines the reasons offered over the past two decades 
for reviving the one-state idea and the challenges still facing it.
ALTERNATIVES TO PARTITION:  
PREMISES AND PROMISES
The one-state solution to two national groups fighting over the same land is not 
new. It has been proposed by Jewish Zionists as well as Palestinians. It was also 
considered by the international community, which has always been a central actor 
in this ongoing conflict. Its appeal stems from its promise to protect citizen rights 
over what some consider chauvinist national claims, since it guarantees equal 
political rights to all those wishing to live in Palestine, be they Jewish, Christian, 
or Muslim, immigrant or native. Its problem has lain in how it can reconcile indi-
vidual rights with national rights within a single polity; in other words, with how 
to protect citizens’ individual political rights to representation and equality as well 
as their collective rights to speak their own languages, protect their cultures, and 
define themselves as national entities with the right to self-determination, that is, 
to rule themselves by themselves.
Proponents of the one-state idea have attempted to tackle this problem by 
 proposing two main political structures for it: a singular democratic state or a bi-
national state. The former prioritizes individual over collective rights, leaving it to 
specific constitutional arrangements to sort out the ways in which group rights can 
be protected. The latter envisages a federated or confederated state along the Bel-
gium or Swiss model, one that protects Israeli and Palestinian cultural and politi-
cal institutions while giving them local autonomy within a democratic, binational 
state. It acknowledges the right of each national group to have their own elected 
local government, levy local taxes, control their domestic police, and speak their 
language. Both groups would form a federal representative government, one that 
would have control over a common foreign and defense policy.
At the heart of any one-state solution is an attempt to redefine the  relationships 
between sovereignty, nationhood, and statehood. Examining how proponents of 
a unitary solution in Palestine have historically articulated the link between 
these concepts can shed light on the political challenges, as well as the oppor-
tunities, involved in advocating today for a one-state solution to the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict.
Historical Origins
The genesis of the one-state solution can be traced back to the British Mandate, 
specifically to the period between 1922 and 1928 when the colonial power treated 
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the newly demarcated state of Palestine as a single political and administrative 
unit. Britain, while incorporating the Balfour Declaration in its mandate, drafted 
a constitution for Palestine in 1922 that included the different communities in a 
single polity. It issued a single Palestinian nationality, recognized Arabic, Hebrew, 
and English as official languages, and provided for the creation of a legislative 
body that would consult with the British high commissioner, who held the execu-
tive power of this new modern state. This legislative body was to represent the 
whole population and be the parliament of the single state. It was to be composed 
of twenty-three members, twelve of whom would be elected in proportion to the 
population size of the respective communities (eight Muslims, two Christians, and 
two Jews) with the other eleven chosen by the high commissioner.3 The Zion-
ist leaders at the time gave this idea a lukewarm reception but, according to Ilan 
Pappe, they were not really interested in it, since they sought separation from, not 
integration with, the Arab population of Palestine.4 The Arab leadership opposed 
the plan, mainly because it opposed the mandate and the Balfour Declaration, 
but by 1928 many leading Palestinian notables were willing to endorse it.5 The 
Western Wall riots of 1929, however, made the British Mandate abandon the idea 
of a single polity in Palestine. The Peel Commission recommendation in 1937, and 
later UN Resolution 181 in 1947, enshrined partition as an imperial and, later, the 
 internationally sanctioned solution.
A Zionist Rationale for a Binational State
Historically, among the Jewish Zionist community, the most vocal supporters of a 
one-state solution in Palestine have been members of Brit-Shalom, formed in 1925, 
and of Ihud, formed in 1942. The latter included Jewish intellectuals such as  Martin 
Buber and Judah Magnus, the first chancellor of Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 
as well as business leaders such Moses Smilansky among others.6 Together, they 
sought to influence the Zionist leadership with their ideas and convince Arab 
notables to join their plan for a binational state in Palestine.
Ihud’s members tended to view Zionism as a quest for a spiritual and cultural 
Jewish redemption, one that required the creation of a Jewish nation but not nec-
essarily that of a separate Jewish state. Magnus argued that the Jewish people do 
not “need a Jewish state to maintain its very existence” and that the Jewish nation 
did not need to be conceptualized or guaranteed in territorial terms.7 Martin 
Buber maintained that a Jewish home in Palestine could not be successful without 
addressing what he defined as the “Arab question,” which he defined as the legiti-
mate presence of Arabs living in Palestine.8
Ihud’s document, entitled Palestine: A Bi-National State, written by Martin 
Buber, Judas Magnus, and Moses Smilansky in 1946, presents the clearest Zion-
ist position in favor of a one-state solution in Palestine, one it clearly defines as a 
 binational state. It is Zionist insofar as its writers define themselves as people com-
mitted to the right of the Jews to return to Palestine and establish a home there, 
who maintain that Jews form a national, not simply religious, entity. As Martin 
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Buber put it, “Jewish settlement in Palestine . . . was embarked upon in order to 
enable the Jewish people to survive as a national entity and which in its social, 
economic and cultural aspects constitutes an enterprise of universal significance.”9
The Ihud document, presented to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry 
in 1946 and to the visiting United Nations Special Committee on Palestine 
(UNSCOP) in 1947, was committed to Jewish migration to Palestine. However, it 
called for “ the union of Jews and Arabs in a bi-national Palestine based on parity 
of the two peoples; and for the union of the bi-national Palestine with neighboring 
countries.”10 It defines this binational country as one in which “the two nations 
[will] have equal freedom and independence, equal participation in government 
and equality of representation and one people shall not be stronger than the other 
. . . s. they must make the country into a country of nationalities. This is altogether 
different from a nationalist country.”11
The Ihud document thus emphasizes three notions that are central to any 
alternative to partition in Palestine. The first is the notion of equality. This applies 
to equality in basic rights, such as freedom, as well as in political rights, such 
as representation and governance. The authors also acknowledge the “natural 
rights of the Arabs in Palestine,” by virtue of having been the country’s inhabit-
ants and “tilled its soil,” which they juxtapose with the “historical rights of Jews 
in Palestine” (emphasis added). They thus equate two kinds of entitlements, both 
related to the land, but one created through labor and actual presence, and the 
other through a historical connection, which has often been defined as mythi-
cal, albeit meaningful.12 “We regard the historical rights of the Jews and the natu-
ral rights of the Arabs as, under all the circumstances, of equal validity, and it is 
the task of statesmanship to find ways of adjustment between these contending 
claims.”13 The equality of these claims is based on the comparability of rights rather 
than their sameness.
The second rationale for the binational state relates to the right to self- 
determination and self-government. Buber and Magnus were well aware of the 
Palestinian struggle for political independence, which they attributed to the rise 
in Palestinian “political maturity” in the wake of the anticolonial struggles world-
wide at the end of WWII. However, they wanted to make the case that this right 
was compatible with the Jewish struggle for self-determination. They maintained 
that Jewish and Palestinian self-determination could be accommodated within a 
single political space by respecting the national claims of each party and detach-
ing sovereignty from statehood. The authors use concepts of state and country 
interchangeably throughout the document, reflecting an interest in prioritizing 
the notion of national self-determination over notions of territorial sovereignty 
or statehood per se. National rights here mean collective political rights that can 
be fulfilled in various political configurations. Nationalism, in their view, need 
not be nationalistic, that is, chauvinistic or separatist, and can be accommodated 
within larger political entities—such as the European Union today. As the authors 
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put it: “We contend that the sovereign independence of tiny Palestine, whether it 
be  Jewish sovereignty or Arab sovereignty, is a questionable good in this post war 
period when even great states must relinquish something of their sovereignty and 
seek union, if the world is not to perish. We contend that for this Holy Land the 
ideal of a bi-national Palestine is at least as inspiring as that of an Arab sovereign 
Palestine or Jewish sovereign Palestine.”14
The third rationale the authors make for the binational state lies in the fact that 
it prevents the domination of one group over another. The authors were concerned 
about the tyranny of majority rule over the minority, a likely outcome in 1947, 
given that Jews comprised approximately one third of the population in Palestine 
at that time. Moreover, Ihud was opposed to the creation of a Jewish state through 
violence, which Magnus rejected morally and politically since it would have led 
to domination, if not expulsion, of one group by the other.15 In a binational state, 
the Ihud document insists, Jews should have a right to immigrate until demo-
graphic parity is reached, after which a board would be formed of Jews and Arabs 
to decide who was entitled to enter the new binational state. Ihud members drew 
on the example of Switzerland, considered to be a comparison “most relevant to 
Palestine” despite its differences in level of economic development. They argued 
that a “federal multi-national state, based on the parity of nationalities is a most 
hopeful way of enabling [the people] to retain their national identity and yet of 
coalescing in a larger political framework. It results in separate nationalities yet a 
single citizenship.”16
This 1946 document laid the foundation for future calls, put forward most 
vocally by ‘Azmi Bishara in the 1990s, for Israel to become a state of its citizens.17 
Its emphasis on equality and on separating the nation from the state reflects an 
understanding of the state as a juridical entity responsible for protecting its citi-
zens’ rights, both individual and collective, irrespective of their national identity. 
Sovereignty is understood to be tied to the people, not to the land. The state is a 
political structure responsible for law and order that can combine within its ter-
ritorial boundaries various national groups who are represented and can exercise 
some political autonomy within the state. Ihud members envisaged this binational 
state as part of the Arab world, in a regional union that acknowledged Jewish 
 historical attachment to Palestine. They envisaged a multicultural state that was 
not too common in the 1940s, but one that is relevant to the twenty-first century, 
given the effect of globalization and international migration in constraining the 
scope of state political power.
The Palestinian Vision of a One-State Solution
The Palestinian vision of the one-state solution is most clearly presented in the 
PLO’s pamphlet “Towards a Democratic State in Palestine for Moslems, Christians 
and Jews,” published in 1970. The ideas proposed in this pamphlet, written by a 
Fatah member under a pseudonym, were largely adopted by the PLO in 1971.18 
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They build on ideas expressed by the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Pal-
estine and its leader, Nawaf Hawatmeh.19
The pamphlet, as well as the eighth Palestinian National Council (PNC) of the 
PLO in 1971, calls for the creation of a democratic, nonsectarian, state in Palestine 
inclusive of Muslims, Christians, and Jews. The PNC then declares that “the armed 
struggle of the Palestinian people is not a racial or religious struggle directed 
against the Jews. This is why the future state that will be set up in Palestine liber-
ated from Zionist Imperialism will be a democratic state, all those who wish will 
be able to live in peace there with the same rights and same duties.”20 Although 
the PLO called for the destruction of Israel, which it defined as a colonial entity, 
its one-state position in 1971 provided the first official Palestinian attempt to 
accept Jewish presence in Palestine. It acknowledged their individual, if not their 
national, political rights.
The Palestinian version of the democratic single state remained the official PLO 
plan for resolving the conflict up until 1988. It represented the Palestinian interpre-
tation of its right to self-determination, at a time when Israel and the international 
community, with UN Resolution 242, had not acknowledged the existence of the 
Palestinian people. The PLO 1971 state project thus was as much about proposing 
a solution to that conflict that would affirm Palestinian existence as a national, 
not humanitarian, entity, with a right to self-determination, as it was about being 
inclusive of Jews in a single polity.
The revolutionary element in the Fatah 1970 proposal, as far as the author put 
it in his pamphlet, lies in its acceptance of the Jews, both those living in this new 
state and those wishing to come to it. One could argue that the Fatah and PLO 
 proposal seeks to repair the injustice that the creation of the state of Israel gener-
ated and that Ihud had predicted. It wants to eliminate the Zionist domination 
Magnes and Buber warned against. The democratic state the PLO is proposing, 
though, is neither binational nor clearly secular in the true sense of the term.21 
The constitutional shape of the state is not discussed, nor is the relation between 
state and religion, though the document recommends the teaching of Hebrew and 
Arabic in the public schools of the future democratic state.
The 1970 text, in fact, clearly rejects binationalism because it argues that “reli-
gious and ethnic lines clearly cross in Palestine so as to make the term bi-national 
and the Arab-Jewish dichotomy meaningless or at best quite dubious.”22 The docu-
ment does not consider that Jews form a nation, and refuses to deal with them as 
a unified cultural group either. It considers them rather a diverse group of people, 
of different nationalities, never holding “a truly monolithic Jewish opinion”; all the 
while, though, it acknowledges the persecution they have suffered as a people.23 
It notes that “the majority of Jews in Palestine today are Arab Jews,” who are thus 
assumed to have Arab nationalities.24 The author thereby highlighted the notion of 
the Arab Jew, a concept completely absent from the Zionist document reviewed. 
As Ella Shohat has already demonstrated, Zionist thinking remains Orientalist in 
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its mission to modernize oriental Jews and homogenize them into a newly created, 
Jewish-Askenazi defined Israeli identity.25
Central to the Palestinian vision of a one-state solution thus is the separation it 
clearly makes between Jews and Zionists. It is a vision that maintains that the dem-
ocratic state cannot be Zionist or include Zionists, for Zionism is a  settler-colonial 
project that seeks to eliminate the indigenous Palestinians. It does, however, include 
Jews, even Israelis born after 1948, so long as they give up Zionism. The document 
thus marks a shift in the PLO’s 1964 position, which maintained that only Jews 
born before 1914 are entitled to be in Palestine. It states that “All Jews, Muslims 
and Christians living in Palestine or forcibly exiled from it will have the right to 
Palestinian citizenship . . . . Equally this means that all Jewish  Palestinians—at the 
present Israelis—have the same right provided of course they reject Zionist racist 
chauvinism and fully accept to live as Palestinian in the New Palestine.”26 
The nationality of the state is thus Arab Palestinian, as it “will be part of the 
Arab Homeland.”27 From Fatah’s point of view, the democratic state provides 
the basis on which reconciliation with the Jewish people is possible. As the author 
of the document puts it: “The call for an open new tolerant Palestine for Jews and 
non-Jews is a dramatic change in the Palestinian struggle, but it is hardly a new 
idea .  .  . what is new, is the fact that the non-Jewish Arab exiles who have been 
deprived of their homes and displaced by the Jews in Palestine can still . . . call for 
a new country that combines the ex-aggressor and the persecutor.”28
In this respect, the 1970 document refuses to separate the nation from the state. 
It is, however, in direct Palestinian dialogue with the Jewish presence in Palestine, 
albeit on its own terms. While its author acknowledges Jewish suffering, denounces 
the injustice done to them by Arab countries in the 1940s, and invites them to cre-
ate a new polity, the Palestinian version of the one-state solution does not explain 
how the collective rights of citizens will be protected. The emphasis is on notions 
of reconciliation and recognition. Jewish rights are defined as individual, political 
rights of citizens of a state, a state that is fundamentally Arab, not binational. Self-
determination is thus recognized for the Arabs only, since, in the author’s view, the 
Jews cannot be a national group. If they were, they would become a racist colonial 
state, just as Israel, the author argues, has demonstrated itself to be.
THE T WO-STATE SOLUTION:  WHAT WENT WRONG?
The Palestinian state project declared in 1971, though, was soon shelved in favor 
of the two-state solution. The Palestinian leadership was aware by the mid-1970s 
that a Palestinian state could not materialize on all of historic Palestine, given 
Zionist rejection of it and the international community’s support for the two-
state solution. In 1988 the PLO issued its Declaration of Independence, officially 
acknowledged Israel, and accepted UN Resolution 242 as the basis for peace nego-
tiation. This paved the way for the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and 1995.
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The Oslo agreements indirectly acknowledged the Palestinian right to self- 
government in the West Bank and Gaza. They allowed the formation of Palestin-
ian elected representative institutions and the creation of a whole infrastructure of 
security coordination between the Israeli military and the Palestinian Authority. 
Although the signed agreements never promised the independence of a  Palestinian 
state in the Occupied Territories, the Palestinian leadership and the international 
community saw as the aim of the peace process the eventual establishment of a 
Palestinian state, as acknowledged by the Quartet Road Map for Peace in 2003. 
A Palestinian state on 22 percent of historic Palestine was considered better than 
no state. It was also an act of historical reconciliation with Israel, one that acknowl-
edged Jewish individual and collective political rights to their own state on part 
of Palestine.
The developments of the past thirty years, though, reveal that a Palestinian 
state cannot materialize. The present revival of the one-state solution today is part 
of an attempt by activists and intellectuals to challenge the Oslo conceptualiza-
tion of the conflict and the means to resolve it, stressing the way in which the 
peace  process deepened, rather than repealed, Israel’s colonial domination. These 
activists argue that the conflict was never a struggle between two equal compet-
ing national groups but rather as a struggle for ending colonialism and achieving 
political liberation.29
Three reasons explain the revived interest in a one-state solution in Palestine 
since 2000. The first argument lies in the fact that Zionism proved determined to 
destroy, rather than respect, Palestinian national self-determination. The bet that 
many Palestinians were willing to make in September 1993, when the first Oslo 
Accord was signed, that the end of the occupation would create a Palestinian state 
on 22 percent of Palestine that would protect their fundamental rights, was lost 
with the Camp David negotiations in 2000 and the Israeli military response to the 
Second Intifada.
Moreover, facts on the ground reveal that Israel instituted by a de facto apart-
heid structure of domination. Israel devised a segregated system of control by 
which Israeli citizens are governed by democratic rules while Palestinians are 
deprived of political rights. The US stance in 2020, in which the Trump admin-
istration accepted Israeli claims over East Jerusalem and the annexation of Pal-
estinian land, confirmed Israeli colonial control and trivialized the scope of the 
Palestinian territorial and political jurisdiction.30
Secondly, the Palestinian quest for statehood under the Oslo peace process has 
compromised Palestinian collective and individual political rights. These rights 
include not only the end of Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza, but 
also Palestinian sovereignty and access to East Jerusalem and a recognition of the 
right of return, which is protected by UN Resolution 194. The Oslo agreements, 
by prioritizing the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) over the all-encom-
passing PLO institutions, separated refugees from those living in the West Bank 
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and the Gaza Strip, who were in turn separated from Palestinians living inside 
Israel and the  Palestinian diaspora. It fragmented the Palestinian body politic by 
 locking  Palestinian national aspiration to the West Bank and Gaza. At the same 
time, the Palestinian Authority has forsaken the unity of the Palestinian people 
for a promise of independence that provided financial gains to a small stratum of 
the population. It proved uninterested in protecting citizens’ rights. In the West 
Bank, the PNA tried to buy legitimacy and divert calls for political accountabil-
ity by  providing unsustainable economic opportunities.31 In Gaza, the Hamas 
 government sought political legitimacy by asserting the right to resistance, prom-
ising security, and fighting Israel, not by protecting freedom of expression and 
political representation.
Thirdly, the demographic reality on the ground threatens the political sustain-
ability of the segregated political structure Israel has created. In 2020, 6.87  million 
Jews were living in Israel/Palestine, which is close to the number of Palestinians 
living in it (5.03 million in the West Bank and Gaza and 1.96 million living inside 
Israel). By 2025 Palestinians will be a majority in Israel/Palestine, given their 
higher population growth rate (2.7 percent compared with 1.8 percent in Israel), 
making the question of their lack of real political rights increasingly troublesome, 
both to the Israelis and the present Palestinian leadership.32 For many Palestinians, 
inside and outside the West Bank and Gaza, the quest for separate statehood is 
void, if not altogether outdated.
POLITICAL FR AMEWORK AND PRINCIPLES 
Turning the one-state apartheid reality that the Oslo years have institutionalized 
into a one-state solution, though, is not an easy task. It requires a political will to 
undo the colonial structure that Israel perpetuates as well as the ability to articu-
late the components of a viable democratic state that is inclusive of the individual 
and collective rights of Palestinians and Israelis. It is thus necessary for any politi-
cal alternative to partition, whether a democratic binational state or a democratic 
federal state, to explain how the political visions introduced in the 1940s and 1970s 
can be reworked in view of the developments that have taken place over the past 
decades. In other words, it needs to rearticulate the relation between the nation 
and the state as well as explain how the colonial power relations that the partition 
paradigm consolidated can be dismantled.
The Right to Self-Determination: Decoupling the State from the Nation 
The right to self-determination, ever since it was recognized by international law, 
has been tied to the notion of statehood. The definition of the state, and the political 
expression of the right to self-determination, however, have remained  contested as 
much as historically determined. The state has been perceived in Western thought 
not only as the highest form of political union between free individuals, but also 
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as a tool of domination, particularly in Marxist thinking. The twentieth-century 
Weberian definition of the state as a “human organization that has the legitimate 
monopoly over the use of force in a specific territory,” has tied it to a Westphalian 
understanding of the world, that is, a world made of clearly demarcated states 
defined by specific borders. Although the state is never a neutral entity, as the 
Weberian definition leads one to believe, since it reflects, as much as articulates, 
different class interests within a given social formation, it has remained a core site 
of sovereignty and control. 
Self-determination has also been more closely tied to the concept of the nation, 
which remains a far more nebulous term than statehood. The nation is understood 
today to be a “imagined community,” a political entity that affirms the right of the 
people, however they define their collective sense of “we,” to have collective, not 
just individual, rights, and to have the right to rule themselves by themselves.33 
People under colonial rule have used the notion of self-determination to claim 
their right to political independence, one that is associated with statehood. The 
demand for an independent state has been a central demand of most nationalist 
movements precisely because the state asserts sovereignty (since it has the monop-
oly over the use of violence) and confers international recognition of the nation’s 
right to political agency, or self-determination.
There has always been an inherent tension, though, in the quest to exercise self-
determination through the creation of an independent nation-state. This  tension 
arises from the inherent incongruency between the state, which is a territorially 
bound political concept, and the nation, whose boundaries can transcend the 
 territorial frontiers of a given state.34 This tension also stems from the ambiguity 
surrounding the notion of sovereignty. Ever since the eighteenth century, sover-
eignty has been articulated as springing from the people, who create the polity 
called the state and are the source of its legitimacy. The state speaks for the people 
as much as represents them through its representative institutions, especially when 
it claims to be a democratic state. However, once established, the state becomes 
juridically sovereign in the sense that it has the ultimate power over the life and 
death of its citizens.
As Arendt has argued, a state is needed to affirm people’s right to have rights, 
that is, to exist juridically as a political entity and have a political structure that 
protects its citizenship rights. However, as soon as the nation-state is established 
it inadvertently leads to the exclusion of others, those who do not belong to 
the nation, creating categories of minorities and of refugees, or stateless people 
deprived of their basic human rights.35 While international law has tried resolve 
this tension through international human rights law, which protects individual 
human rights irrespective of political affiliation, it also admits that human rights 
are tied to citizenship rights, that is, to belonging to a state. International law ulti-
mately leaves it to individual states to define their own juridical and constitutional 
structures to protect the collective and individual rights of their citizens.
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Various scholars have sought to readdress the exclusionary nature of the 
nation-state and the problem of minorities it creates by calling on the state to be 
above the nation.36 They privilege a definition of the state in civic, rather than 
in ethnic terms, confining it to the juridical role of executing the will of citizens 
 living within its boundaries. The state thus becomes an instrument, or executor, 
of the law enacted by the people, who are sovereign. Such a definition of the state 
implies a commitment to a constitutional and deliberative democratic political 
order. While such a conceptualization of the state is liberal and does not address 
fundamental questions about the historical injustices and colonial foundation of 
the modern state, it does decouple the nation from the state while giving space 
for a civic engagement that alone can determine the means by which a state can 
be decolonized; in other words, one that is able to reconcile with its past while 
being inclusive of all those who live on the land as equal citizens irrespective of 
their ethnicity.
Reified versus Divisible Sovereignty
The political framework for any alternative to partition in Israel/Palestine must 
transcend people’s obsession with the state as the only protector of people’s rights. 
This is not easy given that the official political discourse of both Zionists and 
 Palestinians remains staunchly attached to the nation-state. This discourse con-
ceptualizes sovereignty as territorially bound, with one group of people entitled 
to it. The Palestinian obsession with statehood, as much as Zionism’s, stems from 
a belief that only a state can protect national identity and existence. According to 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the Jewish state is the only means 
to protect the Jewish people worldwide, an assertion that continues to be con-
tested by world Jewry but is central to mainstream Zionism.37 It is a contention 
that inevitably leads to racist and exclusionary politics, as Israel’s nationality law of 
2018 proves. This law confers the right of self-determination only to Jewish people 
within the historic land of Palestine, denying the equal rights of Palestinian citi-
zens of Israel as well as those living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Palestinians, particularly those in the West Bank and Gaza, also remain keen 
on their own state, albeit one that would extend over just part of Palestine. In 
a survey conducted by the Birzeit University Center for Development Studies 
(CDS) in 2015 regarding Palestinian views on the present status quo and possible 
alternatives to it, over 80 percent of respondents supported the idea of a Pales-
tinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.38 They considered it a necessity, despite 
the fragmentation of Palestinian land and people, and the low possibility of its 
creation. Nearly half of respondents (47 percent) maintained that such a state is 
necessary because it would provide security; 22 percent who saw its role as protec-
tor of political and civil rights as the most important rationale for its existence. 
The majority of respondents associated state sovereignty with the ability to have a 
passport and to be able to move freely and be secure in their home.39 While many 
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were critical of the PNA and aware that the state-building project has benefited 
certain economic classes while usurping power in the name of national unity, the 
majority viewed political independence in a two-state solution as the only politi-
cally realistic option.
Most recently, some authors have proposed a parallel-states structure that 
would allow Palestinians and Israelis joint sovereignty of the whole land.40 This 
proposal represents a reformulation of the binational ideal by acknowledging 
present government structures rather than seeking to dismantle them. A parallel-
states structure would accept the presence of Israelis settlements as well as the 
rights of Palestinian refugees to return. It takes as given the national autonomy of 
Palestinians and Israelis, acknowledging the existence of what it calls “territorial 
heartlands” for each group, while allowing both Israelis and Palestinians to have 
joint sovereignty over Jerusalem. Its proposal is not different from the confeder-
ated or federated structure that binationalists have envisaged, wherein the auton-
omy each community is recognized under the umbrella of a common defense and 
foreign policy.
Without dismantling the colonial foundation of Israel, however, the parallel-
state proposal will simply perpetuate Israel’s colonial power and Palestinian dis-
possession. On a most rudimentary level, it is difficult to imagine how to get two 
groups of people who have been separated by 708 kilometer walls, over ninety-
nine checkpoints and a siege on 2 million Palestinians in Gaza to talk, let alone to 
want to live together. The Israel government has shown no intention of treating the 
Palestinians as equal, let alone of relinquishing its control of land and resources. 
Some among the Israeli political right, meanwhile, are willing to give Palestinians 
political rights but no national rights in what it defines as greater Israel.41 The 
majority of Israelis have no intention of living with Palestinians together in one 
state, as the 2021 Israeli war on Gaza and the Palestinians revealed.
Moreover, political elites both within Israel and among the PNA consider the 
one-state option a capitulation of their respective national projects, rather than a 
fulfillment of each party’s right to self-determination. Judging from the 2015 CDS 
survey, the average Palestinian in the West Bank and Gaza also is not keen on the 
one-state idea. In the survey over 66 percent of respondents rejected the idea of 
a democratic state guaranteeing equal political rights to Palestinians and Israelis. 
Only Palestinian citizens of Israel accept political representation and voting rights 
for Palestinians and Israelis in a single state (over 80 percent of respondents com-
pared to under 40 percent in the West Bank and Gaza).42 While many Palestinians 
in the West Bank and Gaza lament the siege of Gaza, and the lack of independence 
of the West Bank, they demand the lift of the siege, not integration into Israel. By 
contrast, the advocates of a one-state solution are concentrated in the diaspora and 
among Palestinian citizens of Israel. Unless they form a political movement that 
can galvanize the population both in Israel and inside the Occupied Territories, 
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it is difficult to see how the one-state model can become a viable political project 
rather than an expression of despair or a threat
Domination versus Equality
It would difficult to move forward with any alternative to partition without pro-
posing a political and legal strategy for dismantling Israeli colonialism. Such a 
dismantlement would require rebalancing the power inequalities between Israe-
lis and Palestinians, both militarily and economically. Israel has an economy that 
is over 20 times the size of the Palestinian economy, with developed industrial 
and buoyant trade sectors that will continue to dominate Palestinian economic 
growth.43 This difference in comparative advantage between Israel and the West 
Bank and Gaza would allow Israeli capital to dominate in Palestinian sectors while 
Palestinian workers continued to serve as cheap labor. While liberal economic the-
ory argues that such a division of labor is beneficial to everyone, free market forces 
can also lock each party into its own sphere of comparative advantage. Although 
in the long run consumers and producers will benefit from a more efficient alloca-
tion of resources across the Green Line, various vested interests will be harmed in 
any one-state configuration, especially in the short run, among them small Pales-
tinian businesses and unionized Israeli labor.
A constitutional arrangement that guarantees the equality of all citizens before 
the law, dismantles Jewish privileges, and sets up compensation mechanisms to 
address the present economic and political inequalities, could help alleviate these 
worries. International law can also offer insight for moving forward. It has already 
offered various models for a federal state in Palestine, such as the minority report 
proposed by the UNSCOP in 1947, which proposed an economic union between 
Israelis and Palestinians. Creating appropriate institutional support systems (such 
as affirmative action) that can redress the present economic inequality and offer 
increased investment and openness could also help, as already seen in other cases 
where economies of different sizes integrate (European Union, South Africa, etc.).
Recognition and Reconciliation: The Rights of the “Other”
For any political alternative to partition to work, it will inevitably need to address 
the issues of historical reconciliation and recognition. The two-state model sought 
a historical reconciliation through territorial separation. It was premised on the 
merit of acknowledging the collective rights of Israelis and Palestinians in two 
separate political entities. It thus avoided addressing the fundamental injustices 
created in 1948 by focusing on the post-1967 reality. The very fact that Israel 
refused to abide even to this paradigm, by continuing building settlements and 
insisting on the Jewishness of the state, has shown that reconciliation cannot be 
achieved without addressing the core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
These include not simply right to the land, but also freedom of movement, return, 
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and  equality before the law for all.44 Insofar as Israel is concerned, the challenge is 
how to acknowledge the collective rights of the Palestinians in a polity that does 
not ensure Jewish supremacy. Insofar as the Palestinians are concerned, they need 
to confront the reality of Jewish attachment to Palestine, as much as grapple with 
the question of what rights of Jews in Palestine are entitled to as a political com-
munity rather than as a religious group or as individuals.45 This is a thorny ques-
tion that requires addressing the right of the indigenous as much as the right of 
migrants, the refugee as much as the exiled.
No alternative to partition can materialize before each side recognize the rights 
of the “other” in Palestine. In this regard, the Palestinian national movement 
needs to address what can be defined as the Jewish question, namely Jews’ attach-
ment to Palestine and the Jewish claim to a home in Palestine. This does not mean 
that Palestinians should accept Zionism or give up on dismantling Israel’s colonial 
structure. They need, though, to explain how to decolonize Israel without negating 
the Jewish Israeli culture it has created over the past seventy years: to accommo-
date the political rights of the Jews to live and prosper in Palestine, to continue to 
speak Hebrew, and to have political autonomy. The challenge for the Palestinians 
remains how to create a new polity that includes the Jews rather than seeks to 
reconvert them into Arabs. The PLO’s 1971 appeal for of a single democratic state 
needs thus to be reworked to take into consideration the reality on the ground 
today. It needs to explain how the Jewish Israeli can be part of that state without 
necessarily becoming a rehabilitated Arab citizen or alternative, only a resident 
not entitled to full equal citizenship.
Israelis, for their part, need to address what Martin Buber has already called the 
“Arab question.” They need to give up their privileges and acknowledge  Palestinian 
collective and individual rights in all the land under Israel’s control. This is not an 
easy matter for Israelis to face, for it would force them to admit the colonial dimen-
sion of their emancipatory project of nation-building, as well as give up their privi-
leges. Just as challenging, facing the Arab question implies that Israelis have to 
confront the fact that they live in an Arab world, that over 50 percent of their Jew-
ish population is of Arab descent, and that the future state will also be part of the 
Arab world, not Europe. At a fundamental level, it implies that Jews in Israel need 
to confront the Arab dimension of their Jewishness. Zionism  cannot deal with 
such a reality, since it is fundamentally a Western civilizing enterprise that seeks 
to universalize Jews, including Arab Jews, and turn them into an enlightened, that 
is, Western Ashkenazi Jews who have their own home as all civilized nations do. 
Negation of the Arab Jew, already noted by Ella Shohat among others, is still pro-
found in Israeli society.46 Yet reviving as much as reconstructing the Arab Jew 
would be central to this new state: the Arab Jew partakes as much part in Jewish 
identity as in the Arab world. At present both are negated and in need of rehabili-
tation within their historical context. They also need to be rearticulated in today’s 
reality as part of an attempt to create a new collective “we” for a post-partition, 
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single democratic state (whether its constitutional shape were binational, federal, 
unitary, etc.; see chapter 9 in this book).
C ONCLUSION
Partition as a solution to Palestine has failed, but the one-state solution as 
a clear and acceptable political project is still not born. Its birth will require a 
political movement that has been growing but still has work to do to reach 
mainstream discourse. Success will depend on the ability of its advocates to for-
mulate a clear political agenda that protects the individual and collective rights 
of citizens irrespective of their ethnicity. The Palestinian citizens of Israel are the 
best placed to lead the movement, for they know well both sides of the conflict 
and can act as a bridge between both national movements. The historical juncture 
that the conflict is in puts them in the best place to push the one-state solution 
forward. Whether they can take on this role is still to be seen. What is clear is that 
they will work with the various Palestinian constituencies. They need to be rein-
corporated in the Palestinian national movement, the PLO, which today needs to 
be redefined and reinvigorated. International pressure on Israel will also be key in 
any attempt to force it to give up its privileges, uphold its international obligations, 
and renounce the ethno-racist definition of identity that Israel’s 2018 nationality 
law enshrined. 
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From the Lausanne Treaty to Today
Susan M. Akram
This chapter assesses the legal foundations of Zionist and Palestinian national 
claims over the land of Palestine since the British Mandate. It explores the legal 
basis and implications of the claim of Jewish nationality in Palestine and compares 
it with the claim of Palestinian nationality. The question of national rights, and 
who can claim them, is central to rethinking the statehood and residency rights 
of those living today in the area of historic Palestine. The law of nationality is 
at the core of the protections of peoples’ right to self-determination, and under-
standing the principles underlying nationality law is essential to separating claims 
from rights in considering Palestinian and Jewish peoples’ supposedly conflicting 
claims to residency and right of return.
The central premise in applying international nationality law to the con-
flict over territorial claims is that Palestinians possess a defined nationality that 
remains valid and legally cognizable today. Moreover, as a legal matter, Palestinian 
nationality is not negated by the claim of a Jewish state in Israel, or by an extrater-
ritorial claim to Israel by Jews elsewhere in the world. In order to understand the 
difference between Israeli, Jewish, and Palestinian national statuses, it is critical 
to appreciate that the international law of nationality operates to protect a funda-
mental connection between peoples and their lands of origin: the territorial and 
direct “bloodline” connection, not a religious connection, determines national 
rights. This chapter will analyze the key norms of international nationality law, 
and apply them to the relevant legal instruments affecting the conflict over rights 
to territory in Palestine. It examines not only the application of the norms to this 
conflict, but also how (and whether) instruments such as the British Mandate, the 
Balfour Declaration, and the most relevant United Nations resolutions affected 
the claims of Jews and Palestinians to national status in the territory. In essence, 
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this short excursus into the legal and historical background of the conflicting 
claims of self-determination to and in Palestine illustrates how “getting the law 
right” paves the way for a different and more equitable shared future in the same 
land for Jews and Palestinians, both those now living there and those who have the 
right to return there.
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DEFINITIONS OF  
NATIONALS AND CITIZENS
At the outset, it is important to define the meaning of the terms citizen and national. 
Although these terms are frequently used interchangeably, they have  distinct legal 
meanings. Nationality has both a sociological meaning and a legal one; the socio-
logical understanding is quite distinct from but more commonly understood than 
its legal definition. In sociological terms, nationality encompasses ethnonational 
identity, that is, self-identification with a particular group considered to have a 
common ethnic origin—for example, Bosnians, Serbs, Kurds, Tamils, or Arme-
nians—regardless of the territory in which they are located. The legal meaning 
is quite different, however, and refers to a legal relationship between an individ-
ual and a particular state or territory. Under classical international law theory, 
nationality determines which state a person belongs to for purposes of disputes 
with other states. Since nationality is “the link between [international] law and the 
individual,” it is critical to determine who is a “national” of a state or territory, and 
hence what rights in and to that state or territory the individual has as a matter 
of international law.1 From the legal perspective, the ethnonational identity of a 
person is irrelevant, as it is the connection the person has to a particular state or 
territory—that is, their membership in it—which defines a person’s legal national-
ity and political rights.2
Nationality as an international legal concept was defined as early as 1939 by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice as “the bond . . . between the State and 
the individual,” and further interpreted by the successor International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) as the “genuine link” between an individual and a territory.3 The core 
principle of which “genuine links” establish nationality was already incorporated 
in domestic laws and treaties by the late 1800s and included birth on the soil of 
the territory (jus soli), birth to a parent with the national status of the territory (jus 
sanguinis), and less frequently and with less certain rules, long-term residence on 
the territory (jus domicilii).4 By the early 1900s, nationality principles had solidi-
fied around these norms to exclude race, religion, language, or ethnic origin alone 
as the basis for national status. Birth on the territory, direct blood relationship 
through a parent holding the nationality, and/or long-term (“habitual”) resi-
dence were the key “genuine links” for nationality status to be recognized under 
international law.5 Equally important during the colonial era was the  obligation 
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to  conform any nationality legislation to binding treaties regulating the status 
of inhabitants of territories, whether such inhabitants were part of independent 
states or under colonial rule.6
The term citizen is of significance as a matter of the domestic law of states; that 
is, a state can determine through its internal laws who among its residents has 
the preferred status of citizenship, with its particular privileges and benefits, as 
well as its concomitant responsibilities. A state’s prerogative to define its citizens, 
however, has normative limitations, as it cannot define citizens in an arbitrary or 
discriminatory way that is prohibited by treaty or international custom. In other 
words, a state’s ability to pass domestic law on citizenship is circumscribed by cer-
tain international legal rules.7 The most important of these rules is the “genuine 
links” principle described above. Another key rule that was already recognized 
as customary international law by the time of the Harvard study on nationality 
laws in 1929 was that inhabitants of a territory undergoing a change of sovereignty 
automatically acquire nationality in the new state.8
A corollary to this principle, now codified in human rights treaties, is the prin-
ciple that no state can denationalize an individual on an arbitrary basis—this 
prohibits, for example, denationalization or prevention of return to the territory 
of nationality for reasons of race, religion, or national or ethnic origin.9 The rule 
requiring states to conform to these treaty requirements is as absolute today as it 
was during the colonial or mandate era.10 Although in classical international law 
terms the nationality of a person is determined by international law and  citizenship 
by domestic law, the distinction between the two has become less significant with 
the growing importance of human rights law. In the Palestinian case, and in most 
of the Arab world, however, the distinction between the two remains both relevant 
and critical, primarily because most of these states have not ratified the relevant 
treaties that would apply human rights law to nationality, citizenship, and related 
principles regarding stateless people and refugees.
One of the prime illustrations of the importance of distinguishing between 
the concepts of citizenship and nationality is with regard to the definition of 
 statelessness. The international legal definition of a stateless person under the 1954 
Stateless Persons Convention is one “who is not considered as a national by any 
State under the operation of its law,” a definition clearly connected to domestic 
citizenship legislation.11 However, if the relevant domestic citizenship law fails 
to conform to international principles, is the individual truly stateless? The 1961 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness adopted a recommendation that 
persons who were effectively deprived of nationality should be treated as meeting 
the international definition of stateless persons de jure.12 In the Palestinian case, 
it is the premise of this chapter that Palestinians remain nationals of Palestine 
today, but are effectively stateless because they have been wrongfully deprived of 
their nationality in violation of international law. Stateless nationals of Palestine 
number approximately twelve million persons worldwide today, all of whom are 
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entitled to return to their original homes and lands, and obtain either Palestine 
nationality or the nationality of the successor state regardless of race, religion, or 
ethnic origin.13
THE LEGAL STATUS OF PALESTINIANS AND JEWS  
IN PALESTINE BEFORE 1948
Palestinian Nationality 
The legal history of Palestinian nationality begins with the Ottoman Empire. The 
area of historic Palestine was settled continuously by a majority Arab population 
and was under Arab rule from the seventh century onwards, throughout the Cru-
sader and Turkish (Ottoman) periods, until British rule.14 During the Ottoman 
period, from 1516 to 1917, Palestinians obtained Ottoman citizenship under the 
Ottoman Nationality Law of 1869, which was largely based on jus sanguinis and jus 
soli principles discussed above, and not on religious or ethnic criteria.15 The  British 
occupation of Palestine began on December 9, 1917, by which time Palestinians 
had a recognized nationality through the Ottoman Nationality Law, and carried 
internationally recognized Ottoman passports. Following Britain’s imposition of 
civil administration through the “Government of Palestine,” it took steps to rec-
ognize Palestinian citizenship, including issuing passports and travel documents 
to Palestinian citizens.16 Within the next ten years Palestinian nationality was 
attached to a territory with defined boundaries, distinct from its former Ottoman 
neighbors, which had attained statehood.17
The Palestine Mandate was adopted (and internationally “legalized”) 
by the Council of the League of Nations on July 24, 1922 under the Covenant of the 
League of Nations.18 The Palestine Mandate had a unique provision that obliged 
the (British) Palestine Administration to enact a nationality law that included pro-
visions “to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up 
their permanent residence in Palestine.”19 This, of course, was the consequence of 
Zionist pressure, which also resulted in Britain’s inclusion of the Balfour Declara-
tion into the terms of the Palestine Mandate, as discussed below. Britain enacted 
various laws defining who were nationals and who were foreigners in Palestine, 
and regulated naturalization, entry, and egress from Palestine without passing for-
mal nationality legislation until after the end of World War I.
The Treaty of Lausanne concluded World War I and was signed in Lausanne, 
Switzerland on July 24, 1923. It established the boundaries of modern Turkey and 
effectively ended the Ottoman Empire, as Turkey renounced all claims to territo-
ries outside the new boundaries. Article 30 of the Treaty of Lausanne specified: 
“Turkish subjects habitually resident in territory which in accordance with the 
provisions of the present Treaty is detached from Turkey will become ipso facto, in 
the conditions laid down by the local law, nationals of the State to which such ter-
ritory is transferred.”20 Under the terms of the Lausanne Treaty, Ottoman citizens 
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who resided in the territory of Palestine and were Turkish citizens (or Ottoman 
subjects) thus became Palestinian citizens on August 6, 1924, upon ratification of 
the treaty.21 As a matter of international law, Palestinian nationality was formed 
on this date. The Lausanne Treaty also fixed borders and established separate 
nationalities for Transjordan, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. Following the Lausanne 
Treaty, each of these territories, including Palestine, had a citizenship law that 
codified its respective nationality status.22
One year after the Lausanne Treaty came into force, Palestinian citizenship was 
codified by British law in the Palestine Citizenship Order of 1925, which included 
the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship through birth in Palestine. Under the 
League of Nations mandate system, local people were not nationals of the mandate 
power that ruled their territory, although they could obtain diplomatic protection 
from the mandate country. Britain was under an obligation to conform its nation-
ality law to the terms of the Lausanne Treaty. However, Britain sought to satisfy the 
demands of the Zionists, and to act consistently with provisions in the mandate, 
including a provision on nationality in Article 7: “The Administration of Pales-
tine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in 
this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizen-
ship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.” The Palestine 
Citizenship Order afforded Palestinian citizenship to all those who were Turkish 
subjects or citizens at the time of the Lausanne Treaty, and who were habitually 
resident in Palestine.23 This included Muslims, Christians, and Jews living in Pal-
estine at the time of the 1925 Citizenship Order without regard to religion. Pales-
tinians could obtain passports, and over seventy thousand Palestinian passports 
were issued by the mandate authorities.24 However, the 1925 order significantly 
narrowed the terms by which Palestinians living abroad could assert or retain 
their Palestinian citizenship, by limiting the time within which they could return 
and claim nationality. It also deprived descendants of Ottoman subjects of their 
right to claim nationality on the basis of jus sanguinis if they were born abroad, 
and restricted the right of Palestinians temporarily traveling abroad to return and 
claim Palestinian nationality.25 In contrast, the citizenship order included natural-
ization provisions specifically intended to grant Palestinian  citizenship to Jewish 
immigrants who were either foreign residents or illegal immigrants who would 
not have qualified for Palestinian citizenship under the terms of the Lausanne 
Treaty. By proclamation of September 1922, the British government had provided 
that “any person of other than Ottoman nationality, habitually resident in Pales-
tine on that date, might apply for Palestinian Citizenship.” Approximately thirty-
eight thousand people were granted Palestinian citizenship under the proclama-
tion, mostly Jews.26
Under the Lausanne Treaty, the recognition and codification of  Palestinian 
nationality was consistent with international law: it attached to a majority 
 population that was genuinely and intrinsically linked to a defined territory 
Palestinian and “Jewish” Nationality    197
with specified borders, and was passed through blood, residence, or birth on 
the  territory (jus soli, jus domicilii or jus sanguinis).27 It was consistent with the 
 customary law that inhabitants found on a territory when there is a change of sov-
ereignty should automatically acquire the nationality of the successor state.28 The 
Palestine Citizenship Order, however, varied key terms of the treaty and sought 
to incorporate terms of the Balfour Declaration that discriminated against native 
Palestinians and in favor of immigrant Jews. The total population meeting the 
criteria of the Palestine Citizenship Order numbered 847,000 people. This popula-
tion included, however, the foreign residents—mostly immigrant Jews—who had 
immigrated to Palestine between 1920–22 and obtained citizenship under the 1922 
British proclamation.29
The Balfour Declaration and the Claim of Jewish Nationality under 
British Mandate 
As is well known, Britain incorporated the Balfour Declaration in its mandate 
on Palestine, an incorporation that the League of Nations de facto accepted. The 
 mandate preamble essentially restated the Balfour Declaration, while Article 2 
stated: “The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such 
political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment 
of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of 
self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights 
of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.” The Balfour 
Declaration was incorporated into the mandate and set the stage for a two-tiered 
system of rights in Palestine, but it did not mention a Jewish state.30 Setting aside 
the intentions of Zionists within the British government—whose views cannot 
“control” the plain language of the declaration—a discriminatory nationality 
 system based on race and/or religion was manifestly illegal under international 
law even as it stood at the time.31 In order to be consistent with international law, 
the Balfour Declaration must be interpreted as a proposal to provide for Jews a 
“home” in Palestine, but not a Jewish homeland, or Jewish state. This interpretation 
is affirmed by the language of the declaration itself and the history of its incorpo-
ration, Britain’s preexisting obligations under the League of Nations Charter, the 
mandate’s provision on minority treaties, and conformance with existing interna-
tional law.32 Moreover, Britain recognized repeatedly in government letters, state-
ments, and actions that it intended to provide a sanctuary for Jews in Palestine 
without violating the rights of Palestinian Arabs or the rights of Jews in any other 
country in the world.33
Thus, despite the language of the Balfour Declaration and the inconsistent 
commitments of the British in exercising its the mandate, neither Balfour nor the 
terms of the Palestine Mandate itself disturbed the recognition of Palestine nation-
ality as established in the Treaty of Lausanne. Nor did these instruments establish 
a Jewish nationality cognizable under international law.
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THE UN AND THE QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN 
NATIONALIT Y
Resolution 181 (1947)
United Nations Resolution 181, passed on 29 November 1947, is often considered 
the key legal document that affirmed Zionist and Palestinian claims to statehood 
by calling for the creation of a Jewish and Arab state in Palestine. However, a care-
ful reading of this resolution and its drafting history reveals that it does not affirm 
a claim to nationality status for the Jewish people.
To start with, it is important to note that Resolution 181 was a General Assembly 
(GA) resolution, not a Security Council resolution, and under the UN Charter, 
the GA merely makes recommendations to the parties but has no authority to 
divide territory or enforce any kind of obligation on states or peoples.34 The UN 
Secretariat issued an interpretation stating that Resolution 181 “had no obligatory 
character whatsoever.”35
Second, it is important to understand the actual provisions of UN Resolution 
181. On the nationality question, it is true that the British, in incorporating the 
 Balfour Declaration into the mandate, had given preference in permitting immi-
gration and granting Palestinian citizenship to Jews who had entered and remained 
illegally during the mandate period. However, the Jews given citizenship under the 
Palestine Citizenship Order and the 1922 Proclamation were those actually resid-
ing in Palestine, not outside it. Resolution 181’s recognition of a “Jewish” and an 
“Arab” state did refer to religious and racial criteria to identify territorial division, 
but referred to both peoples as the “two peoples of Palestine.” The Partition Plan 
stated that “Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine . . . as well as Arabs and Jews 
who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine . . . shall, upon the rec-
ognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident 
and enjoy full civil and political rights.”36 In other words, the Plan’s principle was 
that regardless of religion, Palestinian citizens residing in the Arab state would 
become citizens of that Arab state, while Palestinian citizens residing in the Jewish 
state would become citizens of the Jewish state.37 Finally, Resolution 181 required a 
one-year period of UN supervision prior to recognition of independence of either 
state, during which time both states had to incorporate constitutions that provided 
for equal rights for all citizens with no discrimination.38 Thus, the Partition Plan, as 
detailed in Resolution 181, did not authorize either state to institutionalize superior 
rights for any religious or racial group.
In sum, up until 1948, the nationality law incorporated in the Lausanne Treaty, 
Palestinian citizenship (with the exception of naturalization provisions in the 
1925 Palestine Citizenship Order), and Resolution 181 as applied to Jews and 
 Palestinians living in Palestine largely conformed to the requirements of inter-
national law. Despite the preferential naturalization terms given to immigrant 
Jews during the British Mandate rule, the state of the law of nationality as applied 
to Palestine was that it granted equal nationality to all who lived in the territory 
Palestinian and “Jewish” Nationality    199
and  qualified for it on the basis of either prior recognized Palestinian national-
ity or their  residency in Palestine (or both), but not simply based on their ethnic 
or religious affiliation.
UN Resolution 194
The next critical instrument to consider on the question of nationality is UN 
 General Assembly Resolution 194 of December 11, 1948.39 Although Resolution 
194 is commonly considered the main UN resolution on the rights of Palestin-
ian  refugees, its reference to refugees relates directly to the United Nation’s view 
of Palestinian nationality as it stood by 1948. In passing Resolution 194, the GA 
framed the rights of Palestinian refugees in the context of their national claims; 
established the UN Conciliation Commission on Palestine (UNCCP) with a very 
broad mandate to resolve both the conflict and the massive refugee problem; 
defined the refugees “persons” for whom the UNCCP would provide “interna-
tional protection”; and in paragraph 11, set out a legal formula for resolving the 
refugee problem.40 Although there is no definition of “Palestine refugee” incor-
porated in the language of Resolution 194, the drafting history and subsequent 
UN Secretariat interpretations clarify exactly which people were defined by the 
term. The UNCCP’s authoritative analysis of Paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 states 
that “the term ‘refugees’ applies to all persons, Arabs, Jews and others who have 
been displaced from their homes in Palestine.”41 The UN legal advisor note to the 
UNCCP, issued on April 9, 1951, defined the categories of Palestinian refugees cov-
ered by the terms of Resolution 194 as:
 1.  Persons of Arab origin who, after 19 November 1947, left territory at present 
under the control of the Israel authorities and who were Palestinian citizens 
at that date;
 2.  Stateless persons of Arab origin who after 29 November 1947 left the 
 aforementioned territory, where they had been settled up to that date;
 3.  Persons of Arab origin who left the said territory after 6 August 1924 and 
before 29 November 1947 and who at that later date were Palestinian 
 citizens; and
 4.  Persons of Arab origin who left the territory in question before 6 August 
1924 and who, having opted for Palestinian citizenship, retained their 
 citizenship up to 29 November 1947.42
In other words, the Resolution 194 definition of Palestine refugee as understood 
by the UN drafters meant the entire group of persons who were covered by the Pal-
estine nationality law of 1924, emanating from the Lausanne Treaty. These were all 
habitual residents and citizens of Palestine defined as such by operation of these 
laws, as well as their descendants. Most important, this definition corrected the 
inconsistent changes made to the Lausanne Treaty provisions by the 1925 British 
Palestine Citizenship Order, which excluded Palestinians entitled to jus sanguinis 
or jus soli nationality who were either born abroad or residing abroad and unable 
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to perfect their citizenship due to the discriminatory terms set in the Order. It 
covers all “persons” eligible for Palestinian nationality as determined by the Treaty 
of Lausanne.
1948 :  ISR AEL’S  REDEFINITION OF NATIONALIT Y  
AND CITIZENSHIP IN PALESTINE
The Law of Return (1950) and the “Nationality Law” (1952)
Israel came into being on May 14, 1948 with a Declaration of Independence claim-
ing that the new state would guarantee equal rights for all its citizens without 
discrimination.43 However, shortly afterwards, Israel passed a series of laws that 
not only affected the rights and interests of the indigenous Palestinians to their 
property, but also permanently affected their legal connection to their homeland 
and purported to strip them of their nationality.44 At the same time, the laws gave 
sweeping rights to Jews around the world who had neither the prior territorial 
connection or the “genuine link” to the country (jus soli or jus sanguinis) that inter-
national law recognizes as necessary for conferring nationality.45 As noted earlier, 
a religious identity or ancient historical claim is not sufficient to grant nationality 
as an international legal matter.46
Concerning the status of those who would be citizens of the new state, Israel 
passed two separate laws on nationality/citizenship. The first was the 1950 Law of 
Return (passed on July 5, 1950 and subsequently amended several times), which 
provides that “every Jew has the right to come to this country [i.e., Israel] as an 
oleh” (i.e., as a Jewish immigrant moving to Israel).47 Immigration to Israel under 
the Law of Return is exclusively reserved for Jews, and all Jews around the world 
can automatically become “Jewish nationals” and part of the Israeli state.48 No con-
nection to the territory is required under the Law of Return, only that the immi-
grant be Jewish.49
The second law is officially translated into English as the “Nationality Law” of 
1952, but this is an erroneous translation as this law does not relate to nationality 
as legally understood, but to citizenship as determined exclusively on the basis of 
Jewish religious affiliation.50 It was passed on July 14, 1952 and has remained cen-
tral to Israel’s definition of who is entitled to nationality. Two main provisions of 
this law are relevant to this discussion; the provisions on “acquisition of national-
ity” and “loss of nationality.”
The Nationality Law specifies four methods for obtaining “Israel nationality”: 
return (for Jews only, under the 1950 Law of Return, even for Jews who entered 
or were born in the country before the state’s establishment); residence in Israel; 
birth; or naturalization.51 Since the first method governed the acquisition of 
nationality by Jews only, non-Jews had to qualify under one of the other three 
methods. To qualify through residence, a person had to be an inhabitant of Israel 
and registered with Israeli authorities by March 1, 1952 under the Registration of 
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Inhabitants Ordinance of 1949; and they had to have remained as “inhabitant[s] 
of Israel” from the day Israel was established until the day the Nationality Law 
was passed, or they had to be able to demonstrate that they had entered legally 
during that time.52 Not surprisingly, none of the 750,000 Palestinian refugees who 
were outside the country during the required residency period were able to satisfy 
these conditions.53 Many of those Palestinians remaining in the country were also 
unable to satisfy the conditions since they had left the territory that became Israel 
at any time before the law was passed, or had been unable to meet the registra-
tion requirements. Another provision in the 1952 Nationality Law stated that only 
children born in the country of an Israeli national father or mother could become 
Israeli nationals.54 Thus, the children of those Palestinians who remained but could 
not meet the registration requirement (and thus could not become “Israel nation-
als”) were effectively denationalized and became stateless as a matter of common 
interpretation of the international legal definition.55
Israel’s Nationality Law of 1952 also has an explicit denationalization provision. 
The law retroactively repealed the Palestinian citizenship that had been granted 
under the Palestine Citizenship Orders of 1925 to May 14, 1948, the date that Israel 
was declared a state. Under its “Loss of Nationality” section, the law states, “Any 
reference in any provision of law to Palestinian citizenship or Palestinian citizens 
shall henceforth be read as a reference to Israel nationality or Israel nationals.”56 
Thus all Palestinians who could not meet the stringent requirements for obtaining 
“Israel nationality” became stateless under Israeli law, a conclusion affirmed by 
decisions of the Israeli courts.57
As a matter of international law, the Israeli law repealing the Palestine citizen-
ship law and replacing it with one that denationalized the vast majority of Pal-
estinians in 1952 was an illegal act. It violated two fundamental customary law 
principles: first, that all habitual residents of the territory of a state that succeeds 
another must be granted citizenship in the new state; and second, that no state can 
“arbitrarily” denationalize habitual residents of its state on the basis of protected 
grounds such as race, religion, ethnic, or national origin.58
“Israel” Nationality, Jewish “Nationality,” and Two-tiered  
Israeli Citizenship
What is little understood about the so-called Israel Nationality Law is that it cre-
ates a legal fiction: in fact, there is no such thing as “Israel nationality,” as even 
the Israeli High Court itself has confirmed.59 Israeli law, official institutions, and 
records do not recognize an “Israel nationality” status. The Israeli Population Reg-
istry lists over one hundred nationalities; no “Israel nationality” is listed.60 The 
only “nationality” to which the state’s rights and privileges are attached is “Jewish 
nationality.”61 Jewish nationality is restricted to those qualifying under the 1950 
Law of Return (i.e., the global community of Jews seeking to exercise aliya) and its 
specific amendments relating to olim, or Jews immigrating into Israel. Thus, the 
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so-called “Nationality Law” of 1952 is in reality a citizenship, not a nationality law, 
as it defines who can obtain citizenship in Israel and how.62
The Law of Return and the Nationality Law thus set up a two-tiered system for 
acquiring Israeli citizenship: one for Jews anywhere in the world, who are deemed 
“nationals” of Israel and can automatically become citizens (through the Law of 
Return); and another for non-Jews, who can become citizens (through the other 
routes specified in the “Nationality Law”—residence, birth, or naturalization), but 
because they are not Jewish, can never achieve the superior rights available only 
to Jewish nationals.63
The superior rights that only Jewish nationals can enjoy include the exclusive 
rights to use, develop, reside on, and alienate the approximately 95 percent of the 
lands expropriated by Israel from Palestinians under a series of laws passed from 
1948 onwards and codified in the Absentee Property Law.64 These homes, lands, 
and public and agricultural areas were seized from Palestinians and converted 
into a land bank “owned” and operated by the Jewish National Fund and its affili-
ates as “Israel Lands” that remain exclusively for the use and enjoyment of Jews.65 
The discriminatory land laws and seizure of Palestinian land, the establishment 
of exclusive “Jewish-only” communities with superior housing rights, and Jewish 
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza have been legalized with the sanction of 
the Israeli Supreme Court.66 The Absentee Property Law and its amendments are 
thus directly related to the distinction between “citizens” and “nationals” under 
Israeli law. However, Israel’s granting of two-tiered “citizenship” under its “nation-
ality” law violates customary rules on nationality that have become increasingly 
well settled since 1948.67
As an international legal matter, Israel could not define as its nationals 
persons who were nationals of other states with no connection to the territory, 
particularly if doing so did not require the specific consent of the individual for-
eign nationals and their states. The ICJ’s decision in the Nottebohm case in 1955 
simply restated and interpreted the well-established principle discussed earlier 
that from the perspective of international law, a state’s granting of nationality must 
be based on some close connection between the state and the individual, and that 
decisions on nationality are not solely within the domestic purview of states.68 
In the Nottebohm case, contested between Guatemala and Lichtenstein, the ICJ 
established that a state cannot simply confer its nationality on persons of foreign 
nationality living in other states absent a close connection between the person and 
that state, even if the person accepts the nationality status.69 Long before 1948, the 
question of who is a national was no longer within the sole discretion of states, and 
a conferred status of nationality could be denied international recognition if the 
requisite factors constituting a “genuine link” were missing.
This prohibition on granting nationality to those not resident in the country 
because of their religion or ethnicity is an ongoing, or “continuing” breach of 
international law since its consequences remain unredressed today.  Continuing 
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breaches require laws to be amended to conform to international criteria, in 
this case, by granting nationality status to Palestinians who have been deprived 
of nationality, and implementing the right of return to denationalized Palestin-
ians who were expelled from their homes and lands.70 Although there are limited 
mechanisms that could address and provide remedies for the denial of return, 
deprivation of nationality, and dispossession, understanding the law suggests both 
how Palestinian rights should be framed and which Palestinians must be part of 
any final peace agreement.
It is thus important to emphasize that, as a matter of international law, Jewish 
claims of nationality and self-determination must be clearly distinguished from 
the claims of Israeli Jews to nationality and self-determination.71 Israel proclaimed 
her state on behalf of “the Jewish people,” a definition that grants rights to and 
within the state on an extraterritorial basis to Jews living anywhere in the world. 
Israel enacted its citizenship law of 1950 to grant “nationality” to Jews only. How-
ever, the people entitled to national status in the “Jewish state” defined under GA 
Resolution 181 included both Jews and Palestinians already residing in the terri-
tory, all of whom were to be granted equal rights under a constitution that was to 
be in force in both new states prior to UN recognition.72
The United Nations, including its treaty bodies and the ICJ, has consistently 
called preferences for Jews under Israeli citizenship, property, and other laws a 
violation of the UN Charter and human rights treaties.73 In other words, outside of 
Israel, there has been no international legal recognition of the “Jewish people” as a 
nationality concept that grants self-determination rights to Jews living outside of 
Israel. Nor is there legal support for the premise that Israel has a right to maintain 
a legal-preferencing system that grants superior rights to Jews as against other 
citizens of the Israeli state.74
In 2018, Israel passed a new law on nationality and citizenship, the Jewish 
Nation-State Basic Law, which clarifies in unambiguous terms the identity of Israel 
as a nation-state exclusively for and of the Jewish people.75 It is important to under-
stand that the Nation-State Law is different from the Nationality Law and the Law of 
Return, in that it is a “basic law,” which in Israel is the equivalent of a constitutional 
provision.76 The 2018 Jewish Nation-State Basic Law states: “The Land of Israel is 
the historical homeland of the Jewish people, in which the State of Israel was estab-
lished . . . . the State of Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people.”77 There are 
three main aspects to this law of significance to Palestinian national rights. First 
is the provision that self-determination in Israel belongs exclusively to the Jewish 
people. This provision formally entrenches state discrimination against non-Jews, 
and particularly Palestinians, who today comprise 20 percent of the population 
within Israel. It formalizes the legal status of Palestinians as second-class citizens, 
that is, citizens who are not entitled to equal civil and political rights in the state.
Second is the establishment of Hebrew as the official language of Israel and the 
commitment to promoting only Jewish symbols and Jewish culture both within 
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Israel and in Jewish communities worldwide.78 This provision reverses the long-
standing status of Arabic as an official language along with Hebrew.
Third is the explicit promotion of Jewish settlement as a “national value” that 
the state will “encourage and promote.”79 This provision legitimizes the Israeli 
 settlement project in the Occupied Territories and East Jerusalem, which has 
independent international consequences from the issues of nationality. That is, 
aside from an act of formal annexation of occupied territory, which is uncontro-
vertibly illegal under international law, the extension of the Nation-State Law to 
the Occupied Territories formally entrenches an apartheid system.80 The crime 
of apartheid involves policies and practices of “racial discrimination .  .  . based 
on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin” for purposes of domina-
tion or systemic oppression by one group against another.81 The Nation-State Law 
expressly declares the intent to discriminate against Palestinians in every field, 
establishing preferential rights for Jews and Jewish settlers, and another lesser set 
of “rights” for Palestinians and Arabs in Israel. The law legitimizes discrimination 
in citizenship, language, culture, land ownership and use, and every other sphere 
of public and private life.82
Israel “Nationality” and the Palestinian Right of Return
As explained above and as has been discussed by various scholars, Israel’s law of 
nationality was as much directed at attracting the largest number of Jewish migrants 
into Israel as it was at preventing Palestinians from claiming their  political rights 
to return to their home. Its passage in the Israeli Knesset in 1952 does not, from 
an international legal point of view, abrogate UN Resolution 194, the customary 
international law norms on which that resolution rests, nor the laws pertaining to 
the rights of refugees and forcibly displaced persons more generally.83
Since their forced departure and expatriation from their homeland by Israel, 
Palestinian refugees have continuously asserted that they have a legal right, popu-
larly referred to as the “right of return.” Israel has contested the legal basis for this 
right on a number of grounds, including that it did not forcibly expel Palestinians, 
and that as a sovereign state it has the right to define who is entitled to enter its 
borders and who can remain.84 From an international legal point of view, Israel’s 
position on each of its key arguments is either weak or simply without merit.85 
In general, the right of return represents a complex, interrelated set of rights 
grounded in distinct bodies of treaty and customary international law. For this 
discussion, however, the most important and relevant argument on right of return 
relates to the right of an individual to return to his place of origin or nationality.86
Two core human rights treaties ground the critical aspects of the right of return, 
and are at the heart of the contest over whether Palestinians have such a right: the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD). The ICCPR states in 
Article 12(4) that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own 
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country.”87 This language raises questions about the meaning of the phrase “his 
own country.” Does it apply to someone who is a national of the country, someone 
who is a refugee, someone who was born outside “his” country, or to individuals 
in all these situations? The drafting history of this provision shows that the draft-
ers rejected proposals to replace “his country” with “the country of which one is a 
national” because they wanted to include “those persons who under domestic law 
enjoy a right to ‘return’ or reside in a country even though they are not nationals 
of that country.” The drafters also chose “enter” over “return” in order to ensure its 
application to those who were nationals or citizens of the country but had never 
lived there.88
The other ambiguous term in ICCPR 12(4) is “arbitrarily.” The drafting history 
reflects that “arbitrary” was used with a specific meaning.89 The UN Study of the 
Right of Everyone To Be Free from Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile differ-
entiated “arbitrary” under international law from “illegal”; that is, an act could be 
legal under domestic law but would be arbitrary if it were discriminatorily applied 
or were otherwise incompatible with international norms.90 There is legal con-
sensus that an act such as denationalization, even if it conforms to domestic law, 
is arbitrary and thus prohibited if it violates principles of international law.91 “For 
international law purposes, states do not enjoy the freedom to denationalize their 
nationals in order to expel them as ‘non-citizens.’”92
The CERD’s provision on return is found in Article 5(d)(ii), which requires 
states to prohibit and eliminate racial discrimination “in all its forms,” and 
requires them to “guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, 
colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoy-
ment of . .  . the right to leave any country, including one’s own and to return to 
one’s country.” The CERD’s provision on right of return also prohibits a state from 
establishing citizenship/nationality criteria that discriminate on these grounds. A 
state cannot prohibit someone from entering “his country” on the basis of race, 
nationality, or ethnic origin. The near-universal ratification of these instruments 
has now bound most states to the right as a matter of treaty.
In 1961, the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness was adopted, 
which prohibits depriving anyone of nationality on the basis of race or  ethnicity, 
religion, or political opinion.93 In 1963, the UN Subcommission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities produced Draft Principles on the 
Right to Leave and Return. Section II of these principles states: “Everyone is enti-
tled, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, marriage or 
other status, to return to his country; no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
nationality or forced to renounce his nationality as a means of divesting him of the 
right to return to his country; no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to 
enter his own country.”94 The Draft Principles informed the UN drafters and led 
to the adoption of the language in Article 12 of the ICCPR. One of the astonishing 
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features about the highly fractious debate on the right of return is that it questions 
a right that was almost universally accepted as state practice, though not codified 
until the first international humanitarian law treaties were drafted in the first part 
of the twentieth century.95 But lack of codification did not affect state practice on 
individual return or organized repatriation, both of which occurred in every part 
of the globe long before the first treaties incorporated the principles, and without 
serious question about the underlying right of the individual returnee.
When one carefully examines the nature of the challenge to the right of 
return, one can conclude that the only serious attack on it as a principle or prac-
tice is in its application to the Palestinian refugees. The international community 
has never legitimized any other states’ denial of its nationals the right to return 
to their homes on the basis of race or religion, even though many states perse-
cute their nationals such that the latter are unable or unwilling to return.96 It is 
sufficient to conclude here that the right to return to one’s country is expressly 
recognized in most international and regional human rights instruments, and UN 
bodies have, on numerous occasions, asserted such a right. This, along with recent 
state practice, has led to the formation of a norm of customary international law 
that assures that an individual outside their own country has the right to return 
to it.97
THE OSLO PEACE PRO CESS AND PALESTINIAN 
NATIONALIT Y 
With the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the 
1967 war, Israel created a separate set of laws, primarily through military orders, 
in the Occupied Territories to avoid bestowing citizenship rights on the Palestin-
ian residents of these areas. While it was extending military occupation rules to 
Palestinians, Israel began its settlement project and extended Israeli domestic laws 
to the settlers in both the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian residents in the West 
Bank and Jerusalem were allowed to retain the Jordanian nationality that Jordan 
had extended to Palestinians after the 1948 conflict, while those in Gaza were given 
Egyptian laissez-passer.98 At the same time, Israel implemented various mecha-
nisms for maximizing Israel’s control over the land through settlement construc-
tion, land confiscation, and military control.
Three months after the 1967 conflict, in September 1967, Israel conducted a 
population census. The census counted the 954,898 Palestinians physically present 
in the West Bank and Gaza at the time, but did not include the at least 270,000 
 Palestinians who were absent, either because they had fled during the conflict or 
were abroad for other reasons.99 Based on its census, Israel created a population 
registry and refused to recognize the right of those who were absent to return 
home. Palestinians registered on the census were granted resident status and 
the right to reside in the territory under military occupation, but Israel did not 
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 confer any political rights on them. Any Palestinian who was not registered in 
the  population registry could acquire residency only through a prescribed family 
reunification procedure.100 This process was complex, prolonged, and often unsuc-
cessful—and has become even more so today. Applications languish in the system 
for years. Until 1995, residents who remained outside the territories for more than 
six consecutive years had their residency revoked by Israel.101 Moreover, Palestin-
ian residents of Jerusalem who travel abroad to study, work, or for other reasons 
are routinely stripped of their residency under a law that requires them to main-
tain their “center of life” in Jerusalem. The center of life law does not apply to Jews. 
About one hundred thousand Palestinians have lost their Jerusalem residency in 
this way.102
The Oslo Peace negotiation process seemed to signal the possibility that 
 Palestinians would finally achieve at least a partial implementation of their right 
to return and some semblance of statehood. The signing of the Declaration of 
Principles between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1993 
accompanied a formal recognition by the PLO of Israel as a state and a concomi-
tant recognition of the PLO’s legitimacy by Israel. Israel’s official recognition of the 
PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people seemed to imply rec-
ognition of their right to self–determination. However, the Oslo process precluded 
any rights-based solution for the Palestinians, and had limited, if any, reference to 
Palestinian refugee rights.103
Although the past twenty-five years have not brought about an end to Israeli 
occupation, they have ushered in the establishment of a Palestinian Authority 
(PA) that in fits and starts has attempted to build the legal and economic basis of a 
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. The Oslo agreements gave the PA the 
authority to issue both identity cards and passports for Gazans and West Bankers, 
but only with the permission of Israel.104 The PA was also able to grant permanent 
residence to persons residing in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as to limited 
categories of Palestinians returning from abroad, but again only with permission 
of Israel.105 The Oslo agreements also defined who were West Bank and Gaza “citi-
zens” for purposes of voting.106
In 1997, the Palestinian Legislative Council passed the Palestinian Basic Law, 
intended to provide a temporary constitution until an independent Palestinian 
state could be established with a permanent constitution. The Basic Law was rati-
fied by President Yasser Arafat in 2002, and has been amended twice (in 2003 and 
2005).107 However, the Basic Law addresses Palestinian nationality or citizenship in 
very limited fashion in three articles: 1, 4 and 7. Article 1 defines Palestine as “part 
of the larger Arab world, and the Palestinian people are part of the Arab nation. 
Arab unity is an objective that the Palestinian people shall work to achieve.” In 
other words it defines Palestinian identity as synonymous with “Arab” identity. 
Article 7 states that “Palestinian citizenship shall be regulated by law.”108 Presum-
ably, the “nationals” entitled to become citizens of the Palestinian state would 
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be those whose nationality was redefined under the Palestinian Basic Law, but 
that law makes no reference to Palestinian nationality as internationally defined. 
Absent such a reference, it is unclear whether the language of Article 1 of the Basic 
Law is intended to cover only those Palestinians residing within the 1967 bor-
ders of the West Bank and Gaza, or the global population of Palestinians entitled 
to Palestinian nationality as discussed earlier. Moreover, the PA has legitimacy to 
govern only approximately 30 percent of the global Palestinian population that 
voted for it—and even this is questionable, as it has long exceeded its term of office 
and has been replaced in Gaza by the Hamas government. Thus, the question of 
who is meant by the reference to the “Palestinian people” is ambiguous and highly 
contentious, both as a matter of politics and a matter of international law.
There have been two attempts at drafting a Palestinian citizenship law: one by 
the PA, and one on behalf of the PLO. In 1995, the Palestinian Ministry of the Inte-
rior drafted a citizenship law that was based on the 1925 Palestinian Citizenship 
Order and the 1954 Jordanian Citizenship Law. “In its twenty-five articles, the draft 
defined who is a Palestinian, fixed the modes of citizenship acquisition, naturaliza-
tion, revocation and repatriation, covered issues such as the citizenship of spouses 
and children, and contained other provisions that normally exist in the citizenship 
legislation of independent States.”109 This bill was was not publicly disseminated 
and was never taken up for deliberation by the Palestinian Legislative Council.
In 2012, a citizenship law was also drafted for the PLO.110 The draft law incor-
porated a sophisticated legal understanding of the international legal underpin-
nings of Palestinian nationality. It recognized the conferment of nationality on the 
basis of eligibility stemming from the Treaty of Lausanne provisions and the indi-
vidual choice to acquire (or reacquire) Palestinian nationality. Its basic “rule” for 
nationality states: “Palestinian citizens are those persons who acquired or had the 
right to acquire Palestinian nationality as of 6 August 1924, the date on which the 
Treaty of Lausanne that was signed by Britain . . . and Turkey . . . came into force 
whereby Palestine ceased to be part of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, this Draft 
Law is based on factors that have emerged since the signing of the said treaty; 
such factors can be found in international law and comparative nationality law.”111 
The draft law conferred citizenship on three general categories of people (while 
also breaking those into various subcategories): inhabitants of the West Bank 
and Gaza, refugees from Mandate Palestine, and Israeli inhabitants. The law was 
 circulated among a few international experts for commentary and discussed inter-
nally within the PLO and certain members of the PA, but never tabled for debate 
by the Legislative Council. The effort to finalize and pass the citizenship law was 
stymied by the complex and fraught political and legal issues involved. The draft 
law, however, represented an initiative to conform a future Palestinian citizenship 
law with international legal standards and the international status of Palestinian 
nationality. A precise definition of Palestinian nationality remains as crucial under 
current conditions as ever, as it would identify the “nationals” to whom the right 
of return would apply.
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RIGHT OF RETURN,  ISR AEL’S  NATIONALIT Y L AWS, 
AND PALESTINIAN NATIONALIT Y TODAY 
So, from an international law point of view, what is the status of Palestinian nation-
ality today, and what relevance does that have to the right of return? On the one 
hand, there is an argument that Palestinians continue to retain Palestinian nation-
ality to the present. This is based on the historical and legal facts described in this 
chapter, including that Israel’s revocation of Palestinian citizenship and denatural-
ization of Palestinians was illegal, and its denial of Palestinian return is also illegal. 
This argument rests on the claim that Israel’s illegal acts and laws that violate inter-
national norms do not affect Palestinian nationality as a matter of international 
law, and that Palestinian nationality is unbroken today, despite the inability of the 
majority of Palestinians to return to their homes.
Israel is a party to the major treaties that ground the right of return: the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, the ICCPR and ICERD.112 Israel’s massive denationalization 
of Palestinian Arabs on the basis of their national/ethnic origin was a violation of 
law at the time it occurred, and Israel remains bound today, despite the long pas-
sage of time, to remedy the denationalization and expulsion by implementing the 
right of return. UN General Assembly and UN Security Council resolutions over 
decades affirm and reaffirm the right of return for refugees to their homes in every 
part of the world.113 From state and international practice alone, it is evident that 
under international law, refugee return is the rule, and nonrecognition of Palestin-
ian refugees’ right to return is the aberration.114
On the other hand, there is the argument that Palestinians lost their nationality 
in 1948 and those unable to meet the criteria of Israel’s Nationality Law became 
stateless.115 My contention is that Palestinians are stateless nationals, and framing 
Palestinians as only refugees or stateless persons is the weaker argument, both 
legally and in terms of its consequences for Palestinians, in particular with regard 
to the right of return. The argument that Palestinians are stateless does have the 
advantage of triggering UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) protec-
tion under the two conventions on stateless persons, but this is irrelevant in the 
Arab states, which are not parties to either of these treaties, and which explicitly 
prohibit UNHCR from providing protection to Palestinians through memoranda 
of understanding with state governments.116 In the Western states, this is also only 
marginally helpful as UNHCR has not actually taken significant steps to advance 
the rights of Palestinians as stateless persons.117
From an international legal point of view, Palestinian nationality remains intact 
today, and their right of return is based squarely on their rights as nationals of 
Palestine, not only as refugees. Moreover, there is no parallel legal authority for a 
claim of Jewish nationality that negates Palestine national rights. Jews claim the 
right to return on the basis of historic religious claims to Palestine that are not 
cognizable under the international law of nationality, as religion and ancient “his-
toric” claims are not “genuine links” for the purpose of nationality recognition. For 
Palestinians who have acquired a second citizenship, dual nationality is also no 
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barrier to a right of return, as most Jews in Israel have Israeli and a second citizen-
ship. The strongest claim for right of return is based on Palestinians as nationals, 
not as stateless persons and not just as refugees, and should be clearly framed 
around the language of and principles underlying the Lausanne Treaty provisions 
from which Palestinian nationality stems. Palestinian nationality is not under-
mined by any aspect of Resolution 181, Resolution 194, or Israel’s Nationality Law.
Nevertheless, fashioning a nationality law for Palestinians remains a compli-
cated proposition in the two-state scenario. The multiple categories of Palestinians 
that must be taken into account in order to craft an equitable and legally justified 
Palestinian nationality law make this an exceedingly daunting task. Just within 
a Palestinian state that would include the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, 
there are multiple categories to consider: “the inhabitants of East Jerusalem, refu-
gees who were expelled from the territory of Israel since 1948 and settled in the 
West Bank or Gaza, West Bankers or Gazans who lost their residence in these 
two areas at any point since 1925 and were prevented by Britain (1917–1948) or by 
Israel (since 1967) to return, and Jewish-Palestinian natives of the West Bank or 
Gaza who lost their residence therein since 1948.”118 The definition of nationality 
must also consider each category in the diaspora, including those with citizenship 
in Jordan and elsewhere who would be considered dual nationals, and refugees 
across the Arab world who are also Palestinian stateless nationals.
In the current climate, there is no serious prospect of implementing a citizen-
ship law to codify Palestinian nationality for Palestinians outside Israel—whether 
in the West Bank, Gaza, the Arab world, or elsewhere in the diaspora. The PLO 
and PA have recognized, in the citizenship laws they have drafted and  considered, 
that in the absence of independence accompanying statehood recognition, a Pal-
estinian citizenship law remains aspirational. Although the right of return for 
Palestinians per se can be implemented in the absence of such a law, this is also 
unlikely under the current political conditions, particularly since passage of the 
Israeli Nation-State Law and the seeming official consensus that a two-state solu-
tion is still the only option. Ironically, Israel’s passage of the Nation-State Law and 
its declaration that it intends to fully annex the West Bank make it evident that 
it has no intention to allow the establishment of any semblance of a Palestinian 
state. The right of return for all Palestinians no matter their location, and to their 
original homes and lands, is not acknowledged in the political discourse either.
If in a future changed political context it would be possible to contemplate a 
Palestinian nationality in a single state that would include equal citizenship with 
Jews in Israel, the “nationality” distinctions under current Israeli law would need 
to be repealed along with the denationalization provision of the 1950 Nationality 
Law and the Nation-State Law in its entirety. Palestinians in the West Bank and 
Gaza and all those in the diaspora could be included by applying the provisions 
of the Lausanne Treaty. In that sense, the general definition of who is a Palestin-
ian is a simple one: all those who can claim nationality by jus sanguinis and/or 
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jus soli as fixed on August 6, 1924 by the terms of the Lausanne Treaty, and all 
their descendants, are nationals of Palestine with the right to return to their homes 
and the right to obtain restitution and other compensation as recognized under 
 international law.
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for a One-State Option in Palestine
An Assessment
Mazen Masri
Statehood is inherently intertwined with the law. The powers of the state and their 
limits, the different organs of the state and their relationships with each other, 
the relationship between the citizens and the state, and the rights of citizens— 
all these are governed by constitutional law. The constitutional model to be 
adopted, the internal ordering of the state, the relationship between the citizenry 
and the state, and how the constitution addresses matters of membership, belong-
ing, and rights are all significant questions in any exercise related to thinking 
about possible constitutional frameworks. These are especially important in the 
context of exploring options for creating a single democratic state in the area of 
historic Palestine (Israel and the West Bank and Gaza Strip) as part of resolving 
the Israeli-Arab conflict.
Any such thinking about solving the conflict will have to address the many 
challenges that the conflict presents. It is a longstanding conflict that has its roots 
in the late nineteenth century between two conflicting national movements. One 
of the movements, Zionism, shares many characteristics with settler-colonial 
movements in its ideologies, narratives, and strategies. Indeed, that is how the 
Palestinians, the native population, experienced and still experience the policies 
and practices of the Zionist movement and later on the state of Israel. As in other 
settler-colonial situations, the current reality reflects conditions of severe inequal-
ity between the settler population and the native population. This inequality is 
built into the political system, the economy, and law, reflecting the privileges that 
the settler population enjoys in the settler state. In addition to pervasive inequal-
ity there are certain events in the history of the conflict that became important 
landmarks because of the intensity of their violence and the profoundness of their 
impact. Events such as the Nakba came to embody decades of historical injustice. 
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A solution that is based on a single state built on the principles of equality and 
democracy has to address these challenges of inequality as well as tackle the injus-
tices of the past and foster a sense of security and partnership for the future.
What would the possible constitutional frameworks for a single state be? What 
are the merits and demerits of each model? Would these models be able to sat-
isfy the rights and needs of citizens of the future state? To guide the discussion 
and the assessment of the various options, this chapter will first discuss a number 
of guiding principles against which the models will be assessed. These principles 
are designed to address the problems under the current conditions, the historical 
injustices, as well as the needs, claims, and aspirations of the people living in this 
region today. It then moves to discussion of the different unitary models available, 
particularly the liberal state, the binational model, and the multicultural model. 
The chapter will also examine the possible federal models, mainly purely territo-
rial federalism, and a mix between federalism and consociationalism. Finally it 
discusses human rights arrangements, assessing the role of human rights in any 
future constitutional settlement. 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Constitutional design is not an abstract exercise conducted on a blank slate. While 
in this case it signifies a new beginning, no beginning and no thinking about 
 constitutional design can be separated from its context. Constitutional design 
means thinking about the issues, the problems, the questions, and the controver-
sies that affect a certain country, and thinking of ways to articulate the principles 
on which the new constitutional order will be built. In our context, these  principles 
are meant to address the problems and the injustice of the current situation, prob-
lems that the two-state solution is unlikely to solve, as well as potential problems 
that are likely to emerge in the context of a one-state arrangement. Setting clear 
principles is also necessary to guarantee fairness and justice and a measure of sta-
bility for the regime that is being designed.
Equal Citizenship
Lack of equality between Palestinians and Israelis is one of the core problems 
and injustices that affect that daily lives of people, and it reverberates throughout 
Israel’s legal and political system. It stems from the colonial outlook and policies 
implemented by Israel that have their roots in the early (pre-state Zionist) thought. 
If one were to classify the inhabitants of the area between the Mediterranean 
and the river Jordan according to their rights as a matter of law, it would be clear 
that there are a number of hierarchical categories. On the top we can find the 
Jewish citizens of Israel. They enjoy the full spectrum of rights, and their rights 
and interests almost automatically trump the rights of all those in the catego-
ries ranked below them. The second category is the Palestinian citizens living in 
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Israel. While formal citizenship gives them a measure of civil rights, their nominal 
citizenship does not grant full equality, for according to Israeli law and Zionist 
thought they do not belong to the “nation” that alone exercises self-determination 
in Israel. The rights enjoyed by this group do not extend to the full spectrum of 
rights.1 The third category is the Palestinians of East Jerusalem, who, according 
to Israeli law, have residency rights but not citizenship rights. Under Israeli law, 
residency is a status that can be easily revoked if the individual lives outside Israeli 
areas for an extended period of time. Fourth are the Palestinians in the West Bank, 
who live under Israeli occupation. Israel has ultimate control over this territory, 
with the Palestinian Authority acting as the local agent that runs the day-to-day 
affairs of the population. Fifth are Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, which is legally 
still under Israeli occupation and who live under the most severe situation: while 
the Hamas-controlled Palestinian Authority rules over the population, the state of 
Israeli siege, prohibition of movement of people and goods, and the periodic bouts 
of violence visited upon the population by Israel make the conditions drastically 
more serious than in the West Bank. Finally, the group that is most disenfran-
chised and lacks even minimum rights are the Palestinian refugees. Many of the 
Palestinian refugees (those displaced in 1948) live in refugee camps and towns in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but a significant number are concentrated in Jor-
dan, Syria, and Lebanon as well as other countries in the world. A sizable number 
of these refugees are stateless.
While the question of inequality is inherently political, these hierarchies were 
created and are maintained by law, mostly Israeli law. This is clear in Israel’s con-
stitutional definition as a Jewish state, which designates the Jewish collective as 
the dominant group of the state and the public sphere. It is also clear in a range of 
laws and policies that affect the rights of Palestinians, whether they are in Israel, 
the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, or in exile.2 This legally sanctioned inequality was 
put on a more firm footing with the enactment in 2018 of Basic Law: Israel: The 
Nation State of the Jewish People. This law, which has a constitutional status, reas-
serts many of the principles that are associated with the definition of the state as a 
Jewish state. It highlights the notion of self-determination as reserved exclusively 
for Jews in Israel and reaffirms the connections between Israel and Jewish com-
munities elsewhere, the supremacy of Hebrew as the official language, and the 
importance of Jewish immigration and Jewish settlement. All of these ideas are 
already constitutional values in Israel, as stated repeatedly by Israeli courts. But 
the fact that Israeli politicians decided to reassert their importance in the form of a 
basic law (legislation that has constitutional status higher than ordinary legislation 
in the normative hierarchy) indicates the level at which the regime is determined 
to entrench inequality in Israel.
Any solution for the conflict should be based on the idea of equal citizenship 
for all of these population categories. Equality in this context could be divided into 
legal and political equality on the one hand, and social equality on the other. Legal 
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and political equality means that all members of the categories mentioned above 
should be entitled to citizenship as a matter of right, and that each citizen should 
be entitled to the same basic bundle of rights. Equality should also extend to cul-
tural, linguistic, and religious rights, such that each cultural group will be able to 
enjoy and preserve its culture. It is important to highlight that legal and politi-
cal equality cannot be achieved without social equality, especially in a situation 
where there are several categories of people with significant economic and social 
differences among them. As such, in order to achieve equality, future arrange-
ments should contain significant schemes to tackle the sources of inequality. 
Resources should be allocated with the view of eliminating social gaps, an effort 
which should include affirmative action plans. Furthermore, transitional justice 
schemes are needed and these should include reparations, especially with regard 
to the losses of the Palestinian refugees. Reparations, which should include restitu-
tion of property, would help in addressing the current state of economic inequality 
between Palestinians and Israelis.
Immigration, Residency, and Citizenship Laws and Policies 
Citizenship and immigration laws and policies are essential components of mem-
bership in the polity, for they control who can enter the polity and the status of 
individuals and sometimes groups within it. For Palestinians, the 1948 ethnic 
cleansing has been described as the Nakba (catastrophe) and it entailed the mass 
displacement of the majority of Palestinians and the loss of a homeland and all 
of the entitlements that are associated with it—citizenship, land, dwellings, et 
cetera. On the other hand, the policy of creating a Jewish state in Palestine relied 
on Jewish immigration (in addition to expulsion of the indigenous Palestinians) 
in order to establish a critical Jewish mass or a majority that would create its own 
state. Immigration (and demography) was, and still is, vital for the Zionist project. 
Negotiations, contestations, and campaigns to increase Jewish immigration and 
the absorption of the resulting immigrants in Palestine were central to Zionist 
activities both before 1948 and after the creation of Israel. For the Zionist leader-
ship these immigrants, many of whom were refugees fleeing atrocities in Europe, 
were an essential part of the process of building a Jewish majority.3
The current immigration and citizenship laws and policies are more or less a 
translation of this approach, and are characterized by serious discrimination and 
racism.4 The various categories discussed above are essentially the outcome of 
the operation of citizenship and residency laws and policies that allocate rights 
 differentially. Any new constitutional model adopted must address the issues of 
citizenship and immigration with the view of eliminating the current legal sources 
of inequalities, and should also strive to provide an equitable immigration policy 
for the benefit of the citizenry of the future state as well.
Such a model should eliminate the current immigration regime, particularly 
the idea of exclusive Jewish immigration, known as “return” or shvout, which was 
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recently emphasized in the 2018 Basic Law: Israel: The Nation State of the Jewish 
People. This idea is not just a matter of the technicalities of immigration legislation 
(for at some point during or right after the transformational change that would 
bring about the creation of a single state, all existing legislation would need to be 
revised and adapted to the new situation) but extends to the level of fundamental 
principles. Jewish immigration, or aliya, as former Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of Israel Aharon Barak explained, is not a technical term. It is regarded 
as a fundamental political principle, or as Barak puts it, “a social, value-laden, 
and national term.”5 Accordingly, the Law of Return of 1950, even though it is 
not officially a basic law, is seen as “one of the most important laws in Israel, if not 
the most important.” Its importance stems from the notion that it “is the key to 
entering the State of Israel, which constitutes a central reflection of the fact that 
Israel is not merely a democratic state, but also a Jewish state; it constitutes ‘the 
constitutional cornerstone of the character of the State of Israel as the state of 
the Jewish people.’”6
The Law of Return therefore is not merely a matter of immigration: it is the 
main category of distinction between Jews and non-Jews (mainly Palestinians); 
a distinction between those who, according to Israeli law, have the right to self-
determination and the right to a homeland in Israel with all of the associated 
national and collective rights, and those whose presence in the country is based on 
individual rights or status. This distinction is carried from this foundational point 
throughout the legal system and is used to justify discrimination against non-Jews.
On the other hand, the concept of Jewish “return” should not be confused with 
the right of return of the Palestinian refugees. While the former is based on a 
political ideology that was codified into law and has no equivalent anywhere else 
in the world, the latter is a well-established human right that refugees (and others 
who are arbitrarily denied the right to access their countries) are entitled to under 
international law.7 The right of return of the Palestinian refugees is essential in 
equalizing rights and eliminating the current discriminatory hierarchy.
Group Rights
The population between the river Jordan and the Mediterranean belongs to two 
main groups: Jewish Israelis and Palestinians. While both groups are diverse in 
their composition (for example, Palestinians include Muslims and Christians 
but almost all are Arabic speakers; Jews include a number of subgroups, some of 
whom speak other languages such as Russian and Amharic; and some subgroups 
are not “legally” Jewish but speak Hebrew and embrace Jewish Israeli culture), the 
affiliation as Jewish or Palestinian/Arab is the cardinal division. This division is 
the main point of distinction that determines which people have rights under the 
current regime, and is the most pronounced in terms of defining the identity of 
the various populations living under Israeli rule. It also overlaps with the distinc-
tion (discussed below) of settler or indigenous.
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These two groups (and in some cases the subgroups) each have their own dis-
tinctive language, culture, heritage, and religion. These markers are important 
markers of identity. Today, these two groups live more or less separately, even 
though they inhabit the same land. This separation is not between equals. The 
Jewish-Israeli collective is the dominant group in almost all aspects—politically, 
economically and linguistically, The Jewish group is the one that elects the gov-
ernment, it is the one that controls the economy, and Hebrew is the dominant 
language of governance and trade.8 Palestinians, however, enjoy some cultural/
religious autonomy in the areas of the Palestinian Authority. Palestinians who live 
in Israel seemingly enjoy some cultural autonomy in the form of separate religious 
institutions and courts and a separate education system, however these institu-
tions are tightly controlled by the Israeli government and are designed to benefit 
the state rather than the members of these religious groups.
Accounting for the diversity of the population is crucial for a stable and just 
settlement of conflicts in countries with deep national, ethnic, or religious divi-
sions. The constitutional principles and state institutions should acknowledge the 
fact that there are at present two main groups, and these groups have different 
identities that should be accommodated. This recognition and accommodation 
does not and should not mean dominance of one group over the other, or special 
rights or privileges for one group, as is the situation today. The principle of equal-
ity should be observed in the design and administration of group rights, both on 
the level of the group and that of the individuals belonging to each group. At the 
same time, special attention should be given in order to guard against a situation 
where belonging to a certain group, rather than citizenship or membership in the 
broader polity, becomes the most significant source of rights.
Historical Redress, Transitional Justice, and Transformative  
Constitutionalism
Constitutional change in a postconflict context cannot be a tool to preserve the past. 
At the same time, we cannot imagine a constitution that is totally separated from the 
conflict, its history, its injustices, and its underlying causes. The constitution should 
play a dual role: to anchor and facilitate transitional justice measures such as truth-
telling, reparation, and prosecution.9 The second role for the constitution is mainly 
forward-looking: to transform the present into an equal reality. It should mark a 
break with the past and its injustices and inequities, and signal the beginning of 
a new constitutional order that aims at transforming the state and society based 
on a new, just vision. Transformational constitutionalism, Karl Klare explains, is
a long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement 
committed (not in isolation, of course, but in a historical context of conducive politi-
cal developments) to transforming a country’s political and social institutions and 
power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction. Trans-
formative constitutionalism connotes an enterprise of inducing large-scale  social 
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change through nonviolent political processes grounded in law. I have in mind a 
transformation vast enough to be inadequately captured by the phrase “reform,” 
but something short of or different from “revolution” in any traditional sense of the 
word. In the background is an idea of a highly egalitarian, caring, multicultural com-
munity, governed through participatory, democratic processes in both the polity and 
large portions of what we now call the “private sphere.”10
Transformation cannot be an initiative that is undertaken solely by the legal sys-
tem. It is essentially a political process with many actors and in which the legal 
system can play an important role. This role was articulated in the postapartheid 
jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court, which emphasized that 
the postapartheid interim Constitution of South Africa,
is not simply some kind of statutory codification of an acceptable or legitimate past. 
It retains from the past only what is defensible and represents a radical and deci-
sive break from that part of the past which is unacceptable. It constitutes a decisive 
break from a culture of Apartheid and racism to a constitutionally protected culture 
of openness and democracy and universal human rights for South Africans of all 
ages, classes and colours. There is a stark and dramatic contrast between the past in 
which South Africans were trapped and the future on which the Constitution is pre-
mised. . . . The relevant provisions of the Constitution must therefore be interpreted 
so as to give effect to the purposes sought to be advanced by their enactment. (Sha-
balala and Others v Attorney-General of the Transvaal and Another, 1995)
This vision helped transform South Africa, and made its Constitutional Court a 
leading actor especially with regards to social and economic rights, even if this 
transformation did not go far enough in some areas.11 This kind of transforma-
tive thinking about the constitution is indispensable for a one-state model to 
work effectively, regardless of the model adopted. In our context it means a major 
change in the doctrines, principles, mindsets, and practices that have informed 
existing constitutional and legal thinking and have established and entrenched the 
current apartheid realities. It means that constitutional practice should be guided 
by the principles that ensure a viable and democratic single state, such as the prin-
ciples discussed below.
Decolonization 
Colonialism, and more specifically settler-colonialism, lies at the heart of the 
conflict between Palestinians and Jewish Israelis. The division is not just ethnic/
national in its nature, but also a division between a settler society that has almost 
full control over the state, and an indigenous society that is resisting the status 
quo. As in other colonial situations, the colonization process was accompanied by 
widespread processes of elimination of the indigenous population. The  uniqueness 
in the case of Israel is that Israel as a state was formed as a settler-colonial state, 
and at the same time acts as a colonial power in the West Bank under the guise 
of occupation.
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Patrick Wolfe, a prominent theorist of settler-colonialism, identifies its 
essential feature as “the logic of elimination, a sustained institutional tendency 
to supplant the indigenous population which reconciles a range of historical 
practices that might otherwise seem distinct.”12 This colonial process applies 
to Israel. However, the characterization of Israel and the Zionist movement as 
settler-colonial is not accepted by many Israelis who think of Israel as the culmi-
nation of a historical and natural right to establish a Jewish state.13 Many writ-
ers on the other hand see the Zionist project and the formation of the state of 
Israel as a form of settler-colonialism.14 They highlight the intensive immigration 
from Europe with the intention of building a state exclusively for the benefit of the 
settler society. This approach is also accepted by a number of Israeli academics 
who agree that Israel and the Zionist project have a strong settler-colonial ele-
ment, or who, like Baruch Kimmerling, have adopted the settler/native distinction 
 without using the term settler-colonialism.15 Some, like Wolfe, even observe that 
the Zionist logic of elimination is more exclusive than such logics in Australia 
or the United States.16
Since colonialism is one of the significant issues at the heart of the conflict, 
decolonization should be at the center of any solution. The concept of decoloniza-
tion can have several meanings depending on context, location, and epoch, such 
as the decolonization in Asia and Africa in the 1950s–1970s and the creation of 
independent states. In our context we need to adopt an approach to decoloniza-
tion that takes into account the particularities of the present Israeli-Palestinian 
situation. It does not mean the departure of members of the settler society, but 
rather a political process that addresses the main structures and manifestations 
of  colonialism, and the distinctions, inequities, and injustices it has produced 
over the past one hundred years, with the view of transforming the relationships 
between the two major groups into ones that are built on equality. It entails, on the 
part of the settler society, the willingness to abandon colonial privileges and rec-
ognition of past injustices, and for the indigenous society, the willingness to accept 
that the settler society, having abandoned its colonial privileges, has the legitimate 
right to exist as an equal partner in the new state. The same way colonialism affects 
all aspects of life, decolonization should also address those aspects, and should be 
a central theme in the constitutional design. Decolonization is at the heart of the 
four principles discussed earlier (equal citizenship, immigration, group rights, and 
transitional justice and transformative constitutionalism). In some sense, it is the 
means to ensure that these four principles guarantee equality and justice.
C ONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN I :  A UNITARY STATE
A unitary state is one in which state power is centralized—that is, there are no 
competing sources of state power, and the different branches of the state control 
exercise the same level of power in the whole territory of the state. Autonomous 
Frameworks for a One-State Option    233
regions are possible, but they are not seen as constituent components of the state. 
A unitary state could have a number of possible constitutional frameworks.
A Liberal, Difference-Blind State
A neutral state is one that does not adopt any preference regarding its citizens’ 
values, preferences, or principles. It views the citizen first and foremost as an indi-
vidual, and provides all citizens with the full range of liberal rights regardless of 
their belonging. It adopts a policy of difference-blindness when it comes to citi-
zens’ identities, whether they are cultural, linguistic, ethnic, or national. Such a 
state does not exist in reality. While there are states that adopt a policy of neu-
trality in certain areas such as religion, a state cannot be neutral in areas such as 
language for practical reasons. Rather, what exists in reality are states that try to 
promote what Charles Taylor calls “the politics of universalism,” that is, the pro-
motion of equality of all citizens and the avoidance of stratification of citizens into 
classes or ethnic identities.17 This could be seen as the nation-building model: the 
state encourages a certain identity, culture, language, and political culture.18 This 
approach applies to areas that are seen as “official” or public. The state on the other 
hand gives the citizens belonging to minority ethnocultural groups the liberty of 
using their languages or practicing their cultures in the private sphere.
It should be noted that what is seen as “universal equality” is in reality not 
universal, as it maintains a preference for particular cultures. It does promote a 
hegemonic culture; as Charles Taylor puts it, it is “a particularism masquerading as 
the universal.”19 France is generally adopted as the archetype for this model, with 
its emphasis on French republican values, French culture, and French language. 
These are seen as “universal” even if they are particular to France.
Adopting such a model for a new state in Israel/Palestine would raise many 
difficulties. Under the current situation, there is no one hegemonic culture that 
a clear and substantive majority would support. This obstacle, however, could 
be surmounted by leaving the question of hegemonic culture open and where 
absolutely necessary, adopting cultural elements of both groups, such as officially 
recognizing their respective languages as official languages. While this would 
be transformational in the sense that it would present a break with the current 
situation, in which Jewish Israelis dominate the state, this transformation would 
be of a limited scope because of the model’s narrow conception of equality. 
For even though it is based on equality, and there is much to admire in the  emphasis 
on “universal equality” among citizens, this kind of equality assumes unifor-
mity, and is contrary to the realities of most societies. This concept understands 
equality in its narrow sense only. It is based on respect for individual equality 
and does not take into account individual and collective diversity. This indiffer-
ence to diversity means that eventually one culture or group, whether through 
numeric preponderance, political power, or economic advantage, will eventually 
become hegemonic.
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The emphasis on equality as uniformity and difference-blindness also creates 
problems when it comes to group rights, especially if those rights require some 
form of recognition of these groups and adjustment to their special interests or 
needs. Similarly, this model will hinder transitional justice, for transitional justice 
in the context of the Israeli-Arab conflict requires acknowledging group differ-
ences and identities. Under this model, there is no means to talk about settler soci-
ety and indigenous society, but only individual citizens. The same problems arise 
regarding decolonization: for decolonization to work, one should first identify the 
colonial process and the privileges it created, which would be hard to achieve in a 
model based on uniformity.
The Binational Model 
A binational state is one that acknowledges the political presence and rights of 
two national groups. Those who belong to the relevant national groups are able 
to enjoy individual and national rights, and their right to be represented in 
state  institutions is constitutionally protected.20 The origins of this approach 
in  Palestine/Israel can be traced back to the Brit Shalom group, which was later 
recreated as Ihud and was active among the Jewish immigrants in Palestine in the 
1920s–1940s. The impetus behind this group, which was small and politically mar-
ginal, was their understanding that the Palestinians would never agree to a Jewish 
state in their land since that would mean that they would not be able to exercise 
their right to self-determination. The group believed that Jews had “historical” 
rights over Palestine while the Palestinian Arabs had “natural rights.” To recon-
cile those rights they proposed binationalism: the state would be composed of 
two nationalities (or nations), Jews and Arabs, and both groups would have equal 
political rights regardless of majority or minority status.21
But binationalism is to a large extent an abstract and vague concept that can 
mean a number of political configurations. It is possible to identify four levels or 
types of binationalism, as explained here. 
Binationalism as Declarative.  Binationalism could be expressed on a declarative 
level as recognition by the state, through its constitution or other legal instru-
ments, of the fact the majority of the citizens belong to two national or ethnic 
groups. If such a clause is kept at the declarative level and not given normative 
weight, then it has the potential to satisfy the aspirations of both groups. It pro-
vides recognition without providing special rights or privileges to any group. Such 
a clause would be compatible with the principle of equal citizenship and would 
not necessarily have implications for immigration policy. It may be be vague with 
regards to the issue of group rights, since it would depend on how these rights 
would be defined and on the level of involvement of the state in protecting them. 
If issues such as religion, language, and culture are seen as a matter of private 
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 preference only, the state would not promote any aspect of those, but at the same 
time would not interfere in regulating them.
Binationalism as Cultural Autonomy and Official Adoption of Symbols.  This level 
complements the declarative level with active measures that give expression to 
group preferences. The recognition of the two groups would extend to granting 
some form of cultural autonomy in areas such as religion, cultural institutions, 
and recognition of the equal status of both languages. Additionally, the recogni-
tion would extend to state symbols (flag, anthem, emblem), which would combine 
elements representing both groups.
Recognition and cultural autonomy could take different forms, and those 
would determine its compatibility with the principles set out in the earlier section. 
If both groups are given exclusive jurisdiction on their cultural affairs, then a num-
ber of problems might arise. First, this arrangement would mean that all citizens 
have to belong to one of the groups. This raises difficulties regarding those who do 
not belong, or do not want to belong, to either group. Second, this emphasis on 
strict group differentiation might be manipulated to provide rights or services in 
a discriminatory manner to different groups, as is the situation today in religious 
services in Israel. A third problem that would arise is the problem of accountabil-
ity and state control: To whom will those autonomous institutions be accountable? 
What is the role of the state in their regulation?
Binationalism and Immigration.  The shape of the binational state is also going to 
be impacted by the way it deals with the issue of immigration and citizenship pol-
icy. Since it was enacted in 1950, the Law of Return has been justified and rational-
ized based on the right to self-determination, namely that a state in which a specific 
group exercises self-determination should allow members of that group the right 
to immigrate to it and become citizens. As such, Jews, as a national group, should 
be allowed to immigrate and join their conationalists in their national home.22 
If this logic is applied to binationalism then the binational state has to allow the 
immigration of members of both groups, or at least facilitate it significantly. This 
means the preservation of the Law of Return, or some variation of it. This com-
ponent of binationalism was at the heart of the binational view promoted by Brit 
Shalom/Ihud. The group believed that there should be numerical parity between 
Palestinians and Jews in Palestine, and part of their plan was to allow unlimited 
Jewish immigration until this numerical parity was achieved.23 This requirement 
might prove to be problematic on a number of levels.
Binationalism and Governance: Conscociationalism.  The principle of consocia-
tional democracy proposed by Arendt Lijphart is the most relevant model of shar-
ing power between multiple ethnic groups within any given state. Lijphart’s model 
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aims to share, decentralize, and limit state power. The model has a number of 
elements. First, it institutes power-sharing on the executive level. Second, Lijphart 
advocates for proportional representation of the groups in parliament and in the 
main institutions of the state such as the civil services, judiciary, police force, and 
army. Third, this model allows each group to have mutual veto power on matters 
of vital interest. This is especially important for minorities whose representation 
is not always strong. Fourth, consociational democracy ensures segmental auton-
omy, in the form either of federalism or of group autonomy in areas linked closely 
to ethnic identity.24
Binationalism at the level of governance is indeed a form of consociational-
ism where the power is shared between the two groups. There is no one model to 
implement this system, but the principles listed above could be implemented in 
a number of ways. In the Israeli/Palestinian context, binationalism could entail a 
bicameral parliament, a cabinet composed of equal number of individuals belong-
ing to both groups, quota systems in public service and other state offices, and 
veto rights on vital interests. This seems to be the thrust of the binational state 
proposed by Brit Shalom/Ihud in 1946. One of the main components of their pro-
posal was the creation of a constituent assembly which would draw up a constitu-
tion and a legislative assembly which would include equal number of Palestinians 
and Jews.25 This was at a time when Palestinians out-numbered Jews two to one, 
though the plan included massive Jewish immigration to bring about numerical 
parity. Parity would also be maintained at the level of the executive through the 
creation of an executive council. The proposal also spoke of a Jewish Council and 
a corresponding Arab Council which would be responsible for the cultural affairs 
of each community, such as issues related to education.
Binationalism: Pitfalls and Potential.  The first problem of binationalism as a 
state model to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lies in defining the identity 
of the two nations creating this new state. Two questions arise here: Who are the 
two nations? And who is included in each group and who is going to decide on 
that? As for the first question, it is not clear whether the non-Palestinian group 
is Jewish (that is, composed of anyone who is religiously or culturally Jewish) or 
Israeli. While there is overlap between the two categories, there is definitely a big 
difference between them. Even though sociologically one can identify an Israeli 
collective that has emerged in the past seventy years, one that has features that 
distinguish Israelis from Jews elsewhere, Israel has refused to acknowledge this 
fact. Officially and legally, there is no such thing as an Israeli nation, and the only 
nation in Israel is the Jewish nation (Tamarin v. The State of Israel, 1972). On the 
conceptual level, stating that all Jews have a right to self-determination and a stake 
in the state flies in the face of contemporary practices that emphasize citizenship, 
and not religious or ethnic belonging, as the main criteria for being member of 
the state. On a practical level, especially if this arrangement is accompanied with 
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immigration rights similar to the ones adopted today, it means that millions of 
Jews whose only link to Palestine is religious will be able to immigrate to it and 
settle in it.
Equally problematic is the issue of who would be included in each group, or 
who is a Jew/Israeli, and who is a Palestinian. The question of “who is a Jew” has 
been a serious constitutional and political question in Israel. The question of who 
is Palestinian may prove to be easier to answer: anybody who originates from the 
area of Mandate Palestine is Palestinian. Yet there are some who could not be 
included in this category, yet could be seen as Palestinian by association, such as 
political figures who played important roles in Palestinian politics. Adopting a 
binational model means that these two categories need to be legally defined, since 
eligibility to participate in politics and access to some services will rest on the 
whether an individual belongs to one group or the other.
Similarly, this emphasis on group belonging in the power-sharing mechanisms 
assumes that all citizens belong to these two groups. But what about those who do 
not fit the definition? This emphasis might lead to absurd outcomes that under-
mine the principles of equality and citizenship. A case in point here is  Bosnia 
 Herzegovina and the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the Sejdić 
and Finci case. As part of the Dayton Agreement, the preamble to the  Constitution 
of Bosnia Herzegovina describes Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs as “constituent peo-
ples.” The presidency and all legislatures (on the federal level and state level) are 
shared with representatives from each group. In this case, Sejdić, who is of Roma 
origin, and Finci, who is of Jewish origin, wanted to stand for elections, but since 
they did not fit any of the three “constituent peoples,” they were ineligible. The 
court ruled that this was a violation to their right to participate in free elections 
and their right to be protected from discrimination (Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia 
Herzegovina, 2009). The other side of the coin here is the problem of compelled 
association: those who do not want to be part of any group, in order to participate 
in politics, would be compelled to associate with one of the two groups.26
The second problem that binationalism can give rise to relates to its emphasis 
on national/ethnic belonging as the main political criteria for belonging to the 
polity. It thus could be more conducive to highlighting what divides a polity rather 
than what unites it. Political power channeled through the ethnic/national affili-
ation makes membership in the communal group, rather than citizenship and 
membership in the state, the source of political power and rights. This might lead 
to both groups adopting initiatives to develop and highlight their particular iden-
tity in a manner not necessarily constructive for creating a new collective sense of 
“we,” or a new common state identity.
In addition to these particular concerns, the academic literature points out other 
salient critiques of the consociational model. Critics argue that consociationalism 
tends to strengthen the elites of the national or ethnic groups, because its success 
relies on the elites’ ability to demonstrate that they can enforce the  consociational 
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arrangements within their respective groups. Critics also observe that conso-
ciationalism limits competition among elites over issues of public  concern and 
policy questions, which in turns produces weak and undemocratic government. 
Moreover, consociationalism hinders politics of economic distribution, especially 
because it focuses on cultural/ethnic recognition and ignores social class. Ques-
tions of allocation of resources can easily escalate into disputes between the two 
groups, especially in situations of economic disparity as in our case. Addition-
ally, since consociationalism requires many actors and political parties to be in 
power in order to form of a broad ruling coalition, the official opposition tends to 
be small and very weak. Consociationalism effectively eliminates or significantly 
weakens official opposition, which is essential for the functioning of a democracy. 
This, according to critics of consociationalism, weakens democracy.27
Consociationalism is also likely to violate some of the principles mentioned 
above. Most significantly, it could potentially violate the principle of equal citi-
zenship especially if the equally divided legislature advocated by Ihud were to be 
implemented. While the numerical composition of the population of a binational 
state is hard to assess at this point, and may well be close to parity, it is hard to 
guarantee that it will stay the same, and if this happens, an equally divided legisla-
ture will give more power to the group that is a minority. This could be dangerous 
in situations where, for example, the ethnic/national divide also overlaps with a 
socioeconomic divide. Similarly, because of the general weakness and instability 
of the state under this model, it would be hard to implement transitional justice 
initiatives and changes that are conducive to decolonization.
Despite these critiques and potential problems, some of the ideas that con-
sociationalism promotes could be employed without emphasizing their ethnic/
national dimension. The adoption of a parliamentary system, proportionate 
 representation (of parties) in parliament, recognition of ethnic/national groups, 
language rights, and some form of cultural autonomy are all ideas that could be 
used and  implemented without necessarily adopting some of the problematic 
aspects of consociationalism. This way, power is shared and diffused without nec-
essarily strengthening sectarianism.
A Multicultural State 
Principles.  A multicultural state is one that could potentially combine many 
of the benefits of a binational model and at the same time avoid the potential risks. 
There is no one universally agreed upon definition of multiculturalism, for it can 
take a number of different shapes or models.28 The definition that Will Kymilcka, 
one of the leading theorists of multiculturalism, adopts could help clarify the 
concept. Kymlicka sees multiculturalism as “the view that states should not only 
uphold the familiar set of common civil, political, and social rights of citizenship 
that are protected in all constitutional liberal democracies, but also adopt  various 
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 group-specific rights or policies that are intended to recognize and accommodate 
the distinctive identities and aspirations of ethnocultural groups.”29 Kymlicka 
 identifies three principles useful in struggles to achieve multiculturalism.30 The 
first is the idea that the state belongs to all citizens equally. The second princi-
ple involves the state according “recognition and accommodation to the history, 
language, and culture of non-dominant groups, as it does to dominant groups.” 
The third principle directly addresses the issue of past injustices: “a multicultural 
state acknowledges the historic injustice that was done to minority/non-dominant 
groups by these policies of assimilation and exclusion, and manifests a willingness 
to offer some sort of remedy or rectification for them.”31 These three principles 
could help in devising a state model that maintains group recognition without 
entrenching group privileges and making them the main marker of politics.
Equality and Cultural Autonomy.  The starting point of such a model is equality. 
In our context, the state should recognize that nearly all citizens belong to one of 
two groups, Palestinians and Jewish Israelis, with different languages, culture, and 
history, and should give these groups a measure of cultural autonomy. This rec-
ognition includes recognition of Arabic and Hebrew as official languages of equal 
status, and recognition of the right of citizens to receive services from and com-
municate with the state in both languages. Also, special arrangements should be 
adopted to allow for the use of either language in government offices (both central 
and local), parliament, and the courts. Similarly, the state should adopt a policy 
of bilingualism and encourage (and in cases of critical services or monopolistic 
companies, mandate) the use of both languages. Both languages should be taught 
in all schools, whether public or private.
Cultural autonomy is commonly understood as allowing members of a distinct 
group to manage matters that are related to cultural affiliation, such as language, 
education, cultural and artistic production, and religious institutions. The state is 
a major player in these areas, and its policies should, as much as possible, leave 
the decisions on these cultural issues in the hands of the group as recognition of 
cultural distinctiveness. At the same time, policies encouraging cultural autonomy 
should be designed in a manner that highlights equality, diversity, and openness, 
and not adversity and difference.
A number of guiding principles could be adopted to achieve these goals. A 
major principle is related to group definition and membership. In our context, 
where the question of who is Jewish Israeli and who is Palestinian seems to be 
complicated and could potentially lead to disagreements, the best marker to define 
a group could be language. This way we can avoid the thorny question of group 
definition and membership and still maintain group recognition in a manner that 
is significant for the groups involved. As such, in all areas and institutions of cul-
tural autonomy—except for religion—the autonomous institutions should first 
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and foremost be based on language. In this way, membership in each group will be 
based on self-identification and preference and not, as it is today in Israel, based 
on religious criteria or compelled identification.
Other principles could be adopted to guarantee equality and openness, such 
as accountability. Government departments that provide cultural services should 
be accountable to the public as a whole, and not just to the particular commu-
nity they serve. They should be committed to the principles of equality and diver-
sity. They should not discriminate against individuals in the provision of service 
even if those individuals are deemed not to belong to the linguistic group they are 
intended to serve. Similarly, other administrative law norms that guarantee fair-
ness and accountability should apply.
It should be highlighted that equality in the context of a multicultural state in 
historic Palestine cannot be abstract. Policies aimed at equality should be informed 
by decolonization such that the new constitutional framework is a way to decolo-
nize the state apparatus and address the wrongs of the past. They should make 
clear that this conception of equality aims to remove the privileges of the settler 
society rather than recreate them or rename them. They should also support and 
facilitate measures of transitional justice, as equality cannot be achieved without 
addressing the injustices of the past.
Multiculturalism and Democratic Governance.  Multiculturalism does not offer 
specific guidelines about constitutional arrangements beyond the main principles 
discussed above. However one can use these principles, and borrow from some 
of the ideas discussed under consociationalism, to provide a framework that will 
help reflect the diversity of the population in the governing bodies and guarantee 
that no one group can abuse power in a manner that affects the rights of the other 
group, all while maintaining equal citizenship as the founding principle of the 
constitutional order.
The starting point should be constitutional entrenchment of the principles that 
are at the heart of multiculturalism such as equality, bilingualism, recognition of 
group rights, commitment to diversity, and acknowledgment of historical injus-
tice. Constitutional amendments changing such principles should be possible with 
a large majority vote only. The Constitution of South Africa for example, provides 
that the principles of democracy, human dignity, nonracialism, and nonsexism 
may be amended only with the support of 75 percent of members of Parliament 
and the support of six out of nine provinces. These principles should be not just 
declarative in nature but also constitutional principles that legislation should 
observe and be compatible with.
Similarly, the system of governance could be designed in a manner in line with 
the general principles of multiculturalism. A parliamentary system is preferable 
to a presidential system because of its more collaborative nature. While a “first 
past the post” voting system (where the country is divided into regions, and the 
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 candidate with the highest number of votes wins) would potentially provide a 
result representative of the population because of the current state of segregation, 
it is not the most desirable one. A mix between a proportionate representation vot-
ing system where the whole country is seen as one electoral district, and a number 
of relatively large electoral districts would probably be a better way to guarantee 
adequate representation and at the same time provide candidates from different 
backgrounds with incentives to cooperate with each other. Such arrangements can 
guarantee that parliament is representative of the general population, and that the 
cabinet will also have significant representation of both groups without having to 
specify quotas in the constitution.
A multicultural system seems to be the one that is most compatible with 
 principles outlined above. It guarantees equality both for individuals and groups, 
provides a significant measure of recognition of group identity, allows signifi-
cant cultural autonomy, but at the same time maintains an emphasis on the idea 
that the main relationship between the individual and the state is that of citizen-
ship and not ethnic/religious background. The ideas of transitional justice and 
 decolonization could fit into this model given its emphasis on acknowledging his-
torical injustice.
While multiculturalism seems to be a satisfactory model that could address 
many of the challenges in our context, it is important to be aware of the critiques 
leveled against it. Two critiques are especially important. First, critics argue that 
the emphasis on culture and identity diverts attention from social and economic 
justice and undermines class solidarity.32 Second is the question of vulnerable 
internal minorities, or minorities within minorities. The emphasis on the protec-
tion of equality of group identity might worsen existing inequalities within each 
group.33 Subgroups such as women, sexual minorities, and religious dissidents 
might be adversely affected by members of their own group. These critiques are 
indeed significant, but they could also be addressed using other tools.
C ONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN I I :  A FEDER AL STATE
Federalism: Principles and Rationale 
While there is no one universally agreed upon definition of federalism, a useful 
definition that captures the essence of many federal arrangements is William Rik-
er’s. Riker sees a constitution as federal “if (1) two levels of government rule the 
same land and people, (2) each level has at least one area of action in which it is 
autonomous, and (3) there is some guarantee (even though merely a statement in 
the constitution) of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere.”34 Essen-
tially, the powers of the state are divided between the central or federal govern-
ment and the regional or state government. The division of powers varies from one 
country to another depending on the history and the needs of each state. Some, 
like Switzerland, are very highly decentralized, and the cantons (the regional unit 
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in Switzerland) enjoy a wide range of powers, many of them are exclusive. The 
cantons hold so much power that the preamble of the Federal Constitution of 
the Swiss Confederation names the cantons, in addition to the people, as the 
“authors” of the constitution. Other countries, such as Germany, are more central-
ized even within a federal framework.
Supporters of federalism argue that it bolsters democracy, as it gives the local 
population more voice in public affairs through the tiered government system. 
It also allows more political participation, especially that of small communities. 
Similarly, the proximity between citizens and local decision-makers means more 
responsive government. Supporters also argue that the division of state power 
between two levels of government limits this power and contributes to protect-
ing liberties. Some theorists highlight the freedom of movement and choice of 
residence offered by a federal state, which makes it easier for people to move to 
like-minded communities.35
Federalism Implemented: Possible Scenarios
The overwhelming majority of federal states use territory as the basis of federal-
ism. The exceptions, mainly Belgium and Bosnia and Herzegovina, combine the 
territorial dimension with a communal (ethnic/national) dimension. Territorial 
federalism is based on territory, and the region, state, or province has powers that 
are distinct and independent from the power of the federal government. The divi-
sion of power is usually done through the constitution. In situations where the 
constituent states are not preexisting political units with defined borders, the most 
important question is the question of internal borders. In postconflict federalism 
the territorial units are designed in a manner to give national minorities a majority 
in their own regions.36 This, it is thought, will dampen the secessionist sentiments 
of minorities, will provide a measure of control and participation at least on the 
local level, will provide regional jurisdiction over education, language, and other 
cultural aspects, and will address some of the demands of the national groups.
In our case, one approach would be to adopt the 1967 line, creating two territo-
ries where each group—Palestinians and Israeli Jews—will form a clear majority 
in one of the two. It would also be possible to make some amendments to the line 
to account for major population centers that belong to the other group. Another 
option would be to adopt a larger number of units with significantly smaller ter-
ritories. This would allow for a significant measure of self-rule for the residents 
of the units; given the existing state of segregation, those units would likely be 
homogenous, with the exception of some highly mixed areas such as parts of 
Haifa, Yaffa, and Jerusalem.
Another important question concerns the powers of the territorial units in a 
federal state. In postconflict federalism, regional powers are usually given control 
on matters related to language, religious services, education, and other cultural 
aspects as a way to satisfy the aspirations of the particular group living in that 
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area. The scope of regional power can be more challenging or contested in situ-
ations where questions of the distribution of natural resources (such as oil, gas, 
 minerals) and their division arise. In the Israeli-Palestinian context though, this is 
not a major concern and the cultural aspects remain the most important domain 
for asserting regional autonomy. All other state functions and powers would be 
controlled by the federal state.
The other model of federalism is one that combines territorialism with 
 consociationalism based on national/ethnic or linguistic dimensions. Belgium and 
 Bosnia Herzegovina are the prime examples. Bosnia and Herzegovina is divided 
into two federal “entities”: Republika Sparska and the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The federal legislature is composed of two chambers with quotas 
for the constituent peoples (Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats). The federal presidency 
is a joint presidency with the three peoples represented. The federal government 
has powers in limited areas related to international relations, trade, customs, 
 immigration, and monetary policy. All other functions and powers are retained 
by the “entities.”
The Belgian model is equally complicated. Belgium, as Article 1 of its constitu-
tion states, “is composed of Communities and Regions.” There are three regions: 
Flanders (mostly Dutch-speaking), Wallonia (mostly French-speaking), and the 
mixed district of Brussels. There are three recognized communities, the French, 
Flemish, and the German-speaking community. The communities have powers 
in functional areas that are of cultural concern for the different linguistic groups, 
and in what is known as “person-related matters,” which include certain aspects 
of healthcare, family policy, and education. The jurisdiction of the communities, 
however, is territorially defined, and each territorially defined region has power in 
economic areas and has its own elected parliament. In Brussels, for example, each 
community has authority with regards to members of its linguistic group. On the 
federal level, Belgium has a bicameral parliament. The constitution provides more 
seats for the Dutch-speaking population than for the French-speaking population, 
although linguistic parity is maintained in the federal Council of Ministers. For 
changing any current arrangement, the constitution requires a two-thirds majority 
as well as a majority of each linguistic group.37
A federal system that combined territorialism with communal belonging 
would be something along the lines of Belgium or Bosnia Herzegovina: it would 
add a layer of consociationalism to the federal structure. The particular powers 
given to the states or regions would be a matter to be decided, and a number of 
approaches could be taken. But since our concern here is with the cultural rights 
of national and linguistic groups, the states or the regions would have control over 
rights and services related to culture. Cultural autonomy (education, religion, lan-
guage, et cetera) therefore would be overseen on the regional level. The region or 
the state would adopt policies and administer the cultural institutions. In addition, 
other powers could be given to the regions or states in service areas such as health, 
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social security, housing, and other fields that deal with the particular needs of the 
local population.
On the federal level, a number of options could be adopted. In the 1940s, 
Ihud proposed a federal structure with a federal parliament and federal execu-
tive based on parity.38 They also proposed an Arab Council and Jewish Council 
for cultural affairs, and smaller administrative units (counties). In some sense, 
the proposal by Ihud resembles the Belgian model in that it combines federalism 
with consociationalism.
Federalism: Promises and Risks 
Many critics argue that the promises of postconflict federalism are exaggerated. 
Some even suggest that federalism in this context is likely to exacerbate conflict 
and not solve it. They contend that the model is unstable and likely to reinforce 
conflict between identity groups. Simple policy questions, they argue, will be 
recast as conflicts or tensions between national groups. Additionally, the fact that 
the different groups would be in control of different regions—even if only par-
tially and within the confines of federalism—means that they could use resources 
and institutional tools in order to push for greater autonomy.39 Another problem 
related to instability is posed by the borders between the states or regions. On 
the one hand, drawing borders in order to create regions that represent national 
or ethnic minorities is one of the rationales for adopting a federal model. On the 
other hand, studies show that borders that are designed to create homogenous 
populations are unstable.40 Some suggest that creating heterogeneous territorial 
units is more likely to force the different groups to cooperate. Economic equality 
is another major issue that should be flagged. Several studies show that there is a 
correlation between income inequality and federalism.41 Federalism, and decen-
tralization in general, tend to preserve the economic status quo.42
All of these critiques are relevant if a federal model is adopted. It is possible 
to imagine states or provinces using resources in a manner that disproportion-
ately benefits the national majority in their areas, or in a manner that is designed 
to achieve goals that are contrary to the goals of the federal state or the spirit 
of the political settlement. For example, states could act to strengthen the bond 
between individuals and their local state at the expense of the bond with the 
 federal state. Similarly, the question of economic redistribution would be a thorny 
one,  especially since the Palestinian-majority states/regions will be economi-
cally weaker given the current economic realities. For a federal model to work in 
our context, the federal state should have ultimate say in economic matters includ-
ing the ability to overturn the policies and legislation of the states. Other risks 
include the fact that it will be impossible to create regions that are homogenous: 
there will always be a minority. Similarly, language presents a serious challenge: 
Would the regions be allowed to choose just one language for administration and 
service provision? In addition to these particular challenges that federalism would 
Frameworks for a One-State Option    245
present, almost all of the challenges and risks discussed under binationalism are 
relevant when we consider federalism.
Given the nature of federalism and the risks in this model, there are important 
questions related to the compatibility of the model with the principles discussed 
above. While in theory the model could be accompanied by assurances regard-
ing equality, comparative studies show its weakness when it comes to redistribu-
tion and inequality. Similarly, even though it satisfies the requirements related 
to group rights, it runs the risk of putting too much emphasis on group identity 
and group political power in a manner that might intensify tensions. The tendency 
to preserve the status quo that comparative studies associate with federalism could 
also cast some doubt about the ability of the state to implement transitional justice 
schemes or make changes in the context of decolonization.
HUMAN RIGHT S
The protection of human rights through an enforceable constitutional bill of 
rights has become an important feature of peaceful settlement of protracted eth-
nic/national conflict since the 1990s.43 The Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa is a good example. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was 
adopted as an annex to the Dayton Agreement, integrated the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and its protocols. The European Convention on Human 
Rights also played a role in the Good Friday Agreements in Northern Ireland.
One of the main debates in constitutional law and constitutional theory con-
cerns judicially enforceable bills of rights, which give the judiciary the power to 
review legislation. Judicial review of legislation raises a number of problems. The 
rationale behind judicial review is that the legislature, as an organ of the state cre-
ated and bound by the constitution, acts within its powers only when its actions 
do not violate the principles of the constitution, including the bill of rights. The 
problem arises when the legislative body is democratically elected. Here the con-
flict is between democracy, represented by the democratically elected parliament, 
and the idea of constitutionalism—the idea that powers of the state are limited by 
the constitution.
This debate has been one of the central debates in constitutional law, especially 
Anglo-American constitutional thought.44 While cogent arguments are presented 
by both sides, the main question that concerns us here is the possible role that 
a bill of rights could play in the one-state model, and the desirability of such an 
approach. Some of the arguments in the debate on judicial review could be helpful. 
One of the most spirited opponents of judicial review is the constitutional theorist 
Jeremy Waldron. Waldron argues that judicial review is illegitimate from a demo-
cratic point of view, and that democratically elected legislatures are better suited to 
protect rights. His argument, however, is qualified: it is conditional upon satisfying 
a number of assumptions. Waldron’s assumptions are
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(1) democratic institutions in reasonably good working order, including a represen-
tative legislature elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage; (2) a set of judicial 
institutions, again in reasonably good order, set up on a nonrepresentative basis to 
hear individual lawsuits, settle disputes, and uphold the rule of law; (3) a commit-
ment on the part of most members of the society and most of its officials to the idea 
of individual and minority rights; and (4) persisting, substantial, and good faith dis-
agreement about rights (i.e., about what the commitment to rights actually amounts 
to and what its implications are) among the member of the society who are commit-
ted to the idea of rights.45
While the aspiration is to satisfy all these criteria, it is hard to anticipate whether 
this would be achieved in our case, especially in the transitional period. If they 
were not achieved, even according to the strongest arguments against judicial 
review, a bill of rights would be necessary.
Tom Ginsburg advances the theory that bills of rights serve as a form of politi-
cal insurance in the context of transitions to democracy.46 Hegemonic groups or 
parties who anticipate losing their control over the political system as a result of 
the democratic redistribution of political power are interested in being able to 
access a forum where they can challenge the legislature. In our context, where we 
have two large groups, and where it is not entirely clear which group will consti-
tute a majority in the electoral sense (although it is expected that the number of 
Palestinians will increase if a significant number of refugees decide to return), this 
insurance model of judicial review could be helpful for both parties. In constitu-
tional negotiations between the groups, each group would highlight and insist on 
constitutional protection of the issues that are of utmost interest for them.
One principle that should be given prominent status in the bill of rights is equal-
ity. Equality is the main guiding principle for any settlement based on a single state 
(regardless of the model adopted). In this context, the South African constitution 
provides a good example to follow: equality is mentioned in the preamble and in 
section 1, which can be amended only with a three-quarters majority of members 
of Parliament, and is also protected as part of the bill of rights. Equality should also 
be understood in the context of the conflict. The approach to equality should be 
one that is informed by decolonization and one that would allow for and even 
promote transitional justice and affirmative action. It should, for example, allow 
and facilitate measures such as land restitution and reparations.
Constitutional protection should not be limited to civil and political rights only. 
Social and economic rights should also be protected constitutionally. In a reality of 
deep social and economic inequality, the protection of social and economic rights 
is especially important in order to guarantee equality as well as the ability to partic-
ipate in redistributive projects that can help redress economic inequalities. Beyond 
these fundamental ideas about the importance of social and economic rights, 
pragmatic factors also militate in favor of providing protection for such rights: the 
weaker (and more numerous) citizens will have an interest in the success of such 
a settlement.
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EPILO GUE
The different models examined in this chapter show that the one-state solution 
is not necessarily one concrete idea. A variety of models could fit under this cat-
egory, and each model’s efficacy, potential, risks, and pitfalls depend to a very 
large extent on the details of its structure and implementation. As we saw, some 
models are more desirable and more amenable to addressing the important chal-
lenges, while others may end up recreating similar problems and even introducing 
new ones. The primary conclusion is that a number of models exist that could be 
described as democratic, and each model has its promises and risks. The hard task 
here is deciding which option to adopt. It is therefore very important, as a starting 
point for thinking about constitutional design, to have a clear  understanding of 
the problems and challenges that need to be addressed, as well as a clear vision of 
future objectives to be achieved by the constitution. While some of these  challenges 
and objectives were discussed in the first part of this chapter, these are inevitably 
intertwined with the social, political, historical, and economic questions discussed 
elsewhere in this book. The constitutional model should not be seen as an end, but 
rather a means to address challenges and achieve social and political ends.
The harder questions, therefore, are not the questions about what is legally 
desirable or what are the best practices in relation to constitutional design, but 
rather questions that go to the core of the political project that is being sought, 
namely decolonization, equality, and/or justice. The nature of the political  project 
sought will dictate whether the constitution facilitates the political goals or hin-
ders them. A constitution may include many clauses dealing with democracy, 
human dignity, diversity, and human rights and other concepts which sound very 
desirable when put on paper and discussed by jurists. But these ideas and concepts 
should go beyond debates among lawyers and elites and should also become the 
local currency of the population, as this is the ultimate test for the success of any 
postpartition constitutional design in Israel-Palestine. For this to happen the pop-
ulation should be able to see that the constitution is addressing its concerns and 
facilitating its political project of decolonization and guaranteed equality for all.
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Between Two States and One
Palestinian Citizens of Israel
Maha Nassar
While numerous studies have examined the impact that the Oslo Accords and 
subsequent Israeli-Palestinian talks have had on Palestinians in the Occupied Ter-
ritories, less attention has been paid to how the Oslo process affected the lives 
and political horizons of Palestinian citizens of Israel (also known as ’48 Pales-
tinians and Palestinians inside the Green Line). In large part this is because the 
Oslo Accords—and before that, the declaration of Palestinian statehood in 1988—
excluded this group from the Palestinian national agenda. As a result, during the 
1990s many Palestinian citizens sought to assimilate into Israeli society, assuming 
that the Oslo talks would solve the conflict in the form of a two-state solution 
and that their future lay within the Israeli state. But the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa 
Intifada in 2000, along with the steady rightward shift of the Israeli political land-
scape, forced Palestinians inside the Green Line to revisit many of their previously 
held beliefs about possible solutions to the conflict.
While recent polls of ’48 Palestinians show that a majority still believe a two-
state solution is the best proposal for solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, a 
growing number of Palestinian intellectuals and activists inside the Green Line 
are calling into question the fundamental premises of the two-state solution.1 The 
development of these positions should be understood within a broader historical 
context of political debates among ’48 Palestinians that goes back to the founding 
of the Israeli state. Despite living under restrictive military rule until 1966 and fac-
ing isolation from the Arab world, Palestinian political activists and intellectuals 
inside the Green Line have engaged in rich political discussions about their posi-
tion within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and especially their relationship to their 
fellow Palestinians beyond the Green Line. While decolonization was a common 
thread in these discussions, the two dominant Palestinian political formations in 
Israel—the communist camp and the nationalist camp—had differing notions of 
how decolonization should be understood in the Israeli context. In this chapter, I 
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argue that these historical discussions shape the political landscape today, espe-
cially with regard to the debates over one- and two-state solutions. I also show how 
Israel’s shift since the 1990s toward emphasizing its Jewish character has led many 
Palestinians in Israel to adjust their earlier, more optimistic views of Oslo. Finally, 
I lay out some of the alternatives to the two-state solution that are being proposed 
among Palestinians in Israel, along with the challenges they face.
PALESTINIAN POLITICS UNTIL 1967 :  
THE C OMMUNIST AND NATIONALIST CAMPS 
Since 1948, the main oppositional Palestinian forces in Israel largely have largely 
fallen into two dominant camps: a communist camp and a nationalist camp. The 
communist camp was represented by the Israeli Communist Party (ICP), which 
has consistently emphasized Jewish-Arab class solidarity and cooperation and, 
until 1991, hewed closely to the Soviet Union’s official positions on all matters for-
eign and domestic. The ICP was known by its Hebrew acronym, Maki, until 1965, 
when it split along national lines into a predominantly Jewish Maki party and a 
new, predominantly Arab party that took the Hebrew acronym Rakah.
During the first several decades of the state, the ICP was the only legal, 
 non-Zionist party in Israel that allowed Arabs and Jews to be equals. Members 
of the communist camp adopted broad concepts of decolonization that empha-
sized the need for everyone to live in peace and equality.2 They further argued 
that the Zionist underpinnings of the state led Israel into the lap of imperialist 
powers, and they denounced the numerous discriminatory policies against the 
 Palestinians who remained within the Green Line, arguing that they were not in 
keeping with Israel’s democratic claims.3 But it was not an anti-Zionist party: 
in keeping with Soviet ideology, the ICP recognized the state of Israel and did not 
question the fundamental legitimacy of Israel’s founding. And although it earned 
the ire of Israeli leaders, as a legal political party it was allowed to operate. That 
included participating in Knesset elections, where the ICP ran lists with alternat-
ing Jewish and Arab names. While the party only held one to three seats in any 
given Knesset, it served as a venue in which MKs such as Emile Habibi and Tawfiq 
Tubi could raise uncomfortable issues about Israel’s mistreatment of Palestinians 
from the dais.4
In contrast to the communists’ general calls for decolonization around the 
world, members of the Arab nationalist camp adopted decolonization dis-
courses that were more vociferously anti-Zionist than those of their communist 
 counterparts. They questioned whether Israel could ever truly be both Jewish 
and democratic, thus sowing doubt about the legitimacy of the state. They identi-
fied more openly with Arab decolonization movements, especially the pan-Arab 
(qawmi) nationalist expressions of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, and they 
argued that for Palestinians inside the Green Line to be truly free, they needed to 
be part of a pan-Arab, Nasser-led, unified formation.5
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Given the Israeli leadership’s fears of Arab nationalism, Palestinian activists in 
Israel who expressed such viewpoints had much less political room in which to 
maneuver. Israeli government and establishment figures claimed that by openly 
siding with Israel’s enemies, those activists posed an existential threat to the state. 
Moreover, with the vast majority of pre-1948 Palestinian national figures and insti-
tutions uprooted, and with the communist leadership taking a dim view of their 
positions, nationalist-minded Palestinians had very few venues in which they 
could express their ideas publicly. Yet Arab nationalist views had wide appeal, 
as evidenced during the brief appearance of the Ard (Land) group in 1959–60. 
Leaders of the Ard group were unabashedly Nasserist and pan-Arab nationalist, as 
demonstrated in their series of wildly popular single-issue papers, issued between 
October 1959 and January 1960, that lauded Egyptian president Gamal Abdel 
Nasser and stressed their desire for pan-Arab unity.6 The communists opposed 
both these positions, arguing that the best way forward was to bring Jewish Israelis 
around to the belief that they could abandon certain elements of Jewish privi-
lege while maintaining Israel as a Jewish state. The communists did not attack the 
nationalists directly, given the strong popular support they enjoyed, but the ICP 
leadership quietly seethed at the nationalists, believing that they undermined the 
communists’ attempts to reassure Jewish Israelis that allowing for equality with 
Palestinians would not pose an existential threat to the state.7
As the Palestinian national movement began to gain traction in the mid-
1960s, Arab nationalists in Israel who affirmed their connection to the Palestinian 
people ran further afoul of the government. In 1964 Ard leaders applied for for-
mal state recognition as an association—a request that inherently signaled their 
 recognition of the Israeli state. But their proposed articles of association stated 
in part that their group was aimed at “finding a just solution for the Palestinian 
problem, through its consideration as an indivisible unit—in accordance with the 
wish of the Palestinian Arab people.”8 The language of the clause bore a striking 
resemblance to Articles 3 and 4 of the PLO’s Palestinian National Charter, signal-
ing that there were Palestinians in Israel who were not reconciled to their per-
petual minoritization within the Jewish state. The Israeli government denied the 
group’s petition—a denial that the Israeli High Court ultimately upheld.9 The fall 
of the Ard movement demonstrated that the Israeli authorities would not toler-
ate discursive framings that tied Palestinians in Israel to the Palestinian people 
as a whole, even if those framings were carefully worded in a way that accepted 
the Israeli state as a fait accompli. That experience would shape the work of sub-
sequent intellectuals and activists, especially as the political landscape gradually 
opened up after the 1967 war.
This brief examination of the Palestinian political landscape in Israel prior to 
1967 shows the spaces—and limits—of oppositional political discourse in Israel. 
While the communists adopted a language of decolonization that denounced, 
often vehemently, Israeli policies that discriminated against Palestinians and put 
Israel in league with imperialist forces, they did not question the legitimacy of the 
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state itself. As a result, although they faced restrictions and attacks from the Israeli 
authorities, they nonetheless continued to operate as a sanctioned political party.
In contrast, the Palestinian Arab nationalists—especially those organized 
around the Ard movement—adopted a language of decolonization that criticized 
Israel at a more fundamental level, denouncing Israel’s Zionist underpinnings as 
inherently discriminatory. While these activists offered de facto recognition of the 
state, Israeli authorities saw their calls for pan-Arab unity and Palestinian self-
determination as too close to Palestinian nationalist rhetoric. As a result, Arab 
nationalists faced more severe punishment from the Israeli state and were not 
allowed to maneuver as freely as were the communists. The 1967 war and the rise 
of the Palestinian nationalist movement further enhanced these differences.
1967–1987 :  THE T WO-STATE DEBATE
The June 1967 war and the rise of the Palestinian resistance movement dramati-
cally altered the political landscape of Palestinians inside the Green Line. Israeli 
officials grew alarmed at the rise in apprehensions of young men seeking to join 
the resistance, especially after the PLO’s famous stance at Karamah in March 
1968.10 Ard leaders Sabri Jiryis and Habib Qahwaji also went into exile in 1969 
and 1970, respectively, further signaling the perceived threat that Palestinian Arab 
nationalism posed to the state.11
For the Palestinian communist Rakah party, the crackdowns on the  nationalists 
and the positions of the Soviet Union led them to emphasize the so-called ’67 
issues, of occupation and settlements in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East 
 Jerusalem, rather than the so-called ’48 issues, of Israeli colonization of historic 
Palestine and the return of refugees. The party strongly denounced Israel’s land 
grab during and after the June 1967 war as illegal. After UN Security Council 
 Resolution 242 was passed in November 1967, calling on Israel to withdraw from 
territories it had occupied in the war, Rakah leaders frequently invoked this reso-
lution as a basis for solving the conflict. Party leaders also strongly denounced the 
treatment of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, reporting regularly on viola-
tions of human rights and international law.12 For Rakah, these positions were in 
keeping with the language of decolonization that it had advocated in earlier years.
But Rakah’s focus on decolonizing the lands occupied in 1967 was at odds with 
the Palestinian national movement in exile, which stressed the need to decolo-
nize all of historic Palestine. Thus, Rakah was critical of the Palestinian resistance 
movement, as well as the broader Palestinian consensus that armed struggle was 
necessary for the goal of liberating all of Palestine. By recognizing that the Israeli 
people had national rights to a homeland within the Green Line, by focusing only 
on territorial disputes in the 1967 territories, and by refusing to unequivocally 
call for the right of return of Palestinian refugees, Rakah adopted positions that 
diverged sharply from the Palestinian consensus at the time.13
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Yet even these positions carried a heavy political cost inside Israel. Several of 
Rakah’s political and cultural leaders were placed under house arrest for years 
following the 1967 war, while others were subjected to a sunset-to-sunrise cur-
few.14 Such measures were aimed at limiting the reach of Palestinian activists in 
Israel who were critical of the state’s policies in the Occupied Territories and its 
repression of Palestinian activists within the Green Line. Despite these oppressive 
measures, Rakah’s history of political organizing and institution-building, coupled 
with a political maneuverability that the nationalists did not enjoy, allowed the 
party to gain steady support over the following years. But a new nationalist chal-
lenge would soon emerge.
During the early 1970s, a new awakening of nationalist thought emerged among 
younger Palestinian intellectuals living inside the Green Line. They had grown up 
under Israeli rule and were frustrated by the rampant discrimination and inequal-
ity they faced. But they were also increasingly aware of Palestinian decoloniza-
tion discourses that were more uncompromising than before and that took into 
account what had happened to the Palestinians in 1948. For many, this nationalist 
rhetoric was more attractive than Rakah’s calls for joint Arab-Jewish cooperation 
and its refusal to endorse armed struggle. Additional social and economic factors, 
such as greater employment opportunities in Israel’s flourishing economy and a 
rise in the number of students who were finishing high school and attending col-
lege, led many younger intellectuals to feel a greater sense of independence.15
Some of these younger, bolder nationalists also grew more vocal in their 
criticism of Rakah, arguing that its refusal to examine critically the founda-
tions of the Israeli state and its emphasis on Arab-Jewish cooperation “enabled 
the  assimilation, as Israelis, of Arabs in the state.”16 In response to this growing 
desire to emphasize their identity as Palestinians, in 1972 several activists based 
in the central triangle town of Um al-Fahm formally declared the establishment of 
the Abna’ al-Balad (Sons of the Village) movement. With a mix of Arab nationalists 
and former communists of various strains, members of Abna’ al-Balad had many 
different ideological orientations, but they came together around a dual platform 
of “affirmation of the Palestinian identity among the Arab people in Israel” and 
“opposition to the communist party.”17
Since Abna’ al-Balad’s members opposed participating in Knesset elections, 
they did not pose a direct electoral threat to Rakah. But they constituted a fun-
damental challenge to key Rakah ideological positions. Since 1967 Rakah had 
emphasized that Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories was the first 
and most necessary step towards the establishment of a Palestinian state in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. At the same time, they demanded collective and indi-
vidual equal rights as Palestinian Israeli citizens. Therefore, while Rakah endorsed 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people, the party did not agree that the PLO represented Palestinians 
in Israel. In contrast, Abna’ al-Balad rejected the idea of a Palestinian state in the 
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West Bank and Gaza Strip as defeatist. They also argued that “the PLO is the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people .  .  . which constitutes a 
single entity, wherever it may be.” Thus, “any settlement of the Palestinian question 
must include an official recognition and international guarantees of the national 
rights of the Palestinians who live . . . in Israel as well.”18 In short, Abna’ al-Balad 
saw itself “as part of the Palestinian national enterprise, which [strove] to establish 
one Palestinian state on all the Palestinian lands.”19
Yet even Rakah’s emphasis on ending the occupation and withdrawing 
from Palestinian lands was met with fear in many Israeli circles. By 1975 some 
on the Israeli right were calling for Rakah and its activities to be outlawed. More 
liberal Israelis warned that this would be a mistake, arguing that Rakah repre-
sented “a relatively moderate Arab nationalism” and was “a safety valve for Arabs 
in Israel, protecting them from slipping into extremist nationalism.”20 These Israeli 
fears had a direct bearing on the political calculations of Palestinian activists in 
the country, who worried constantly that if they crossed a discursive red line, they 
would be banned, as the Ard movement had been a decade earlier.
There were also more urgent pressures at home, including systematic discrimi-
nation against Palestinian citizens and the confiscation of their land. In response 
to these pressures, Rakah and Abna’ al-Balad joined forces in March 1976 to orga-
nize a general strike and coordinate a series of large demonstrations that collec-
tively became known as Land Day. The massive turnout, coupled with widespread 
outrage over the police killings of six unarmed protesters, led to greater politiciza-
tion among Palestinians inside the Green Line.21 At the same time, this increased 
political awareness among Palestinian citizens made the ongoing debates between 
the communists and nationalists all the more visible.
These tensions were especially palpable among youth groups and university 
students, who were debating with each other the possible solutions to the Palestin-
ian-Israeli conflict and the fate of the ’48 Palestinians. In fall 1976, Fouzi El-Asmar, 
a ’48 Palestinian poet and former Ard member who returned for a time to his 
homeland after spending several years in the United States, captured the two sides 
of this debate:
I heard from a number of people with whom I talked during my stay in the country 
that Communist political education of Arab youth encourages them to accept the 
status of an Arab minority in Israel with Israeli identities. A leader of the [Rakah] 
party explained this logic as follows: “When the Palestinian state is established 
alongside its sister Israeli state, we shall remain an Arab minority in Israel. Chang-
ing this situation will take generations and it may never change. The best thing is to 
raise our new generation with this perspective, for in the future it will help them in 
keeping their identity intact.”22
But El-Asmar also observed that not everyone shared the assumption that a 
 Palestinian state would (or should) be established. He cited one student journalist 
who wrote,
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If we suppose that a Palestinian state is established in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip, then the Palestinians living inside Israel proper will remain as a persecuted 
minority. On the other hand, all those Palestinians who were kicked out of their 
homes in 1948 will move from their current refugee camps to other camps set up 
for them on the West Bank and Gaza. Subsequently their status will change but little. 
If such a solution is carried out it will solve the problem of only one segment of the 
Palestinians, namely the ones who have lived for generations on the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. The solution to the Palestinian issue will come about only with the estab-
lishment of a state after the return of all the Palestinian refugees to their homes. The 
new state should be a state concerned with individual welfare, emphasizing collective 
humanity and not racial distinctions.23
Thus, while Rakah leaders defended their support for a Palestinian state in terms 
of pragmatism, their nationalist critics argued that a two-state solution—even if it 
were to come to fruition—would not address the ongoing oppression of the Pales-
tinians living as a minority in Israel. For these nationalists, the best solution was a 
single democratic state that would be free of ethnonational preferences.
Throughout the mid-to-late 1970s the nationalists’ position was more popu-
lar among university students, as evidenced by the consistent victories of Abna’ 
 al-Balad’s student arm, the National Progressive Movement, in student govern-
ment elections.24 But Abna’ al-Balad’s firm position against participating in 
 Knesset elections, coupled with restrictions it faced from the Israeli authorities, 
ultimately limited the impact it could have in the larger political sphere. In its 
absence, communist and other progressive parties that favored a two-state solu-
tion soon dominated the national political arena. The largest was the Democratic 
Front of Peace and Equality (DFPE—also known by its Hebrew acronym, Hadash, 
and its Arabic shorthand, Jabha). Comprised of Rakah members and noncommu-
nist activists, it won 50 percent of the Palestinian vote when it first ran in the 1977 
Knesset elections. In 1983 it was joined by the Progressive List for Peace (PLP), led 
by attorney and former Rakah activist Muhammad Mi’ari, which included radical 
Jewish leftists and former Abna’ al-Balad members who disagreed with the lead-
ership’s refusal to participate in Knesset elections.25 The DFPE and the PLP were 
bitter rivals and campaigned harshly against each other in the 1984 Knesset elec-
tions. But when it came to their positions on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, their 
positions were virtually identical. Both supported the establishment of a Palestin-
ian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip alongside Israel, and both called for 
mutual recognition by Israel and the PLO of each other’s right to self-determina-
tion, which was to be achieved through direct negotiations between Israel and the 
PLO.26 In the 1984 elections the PLP received 18 percent of the Arab vote while the 
DFPE received 33 percent, totaling 51 percent of the Arab vote.27 Abna’ al-Balad 
continued to support a single democratic state in all of historic Palestine, but by 
the late-1980s the emergence of a Palestinian and regional consensus around two 
states pushed it to the margins, leading it to recede from the political scene.28
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By the eve of the First Intifada, the political consensus among the dominant 
Palestinian political parties in Israel rested on the following pillars: “(1) support 
for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip under PLO leadership; 
(2) full equality for Palestinian citizens of Israel; (3) that all political acts would 
be within the constraints of Israeli law.”29 But the political consensus of ’48 
 Palestinians as a whole was not as clear-cut. In a nationally representative poll 
of the Palestinian minority taken by Israeli pollsters in December 1987, only 
28 percent of respondents preferred the establishment of a Palestinian state along-
side Israel, while 33 percent opted for a binational state, and 10 percent wished to 
see a Palestinian state in all of historic Palestine.30 But in the same survey, when 
asked to rank their options for “realistic expectations,” 78 percent of respondents 
favored “the establishment of a Palestinian state in the Occupied Territories with 
no modifications to the 1967 borders.”31
In short, the transformation of the PLO’s position towards an acceptance of the 
two-state solution shifted the balance of power among Palestinian factions inside 
the Green Line, lending greater weight to those who argued in favor of establishing 
a Palestinian state alongside Israel. The transformations brought about by the First 
Intifada and the Palestinian Declaration of Independence would soon solidify the 
political consensus around the two-state solution.
1988–2000 :  THE T WO-STATE C ONSENSUS
The First Intifada, which broke out in December 1987, brought renewed interna-
tional attention to the plight of the Palestinians living under Israeli occupation in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It also gave new urgency to their demand for state-
hood in the Occupied Territories. That urgency, coupled with the PLO’s desire to 
stay relevant in a rapidly changing international environment, led it to formalize 
what had been its de facto stance for several years.
In November 1988, the Palestine National Council (the PLO’s highest 
 decision-making body) adopted a series of resolutions, including a Palestin-
ian Declaration of Independence that formalized its vision of a comprehensive 
 two-state solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.32 While the Declaration of 
Independence did not specify the borders of the Palestinian state, the follow-up 
political communiqué called for “the withdrawal of Israel from all the Palestin-
ian and Arab territories it occupied in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem,” and “the 
annulment of all measures of annexation and appropriation and the removal 
of settlements established by Israel in the Palestinian and Arab territories since 
1967.”33 No mention was made in either the Declaration of Independence or in the 
follow-up political communiqué of the Palestinians inside the Green Line.
By formally adopting a two-state formulation, the PLO’s new policy pri-
oritized the aspirations of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
effectively excising the ’48 Palestinians from the Palestinian national project. 
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As a result, the Intifada and the PNC resolutions “resurrected the Green Line in 
the consciousness of both Palestinian communities.”34 For Palestinians inside the 
Green Line, the PLO’s Declaration of Independence and recognition of Israel sent 
a clear message that their political path would necessitate adopting a program that 
differed significantly from that of Palestinians under occupation.
As a result, many Palestinians concluded that their future lay within the Israeli 
state, and that integrating into the Israeli state would not harm the Palestinian 
cause.35 In the 1992 Knesset elections, for the first time in nearly twenty years, 
a majority of Palestinian voters (53%) voted for Zionist parties, and five Arab 
 Knesset members joined the Labor and Meretz parties to form a coalition gov-
ernment. But while the Rabin government loosened some of the laws restricting 
freedom of expression and accepted the establishment of some Palestinian social 
organizations in Israel, it made no meaningful concessions to the Palestinians 
citizens’ more substantive demands regarding political and economic equality. In 
other words, a large number of Palestinian leaders in Israel were co-opted by the 
Israeli government without achieving material improvements in the conditions of 
their communities.36
Therefore, by the time the Declaration of Principles was signed in September 
1993, Palestinian citizens of Israel had already been conditioned to believe that a 
two-state arrangement was the best solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and 
that they needed to stake their political claims within the Israeli state. Rather than 
marking a watershed moment, the Oslo Accords in many ways marked a return to 
earlier calls to integrate ’48 Palestinians into the Israeli body politic, albeit in ways 
that severed them from Palestinians across the Green Line. The early- to mid-1990s 
saw Israeli government policies that allowed greater freedom of movement and 
expression, while Zionist parties (especially Labor and Meretz) sought to expand 
their “Arab sectors.” In response, many Palestinian citizens became  convinced that 
waiting for a comprehensive solution to the Palestine issue was futile and began 
undertaking acts that were once deemed unthinkable, such as joining Israeli mili-
tary service, celebrating Israeli Independence Day (including raising the Israeli 
flag), and appearing with Israeli Jewish symbols in art, sport, cultural, and political 
venues.37 Palestinian citizens who participated in these activities argued that with 
the PLO engaged in direct talks with Israel, it was only a matter of time before an 
independent Palestinian state would be established in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, Israel’s security concerns would be alleviated, and they would therefore be 
able to enjoy full integration and equality within the Israeli state. They would soon 
be disappointed.
The PLO’s recognition of Israel effectively took off the table the question of 
 Israel’s right to exist, at least within the Green Line. With that matter settled, a 
discursive shift took place within Israeli society, whereby Jewish Israelis began 
to emphasize the state’s Jewish character more clearly than before. While the 
Israeli right had stressed Israel’s Jewishness for decades, the formulation of Israel 
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as a  Jewish state was now articulated increasingly by the Zionist left, which had 
 previously sidestepped questions about Israel’s ethnic character. In other words, 
“the Oslo political climate legitimized ethnic conceptions of the state . . . allowing 
the Left to be vocal about its stance on Israel’s Jewish essence.”38 The Zionist left’s 
growing emphasis on Israel’s Jewish character, even as it was trying to recruit Pal-
estinian citizens into the Israeli body politic, highlighted the limits of assimilation-
ism for Palestinians living inside the Green Line.
This discursive shift also led some Palestinian activists to conclude that the 
communist-led DFPE and other existing Arab parties were insufficiently prepared 
to address these changing political conditions. The notion that Palestinian  citizens 
could be assimilated into Israel as full and equal citizens by working with the 
Zionist left (a key stance of the DFPE and its supporters) did not accord with 
the Zionist left’s own shift towards privileging Israel’s character as a Jewish state. 
Concerned by the growing push towards assimilating Palestinian citizens in ways 
that stripped them of their Palestinian identity, several former Abna’ al-Balad 
activists decided to create a movement that would affirm their people’s indivisibil-
ity from the Palestinian people, while simultaneously utilizing the political tools 
available to them as Israeli citizens. As former Abna’ al-Balad leader Awad Abdel 
Fattah explained, “For the first time we [as a group] decided to take our citizenship 
seriously, but in combination with our nationalist identity. Because even if you 
call for equality, without focusing on adhering to the nationalist identity and 
aspirations, I think you’ll get nowhere. You’ll get civil rights, but you won’t get 
national rights.”39
In 1995 Abdel Fattah and several Palestinian nationalists and former commu-
nists established the National Democratic Assembly (NDA) party (also known by 
its Arabic name, Hizb al-Tajammu‘ al-Watani, and its Hebrew acronym, Balad). 
According to NDA leader ‘Azmi Bishara, one of their key concerns was what 
they called the accelerating “process of Israelization,” by which they meant “the 
marginalization of Palestinians in Israeli society and a gradual joining of Zionist 
parties.”40 Having accepted the two-state solution as the international and local 
consensus at the time, the NDA demanded equal rights for Palestinians within 
Israel at both the civic and—more importantly—national levels. In doing so, the 
party challenged the trend toward characterizing Israel as a Jewish state, adopting 
instead a platform that called for Israel to be “a state of all its citizens.”41
The NDA’s debut onto the political scene came at a time when hopes that the 
Oslo process would bring about both a truly independent Palestinian state on 
the 1967 lines and a collective improvement to the lives of Palestinians in Israel 
were already starting to dim. In October 1995, one month before his  assassination, 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin reassured fellow Knesset members that the 
 Palestinians’ hoped-for state would be “an entity which is less than a state,” while 
the permanent borders of Israel would be “beyond the lines which existed 
before the Six Day War,” and would encompass a “united Jerusalem, which will 
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include both Ma’ale Adumim and Givat Ze’ev [settlements], as the capital of Israel, 
under Israeli sovereignty.”42 Not only did a truly sovereign Palestinian state seem 
further away than ever, but most of the economic improvements and legal changes 
that would have put Palestinian citizens of Israel on equal footing with Jewish 
Israelis did not come to fruition.43
Seeking to highlight these concerns, the NDP ran in the 1996 Knesset elections 
for the first time, joining with DFPE in order to meet the threshold of votes. These 
elections also saw the debut of the United Arab List (UAL, or al-Qa’ima al-‘arabiyya 
al-muwahhada, also known by its Hebrew acronym, Ra’am), which was comprised 
of members of the southern branch of the Islamic movement and ran on a joint 
list with the Arab Democratic Party (ADP, or al-Hizb al-‘arabi al-dimuqrati). 
Both the NDP-Hadash and the UAL-ADP lists called for the establishment of an 
independent Palestinian state on the 1967 lines and stressed equality for Palestin-
ian citizens of Israel; they gained three and four Knesset seats, respectively. But 
their demands received little attention in the Knesset, especially as newly elected 
Likud Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu formed coalitions with far-right and 
religious Zionist parties whose leaders had loudly denounced both the Oslo talks 
and the integration of Palestinian citizens into Israel. Palestinian citizens in turn 
became increasingly skeptical that assimilation into Israel, even on Israeli terms, 
would lead to greater equality.
Building on that skepticism, the NDA began floating the idea of a binational 
state. In 1997, NDA leader and Knesset member ‘Azmi Bishara predicted that 
“when it becomes apparent that an independent and democratic state occupying 
every inch of the West Bank and Gaza Strip free of Israeli settlements is not real-
izable either in this generation or the next, it will be time for the Palestinians to 
reexamine their entire strategy. We then will begin to discuss a binational state 
solution that will do away with the system of ethnic discrimination that is in place 
now.” Pressed further, Bishara elaborated:
It means that the Palestinians in the territories and the Palestinians in Israel will form 
a single political unit within a binational state. There will be a Jewish political unit 
and a Palestinian-Arab political unit, which together will constitute a Jewish-Arab 
polity with two separate legislative chambers as well as a common parliament. I be-
lieve this must become our demand in the future. I am not referring to a democratic 
secular state but to a binational state, a federal or confederal system comprising two 
ethnonational communities. Only in such a context will it be possible to resolve such 
problems as the refugees and the settlements. Settlements no longer will pose an 
insurmountable obstacle within the context of a single binational state: If the Israelis 
should choose to settle in the West Bank, then so be it; we, too, will have the right to 
set up residence in Jaffa, for instance.44
Bishara’s early forays into discussions of binationalism came at a time when the 
Palestinian political consensus in Israel still stressed the need to work within 
the existing political parameters. In order to highlight the limits of those 
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 parameters, during the 1999 election campaign Bishara nominated himself for the 
position of Israeli prime minister, knowing that he did not have a chance of win-
ning. The move garnered much media attention and offered Bishara a platform 
to highlight the fundamental lack of equality in Israel and to call for a shift to 
a binational state. In an interview Bishara stressed that it was still an academic 
discussion at that point, since no political momentum was mobilizing behind 
the idea, but he emphasized that this discussion was the first step toward a larger 
 movement.45 Bishara withdrew his nomination shortly before the election in the 
face of large-scale Palestinian mobilization to ensure that Netanyahu would be 
defeated by Labor candidate Ehud Barak. Barak campaigned on a slogan of “a state 
for all,” receiving 95 percent of the Palestinian vote as a result.46 But Barak’s refusal 
to take seriously any of the demands of Palestinian citizens led growing numbers 
of Palestinians inside the Green Line to wonder if the political calculations they 
had made during the 1990s were accurate.
Largely absent during this period of the “two-state consensus” were formula-
tions of Palestinian liberation that invoked the conceptual framework of decolo-
nization. The PLO leadership framed national liberation as the establishment of a 
Palestinian state in the 1967 territories, while the Palestinian political leadership 
inside the Green Line framed liberation as achieving true equality within the Israeli 
state. The question of what liberation meant for Palestinians in exile remained 
unaddressed beyond vague references to the right of return. But the violence and 
trauma of the next several years would lead Palestinian activists on both sides of 
the Green Line to reassess this absence in their political thinking and would lead 
some to reintroduce decolonization as a guiding conceptual framework.
THE SEC OND INTIFADA AND A RETURN  
TO DEC OLONIZING DISC OURSES
In the months before the Second Intifada broke out in September 2000, Pales-
tinian citizens of Israel continued to receive mixed messages as to whether they 
would be integrated into Israel as equals. In March, after a five-year legal ordeal, 
the Israeli High Court ruled that the Qa‘dan family could not be prevented from 
moving into the predominantly Jewish Katzir community just because they were 
Palestinian citizens. Even though the court’s ruling left plenty of room for the 
Katzir Community Cooperative to maneuver its way out of implementation, it 
nonetheless drew an outcry among Knesset members on the right who declared 
that the ruling marked “a black day for the Jewish people.”47
At the same time, ’48 Palestinians felt increasingly abandoned by the Labor 
Party. Prime Minister Barak refused to include any Arab parties as part of his 
coalition or to meet with the High Follow-Up Committee (the foremost repre-
sentative body of Palestinians in Israel) during his first several months in office. 
The collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian talks at Camp David II that summer, which 
Barak blamed solely on the Palestinians, furthered their disillusionment.
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By early September, tensions were already rising, not only between Palestin-
ian citizens and the Israeli state, but also between Palestinians under occupation 
and the Israeli military. Thus, when Likud Knesset member Ariel Sharon walked 
onto al-Haram al-Sharif (the Temple Mount) surrounded by a bevy of armed 
Israeli guards on September 28, the provocative move triggered Palestinian pro-
tests that erupted into the Second (Al-Aqsa) Intifada. Dozens of Palestinians were 
killed in the first days of the new uprising, including twelve-year-old Muhammad 
 al- Durrah, whose televised screams sparked international outcry. To protest the 
killings and signal support for their people on the other side of the Green Line, ’48 
Palestinians declared a general strike on October 1. During the protests that 
ensued over the following week, Israeli security forces killed thirteen unarmed 
Palestinians (twelve citizens of Israel and one from the West Bank). The killings 
were a major blow to those Palestinians who believed that their Israeli citizenship 
protected them from lethal force. They were also a severe blow to the argument 
that the future for Palestinians inside the Green Line lay in greater assimilation 
within Israel.
Following the killings, the Israeli government established the Orr Commis-
sion to examine the conditions of the Palestinian citizens of Israel. The commis-
sion’s final report, issued in September 2003, marked the first time that an official 
Israeli body acknowledged that the creation of Israel as a Jewish state had inher-
ently led to the unequal treatment of Palestinian citizens. The report’s introduction 
framed the ’48 Palestinians as an “indigenous minority” whose feelings of injustice 
were “fed by the obvious existence of collective rights for the Jewish [people].”48 
Yet despite this unprecedented acknowledgement by an official Israeli body, the 
report’s conclusion offered only vague recommendations.
As a result, the Orr Commission’s report did little to improve the conditions of 
Palestinians within the Green Line. Instead, the Israeli government, led by a series 
of far-right and center-right parties, passed laws that were even more discrimina-
tory against Palestinian citizens than in the past. In 2003, the Knesset passed an 
amendment to the Citizenship Law that prevented Palestinian citizens of Israel 
from bringing in their Palestinian spouses from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 
2007, the law was expanded to apply to spouses from the “enemy states” of Leba-
non, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.49
In part these laws were promulgated to try to counteract the rise of a new gen-
eration of more assertive Palestinian citizens who were emerging onto the polit-
ical scene. Born during the last quarter of the twentieth century, they came of 
age during the tumultuous years of the Second Intifada and had become “disillu-
sioned with the prospect of ever becoming equal citizens in Israel.”50 Rather, they 
became increasingly vocal in asserting their identity as Palestinians, including 
 spearheading collective actions that commemorated events significant to the Pal-
estinian people as a whole, including Nakba Day and Land Day.51 In doing so, they 
were part of a larger shift in Palestinian discourse and strategic thinking, one that 
sought to reframe Israeli-Palestinian relations in terms of colonialism—and more 
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specifically settler-colonialism—and that had longer lineages and wider implica-
tions than the “two-state solution” discourses.52
This renewed attention to the colonial paradigm emerged in three documents 
issued by Palestinian NGOs in Israel in 2006 and 2007 that laid out a vision of 
what the relationship between Palestinian citizens and the Israeli state should be. 
Two of the documents explicitly framed the issue in terms of colonialism: the 
Haifa Declaration described the Zionist movement as having initiated a “settler-
colonial project in Palestine,” while the Future Vision document described Israel 
as “executing internal colonial policies against its Palestinian Arab citizens.”53 
Though they differed slightly from one another in terms of the specific political 
entity they wished to see established, they stressed that “Israel should be a demo-
cratic binational state that guarantees full equality between Arabs and Jews within 
the Green Line.”54
Although the Vision Documents (as they were collectively known) formally 
recognized the state of Israel within the Green Line, they were nonetheless met 
with widespread hostility by Jewish Israelis, who could not countenance a nar-
rative of Israel’s foundation that differed so wildly from their own.55 Especially 
galling for many Israelis was the explicit positioning of the Palestinian citizens 
of Israel—along with the Palestinian people—as victims of Zionist and Israeli 
colonialism. Moreover, the documents were issued at a time in which more wide-
scale and organized commemoration of the Nakba by Palestinian groups within 
the Green Line, such as the Association for the Defense of Rights of Internally 
Displaced Persons, were taking place. In response, in 2011 the Knesset passed a 
“Nakba Law” that criminalized active commemorations of Palestinians’ displace-
ment by Israel in 1948, thereby indicating that the Israeli authorities, too, saw a 
link between commemorations of the Nakba and the shift towards a centering of 
decolonizing discourses.56
But the law had a limited effect in counteracting the rise of these decolonizing 
discourses. A year after it was passed, Palestinian citizens marked the Nakba with 
a general strike, symbolizing the growing salience of the Nakba as central to the 
“collective consciousness” of ’48 Palestinians.57 In short, the Nakba has emerged as 
one of the primary markers of the shift back to decolonizing discourses and along 
with it, a return to the idea that all of historic Palestine needs to be liberated from 
the Zionist project. While this view continued to gain traction over the following 
decade, not everyone agrees that it is the best way forward.
T WO STATES OR ONE?
Bishara’s 1997 prediction that Palestinians would start to call for a binational state 
once the two-state solution no longer seemed viable is gaining traction in some 
circles. With widespread decrees that the two-state solution is dead, some mem-
bers of the nationalist camp are thinking once again of alternative ways in which 
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Jews and Palestinians can live together equally in the area between the Jordan 
River and the Mediterranean Sea. In 2008, for example, Abna’ al-Balad introduced 
a revised political platform that has consistently reaffirmed its call for the estab-
lishment a single democratic state on all of Palestine.58
New initiatives are also emerging, such as the Popular Movement for One 
Democratic State on Historic Palestine, which was established in May 2013. Most 
of the group’s fifty-some members hail from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but 
it also includes leaders from Nazareth, along with Palestinians and Israelis living 
abroad. The Popular Movement argues that since there is already a one-state real-
ity characterized by Jewish Israeli supremacy, “establishing one democratic state 
on the land of historical (mandatory) Palestine, a democratic state for all its inhab-
itants, based on a democratic constitution, the values of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, which guarantee freedom, democracy and equality of rights 
without discrimination based on race, religion, gender, colour, language or politi-
cal or non-political opinion, national or social origin, wealth, place of birth or any 
other status—establishing this state is, indeed, a just and feasible solution for the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.”59
In response to these growing calls for a one-state solution, proponents of the 
two-state solution argue that it is not wise to abandon the goal of an indepen-
dent Palestinian state, especially after so much Palestinian political capital has 
been expended to gain international support for it. As DFPE leader Ayman Odeh 
explained in 2015:
I still believe that the most realistic and possible solution in the foreseeable future is 
the establishment of a Palestinian state in 1967, and I think it is a grave mistake to 
abandon this cause and go to the idea of a single state, because in practice we suc-
ceeded in persuading the whole world, as well as a slice within Israeli society, of the 
two-state solution. We cannot abandon it now and move on to talking about Haifa, 
Acre and Jaffa. We don’t have the constituency for that. I personally cannot say to 
my people who suffer from the occupation on a daily basis, “Wait for the one-state 
solution.”60
Odeh’s argument bears a striking resemblance to those of previous Palestinian 
communists regarding pragmatism and the expeditiousness of the two-state solu-
tion. But there is a key difference: by speaking of “my people” who suffer under 
occupation, he demonstrates a discursive shift in which there is no longer a dis-
tinction being made between Palestinians in Israel and Palestinians in the Occu-
pied Territories. According to Odeh, they are all one people whose futures are 
intertwined. This shift is important because it signals the success of the decolonial 
paradigm in positioning the Palestinians inside the Green Line as part of the Pal-
estinian people as a whole, with a shared future, despite the call for two states.
Odeh’s comments also indicate that while there is broad agreement that Pales-
tinians on both sides of the Green Line share a future together, there is little agree-
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ment on how to operationalize that sentiment through existing political struc-
tures. In a poll conducted in 2015, 56 percent of ’48 Palestinians and 55 percent 
of ’67 Palestinians wanted to see Palestinians inside the Green Line play a greater 
role in the Palestinian national movement.61 But when given several options for 
implementing this idea, there was no consensus. For example, while 73 percent 
of ’67 Palestinians saw a need for Palestinian citizens of Israel to have real repre-
sentation in Palestinian national political institutions, only 41 percent of Palestin-
ians inside the Green Line saw such a need.62
Part of the reluctance among some ’48 Palestinians to participate more robustly 
in Palestinian institutions is likely due to fears of Israeli punitive measures, given 
the state’s long history and ongoing rhetoric accusing Palestinians in Israel of 
being a fifth column. It is also likely related to their experiences fighting for rep-
resentation in Israeli institutions, which they would not want to give up. But we 
cannot overlook the role of the Palestinian national leadership’s own disarray and 
lack of engagement with the Palestinians inside the Green Line. While there have 
been some meetings between Palestinian MKs and various PLO and PA leaders 
over the last few decades, there has yet to emerge a clear articulation of how Pales-
tinians inside the Green Line fit into a broader, representative Palestinian national 
vision of the future. Nor has there been an accounting of how and why Palestinian 
citizens of Israel were excluded from the Oslo process in the first place.
This lack of accounting is also evident among the Palestinian leadership 
in Israel. In 2017, NDA Secretary General Mtanes Shehadeh called for a more 
critical appraisal of how the Palestinians’ initial support of the Oslo framework 
 undermined their project for greater equality in Israel while simultaneously 
marginalizing them from the Palestinian people as a whole. More important, he 
argued, was the need for Palestinians inside the Green Line to reassess the wis-
dom of trying to gain Palestinian liberation by working with the Zionist left: “Can 
a Zionist left that is part of a colonial project offer a solution that accords with 
the Palestinians’ natural rights? Do we support and stand by the Zionist left in 
 accordance with the political ceiling that it poses? [These are especially impor-
tant questions] since we are aware today that the Zionist left does not propose a 
project that is fundamentally  different from the Zionist right-wing project, but 
may differ to some extent from the religious-right settlement project.”63 Sheha-
deh’s placement of the Israeli left within the Israeli colonial structures that have 
impacted  Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line further indicates a more 
assertive discourse of decolonization among some ’48 Palestinians. His questions 
also draw attention to the changes that took place in the Israeli political landscape 
during the 1990s, after the PLO officially recognized Israel, in which the Israeli 
demand shifted to recognizing Israel as a Jewish state. As noted above, members 
of the Zionist left advocated for a two-state solution on the basis that it would 
preserve the Jewish and democratic character of the Israeli state. For Shehadeh, 
this solution is unacceptable because it amounts to a continuation of the Zionist 
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colonial project in which Palestinian citizens of Israel are relegated to permanent 
second-class status.
This more robust decolonizing rhetoric came at a time when Israel moved 
towards embracing its settler-colonialism even more clearly than before. Perhaps 
the clearest manifestation of this was the passage of the Jewish Nation-State Basic 
Law in July 2018. The law describes Israel as “the historic national home of the 
Jewish people,” a people that alone “exercises its natural, cultural, and historic right 
to self-determination.” Moreover, according to the law, “the state views the devel-
opment of Jewish settlement as a national value and will act to encourage it and 
to promote and to consolidate its establishment.”64 The law makes no mention of 
Palestinian citizens’ historic rights or connections to the land, thereby undermin-
ing claims that it is a democratic state. In addition, by refusing to define Israel’s 
borders yet encouraging Jewish settlement in “the Land of Israel,” the law provides 
legal cover for Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories, making the estab-
lishment of a viable, sovereign, contiguous Palestinian state impossible. Together, 
these two aspects of the Jewish Nation-State Basic Law have demonstrated to 
many Palestinian citizens that they will not be able to attain full equality in a Zion-
ist state of Israel, even if a Palestinian mini-state were to be established in parts of 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
In this climate of settler-colonial expansion, several proposals challenging the 
Oslo-based two-state consensus have been gaining ground. In addition to 
the Popular Movement for One Democratic State, which was launched in 2013, the 
One Democratic State Campaign (ODSC) has been holding planning meetings 
and plenary sessions since January 2018. Unlike its one-state predecessor, OSDC’s 
core members are primarily Palestinians and Jews based inside the Green Line, and 
one of its leaders, Awad Abdel Fattah, has a long history of nationalist  organizing 
as a former member of Abna’ al-Balad and the former NDA secretary general. The 
OSDC envisions a future in which, “within a constitutional democracy in which 
all citizens enjoy a common citizenship, one common parliament and thoroughly 
equal civil rights, constitutional protection would also be granted to national, eth-
nic or religious collectivities desiring to retain their various identities and cultural 
lives if they so choose.” Such a structure “allows people to move out of rigidly 
bounded ethnonational blocs into a more integrated, fluid and shared form of civil 
society.”65 These civil society groups are continuing to articulate their views, and 
while their advocates are heartened by the support they have received from Pales-
tinians and Jewish Israelis, they readily acknowledge that these positions are still 
in the minority, at least among Israeli Jews.
The greatest willingness to accept such proposals can be found among the 
Palestinians inside the Green Line. A December 2017 survey found support for 
a number of possible outcomes. While support for the traditional two-state 
 solution was strongest, at 83 percent, majorities also supported the idea of a 
one-state solution (59 percent) as well as a confederation arrangement with 
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Israel (70 percent).66 The results indicate a desire among ’48 Palestinians as a 
whole for a solution that would guarantee their political rights and those of their 
fellow Palestinians.
What is lacking is a consensus among the Palestinian leadership on both sides 
of the Green Line on how to move forward. As of this writing, Palestinian faction-
alism between Fatah and Hamas continues, with neither party able to overcome 
the structural impediments imposed by the Israeli occupation. As for the leader-
ship inside the Green Line, there was considerable optimism when the Joint List 
was formed in 2015 to run in Knesset elections, bringing together the DFPE, NDA, 
and other smaller parties. However, with the continued dominance of Likud and 
other right-wing parties in the Knesset, and in the absence of a deeper conversa-
tion about how best to move forward, the Joint List has not been able to do much 
in terms of moving toward a clear political vision. At the same time, some younger 
Palestinian activists and intellectuals are questioning the wisdom for directing so 
much energy toward seeking inclusion in the Israeli body politic. They argue (in 
language strikingly similar to that of Abna’ al-Balad in the 1970s) that focusing on 
electoral politics grants unwarranted legitimacy to the Israeli state and limits the 
political horizons of Palestinian citizens at a time when integration into Israel as 
equal is becoming evermore elusive.67
Even more elusive are the prospects for a viable Palestinian state, as Israel and 
the United States actively work to undermine any momentum toward full Pal-
estinian sovereignty. In October 2018 the Institute for National Security Studies 
(INSS) at Tel Aviv University published a “Political-Security Framework for the 
Israeli-Palestinian Arena” that envisioned a Palestinian “state” in a mere 65 per-
cent of the West Bank, excluding the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. Israel would 
“continue construction within the existing settlement blocs,” and no settlers would 
be forcibly removed.68 In January 2020 the Trump administration proposed a Pal-
estinian “state” that would have neither contiguity nor sovereignty. Moreover, it 
floated the idea that borders could be redrawn such that the triangle communities 
in Israel would be transferred to the Palestinian state.69 This move, which would 
 potentially strip some 250,000 Palestinians of their Israeli citizenship, was the 
clearest indication yet that the “two-state solution” as envisioned by right-wing 
Israeli and  American administrations would not result in the integration of ’48 
 Palestinian citizens into Israel as equal citizens.
C ONCLUSION
Since 1948, champions of Palestinian rights in Israel have largely fallen into 
two camps: the communist camp and the nationalist camp. While the communist 
camp has focused on decolonizing the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel 
in 1967, the nationalist camp has expanded its decolonizing discourses to include 
all of historic Palestine. Beginning in the early 1970s, the two-state  solution 
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 championed by the communist camp became the dominant position among ’48 
Palestinians, but not all Palestinian intellectuals and activists supported the idea 
of two states. Nationalists associated with the group Abna’ al-Balad provided the 
most clear-eyed advocacy of a single democratic state in Palestine, but their reach 
was largely limited to university campuses. Shifts in the PLO’s official position 
towards endorsement of the two-state solution gave more weight to advocates of 
a Palestinian state.
The 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Independence, the 1993 Oslo Accords, 
and subsequent negotiations between Israel and the PLO seemingly took the 
 binational-state option off the table. However, numerous political and cul-
tural developments since 2000 have allowed for the gradual re-emergence and 
 development of alternative proposals to the two-state solution, particularly the 
idea of a single democratic state. This has corresponded with a broader identifica-
tion of ’48 Palestinians as an inextricable part of the Palestinian people, as well 
as a growing salience of decolonization as a conceptual framework among Pales-
tinians as a whole in order to counteract numerous forms of Zionist and Israeli 
 settler-colonialism on both sides of the Green Line. However, in the absence of a 
clear Palestinian national political program or decision-making body that incor-
porates Palestinians in the ’48 lands, there is no clear way to translate these senti-
ments into political agency.
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“We are not red Indians,” Yasser Arafat declared when presented for the first 
time with the notion of Palestinians as an indigenous people.1 Understandably, 
the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) dreaded the political 
implications of comparing the Palestinians to indigenous groups who had lost the 
struggle for sovereignty and independence, particularly to a group that had been 
enclaved in reservations and pushed to the social and geographical margins of the 
American reality. A group, one should hasten to remark, that nonetheless is still 
struggling and has not, all in all, accepted defeat.
This chapter deals with the delicate relationship between nationalism and indi-
geneity, and specifically in the north of historic Palestine. It begins by revisiting the 
common apprehension, articulated above by Arafat, about framing the Palestinian 
struggle as an indigenous one. By now, this issue has been addressed by the rich 
scholarship that applies the settler-colonial paradigm to the case study of Pales-
tine. In this literature, the Zionist project, and the state of Israel, are presented as 
clear examples of a settler-colonial movement, implying that if the Zionists are the 
settlers, the Palestinians are the indigenous people of the land. What this indige-
neity means and how it relates to the Palestinian national struggle is an ongoing 
discussion among academics and activists, one that will contribute significantly to 
the meaning of political struggle for liberation in this century.
This chapter claims that the people who have carried out the Palestinian  struggle 
within the state of Israel in recent years articulate, by their actions,  aspirations, 
and visions, their own version of a national indigenous struggle for liberation. At 
the heart of this struggle is the wish to decolonize historic Palestine as a whole, 
while being willing to achieve this incrementally and from below. It is an approach 
quite different from other modes of Palestinian resistance, such as the ones carried 
out in the past and the ones chosen by Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the 
West Bank.
My central contention here is that indigeneity has become a signifier of cul-
tural and political Palestinian struggle within the state of Israel, with possible 
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 implications for Palestinians in parts of the West Bank, in Areas B and C, and the 
greater Jerusalem area. It is important to stress that indigeneity is not treated here 
as a fixed identity but rather as a dynamic one that activists articulate and grow 
into.2 This particular resistance complements current modes of existence and 
resistance among the Palestinian community in Israel. In view of recent political 
developments in Israel and the choices confronting the Palestinian community, 
indigeneity is unfolding as a powerful tool that can enhance the project of the lib-
eration of Palestine as a whole, and of the Palestinians in Israel in particular. This 
does not mean that it would be possible to liberate Palestine fully without a total 
dismantlement of the Zionist institutions of the Jewish state and the creation of 
one democratic state as the endgame of this struggle. The discourse and practice 
of indigeneity described here help shed light on new ways to reach this goal.
INDIGENEIT Y AS AN ALTERNATIVE  
POLITICAL DISC OURSE 
Ever since indigeneity became an analytic prism for explaining the Palestinian 
struggle, it has been a bone of contention within the area of Palestinian stud-
ies. The origins of the debate are a bit peculiar. It should have been triggered by 
the almost unanimous scholarly embrace of the settler-colonial paradigm as the 
paradigm for understanding the Palestinian condition, given that the embedded 
logical assumption is to define the Palestinians as either natives or indigenous in 
view of the fact that the Zionists are settlers. However, the indigeneity debate was 
instead prompted when scholars started to study one particular group of Pales-
tinians: the Bedouins of the Naqab.3 Many nationalists feared that using such a 
framework of analysis would differentiate one Palestinian group from another and 
thereby contribute to fragmentation of the Palestinian people through what one 
scholar called “divisive classification.”4 The danger is that such a practice will tally 
with Israeli policies of dividing the Palestinians into religious and cultural minori-
ties, thereby questioning their cohesive national identity.
However, the debate surrounding the applicability of the discourse of indige-
neity to the Palestinians is not simply an academic one. The principal conceptual 
concern among scholars who object to this designation lies in the limited nature 
of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (adopted in 2007) 
when applied to the Palestinian struggle, as this declaration does not include a 
clear endorsement of a people’s right to independent statehood. It is also possible 
that those scholars have reservations regarding the use of the prism of indigene-
ity when it comes to describing the Palestinian struggle because of some precon-
ceived dominant stereotypes concerning the “primitivism” and vulnerability of 
indigenous people.5
One of the most detailed challenges to the indigeneity framework was voiced by 
Nadim Rouhana.6 He claimed that the Zionist settler-colonial project was different 
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from what he called “triumphant” settler-colonial projects—in which the natives 
were conquered and subdued, as in North America and Australia. Since Zion-
ism has not as yet “triumphed,” the struggle against it is still national, including 
for the Palestinians inside Israel. He therefore prefers to use the term “homeland 
nationalism” to designate the efforts of Palestinians in Israel to reclaim Palestine 
as their national homeland. For Rouhana, this “homeland nationalism” comple-
ments the broader Palestinian nationalism of claiming Palestine as the homeland 
of the Palestinian people.
I believe that the political nature of the Palestinian struggle can be enriched 
by incorporating the concept of cultural indigenous resistance into it, in particu-
lar at a time when there is no space or scope for the notion of armed struggle. 
As Edward Said had clarified, culture is political, especially when we focus on an 
expanded, rather than narrow, definition of what culture is. The narrow definition 
relates to the aesthetic and literary assets of a society: “Culture is a concept that 
includes a refining and elevating element, each society’s reservoir of the best that 
has been known and thought.” The expanded definition of culture, by contrast, 
sees it as the theatre of life “where various political and ideological causes engage 
one another.”7 Culture, in the eyes of the settler state, is defined within the narrow 
definition put forward by Said. For the indigenous population, it is understood 
within the expanded version.
This chapter contends that the indigenous cultural struggle is not an antith-
esis, or alternative, to the political national one, but rather the optimal struggle 
available, in view of the historical junction the Palestinian question finds itself 
in. An indigenous cultural struggle is, in its essence, part of a political resistance, 
 especially given that other modes of resistance have not been very successful so 
far. As pointed out by Amara, framing the Palestinian people within the settler-
colonial paradigm is a “manifestation of a resistant approach to the Palestinian 
political project” of state formation.8 The Palestinian wish for decolonization 
remains the same, but the nature of the struggle has changed.
There is a growing recognition among other Palestinian scholars that Palestin-
ians share a common fate with quite a few indigenous peoples. According to Rana 
Barakat, this shared fate with other indigenous people should be the focus of Pal-
estinian research on settler-colonialism moving forward. She argues that it is time 
to leave aside the already saturated deconstruction of Zionism as a settler-colonial 
movement and focus instead on the potency of indigeneity as a conceptual and 
political framework moving forward.9 Her views are in line with the useful com-
parisons that Mahmoud Mamdani makes between the Native American and Pal-
estinian predicaments. Mamdani suggests that in both cases the main struggle 
between the settler states and the natives is about citizenship and land.10 Both 
indigenous communities (and here he refers not necessarily to Palestinians in 
general, but specifically to those in Israel) have employed legal and civil means to 
change their status within the settler state. The legal struggle for citizenship rights 
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in both contexts reflects the settlers’ view of indigeneity: American Indians were 
“declared” citizens in 1924 with the Indian Citizenship Act, thus they were con-
sidered naturalized citizens, as distinct from those who gained citizenship rights 
through birth. Palestinians in Israel were declared citizens by means of a similar 
act, the 1952 Nationality Law. This law immediately created two types of citizen-
ship: one for Jews by virtue of a “birthright,” and one for Palestinians by a process 
akin to naturalization. In both cases, the natives were depicted, or framed, by the 
settlers as aliens who needed to be naturalized. The struggle against this particular 
injustice can be therefore better understood within the field of native and indig-
enous studies than within conventional national or nationalist paradigms.11
Those who insist on employing indigeneity as a useful lens to interpret the real-
ity of the Palestinians in Israel stress that the application of the indigenous frame-
work does not affect the subjective Palestinian sense of identity. Indigeneity stems 
from a more complex and dialectic process in which native people respond to their 
role or place within the settler-colonial narrative and policies. Thus, the compari-
son to Native Americans does not focus on the success or failure of the settler-
colonial project of eliminating the natives but compares their place (or rather their 
absence) within the ethos of settlers’ communities: their construction as the sav-
age Native Americans who will disappear with the completion of the “errand in 
the wilderness” of the white settlers in North America and the primitive Arabs 
who will wilt under the Zionist project of “blooming of the desert.”12 This process 
has profound impacts on Israeli policies and the Palestinian community in Israel, 
since it reflects not simply an assault on Palestinian national dignity, as Rouhana 
argues, but also a threat to their indigenous survival.13
INDIGENEIT Y AS A POLITICAL STR ATEGY 
Israeli politics has undergone a drastic transformation since the collapse of the 
Camp David negotiations in 2000. The Israeli regime has become more  nationalist, 
religious, and extreme. The orientation is towards a unilateral expansion of the 
state over the Occupied Territories and a fierce struggle against any manifestation 
of Palestinian national sentiment or agenda within areas defined as Israel proper. 
This new attitude has been legalized through the Jewish Nation-State Basic Law in 
July 2018. Meanwhile, Israeli processes of land expropriation, informal and formal 
annexation, and the imposition of Israeli law in various parts of the West Bank 
have inflicted a final deathblow to the Israeli Palestinian “peace process” and to the 
chances of a two-state solution.
Within Palestinian politics, as well as in the scholarly world, however, a clear 
distinction continues to be made between the Palestinian struggle for statehood in 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian civic struggle inside Israel. 
To this day, the Palestinian leadership on both sides of the Green Line, notwith-
standing their cooperation and constant dialogue, regard their struggles as distinct 
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and different.14 The implication of such a position is that Palestinian citizens in 
Israel are not present in the classical anticolonialist struggle to achieve an indepen-
dent state, which those in the Occupied Territories still hope to attain. As ‘Azmi 
Bishara commented years ago, the Palestinian strategy in Israel has never been 
about destroying the Jewish state from within or about gaining sovereignty.15
These debates reveal the importance of clearly distinguishing between the 
terms indigenous and native, which activists tend to use interchangeably. In this 
chapter, native is a more neutral, static term, almost an ecological statement, that 
defines a group’s location and attachment. Indigenous, on the other hand, is an 
 evolving position of empowerment and resilience against the oppression that 
natives face. It is the political framework in which communities express their 
national, or group, identity. In this regard, the Palestinians in Israel are indigenous, 
native, and a national minority. They are separated from the other Palestinian 
groups and yet are reintegrated with the Palestinians in the West Bank by virtue of 
Israel’s policies of expansion and colonization, which continue within the Green 
Line and outside it.16
Affirming national identity undoubtedly can entail affirming the Palestinian 
right to their own state next to Israel. However, the claim for indigenous rights 
goes beyond a claim for a sovereign state over 22 percent of one’s homeland. It 
refers to the historical homeland in its totality as much as entails a demand for 
redistributing land ownership and wealth. When it becomes part of a campaign 
for a change of regime from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean, it is also an 
aspiration to dismantle settler-colonial institutions as well as reshape the debate 
surrounding state immigration policy and its symbolic nature. An incremental 
political, cultural struggle in line with such a vision can produce partial but mean-
ingful achievements, even without bringing about a change of sovereignty, as can 
be seen in other parts of the world.17
The visions that one has of the future, or of the possible political solutions avail-
able, undoubtedly impact, consciously or unconsciously, one’s understanding of 
the present. For Palestinians inside Israel, be they activists, scholars, or both, full 
independence, that is, complete territorial decolonization, is not a realistic goal. In 
such a context, indigeneity becomes another form of self-assertion against the set-
tler state of Israel. Willingness to adopt indigeneity as a social and political frame-
work of resistance is more clearly evident, and acceptable, among the Palestinian 
community inside Israel than among the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, 
where quite a few still adhere to a national liberation agenda that seeks the cre-
ation of an independent Palestinian state next to Israel.
This willingness to define oneself as indigenous can clash with more explicit 
national self-definition. Yet, the tension that the Palestinian population inside 
Israel has felt between these two definitions has been eased in recent years. This 
is largely due to two developments: on the one hand, the despair that many feel 
regarding the prospect of substantial political solutions, or a viable Palestinian 
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state, in the foreseeable future, and on another hand, a determination to work 
more locally and less ambitiously against a settler state that with every passing year 
becomes less tolerant and more discriminatory. Both processes, political despair 
and bottom-up activism, have meant that activists are avoiding macro-level politi-
cal and ideological projects and focusing instead on tangible actions that protect 
the Palestinian community.
It is important to note, though, that the transition from political to cultural 
activism that various activists are embarking on is not part of a conscious attempt 
to substitute, or avoid, the need to redefine the Palestinian liberation project mov-
ing forward. It is rather a pragmatic adaptation to an ongoing struggle in light 
of the failure of one hundred years of resistance to liberate the homeland and given 
the existential threats that the neo-Zionist state of Israel poses to Palestinians 
in the twenty-first century.
There is also another impulse encouraging a new civil and scholarly under-
standing of the Palestinian struggle. It is the wish not to repeat past failures such 
as the unsuccessful attempt to internationalize the struggle of the Palestinians in 
Israel. Neither the PLO nor Israel allowed the case of the Palestinians in Israel to 
be discussed in the peace process. The international community regarded the rela-
tionship of the Jewish state with its Palestinian minority as a domestic issue per-
taining to those living inside Israel. The PLO in the 1970s explained this exclusion 
of the Palestinians in Israel from its overall national struggle by stating that each 
group of Palestinians knew best what kind of a struggle it should conduct accord-
ing to its specific context. This has never undermined the PLO’s standing among 
Palestinians in Israel as is so accurately and beautifully manifested in the poetic 
correspondence between Mahmoud Darwish and Samih al-Qassem.18
Within the framework of the conventional Palestinian national struggle, the 
Palestinians in Israel did not constitute a matter of international concern, but were 
a domestic Israeli problem. Framing this minority as indigenous enables it to be 
associated with the global struggle of indigenous people, and therefore interna-
tionalizes its cause. The international dimension of the comparative study on indi-
geneity was highlighted by the case of Steven Salaita, a Palestinian scholar in the 
United States who compared American Indian literature and political history with 
that of Palestine.19 In his work, and in the campaign that ensued in the wake of a 
university decision to withdraw its offer of employment on ideological grounds, 
the international connection between the victims of both settler-colonial proj-
ects showed that academically and politically this is a valid and useful struggle. It 
recruited many in the complex matrix of American ethnicity and multiculturalism 
to the Palestinian struggle, though in the past they had been distanced from it. The 
connection had been recognized before, due to Edward Said’s influence on native 
studies in America and his twin scholarship on Orientalism and Palestine, which 
reinforced these links and made them a potent factor in the struggle for Palestine 
in American and international public spaces.
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The recognition of this international dimension can be seen in the United 
States, where efforts to draw parallels and organize joint solidarity activities 
between indigenous and Palestinian groups have intensified over the past years. 
For example, the Palestine Youth Movement of San Diego and Collectivo Zapatista 
came together in Fall 2013 for a five-kilometer run along the US-Mexico border, to 
show the parallels between the settler-colonial projects in Mexico and Palestine.20
This being said, it is important to make a clear the distinction between indi-
geneity as understood within the liberal Zionist position, which grants cultural 
autonomy to Palestinians, and the nature of the indigenous cultural struggles 
described here. Liberal Israeli bodies such the mainstream Israeli Association for 
Civil Rights see their mobilization on behalf of Palestinian citizens in recent years 
as a struggle over the soul of Israeli democracy. In this they are similar to the 
anti-occupation Jewish movement, which wished to end the occupation because 
of the moral damage it causes to the Jewish state. The indigenous struggle for the 
Palestinians in Israel, however, centers on Palestinian attachment to the land. 
The Israeli democracy, or alleged democracy, can hide its settler-colonial nature in 
many aspects of life, but not on the question of land ownership. As the Palestinians 
in the north of Israel say, the land speaks Arabic in the Jewish state.
Palestinian engagement with Israeli democracy is not an end in itself, but a 
means of ensuring first of all the survival of the indigenous population, then its 
equality, and finally its role in shaping the future solution of Israel/Palestine. As 
the discussion below shows, the projects initiated by Palestinian citizens of Israel 
to assert their rights to the land and to equality are part of an indigenous cultural 
and political resistance now taking precedence over old forms of resistance such 
as armed struggle or state-building. These young Palestinians navigate carefully 
between respect for the national struggle and its legacy, on the one hand, and the 
need to find new forms of struggle, on the other.
INDIGENOUS PALESTINIAN STRUGGLES WITHIN 
ISR AEL:  CULTURE AS POLITICAL RESISTANCE 
Cultural resistance has become quite a common scholarly reference in cultural 
studies, one that is “located in countless non-heroic practices that make up the 
realm of the everyday and its multiple connections with contemporary global life,” 
as Roland Bleiker put it.21 Cultural resistance underscores how various cultural 
practices are employed to contest and combat a dominant power, often construct-
ing a different vision of the world in the process. As Gramsci pointed out, power 
resides not only in institutions, but also in the ways people make sense of their 
world; hegemony is a political and cultural process.22 Armed with culture instead 
of guns, one fights a different type of battle. Whereas traditional battles were “wars 
of maneuver,” frontal assaults that seized the state, cultural battles are “wars of 
Indigeneity as Resistance    283
position,” flanking maneuvers, commando raids, and infiltrations, staking out 
positions from which to attack and then reassemble civil society.
It is precisely in the popular cultural resistance that indigeneity plays an impor-
tant political role. From the point of view of the Jewish state, “traditional” or 
“Arab” frames for social mobilization are not associated with challenging Jewish 
statehood or sovereignty. The main assault on the Palestinian claim of indigene-
ity comes rather from Israeli scholars who are embedded in the settler-colonial 
 project and do all they can to deindigenize the Palestinians in the academic dis-
course. The Israeli government, on the other hand, is far more simplistic in its 
approach, and regards only clear-cut national framings of the struggle as a danger 
to the Jewish state.23 Although one should say that this is beginning to change: 
in part as a result of the effectiveness of cultural resistance and in part due to the 
Israeli political system moving further to the extreme right, indigenous cultural 
projects have been more systemically targeted since 2016 as constituting a threat 
to Israeli national security.
In this respect, it would be useful to note that cultural resistance can be politi-
cal without being outwardly nationalistic. It has a political message even if it is not 
about gaining seats in parliament or winning elections, or seats, at the negotia-
tion table. As the case studies below will illuminate, efforts to de-erase the settler-
colonial state imprint, which has become the major focus of the cultural resistance 
inside Israel, are based on a sense of indigeneity. These current practices can be 
analyzed as a new shift of emphasis, one which also responds to the drastic changes 
of the past two decades. Protecting the indigeneity of the Palestinian people living 
inside Israel as a set of rights can be the principal cultural struggle against a regime 
that has the appearance, and some of the practices, of a liberal democracy, but in 
essence is not. Liberal democracy in the Israeli case has instead proven to be a tool 
of a settler-colonial movement that has not as yet completed its overall objective, 
namely its vision of a Jewish state in Palestine.
It is also worth noting that blurring national and indigenous struggles might be 
less detrimental to the national project than originally thought while being more 
beneficial to the community on the ground. As Stephen Duncombe remarks, with 
the immediacy of global media, the local becomes national and at the same time 
global: cultural resistance becomes a space for developing tools for political action, 
a dress rehearsal for the actual political act or a political action in itself, one which 
operates by redefining the meaning of politics.24 The potential relevance of this 
conception in the case of the perpetual Palestinian demand for the right of return 
is particularly poignant.
De-Judaizing the Judaization
The Israeli double project of indigenizing Jewish society while de-indigenizing the 
Palestinian minority in Israel began in 1948 and has not ceased. The Galilee is 
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the main space where this double process has been taking place, the site of the 
Israeli government project of “Judaization of the Galilee.” In this Israeli campaign, 
the Galilee is presented as a cradle of the Jewish nation, articulating one narrative 
while seeking to obliterate another. The Judaization of the Galilee necessitates not 
only settling the Galilee with Jews, but also altering the landscape so that Jews will 
no longer be considered settlers in the Palestinian Galilee. The establishment of 
national parks around sites that were regarded as important for the Jewish national 
historical narrative served to foster a Jewish self-perception of indigeneity.
The Judaization of the Galilee is portrayed officially as a successful transforma-
tion of the Jews in the region into the indigenous population in the Galilee, and the 
transmutation of the native Palestinians into settlers. However, if in this narrative 
the Galilee was perceived as an ancient Jewish land that was to be redeemed by 
its native sons, there was a functional need to leave intact those parts of the land-
scape that signify the antiquity of the Galilee, even if these were located in emptied 
Palestinian villages and quarters. This revision of spatial narrative thus produced 
a paradoxical reality: the venues in which much of the indigenous cultural resis-
tance in the Galilee takes place are located within Israeli tourist sites. Thus, for 
instance, the ancient archaeological sites of Safuriyya and Bir’im are the spaces in 
which young Palestinians chose to declare their right of return as a second genera-
tion of internal refugees.
So far, the indigenous resistance movement is not counted for much by the 
Israelis themselves and this is the reason why it can still prosper and be expanded. 
The focus of Palestinian counter policy is the commemoration of the catastro-
phe, the Nakba. It consists of efforts to reconstruct life and landscape as it was 
before the catastrophe. Israel does not regard 1948 as a catastrophe, but for now it 
also does not see the connection between the reconstruction of erased life before 
1948 and the commemoration of the catastrophe. In recent years though, Israel has 
enacted a new policy that entails closing access to material in its archives that deals 
with the Nakba and has put serious hurdles in the way of the attempts of Palestin-
ians in Israel to commemorate the Nakba. That being said, such commemorations 
are still allowed and are largely carried out by the younger generation of the Pal-
estinians in Israel.
Palestinians’ use of indigeneity as a powerful motif can been seen in the kinds 
of projects activists have been initiating in various domains, such as art, educa-
tion, and architecture, among others, as part of a cultural resistance that is deeply 
political. These initiatives, some of which are described below, are indicative of a 
bottom-up, daily, and nondramatic resistance to a Jewish state determined to wipe 
out the Palestinian indigeneity.
Graffiti
The theoretical literature on graffiti depicts it as an urban and suburban phenom-
enon but in Israel and Palestine it is mainly rural. Scholars writing about youth 
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graffiti usually see it as part of youth delinquency. Among the Palestinians in Israel 
it is precisely the opposite—graffiti is a manifestation of the commitment and 
struggle of Palestinian youth. It is possible, however, to argue, in line with some of 
the general literature, that graffiti represents a means to share values, ethics, and 
codes of behavior via where and how it is produced.
In several villages in the Galilee murals painted on private homes and public 
buildings draw the pre-1948 village scenery. Once they were drawn in one vil-
lage, they were emulated elsewhere. They are drawn by local artists, encouraged by 
cultural NGOs and local municipalities. The murals convey a very clear message: 
different communities coexisted in peace before the Nakba. In many ways, the 
murals are a virtual attempt to reruralize a community that was long ago forced to 
abandon agriculture and commerce as a way of life.25
Reconstructing the Palestinian “Home” 
In 1948, half of Palestine’s villages were destroyed within nine months of the 
Nakba. The lost Palestinian villages are not the same villages that can been seen 
today all over Israel/Palestine. The pre-1948 Palestinian village was a place where 
people of different religions lived together, where agriculture was the main source 
of subsistence. The village was organically connected to the ecological cycle of 
life in the country, respecting its flora and fauna, utilizing its water resources and 
natural herbs well and responsibly, and built according to the topography and cli-
mate of each region.
In 2017, the cultural NGO al-Manar (situated in Majdal Krum), together with 
the firm al-Arkan (located in Kabul), embarked on a unique project that seeks 
to reconstruct the heritage of Palestine as a legacy for the future. The project is 
called Hadara (“civilization”) and focuses on the reconstruction of archetypal pre-
1948 Palestinian villages. In some villages, such as Kefar Yasif, murals were painted 
and the village piazza and residences were reconstructed. In some houses, people 
scraped away new mortar covering old walls in order to restore the old style of 
building, which provided cool houses in the summer and warm ones in the winter. 
Very few architects or builders today are capable of building in such a way—an 
artisanship that was lost, together with other cultural knowledge, in the Nakba.
The uniqueness of this project lies in the fact that the reconstructions were 
accomplished with materials that came directly from the destroyed villages: 
organic, authentic, natural materials that are part of the Palestinian heritage. The 
reconstructed villages were built with the support of eyewitnesses from the period, 
as well as their photographs and narratives. The terraces were built with stones 
from the destroyed villages; trees and herbs were extracted from the original 
sources. Even the coloring of the houses was sourced from local natural resources. 
A group of highly professional artisans from Russia and the Ukraine, with local 
architects and historians, have also helped to make models of these reconstructions 
that were distributed in recent years to the public. These models were  supplied to 
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more than one hundred Palestinian schools in Israel and the West Bank. In each 
they are placed at the entrance of the school, surrounded by posters that highlight 
aspects of pre-1948 rural Palestine.
Meanwhile, a number of Palestinian individuals and NGOs are working on 
having old Palestinian houses—the few that remain in urban spaces—recognized 
as UNESCO heritage sites. In downtown Haifa, local organizations are trying to 
dissuade the local municipality from demolishing these houses, such as the house 
of Emil Touma, who was one the leading intellectuals and journalists of the late 
Mandate and early Israeli statehood periods.
These projects of rehabilitation of houses and villages may appear cultural in 
nature, since they do not focus on sovereignty or liberation. They remain political 
insofar as they attempt to commemorate and rectify the dislocation of the native 
population by reconstructing the architectural face of indigeneity.
Indigeneity as Educational Resistance
Education is another important space for indigenous resistance, a struggle for 
 Palestinian autonomy in an educational system that has been under Israeli  scrutiny 
since 1948. The Israeli secret service has long vetted teachers and school heads alike, 
while punishing whoever challenged the curriculum by teaching the  Palestinian 
narrative.26 Today, activists need to navigate carefully between the regime’s refusal 
to recognize the Palestinians in Israel as a national minority and the latter’s own 
refusal to accept the imposed Zionist narrative of the Israeli educational system.
The importance of indigeneity for the struggle of Palestinians in Israel—and 
the role of education in that struggle—is clearly articulated in the “Vision Papers,” 
composed by Palestinian political and intellectual elites inside Israel. These are 
four documents prepared and publicized by Palestinian NGOs in Israel in 2006 
and 2007. In 2006, the first two were published by the NGO Musawa in Haifa and 
by the Follow-Up Committee (the main representative body of the Palestinian 
minority in Israel, composed of members of Knesset, all heads of local Arab coun-
cils and municipalities, and heads of NGOs). In 2007, Mada al-Karmil, the lead-
ing independent research center in Haifa, and Adalah, the leading legal NGO of 
Palestinians in Israel, published their own vision papers. All of these papers suc-
cessfully articulate the Palestinian minority’s political aspirations to be recognized 
as “a native national group” (and as a minority according to the relevant defini-
tions in international law), who aspires to live in a democratic state as equal citi-
zens. Several times they mention indigeneity as the main moral and legal basis for 
demanding equality and international protection.27
The authors of these documents demand “cultural educational autonomy,” 
on the grounds that “the Arab Palestinians in Israel—as natives—have the right to 
run their own educational system.”28 They elaborate these educational demands, 
arguing for a “territorial cultural statutory autonomy” and demanding the creation 
of a separate Arab educational authority within the Israeli Ministry of Education.29 
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The structures requested are familiar—they are borrowed from Canada and the 
Swedish minority in Finland. However, to understand why these efforts represent 
an affirmation of indigeneity and not just an affirmation of national rights, it is 
worth pointing out that in a way such a structure already exists; namely, a separate 
educational office for “Arabs” is part of the Israeli Ministry of Education, but it has 
a different cultural vision of what the “Arabs” need to learn than the Palestinians 
in Israel themselves do. Without the defining aspirations of the “Vision Papers” 
within the settler/indigenous binary, it would be very difficult to see any funda-
mental difference in the power relations between an Israeli Zionist Ministry of 
Education and its Arab educational office (as it is now) and an autonomous one 
(as envisaged in the “Vision Papers”).
Meanwhile, the Follow-Up Committee expanded an effort begun in 2008 by 
an NGO, Ibn Khaldun, to “shadow” every textbook and official program of the 
Israeli Ministry of Education with a counter textbook and program, which teach-
ers could use as they deemed right. For instance, when the Israeli Education Min-
istry  provided a booklet of “One Hundred Basic Notions about Zionism” as part 
of the curriculum, Ibn Khaldun produced a counter, “One Hundred Basic Notions 
about Palestine.”30
There is not, as yet, comprehensive research on educational efforts by educa-
tors and parents in the Palestinian community to circumvent the official curricu-
lum. It appears that widespread informal home-schooling provides an alternative 
narrative to the official one. There is also a local Palestinian academic effort to 
deconstruct the “Arab” school curriculum in Israel as a way to de-educate indig-
enous Palestinians. The danger of producing an overtly national narrative is being 
replaced by efforts to create a less conspicuous, indigenous one. It should be noted 
that while the liberal Zionist project tries hypocritically to universalize both the 
Jewish and Arab narratives (by stressing human and civil rights, but ignoring 
indigenous rights), Palestinian activists and NGOs focus on indigeneity as a cul-
tural project from below, one that seeks to counter the erasure produced by the 
settler-colonial project’s false universalizing mission.
Indigenizing Segregated Spaces 
The “Vision Papers” devote considerable space to discussing land ownership and 
rights, which remain indeed the most pressing issue for the Palestinian community 
in Israel. In the early years of the state, the communist party led a national struggle 
to save Palestinian lands from an Israeli policy of expropriation, especially in the 
Galilee. The struggle continues today as a civic one, with a strong emphasis on 
how expropriation, and the severe difficulties of buying land, are violations of the 
indigenous rights of the minority.
There are, however, two ways of living in a mixed community nowadays in 
Israel. Palestinians who live in originally mixed towns are discriminated against 
at all levels of municipal and governmental services. There, the indigenous 
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 struggle is about regaining space for expansion according to the population’s 
needs,  demolishing segregation walls, safeguarding Arabic names of streets and 
neighborhoods, and overall improving the physical infrastructure. In Acre 
and Jaffa, for example, the struggle has been mainly against governmental 
policies of silent  de-Arabization and transfer of Arab neighborhoods to Jewish 
ownership and identity. Ad hoc organizations help residents to remain steadfast, 
providing them with legal aid and attracting international attention to their plight 
and to the danger of their eviction. The town of Ramleh is a case in point. There, 
Palestinians are resisting a municipality that deems them aliens and mitrad—
“nuisance” in Hebrew, a term used for physical objects such as garbage. An NGO 
called al-Bayt (“Home”) has succeeded in persuading the UNESCO to recognize 
some Palestinian buildings as cultural heritage sites. What remains ominous is the 
fact that the Palestinian neighborhoods in Ramleh are not included in the city’s 
overall municipal strategic planning.31
The second way of challenging spatial segregation is seen in Palestinians 
 moving into what were meant to be exclusively Jewish towns. There is no way 
of knowing how many Palestinians have succeeded in moving into towns and 
settlements in the Galilee that are designated by the state as exclusively Jewish. 
Approximately seventy thousand Palestinians are estimated to live in either offi-
cially Jewish spaces or traditionally Jewish neighborhoods in mixed towns. Also 
striking is the increase in the number of Jews living in Palestinian villages. This lat-
ter phenomenon is even more subversive, given the settler-colonial and segregat-
ing structure of present-day Israel.32 There is a socioeconomic dimension to both 
developments: poor Jews move to Arab areas because they are more affordable, 
while Palestinians who are higher earners move to exclusively Jewish spaces. The 
latter can afford paying double, and at times triple, the rent that Jewish house own-
ers would demand from Jewish renters. Their wish to live in these particular spaces 
corresponds to the overall desire to remain within the pre-1967 Israel borders in 
the eventuality of a two-state solution being implemented.
The government has attempted to stop such developments. There is an explicit 
discourse in Israel, which is translated into recent legislation, about “saving” Jew-
ish towns and settlements from further Palestinian “invasion.” One such legal act 
was the Acceptance to Communities bill of 2011, which formalized the establish-
ment of admission committees to review potential new residents of communities 
of up to four hundred family units in the Naqab and Galilee regions, where the 
Palestinian population in Israel is largely concentrated. The law’s central intention 
is to prevent Palestinians from settling in Jewish communities.
Commemoration as Cultural Resistance
Following the failure of the 1991 Madrid Conference to broach the subject of 
refugees, the principal body representing the internal refugees in Israel (more 
than a quarter of a million people) founded a new NGO, the Association for the 
Defense of the Rights of the Internally Displaced in Israel (ADRID). Since 1998 it 
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has  organized an annual March of Return on Israel’s Independence Day (which 
is celebrated according to the lunar Hebrew calendar), marching to the site of a 
different 1948-destroyed village each year, as a way to remind the Jewish public of 
Israel of the price the Palestinians paid for Jewish independence.
Starting in the early 1990s, the Palestinian community in Israel also began com-
memorating Nakba Day on May 15, like all other Palestinian communities in the 
world. These events are closely coordinated with other Palestinian groups in Pales-
tine and beyond. The ceremonies organized by Palestinians in Israel prioritize the 
return of internally displaced refugees to their villages before the implementation 
of the general right of return for all the Palestinians.
Commemoration of the Nakba by Palestinian citizens of Israel is now a wide-
spread annual act, manifested in a March of Return, by thousands of people, to one 
of the many destroyed 1948 villages. These marches are attended by all the Pales-
tinian politicians and have become a focus of cultural, as well as political, struggle 
against the 2011 Israeli Nakba law, which prevents public funding to anyone who 
commemorates the 1948 events as the Nakba. It is also a day of solidarity with 
oppressed Palestinians elsewhere, in which speakers are invited by video call from 
Gaza to emphasize the joint struggle to remove the blockade and end the siege. 
The indigenous dimension of the commemoration is accentuated by the Jewish, 
in particular liberal Jewish, objection to it. One of the gurus of liberal Zionism, 
Professor Shlomo Avineri, criticized it as an act of delegitimizing the state, since 
he saw the commemoration as revealing the hidden national wish of Palestinian 
citizens to lay the foundation of a Palestinian state all over historical Palestine.33
ADRID’s vision of the future is to create clear educational and cultural spaces 
in which to de-erase what was wiped out in the 1948 Nakba. They do this through 
constant exploration of the legal possibilities for return to demolished villages and 
for compensation. Their strategies, such as the demand for the collective memory 
of the Nakba to be part of the identity and ethos of any future political entity 
that would come out of a process of reconciliation and peace, are similar to those 
used in other indigenous struggles. The very term internal refugees emphasizes 
indigeneity and is capable of protecting Palestinian rights in the face of efforts 
to denationalize the Palestinian political struggle. The implications that such a 
denationalization would have for the struggle of Palestinians in refugee camps in 
Lebanon and Syria, as well as Palestinians who might find themselves in a new 
reality if Israel annexes Area C in the West Bank or the West Bank as a whole (as 
the option that would make the return to “only” the Palestinian state in the Occu-
pied Territories irrelevant), would be major.
C ONCLUSIONS
The international legitimacy that the Jewish state enjoys has pushed the Palestinian 
minority in Israel to use new frameworks in the political struggle for their rights. 
The political elite of this minority still operates with reference to the  two-state 
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 solution; it sees the struggle inside Israel as concerned with protecting their 
 collective national rights and encouraging democratization of the Israeli political 
system. However, the death of this solution and the formation of a de facto sin-
gle state, a variation on the South African apartheid model, has brought changes 
in the civil and cultural struggle of the Palestinians inside Israel that might also 
affect those living in Jerusalem and Area C in the West Bank, areas which are 
incrementally being annexed to Israel.
The success of these Palestinian struggles inside Israel will continue to depend 
on the ways in which the Palestinian liberation project will be redefined to fit the 
new reality and thereby stop relying on nostalgic national notions of the 1960s and 
1970s. While the Palestinian national political limbo persists, Palestinians activ-
ists inside pre-1967 Israel are stressing Palestinian indigeneity. They thus offer an 
alternative language to the banned demand for national Palestinian rights in Israel 
while highlighting both the continuous settler-colonial nature of the regime and 
possible ways toward decolonization.
Designing and teaching, even if informally, alternative school curricula, or 
organizing Nakba commemorations and return marches are struggles for indige-
neity. They are particularly important in the face of Israel’s attempts of indigeniza-
tion, or Judaization, that not only come at the expense of the native Palestinian 
population but also are meant to continue their displacement and destitution. Thus 
space, place, and counter-settlements are the means of the modern-day struggle 
against the settler-colonial state, and not only against the occupation in the West 
Bank or the Gaza Strip.34 Although the Israeli unilateral annexation of large parts 
of the West Bank since 2000 blurs the boundaries of post- and pre-1967 Israel, it 
expands the options of struggle within the West Bank, or the part of it that would 
be annexed to Israel.
The Palestinian struggle is and will continue to be a struggle against the privi-
leges granted to the settlers over the natives. However, as long as the democratic 
game is played in Israel, an Islamic movement can win (as it did in municipal 
and national elections) and create a countercultural religious space in the public 
arena, one that is both religious and national. Once Israel outlawed the Islamic 
movement, it became clear that countercultural spaces, defined in either national 
or Islamic terms, would not be tolerated by the state. The Islamic movement has 
moved since then towards claiming religious spaces as “traditional” and “Islamic 
cultural” centers as part of their indigenous rights. This move must be read as a 
strategy of survival against, rather than submission to, Israeli settler-colonial era-
sure policies. Such cultural resistance, as has been shown, is daily, routine, and 
everywhere. It is performed in community centers, in youth and football clubs, in 
the sites of informal education, and in plays and films.35
It is too early to tell whether present-day Israel, with it nationalist and extrem-
ist ideology, will try to block any activity that is defined as indigenous and label it 
as either nationalist or terrorist. Demanding normality may seem a modest claim 
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from a radical perspective that continues to insist on national liberation defined 
in terms of exclusive political sovereignty. The demand for normality, however, 
is existential given the ongoing setter-colonial reality. Unlike the political elites 
on both sides who associate demands for equality with grand political solutions, 
the daily cultural struggles of Palestinians who have lived in Israel for more than 
seventy years are centered on the demand for equality now in the name of civic 
and indigenous rights. Theirs is a struggle for equality as much as it is for national 
liberation. It goes beyond the demand for equal rights; it is an antidote to the 
dehumanization ingrained in a settler-colonial project—a call for humanizing the 
Palestinians in Israel.
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The Palestinian quest for an independent state has been unsuccessful but it was 
not in vain. It undoubtedly affirmed Palestinians’ right to self-determination and 
thereby their political presence, which UN Resolution 242 denied. The struggle 
for independent statehood, however, was not able to bring about liberation, let 
alone justice, because it was confined within an international consensus based on 
territorial partition as a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The partition 
paradigm, or the two-state solution, does not question the settler-colonial struc-
ture of Zionism nor address the injustices that Israel has inflicted on the Palestin-
ians since 1948. Partition was bound not only to compromise Palestinian political 
aspirations but also to deepen Israel’s settler-colonialism, as best manifested by 
Israel’s 2018 nationality law. That law, which upholds the right to self-determina-
tion only for Jewish people in the land that Israel controls, has effectively wrapped 
the dispossession of the Palestinian people with another veneer that voids the Pal-
estinian state project of any emancipatory promise. It demonstrates the dangers, 
and embedded racial-exclusionary connotations, of linking self-determination to 
territorial statehood and ethnic nationhood.
As this volume has stressed, the right to self-determination cannot be protected 
within the confines of a strict territorial understanding of sovereignty nor within 
the boundaries of an ethno-nation-state. A central question that will continue to 
dominate Palestinian politics and Palestine studies moving forward is whether it 
is possible to transcend the state in the attempt to exercise the right of self-deter-
mination. As Adam Hanieh discusses in this volume, the state is not a neutral or 
technical entity, but rather a social relation situated within a dynamic global capi-
talist reality. Analyzing the evolving nature of this political economy,  including the 
impact of Covid-19 on regional economies, the direction of capital flows, and the 
process of class formation, is critical to understanding the kind of state and system 
of government being built and their ability to enhance, or further compromise, 
the Palestinian struggle for justice and equality. De-exceptionalizing Palestine and 
situating it in its regional context is also key, given the genealogy of capital accu-
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mulation and investment in Palestine and the Middle East more generally. This 
contextualization is all the more important given that the Palestinian history of 
displacement, inequality, and oppression is no longer distinctive, as the experi-
ences of Syrian, Iraqi, and Lebanese refugees attest. The demand for the right to 
self-determination and equality has never been unique to the Palestinians; it is a 
demand shared by Arab citizens in the entire region, as the Arab uprising of 2011 
clearly demonstrated.
One of the conclusions drawn from the various chapters in this volume is that 
the state cannot be transcended but needs to be rethought. Because the state is not 
simply about security and order, its power needs to be tamed. The state remains, 
in its essence, a constitutive political community that must be accountable to, and 
representative of, its citizens, who are the source of sovereignty and are entitled to 
full equality. Articulating how the state is to be held accountable in a regional and 
international context that is increasingly integrated economically and is deeply 
unequal is not evident, however, and warrants further research. The signing of the 
Abraham Accords by Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain at the White 
House on September 14, 2020 shows that the economic interests of Arab regimes 
effectively converge with those of colonial states. These accords formalized long-
standing informal economic and security relations between these states and sig-
naled the official end of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, which conditioned Israel’s 
regional normalization on it ending the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and 
establishing a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capitol. Together with the 
Trump Administration’s 2020 peace plan, these accords entrench an authoritarian 
understanding of statehood as well as mark the end of an era in Arab politics in 
which the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was considered central—if 
only rhetorically—to attaining peace in the region.
Some would argue that these recent developments confirm the demise of the 
liberatory promise of statehood, and of the Palestine question. A more careful 
analysis, however, would suggest that the changes precipitated by the 2011 Arab 
uprisings and their aftermath are indicative of the symbiotic relationship that 
exists between Palestine and the larger Arab region. Moreover, the “Ferguson to 
Palestine” rallies, the Black Life Matters demonstrations, and the international 
outcry against Israel’s latest war on the Palestinians in 2021 show again both the 
resonance that the Palestinian cause has worldwide and the intersectionality of 
people’s struggle for freedom. The deep connections between race, class, and 
decolonization in the struggle against authoritarian oppression are increasingly 
evident and warrant further research, especially since they are redefining the 
meanings of political liberation and citizenship in the twenty-first century.
As Masen Masri reminds us in this volume, statehood is inherently intertwined 
with the law. The law delineates the power of the state, its relationship to its citi-
zens, and the rights of citizens. In any democratic society, the law is produced by 
the people and for the people, for they are the only sovereign. Putting the law, 
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especially international law, at the service of the Palestinian cause has remained a 
central feature of Palestinian resistance and research. The law continues to affirm 
Palestinians’ individual right of return, their collective right to fight colonialism, 
and the legal validity of the notion of a Palestinian nationality, as Susan Akram 
demonstrates in this volume. How to translate these legal tools into a political 
program of decolonization needs further study since, as Noura Erekat has shown, 
the law, whether domestic or international, can be a weapon of oppression just as 
much as an instrument for liberation.
The trajectory of the Palestinian struggle so far has shown that political lib-
eration cannot be achieved by accepting Israel’s colonial structure in the hope of 
containing it. The meaning of decolonization in the twenty-first century and how 
to achieve it, however, remains unclear, both from an academic and from a politi-
cal point of view, given that Palestinians do not all face the same material realities 
or embrace the same forms of resistance, even if they share a common history, an 
ongoing Nakba, and a recognized set of rights. While for the Palestinian diaspora, 
decolonization is associated with return, for the Palestinians in the West Bank and 
Gaza, it continues to be tied to independent statehood. For Palestinian citizens of 
Israel, decolonization demands transforming Israel into a state that ensures equal-
ity for all of its citizens. Attempting to harmonize these different visions into a 
single political project is daunting, especially in view of the absence of institutional 
platforms that would enable different constituencies to dialogue and articulate a 
clear political project moving forward.
Moreover, it is far from clear which Palestinian constituency can best articulate 
the political shape of liberation in the twenty-first century. Some argue that Pales-
tinian citizens of Israel are best poised to articulate the elements of decolonization, 
given the historical juncture at which the Palestinian question finds itself today. 
Others see the primary agents of decolonization as the refugees and people in 
the diaspora, given the centrality of their right of return to the question of Pales-
tine. Whether Palestinian citizens of Israel should, or would, become the center of 
gravity of the Palestinian nationalism, as refugees did in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have over the past three decades, remains 
an open question. Only further research can shed light on this question and help 
untangle what at times appears as the dialectical relationship between Palestine 
and the Palestinians.
As has been argued, settler-colonialism is not an event but an ongoing process. 
Its dismantlement entails not only decolonizing the land but, above all, decolo-
nizing Israeli-Palestinian relations. It requires that Israelis give up their colonial 
 privileges and address questions of historical injustices and reconciliation with 
the Palestinians. Palestinians, in turn, will need to address the issue of Israelis’ 
collective and individual rights once their colonial privileges are revoked. The 
question of Israeli rights, however, remains among the thorniest issues for Pal-
estinian activists and researchers. The success of any constitutional design for a 
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democratic decolonized polity, be it binational, federal or confederal, will hinge 
on the willingness of those involved to work and live together as equals. As Nadim 
Khoury explains in this volume, decolonization entails a process of reconciliation. 
It requires engaging with the enemy and confronting the issue of historical respon-
sibility by developing mechanisms for reconciliation, both between Israel and the 
Palestinians and also within Israeli and Palestinian societies. Further research can 
help identify the inherent challenges and the means by which such mechanisms 
of reconciling with the “other” can be developed and implemented, not only in 
Palestine but also in the whole Arab world, where the scars of the past ten years of 
war would need to healed to ensure stability moving forward.
On both the epistemological and political levels, the issue that will continue to 
face Palestinian and Arab liberation struggles is how to move beyond the grand 
narrative of national liberation without falling into the neoliberal discourse of 
rights, which privileges individuality and inequality. Some academics, such as Ilan 
Pappe among others, argue that the discourse of indigeneity offers a more pro-
ductive approach for decolonizing the land. It still remains to be seen, however, 
how far indigeneity can become an effective tool to understand the political shape 
of self-determination moving forward. Further research can shed light on how 
far the Palestinians can relinquish the dream of unifying their fragmented nation 
within the boundary of a state, as opposed to accepting the diversity of Pales-
tinians’ political experiences and modes of resistance. The political manifestation 
of this dilemma can be heard in the contrast between those who call for reviving 
the PLO, on the one hand, and those who accept its demise and advocate for a 
new reliance on grassroots forms of resistance. These forms of popular resistance 
can be seen in the yearly commemoration the Nakba by Palestinian citizens of 
Israel inside the Green Line, in the 2017–18 Great March of Return in Gaza, and in 
the Palestinians’ uprising in Spring 2021 against Israel’s war on Gaza, house evic-
tions of Palestinians in East Jerusalem, and Jewish mob attacks against Palestinian 
citizens in Israel. They express new ways of unifying the Palestinian body politic 
without ossifying it in rigid institutions.
At the heart of the question of Palestine is the desire for freedom and justice. This 
desire is also at the center of the struggles of Arab citizens against their  oppressive 
regimes and the struggles of all those fighting injustice globally, be they  indigenous 
peoples in the Americas and Australia, people of color in the United States, refu-
gees waiting at the doors of Europe, or Iranians waging the Green Revolution, 
among so many others. If this book has shown that Palestinians are rethinking 
statehood beyond partition and continue to resist their ongoing  colonial reality, 
further research can illuminate what kind of political and legal actions are needed 
to create a decolonized polity that ensures liberation and equality for all.
299
list of Contribu tors
susan m. akram is clinical professor and director of Boston University’s International 
 Human Rights Clinic. Her most recent books include Still Waiting for Tomorrow: The Law 
and Politics of Unresolved Refugee Crises, edited with Tom Syring (New York: Routledge, 
2014); and International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Rights-Based Approach 
to Middle East Peace, edited with Mick Dumper, Michael Lynk, and Ian Scobbie (New 
York: Routledge, 2011). Her articles and book chapters include “Palestinian Exceptionalism, 
Whether It Matters, and the Role International Agencies Play,” in The Oxford  Handbook 
of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); with 
 Michael Lynk, “The Arab Israel Conflict,” in the Max Planck Encyclopedia of International 
Law (2013); and “Temporary Protection as an Instrument for Implementing the Right of 
Return for Palestinian Refugees,” in Boston University International Law Journal 22, no. 
1 (2004).
hania walid assali is a Palestinian born and raised in Jerusalem. She holds a law de-
gree from the University of Montpellier, France. She worked as in-house general counsel 
to the Jordanian affiliate of a major international company for several years. She is now 
working as a freelancer consultant and researcher.
tareq baconi is the Crisis Group’s senior analyst for Israel/Palestine and Economics of 
Conflict and author of Hamas Contained: The Rise and Pacification of Palestinian Resis-
tance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2018). His writing has appeared in Arabic 
in Al-Ghad and Al-Quds al-Arabi, and in English in The New York Review of Books Daily, 
The Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, The Guardian, The Nation, The Daily Star (Lebanon), 
and al-Jazeera. Dr. Baconi holds a Ph.D in international relations from King’s College Lon-
don and an MPhil degree from the University of Cambridge.
leila farsakh is an associate professor and chair of the Political Science Department at 
the University of Massachusetts, Boston. Her books include Palestinian Labour Migration 
300    list of Contributors
to Israel: Labour, Land and Occupation (London: Routledge, 2005; 2nd ed. 2012); and The 
Arab and Jewish Questions: Geographies of Engagements in  Palestine and Beyond, edited 
with Bashir Bashir (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020).
adam hanieh is a professor of development studies at the Institute of Arab and Islamic 
Studies, University of Exeter. He is author of Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) and Lineages of Revolt: Issues of Contemporary 
Capitalism in the Middle East (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2013). His most recent book is 
Money, Markets, and Monarchies: The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Political Economy 
of the Contemporary Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
nadim khoury is an associate professor in international studies at Lillehammer Uni-
versity College. Prior to moving to Norway, Professor Khoury taught and ran the political 
studies program at Al-Quds Bard College in Palestine (2012–2014). His research interests 
include contemporary political theory, nationalism, collective memory, and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. He has published on these issues in Constellations, Philosophy and 
Social Criticism, European Journal of International Relations, Nations and Nationalism, 
and in edited volumes. Currently, he is completing a book manuscript entitled Partitioning 
Memory that critically examines the politics of memory of the Oslo peace process
mazen masri is a senior lecturer in law at the City Law School, City University of Lon-
don. His areas of teaching and research are constitutional law and public international law 
with special interest in comparative constitutionalism. His work has appeared in legal and 
interdisciplinary journals such as Social and Legal Studies, Asian Journal of International 
Law, and International Journal of Law in Context as well as scholarly e-zines and blogs. His 
book The Dynamics of Exclusionary Constitutionalism: Israel as a Jewish and Democratic 
State was published as part of the Hart Studies in Comparative Public Law Series (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2017).
yousef munayyer is a nonresident senior fellow at the Arab Center Washington, DC. 
He holds a Ph.D from the University of Maryland in government and politics. Previously he 
served as executive director of the US Campaign for Palestinian Rights as well as of the Je-
rusalem Fund. He has written widely on US policy toward Israel/Palestine and his research 
interests include the politics of human rights and political repression.
maha nassar is an associate professor in the School of Middle Eastern and North Af-
rican Studies at the University of Arizona, where she specializes in the cultural and intel-
lectual history of the modern Arab world. Her book Brothers Apart:  Palestinian Citizens 
of Israel and the Arab World (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2017) examines 
how Palestinian intellectuals in Israel have connected to global decolonization movements 
through literary and journalistic writings.
ilan pappe is the director of the European Center for Palestine Studies and a  fellow of 
the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter. Pappe is the author 
of twenty books, among them The Ethnic Cleansing of  Palestine (Oxford: OneWorld, 2007), 
A History of Modern Palestine (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2006), and On 
Palestine, with Noam Chomsky (Chicago: Haymarket, 2015. His two latest books are Ten 
Myths about Israel (London: Verso, 2017) and The Biggest Prison on Earth: A History of the 
Israeli Occupation (Oxford:  OneWorld, 2017).
list of Contributors    301
hanan toukan is assistant professor at Bard College Berlin. She was also a visiting assis-
tant professor in Middle East studies at Brown University (2016–2018) and visiting profes-
sor of the cultural studies of the Middle East at the University of Bamberg (2018–2019). Her 
research focuses on media, film studies, and the visual politics of museums. She is author 
of The Politics of Art: Dissent and Diplomacy in Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2021). Professor Toukan’s work has also been published in In-
ternational Journal of Cultural Studies, Cultural Politics, Arab Studies Journal, Radical Phi-
losophy, Journal for Palestine Studies, Review of Middle East Studies, Jerusalem Quarterly, 




’48 Palestinians, 253–71: indigeneity and cultural 
resistance of, 276–91 
1948. See Nakba
1967 Six Days War, 39, 81. See also United 
Nations Resolution 242
1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, xii, 116
Abbas, Mahmoud, 63, 112, 116
Abna’ al-Balad, 257–59, 262, 267, 269–71
Abraham Accords (2020), 46–47, 81, 139–40, 296. 
See also normalization
Absentee Property Law, 201–2, 220–221n103
advocacy: for Palestinian rights, 127–30, 138, 
140–46; Zionist/pro-Israel, 134–40.  
See also Boycott, Divestments, and 
Sanctions; resistance, Palestinian
aid: to Palestinians, political economy of, 8, 
30–48, 98, 113; military, to Israel, 128, 145; 
humanitarian, to Gaza, 8, 145. See also 
development: de-development of Gaza; 
neoliberalism
Al-Aqsa, 88–89, 98, 100–101; Intifada, 58–60, 
88–89, 264–65
Al-Ard (Land) movement, 255–58
Al-Qattan, Omar, 109, 113, 116. See also 
Palestinian Museum
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 143–44
American Israeli Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC), 128, 137
annexation, of Palestinian areas by Israel, 12, 
68–69, 180, 204, 260; in East Jerusalem, 
80–88, 96–99; of the West Bank, 68–69, 139, 
279, 290. See also ethnic cleansing; settler 
colonialism, Zionist
Anti-Defamation League (ADL), 128; funding of 
US-Israel police exchange programs, 141
anti-Semitism, 130–31; rise with Trump 
presidency, 138; of Benjamin Netanyahu, 
138–39. See also Anti-Defamation League; 
Balfour, Arthur
apartheid, Israeli, 9, 180–81; enshrined in the 
Israeli Nation-State Basic Law, 203–4, 210, 
227–29, 269–70, 279; Trump administration’s 
normalization of, 139–140. See also ethnic 
supremacy: Jewish; settler colonialism, 
Zionist; transitional justice
apartheid wall, 11map, 59, 89–91, 141. See also 
apartheid, Israeli
Arab Democratic Party (ADP), 263
Arab Israeli. See ’48 Palestinians
Arab League, 2–3, 20n17, 139. See also Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO)
Arab Peace Initiative (2002), 6, 139, 296; See also 
normalization; peace plan
Arafat, Yasser, 6, 55–60, 276; Museum of, 119.  
See also Palestinian National Authority (PNA)
archives, Palestinian, 112, 116–17. See also 
resistance, Palestinian: cultural
304    Index
Arendt, Hannah, 14, 182
art, Palestinian: Palestinian Museum, 17, 108–121; 
as indigenous cultural resistance, 284–86
Association for the Defense of the Rights of 
the Internally Displaced in Israel (ADRID), 
288–89
Ateret Cohanim, 99. See also settler-colonialism, 
Zionist
BADIL, 158–159. See also refugees, Palestinian; 
transitional justice
Balfour, Arthur, 130–32 
Balfour Declaration, 130–32, 174–75, 192, 195–98 
Barak, Ehud, 87–88, 264
Barcelona Process, 41–42
Bedouins, Palestinian, 277. See also indigeneity, 
Palestinian
binationalism, 13–14, 174–178, 184, 234–38, 
260–67, 271. See also one-state solution
Bishara, ‘Azmi 177, 262–64, 280. See also 
binationalism 
boycott: of Hamas’s 2006 electoral victory, 6; of 
Israel by Arab states, 40–41; of Palestinian 
National Authority elections by Hamas, 57; 
See also Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions; 
resistance, Palestinian
Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS), 
12; 127–30, 136–38; and lobbying toward 
sanctions, 140–43; criminalization of, 137, 
143–44
Brit Shalom, 175, 234–36. See also one-state 
solution; Ihud
British Mandate 56, 130–32, 174–75, 192, 195–98
Buber, Martin, 173–78, 186
Camp David. See Oslo Accords
checkpoints, Israeli, 1, 88–89, 95, 173, 184 
citizenship, rights of, 18; denied to or imposed 
onto Palestinians by Israel, 5, 9, 12–14, 82, 84, 
91–97, 206–11, 226–30, 262–66; in single-
state solution, 174–79, 186, 233–41, 269–70; 
in international law, 5, 182, 193–94, 198–200, 
205–6, 209–11; under the British Mandate, 
195–98; under Israeli law, 200–205, 228–93; 
under Palestinian law, 9, 208; see also Orr 
Commission
class structure, Palestinian, 114; as linked to state 
structure, 36–38, 42–47, 114, 182, 238. See also 
communism; normalization
collective punishment, 65–67. See also settler 
colonialism, Zionist
colonialism. See British Mandate; Ottoman 
Empire; settler colonialism, Zionist 
communism: of ’48 Palestinian political groups, 
253–62, 270–71
consociationism, 235–38, 243–44
constitutionalism, 182–85, 225–32, 245–47, 269. 
See also citizenship, rights of 
Darwish, Mahmoud: Museum of, 119
decolonization, xi-xii, 2–5, 185–86, 231–34, 
297–98; one-state solution as means to, 13–15; 
as conceptualized by Palestinian communist 
versus nationalist parties, 253–271; and 
the Palestinian Museum, 116–21; and 
transitional justice, 161, 240–41, 246–47. 
See also indigeneity, Palestinian; resistance, 
Palestinian
democracy, 315; Israel’s prioritizing of Jewish 
identity over, 136, 254, 268–69; neoliberal 
models of, 31–33, 41, 283; in one-state 
proposals, 14, 173–87, 225–47, 267–71; 
promoted and undermined in Palestine by 
the US, 60–65, 139–40; under binationalism, 
14, 263, 266. See also transitional justice
Democratic Front of Peace and Equality (DFPE), 
259, 263. See also communism 
democratization: in neoliberal development 
models, 31–33, 41; promoted and undermined 
in Palestine by the US, 60–65. See also 
democracy; neoliberalism; normalization
development, international, 6–8, 30–48;  
de-development of Gaza, 6, 65–66
diaspora, Palestinian, 210–11, 297; impact on 
Palestinian economy, 30, 43; popularity of 
anti-statist approach amongst, 13. See also 
return, Palestinian right of
donors, international, 6–8, 30, 33–48, 98. See also 
neoliberalism; normalization
Doumani, Beshara, 117–18
Egypt: neoliberal trade and normalization of, 
40–42; resolution on Israeli settlements, 137; 
and pan-Arab unity movements, 254–55.  
See also normalization; neoliberalism
Entry into Israel Law (1952), 82, 84–85, 91–94. 
See also citizenship, rights of
ethnic cleansing: of Palestinians by Israel, 91, 
92, 99, 231–32. See also annexation; Nakba; 
settler colonialism, Zionist
ethnic nationalism. See ethnic supremacy
ethnic supremacy: white, of Arthur Balfour, 
130–132; Jewish 14, 185–86, 202. See also 
settler colonialism, Zionist
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), 41–42. 
See also neo-liberalism; normalization
Index    305
European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), 31, 45. See also  
neo-liberalism; normalization
Fatah, 55–58, 61–65, 177–79. See also Hamas; 
Palestinian Liberation Organization
federalism, 241–45
First Intifada, 55–56, 88, 98, 160, 260–61. See also 
resistance, Palestinian
graffiti, 284–85
Great March of Return, 70–71, 289
Greater Jerusalem Plan, 86–91. See also 
annexation; ethnic cleansing; settler 
colonialism, Zionist 
Green Line, 157, 261, 89. See also ’48 Palestinians; 
Separation Barrier
Hadash, 259, 263. See also See also communism
Hamas, 54, 181; entry into political sphere, 60–65; 
and Gaza blockade, 65–71; and the Oslo 
process, 55–58; and the Second Intifada, 58–60 
HaMoked, 94, 98
Hourani, Khaled, 113–14. See also art, Palestinian
humanitarianism; approach to Gaza, 8, 
55, 68–70, 145; as reductive framing of 
Palestinian struggle, 4, 9, 157, 178; of Welfare 
Association/Taawon, 109–10
Husseini, Fasal, 97–98. See also Orient House
Ihud, 173–78. See also Brit Shalom; one-state 
solution
independence, national. See liberation; 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO): 
Declaration of Independence;  
self-determination; sovereignty
indigeneity, Palestinian, 14, 19, 231–32, 265, 
276–91, 298. See also settler colonialism, 
Zionist; transitional justice
International Court of Justice, 6, 89, 193, 202–03
International Monetary Fund, 6–7, 33–34, 44–45. 
See also World Bank
intifada: First Intifada 55–56, 88, 98, 160, 260–61; 
Second Intifada, 58–60, 88–89, 264–265. See 
also resistance, Palestinian
Ir Amim, 82, 96–97. See also citizenship, 
Palestinian
Iran: US policy on, 133–36
Iraq, 31, 39–40. See also democratization
Islamism, 56, 290. See also Hamas
Islamophobia, 134–38
Israeli Basic Law: Israel Lands, 216–17n65; Jewish 
Nation-State, 203–204, 210 227–29, 269–70, 
279; Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 90. See also 
Palestinian Basic Law
Israeli Communist Party (ICP), 254–55. See also 
communism; Rakah
Israeli Law of Return, 228–29, 235
Jabha, 259, 263. See also communism 
Judaization: of East Jerusalem, 80, 86–88; of the 
Galilee, 283–84. See also ethnic cleansing; 
ethnic supremacy: Jewish; Zionism
justice. See transitional justice. 
Khan, Mushtaq, 34–35
Land Day, 258, 266. See also ’48 Palestinians; 
Abna’ al Balad; Rakah
Lausanne Treaty, 195–200, 208–11
lawfare, 142–44. See also Boycott, Divestment, 
and Sanctions (BDS)
liberation, Palestinian, 3–5, 9, 15–16, 54–58, 61, 
66–67, 264, 276–77, 280–81, 290–91, 297–98. 
See also decolonization; resistance
Livni, Tzipi, 157–58
Magnus, Judah, 175–77. See also binationalism
Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA), 41. 
See also democratization; neoliberalism; 
normalization
Mignolo, Water, 120–21. See also  
decolonization
Nakba, 2, 157–64, 200–201, 228, 284–85; Palestin-
ian commemorations of, 284–89; as erased 
through partition logic, 157–58; Israeli 
criminalization of commemorations of, 266, 
284, 289; reparations for, 158–60. See also 
(Great) March of Return; settler-colonialism, 
Zionist; ethnic cleansing: of Palestinians by 
Israel; Resolution 194; refugees, Palestinian; 
transitional justice 
nationalism: as collective political rights,  
176–77; international legal rights of, 192–211; 
in Israeli Nation-State Basic law, 203–204, 
210, 227–29, 269–70, 279; Zionism as ethnic 
supremacist form of, 130
neoliberalism, 6–7, 9, 30–47, 114. See also 
aid; development; donors, international; 
normalization, with Israel
Netanyahu, Benjamin, 88, 133–39, 183, 263–64
normalization, with Israel, 40–41, 114, 139, 
296; via the Abraham Accords, 46–47, 81, 
139–40, 296. See also neoliberalism; qualified 
industrial zones
306    Index
Obama, Barack, 132–37
occupation, Israeli, 6, 35–39, 54–62, 69, 81, 108, 
180–81, 206, 227, 260, 267, 282; checkpoints, 1, 
88–89, 95, 173, 184; facilitation by Palestinian 
Authority, 8, 35, 44, 66–67, 107–108, 116, 162, 
180; Separation Wall, 11map, 59, 89–91, 141. 
See also settler colonialism, Zionist
Odeh, Ayman, 267–68. See also Democratic 
Front of Peace and Equality
oil, Gulf, 38–43. See also class structure; 
neoliberalism
Olmert Peace Plan (2008), 11
one-state solution, 173–75, 179–87: constitutional 
frameworks for, 225–47; as proposed by 
Abna’ al-Balad, 267, 269–71; as proposed 
by the One Democratic State Campaign, 
269; as proposed by Zionist groups 175–77; 
as proposed by the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization, 1, 4–5, 177–79, 186. See also 
binationalism
Orient House, 97–98: Israeli closure of, 89
Orientalism: of Zionists, 178–79, 186
Orr Commission, 265. See also ’48 Palestinians; 
citizenship, Palestinian
Oslo Accords, xvmap, 1, 6–11, 33, 54–55, 119, 173, 
179–81, 206–208; Hamas’s opposition to, 
55–65; impact on ’48 Palestinians, 253–54, 
261–63, 268–71; impact on East Jerusalem, 
80–101; as fragmenting Palestinian unity, 70, 
160; and normalization with Israel, 40–44; 
and transitional justice, 153, 156–61
Ottoman Empire: rule of Palestine, 195–96, 208
Ottoman Nationality Law (1869), 195. See also 
citizenship, Palestinian
Palestinian Authority. See Palestinian National 
Authority. 
Palestinian Basic Law, 207–208. See also Israeli 
Basic Law.
Palestinian Legislative Council, 85, 95, 207–208
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 
5–8, 54–71, 80, 95, 98–100, 116, 128, 207, 281; 
Declaration of Independence (1988), 5, 179, 
260–61; proposed citizenship law (2012), 
208–210; shift to accepting a two-state 
solution, 257–60, 271; vision for a one-
state solution, 1, 4–5, 177–79, 186. See also 
Palestinian National Authority 
Palestinian Museum, 17, 108–121
Palestinian National Authority (PNA), 6–9, 
29, 33–36, 57, 61–63, 81, 89, 95, 98–100, 
107–108, 118–19, 207, 224; class formation 
under, 16, 30, 42–47; as facilitating Israeli 
occupation and committing violence against 
Palestinians, 8, 35, 44, 66–67, 107–108, 116, 
162, 180; museum projects of, 118–19 
Palestinian National Council, 4, 8, 99, 173–74, 
178; Declaration of Independence,  
260–61. See also Palestinian Liberation 
Organization
peace plan: Arab Peace Initiative (2002), 6, 139, 
296; Olmert Peace Plan (2008), 11; Quartet 
Road Map to Peace (2003), 6, 180; of the 
US Trump administration, 68–69, 139–40, 
270. See also neoliberalism; Oslo Accords; 
transitional justice 
Persekian, Jack, 111. See also art, Palestinian
Progressive List for Peace, 259
qualified industrial zones, 40–41. See also nor-
malization; neoliberalism
Quartet, 8, 61–63: Road Map to Peace (2003), 
6, 180
Rabin, Yitzhak, 88, 156, 262–63. See also Greater 
Jerusalem Plan; First Intifada
Rakah, 254–259. See also Democratic Front of 
Peace and Equality
refugees, Palestinian, 67–68, 85, 111, 160–163, 
227–29: right of return, 2–5, 70–71, 156–58, 
180–81, 199–211, 248n7, 256, 288–89; in 
transitional justice proposals, 159–60, 164
reparations. See transitional justice: and 
reparations for the Nakba
residency laws, Israeli. See citizenship, 
Palestinian
resistance, Palestinian, 12, 181, 228–29, 298; 
armed versus nonviolent, 161, 256; through 
Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS), 
12, 127–30, 136–44; cultural, 114–119, 282–91; 
in East Jerusalem, 97–98; First Intifada, 
55–56, 88, 98, 160, 260–61; through the Great 
March of Return, 70–71, 289; as indigenous, 
277–82, 286–87; Second Intifada, 58–60, 
88–89, 264–65
return, Palestinian right of, 2–5, 70–71, 156–58, 
180–81, 199–211, 248n7, 256, 288–89; in 
transitional justice proposals, 159–60, 164; 
and the Great March of Return, 70–71, 
289. See also Boycott, Divestment, and 
Sanctions; decolonization; resistance, 
Palestinian
Index    307
Rouhana, Nadim, 155, 161, 277–79. See also 
decolonization; transitional justice
Said, Edward, 4, 15, 160, 278, 281
Second Intifada, 58–60, 88–89, 264–65. See also 
resistance, Palestinian
security: of Israel as condition of Palestinian 
self-governance, 8, 32–34, 57; Palestinian 
Authority-Israel coordination on, 7, 57, 
66, 107, 180; as pretext for annexation of 
Palestinian land by Israel, 59–60, 66
security fence, Israeli. See apartheid wall, Israeli
self-determination, 3, 181–84, 295; in binational 
proposals, 14, 176, 234; denied to Palestinians 
in the Balfour Declaration, 131–32; exclusive 
to Jews under Israeli law, 14, 203–204, 
227–29, 269, 295; in international law, 181–82; 
as national liberation versus statehood for 
Palestinians, 4–13; in one-state proposals, 
178–80; for Palestinians including Palestinian 
refugees, 157; United Nations Resolution 1514 
affirming the right to, 3. See also resistance, 
Palestinian
separation barrier, Israeli, 11map, 59, 89–91, 141. 
See also settler colonialism, Zionist
Separation Wall, Israeli, 11map, 59, 89–91, 141. 
See also settler colonialism, Zionist
settlements, Israeli. See settler colonialism, 
Zionist
settler colonialism, Zionist, xi, 1, 9, 12, 57–60, 
86–88, 99, 115, 173–79, 184–86, 202–204, 206, 
225, 231–32, 263, 266–71, 276–84, 287–91, 295. 
See also apartheid, Israeli; ethnic supremacy: 
Jewish 
settlers, Jewish-Israeli, 1, 99, 206, 279. See also 
settler colonialism, Zionist
Sharansky Declaration 92–93. See also 
citizenship; ethnic cleansing; settler 
colonialism, Zionist
Sharon, Ariel, 58–60, 88–89, 265
Shohat, Ella 178, 186
Six Days War (1967), 39, 81. See also United 
Nations Security Council Resolution  
242 (1988)
solidarity: with and among Palestinians, 12, 
17, 116, 141–42, 282, 289. See also Boycott, 
Divestment, and Sanctions
Soumi, Nassar, 117–118. See also art, Palestinian; 
resistance, Palestinian: cultural 
sovereignty, 69; as national versus territorial, 
2–3, 13–15, 176–77, 182–84, 295; of Palestinians 
affirmed by United Nations Resolution 
3236, 4; of Palestinians undermined by the 
US, 69, 270; for Palestinians as proposed 
in Oslo process, 10map, 107. See also self-
determination
Stateless Persons Convention (1954), 194, 217n67. 
See also citizenship, rights of; refugees, 
Palestinian
Taawon, 109–112, 116–17
transitional justice, 17–18, 153, 163–65, 228–30; 
retributive and restorative forms of, 
154–55; as promoting Jewish-Palestinian 
reconciliation, 160; and decolonization 
of Palestine, 160–61; and reparations for 
the Nakba, 158–60, 228; United Nations 
definition of, 154–56; weaponized against 
Palestinians by Israel, 162–63
Trump, Donald, 68–69, 132, 135–43, 270
truth commissions. See transitional justice 
Tuqan, Ja’afar, 119. See also Palestine Museum
two-state solution, xi, 29–30, 107–108, 160–61, 
179–81, 185–86, 210–211, 253–54, 256–71, 295. 
See also one-state solution
United Arab List, 263
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
1514 (1960), 3. See also self-determination
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
3236, 4. See also self-determination
United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
(UNRWA), 68. See also refugees, Palestinian
United Nations Resolution 181 (1947), xiiimap, 
173, 198–199, 203
United Nations Resolution 194 (1948), 2–3, 
156–157, 180–181, 199–200, 204, 248n7. See 
also return, Palestinian right of
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 
(1988), 3–5, 82, 128, 178–79, 256, 295. See also 
occupation, Israeli; peace plan
United Nations Security Council Resolution 478 
(1980), 82, 101n7. See also occupation, Israeli; 
peace plan
United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), 32
United States Campaign for Palestinians Rights 
(USCPR), 128–30
uprisings, Arab (2011), ix, 44, 296.  
See also intifada
Vision Papers, 286–287
308    Index
War on Terror, doctrine of, 59–60, 67–68, 134
Welfare Association, 109–112, 116–117
Wilson’s Fourteen Points (1918), 3
World Bank, 31–34, 42–45. See also 
neoliberalism; normalization; Abraham 
Accords (2020)
Zionism: Arthur Balfour’s support of, 130–132; 
and the nation-state, 183; Evangelical, 134; 
liberal, 289; orientalism of, 178–79, 186.  
See also Brit Shalom; decolonization; Ihud;  
settler colonialism, Zionist.
Zochrot, 158–59
Founded in 1893, 
University of California Press 
publishes bold, progressive books and journals 
on topics in the arts, humanities, social sciences, 
and natural sciences—with a focus on social 
justice issues—that inspire thought and action 
among readers worldwide.
The UC Press Foundation 
raises funds to uphold the press’s vital role 
as an independent, nonprofit publisher, and 
receives philanthropic support from a wide 
range of individuals and institutions—and from 
committed readers like you. To learn more, visit 
ucpress.edu/supportus.
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
WWW.UCPRESS.EDU 
A free ebook version of this title is available through Luminos, 
University of California Press’s Open Access publishing  
program. Visit www.luminosoa.org to learn more.
Cover illustration: Franz Josef Ulm, Ghanamaat.





INATION AND DECOLONIZATION BEYOND PARTITION
RETHINKING STATEHOOD 
IN PALESTINERETHINKING STATEHOOD IN PALESTINE
EDITED BY  
LEILA H. FARSAKH
FARSAKH
POLITICS | MIDDLE EAST STUDIES 
The quest for an inclusive and independent state has been at the center of the Palestinian 
national struggle for a very long time. This book critically explores the meaning of Palestin-
ian statehood and the challenges that face alternative models to it. Giving prominence to 
a young set of diverse Palestinian scholars, this groundbreaking book shows how notions 
of citizenship, sovereignty, and nationhood are being rethought within the broader context 
of decolonization. Bringing forth critical and multifaceted engagements with what modern 
Palestinian self-determination entails, Rethinking Statehood sets the terms of debate for 
the future of Palestine beyond partition.
“At a juncture when independent Palestinian statehood seems unachievable, these astute 
reflections are particularly welcome. They offer innovative suggestions for how to provide 
renewed dynamism to the Palestinian struggle, outside the confines of a two-state solu-
tion that has been systematically sabotaged by Israel for over fifty years.” RASHID KHALIDI, 
author of The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine
“Rethinking Statehood in Palestine breaks new analytical ground on urgent issues. It is 
also theoretically rich for more general explorations of the nation-state, citizenship, justice, 
and the efficacy (or not) of international legal mechanisms in addressing injustice.” PENNY 
JOHNSON, coeditor of Seeking Palestine: New Writings on Home and Exile
“This book provides crucial answers to the challenges facing the Palestinians and new 
insight into the nature of the relationship between national liberation, human liberation, 
and state-building.” ALAIN GRESH, author of The PLO: The Struggle Within and cofounder 
of Orient XXI
LEILA H. FARSAKH is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachu-
setts Boston. She is author of Palestinian Labor Migration to Israel: Labour, Land and 
Occupation and coeditor of The Arab and Jewish Questions: Geographies of Engagement 
in Palestine and Beyond.
